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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is concerned with texts that mystify events being reported. It begins by focusing 
on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a currently prominent enterprise, one of whose 
concerns is with the isolation of text which mystifies the nature of events described. When 
CDA isolates mystifying text, it is usually with the perspective of a non-analytical reader, 
either explicitly or implicitly in mind. However, the notion of a non-analytical reader in 
CDA is undeveloped from a cognitive point of view. The general structure of the thesis is 
as follows. In the first section, I show how CDA's approach to highlighting textual 
mystification is inadvertently bound up with symbolic notions of mental representation in 
cognitive science. In the second section, I outline theories of mental representation in 
connectionism and cognitive linguistics which problematise the symbolic assumptions of 
CDA and thus what CDA locates as mystifying text. The thesis develops cumulatively 
towards an alternative framework for highlighting mystification, in the third section, which 
includes compatible elements from connectionism, cognitive linguistics and recent 
psycholinguistic research on inference generation. My framework predicts how certain text 
can lead to mystification for a non-analytical reader who has little vested interest in a text 
and is largely unfamiliar with its subject matter. I show how mystification for this non-
analytical reader is connected with inference generation but, in contrast to CDA, I provide 
a detailed processing profile for such a reader. Attitudes in CDA towards inference 
generation are often inconsistent and are in conflict with recent psycholinguistic research. 
My framework, rooted in empirical psycholinguistic study, enables a more plausible, 
comprehensive and thus consistent perspective on inference generation in reading and how 
this relates to mystification. Finally, my framework also highlights CDA's 'over-
interpretation' in text exegesis done by proxy for non-analytical readers. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Description of the Thesis 
Critical Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) [see for example: Fowler, 
Hodge, Kress and Trew (1979), Kress and Hodge (1979), Fairclough (1992a), Hodge and 
Kress (1993), Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard (1996), Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999)] 
are enterprises broadly concerned with highlighting the traces of cultural and ideological 
meaning in spoken and written texts. CDA is now the most common contraction of the two, 
CL usually seen as a precursor of CDA. Both enterprises have become established text 
analytical strategies, extending their scope to educational practice, i.e., Kress (1989a), 
Fairclough (1992b), Wallace (1992) etc. One concern of both CL and CDA is the 
highlighting of how certain syntactic and semantic choices can mystify the nature of the 
events being described in a text. Indeed, CL and CDA have in recent years been the most 
dominant strategies in applied linguistics for the exposure of textual mystification. The 
theoretical base of such highlighting lies in Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew (1979) and 
Kress and Hodge (1979) whose ideas continue to inform detections of textual mystification 
in current CDA. Another facet of CL and CDA has been the incorporation of the approach 
to metaphor in Lakoff and Johnson (1980), two of the pioneers of cognitive linguistics (see 
1.6.3). Common in CL and CDA is the notion that textual metaphor helps to construct a 
particular view of a situation which can mystify the actuality of events. 
There has been very little inspection of the processing assumptions within CL and CDA, 
which underwrite how these enterprises highlight mystifying text. Some of these processing 
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assumptions derive from psycholinguistic work on language processing from the 1960s, but 
reassessment of such assumptions has not taken place. Indeed, there has been little drawing 
upon of more recent psycholinguistic evidence of text comprehension to substantiate claims 
as to how certain text can be mystifying for the reader. Moreover, there is very much an 
absence of a global perspective on text processing in CDA, with different CDA authors often 
in conflict with one another with regard to how text is processed, particularly with regard 
to the issue of inference generation; see 1.4. This lack of inspection of processing 
assumptions in CDA and lack of citation of work in psycholinguistics has been the case, no 
doubt, because of the weight CDA attaches to social theory, particularly the work of 
Foucault, e.g. Foucault (1972). With regard to text which can lead to mystification in 
reading, my thesis counters both the paucity of appreciation of cognitive matters and 
inconsistencies in CDA. Despite inconsistencies on the issue of text processing, what most 
CDA authors do have in common, however, is a cognitive / philosophical position on mental 
representation which underlies their perspectives on text processing. This particular notion 
of mental representation is known as symbolicism [see 1.6.1 for details]. However, this 
position in CDA is very much an implicit, unrecognised one. In section A of the thesis, I 
show how symbolic mental representation not only underlies CDA but also influences what 
CDA regards as being mystifying text. So the initial focus of the thesis might then be 
construed loosely as a piece of `CDA of CDA', seeking to 'denaturalise' its assumptions of 
mental representation. 
The second large focus of the thesis, which constitutes section B, outlines theories of mental 
representation in two relatively recent, prominent and broadly-speaking complementary 
enterprises - connectionism and cognitive linguistics (see 1.6.2 and 1.6.3 for more details). 
These enterprises present a direct challenge to notions of mental representation in 
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symbolicism. In cognitive psychology, symbolicism and connectionism are, broadly 
speaking, the dominant approaches to cognitive modelling. Section B of the thesis 
problematises the taken-for-granted symbolic postulates of mental representation in CDA 
with enterprises, which taken together, can be regarded as the natural antithesis of 
symbolicism. In problematising the symbolic assumptions of CDA, I thus problematise how 
CDA locates mystifying text. 
In section B, in effect, I produce a timely situating of CDA within a wider appreciation of 
the issue of mental representation. A brief history will make this clearer. While the socio-
theoretical base of CDA, broadly speaking, is different to that of CL (see 1.2.1 and 1.2.2), 
notions of mental representation are carried through from CL into CDA of the eighties and 
nineties. Many of the bearings for the detection of mystifying text in CDA in the nineties 
derive from the CL work of Fowler et al. (1979) and Kress and Hodge (1979). For example, 
Fairclough (1995a) contains a chapter on representation that makes explicit citation and use 
of Fowler et al. (1979) and Kress and Hodge (1979). Hodge and Kress (1993), the second 
edition of Kress and Hodge (1979), actually does not revise the earlier work, including 
instead a new final chapter which is more CDA oriented and accordingly a revised 
bibliography (see: Hodge and Kress, 1993: xii). Now, connectionism only became a serious 
challenger to symbolicism in the late eighties, continuing to flourish in the nineties. Because 
of this, looking at CDA in term of 'neglect' of the issue of mental representation would be 
an unfair ex post facto. The symbolic assumptions operative in the above authors would 
have seemed obvious in the absence of another cognitive perspective. It is timely then to 
consider issues of mental representation in CDA from the perspective of connectionism, as 
well as cognitive linguistics, given their contemporary prominence and the challenge they 
pose to symbolicists. 
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After problematising, in section B, the symbolic assumptions of CDA and thus how CDA 
locates mystifying text, in section C I undertake the creation of an alternative framework for 
the highlighting and analysis of mystifying discourse. I shall discuss the contents of section 
C in 1.7 and there comment on the text / discourse distinction. Let me now, though, in 1.2 
flesh out the theoretical background and tactics of CL and CDA in general and then, in 1.3 
and 1.4, their perspectives on textual mystification. 
1.2 Critical Approaches to Language 
1.2.1 Critical Linguistics 
Critical linguistics (CL) is the term used to describe the application of a particular set of 
linguistic procedures to texts with a view to uncovering concealed cultural and ideological 
meanings, (see for example: Fowler et al. 1979; Kress and Hodge 1979; Fowler 1991.) 
Whorf 
Crucial to the theoretical grounding of CL has been what has become popularly known as 
the 'Whorfian hypothesis' (or Sapir-Whorf hypothesis'): `...differences of linguistic 
structure cause the speakers of different languages in some sense to 'see the world' in 
different ways' (Fowler, 1991: 30). Critical linguists cite Whorf as theoretical validation 
(e.g. Fowler et al., 1979) although with some modification. 'Language' is replaced with 
`linguistic varieties' with an emphasis on text varieties. On this derivation, in CL, texts are 
regarded as enshrining ideology which in turn is manipulative of the reader's thought. 
However, there are a number of problems with citing Whorf as theoretical validation. There 
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is actually no mention of a hypothesis in Whorl's writings (Whorf, 1956). On this point see 
Ellis (1993). When we read Whorf we find his writings indicate a more subtle appreciation 
of the relationship between language, thought and culture than that gleaned from the 
phrasing of the hypothesis. Another difference lies in the fact that language and thought are 
blended for Whorf rather than separated as the 'hypothesis' suggests. Indeed, as argued 
elsewhere, (O'Halloran, 1997), the 'hypothesis' is most probably an ex post facto distillation 
of his work, and as such a distortion.' While we might be suspicious that the 'hypothesis' 
would have had Whorl's approval, more charitably, one might regard the `Whorfian 
hypothesis' as a peg on which to hang the common intuition that use of language can 
naturalise particular perspectives, a convenient citation point for those who feel this intuition 
strongly. Whorf is largely omitted now from the theoretical base of CDA (see 1.2.2). 
Nevertheless, in chapter 3, we shall see Whorfian vestiges in CDA's attitude to language and 
cognition. Another citation point for mystification in language is the work of Orwell, 
particularly his essays on the English language. His novel 1984, is also alluded to, especially 
the factitious dialect 'Newspeak', and the intended 'doublethink' that ensues through its use 
(Fowler et al.,1979). 
Halliday 
Various facets of Hallidayan functional linguistics are also drawn upon in CL. Hallidayan 
linguistics is functional since the working premise in Halliday's work is that 'language is as 
it is because of its function in the social structure' (1973: 65). Underlying this strong 
functionalism are the postulates that linguistic forms realise particular functions and that 
speaker selections are systematic and principle-governed. For Halliday, language serves 
three functions: i) ideational - to represent people, objects, events, and states of affairs in the 
world; ii) interpersonal - to express the speaker's attitude to these representations; iii) 
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textual - to array i) and ii) in a cohesive and appropriate manner. Salient parts of the 
grammar are configured into systems to enable the actualisation of these functions. Speakers 
make choices from these systems such that the selection of a particular form is against a 
background of other potential selections. Linguistic selections are significant in that they 
are woven into the functional demands of the context of the situation. Taking these posits 
as lead, Fowler et al. (1979: 187) 'follow Halliday in requiring that social meanings and their 
textual realisations be included within the scope of grammatical description'. Halliday's 
ideational function is crucial to CL since CL maintains that particular grammatical 
configurations in texts can be ideologically salient. For instance, it has been argued in CL 
that the occurrence of passives in a text may have ideological significance since passives 
allow agency deletion (Trew, 1979).2 The same applies for what is known as nominalisation 
- where a noun form is viewed as being derived by transformation from a verb with the 
accompanying deletion of argument(s) (see 1.4.2). 
Why CL is 'Critical' 
Having profiled the machinery of CL, what then is its purpose? Since the underlying 
premise is that encoded ideology in the text can manipulate or mystify thought, the 'critical' 
reader is one vigilant to the prospect of reader construction, and seeks to expose: 
the ideological level of meaning in texts that are manipulative of their readers and / or mystifying of their 
subject matter. To read innocently, non-analytically, is to be manipulated and mystified... 
Richardson (1987: 146-7) 
So, non-analytical reading facilitates textual manipulation and mystification. In CL, the 
general supposition, although sometimes implicit, is that disclosure of ideology in a text is 
consonant with some sort of exegetic privilege. That is, a 'critical reading' has exegetic 
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privilege if it leads to the 'social emancipation' of the reader, preventing textual 
manipulation and mystification. 
1.2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis3  
Explanation eInterpretation-2 9 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has largely evolved out of CL, regarding itself as being 
corrective and constructive upon the tenets of CL. CDA criticises CL for its callow 
appreciation of ideology theory, following criticism from sociologists such as Thompson 
(1984). The upshot is that, compared to CL, CDA seeks to make much more of an explicit 
and theoretically rich yoking of sociology, the theory of ideology and linguistics. CDA still 
retains the Hallidayan component but in contrast to the 'Whorfiare base of CL, CDA draws 
upon Foucauldian Discourse theory, e.g. Fairclough (1992a). Foucault (1972) characterises 
discourses as systematically organised sets of statements that give expression to the 
meanings and values of an institution. Discourses are seen as defining and delimiting what 
it is possible to say and not possible to say (and by extension - what to do or not to do) with 
respect to the area of concern of that institution. For CDA, (see Fairclough (1992a: chapter 
3 and especially page 84), non-resistant readers allow texts to position them as subjects such 
that they draw upon a particular discourse without them necessarily realising that this 
discourse sets limits on their interpretation (`interpretation-1' in Fairclough (1996: 50)). 
One of the purposes of CDA, then, is to expose how discourses can set such limits to the 
interpretation-1 of text by non-resistant readers. This procedure is known as explanation (or 
`interpretation-2' in Fairclough, 1996: 50): 
...interpretation-1 is part of the domain of interpretation-2; one concern of interpretation-2 is to investigate how 
different practices of interpretation-1 are socially, culturally and ideologically shaped. Fairclough (1996: 50) 
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Put another way, an aim of interpretation-2 is to highlight how the macro-context affects the 
micro-context of interpretation of a non-analytical reader. 
Why CDA is 'Critical' 
The critical aspect of CDA does chime with that of CL but the scope is broader. As 
indication of this scope, here is Fairclough again: 
Relationships between discursive, social and cultural change are typically not transparent for the people 
involved. Nor is technologization of discourse. 'Critical' implies showing connections and causes which are 
hidden; it also implies intervention, for example providing resources for those who may be disadvantaged 
through change. 	 Fairclough (1992a: 9) 
There is a strong case to be made for a mode of language education which emphasises critical awareness of 
ideological processes in discourse, so that people can become more aware of their own practice, and be more 
critical of the ideologically invested discourses to which they are subjected. 	 Fairclough (1992a: 90) 
The focus here is not just a criticism of how language is used to either construct or naturalise 
a set of attitudes, but an enabling of a critical stance on how socio-historical circumstances 
inscribe the reader into accepting certain positions over others. So, while CL might be 
regarded as a branch of stylistics which concentrates on the exposure of ideology within not 
only literary texts but non-literary ones too [see Simpson (1993: 2-10)], CDA practitioners 
(such as Fairclough and Kress in his more recent writings) place a greater emphasis than 
early CL on explaining the social conditions within which texts are read. Although CDA 
is in many ways corrective of CL, it must be said though that criticism of CL has also 
emanated from former practitioners (see Kress (1989b); Fowler (1988)). Indeed, Hodge and 
Kress, two of the progenitors of CL, would happily classify themselves as critical discourse 
analysts, [see the last chapter from Hodge and Kress (1993), added in the second edition]. 
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In contrast to his CL period, Kress (1989a) now draws explicitly on the work of Foucault, 
with no allusion to Whorf as a theoretical underpinning. Where some of the original 
`Whorfianism' is retained in former CL theorists (Fowler, 1991), there are nevertheless 
explicit references to Foucauldian discourse theory. 
Awareness in CDA of Exegetic Plurality 
Within CDA, there is also a greater awareness, at least (but see 1.3), of exegetic plurality 
compared to CL: 
But texts may be open to different interpretations depending on context and interpreter, which means that the 
social meanings (including ideologies) of discourse cannot simply be read off from the text without considering 
patterns and variations in the social distribution, consumption and interpretation of the text. 
Fairclough (1992a: 28) 
...while some readers may interpret texts compliantly, fitting in with positions set up for readers in texts, other 
readings may be resistant. 	 Fairclough (1996: 50) 
Signalled here is the greater awareness in CDA of the possibilities of exegetic plurality with 
regard to a text. There is also a greater awareness in CDA, compared to CL, that readers are 
capable of being resistant, i.e., they do not necessarily comply with the positioning of the 
text; [see also Fairclough (1992a: 29; 136) and Kress (1989a: 40-43) on non-resistant / 
resistant readers]. This recognition of exegetic plurality in CDA towards texts, though, does 
not equate with the exegetic plurality advocated in Derridean deconstruction. This is 
because CDA seeks exegetic privilege. CDA aims to show how non-resistant readers can 
be inscribed by a discourse or set of discourses which 'prefer' a particular interpretation so 
as to enable 'liberation' from the naturalising effects of dominant discourses. So while a 
Derridean approach might be construed as radical hermeneutics, CDA forms part of critical 
21 
hermeneutics. 
The Scope of this Thesis in its Relation to the Scope of CDA 
It should be clear, then, that the overall scope of CDA is much broader than that of CL, in 
being much more social theoretical. For example, Fairclough contends that a social theory 
of discourse should encompass the domains of both social production and social 
transformation, and that a critical discourse analysis is as much a method for studying social 
change as an investigation into how language use contributes to the reproduction of social 
structure (as well as seeking to highlight mystifying text). Fairclough (1992a), for instance, 
has used strategies within CDA as a method for tracing social and economic mutations in 
the Post-Fordist era and the influence of the market model in education. The boundaries of 
CDA are with such a developing enterprise difficult to draw, as different directions are 
sought and its eclecticism becomes even more ravenous. In the nineties, Fairclough (1992a; 
1995a) draws upon the work of Bakhtin (1981, 1986) for example in highlighting the 
meshing of genres and discourses into discourse types. Indeed, Fairclough (1995a) reaches 
for greater scope in trying to provide an analytical `tool-kit' to enhance Critical Media 
Literacy. 
As I have said, with regard to CDA, this thesis will only be concerned with its cognitive 
assumptions, and so does not deal with the sociological / media theory which many 
practitioners draw upon. To furnish the reader with an idea of the scope of the thesis in its 
relation to the scope of CDA, below is an abridgement of what Fairclough (1995a: 201-205) 
calls 'tentative agenda for teachers'. These 'agenda' are based on four questions for students 
of media and language which relate to any media text: 
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1. How is the text designed, why is it designed in this way, and how else could it have been designed? 
2. How are texts of this sort produced, and in what ways are they likely to be interpreted and used? 
3. What does the text indicate about the media order of discourse? 
4. What wider sociocultural processes is this text a part of, what are its wider social conditions, and what are 
its likely effects? 	 [my bold] 
This thesis is in the domain of question 1 and the second part of question 2. For question 
1, Fairclough summarises the 'main forms of analysis introduced in the book': 
a) Intertextuality 
• What genres, voices and discourses are drawn upon, and how are they articulated together? 
- direct and indirect speech, generic structure or 'staging', narrative analysis (story, presentation), conjunctions, 
collocations 
b) Language 
i) Representations 
• What presences and absences, foregrounding and backgrounding, characterize the text? 
• What process and participant types are there? How are processes and participants categorized and 
metaphorized? 
• What relationships are set up between propositions (clauses) in texts? 
- presupposition, process and participant types, nominalisation, agency and voice (active and passive), 
categorization and wording, metaphor, main and subordinate clauses, theme, local and global coherence 
relations 
ii) Relations and identities 
What are the participants (voices) in the text, and how are they constructed? 
• What relationships are set up between participants - specifically between: 
- media personnel (journalists, presenters) and audiences / readerships 
- 'others' (e.g. experts, politicians) and audiences / readerships 
- media personnel and 'others' 
• Are constructions of participants and relationships simple, or complex / ambivalent? 
• What relative salience do institutional and personal identities have in the construction of participants? 
- oral delivery, body movement, key (serious or humorous), conversationalization, vocabulary, mood, modality, 
interactional control features, lists 
iii) Image and text 
• In the case of television, how are visual images constructed, and what relationships (e.g. tension) are set up 
between language and image? 
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In the domains of question 1, this thesis only focuses on b) i) (and only then certain aspects). 
In relation to the second part of question 2 (in what ways are texts likely to be interpreted?) 
my emphasis is cognitive. As a final point, when I refer to CDA in this thesis, it is often in 
reference to the work of Norman Fairclough. This is mainly because he is commonly 
regarded as the principal exponent of CDA (Trask, 1999: 63) and because he has been more 
explicit than other CDA theorists in alluding to inference generation in text comprehension 
(see 1.7.3). 
I have outlined very generally the theoretical background of CL and CDA. In 1.4 and 1.5, 
I will outline some examples of how CDA highlights textual mystification. But before I do, 
in 1.3 let me indicate some of the major criticisms made of CDA and CL. 
1.3 Criticisms of CDA4 
With regard to CDA, Stubbs (1997: 102) avers that 'some sharp criticisms have been around 
for a long time, but remain unanswered'. One such criticism is that CDA lacks appreciation 
of how readers who are not analysts might interpret texts in different ways to the analyst; see 
Sharrock and Anderson (1981) and Richardson (1987: 152-3) for this criticism of CL, which 
is found in more developed form in recent criticisms of CDA by Widdowson (1994; 1995a; 
1995b; 1996; 1997; 1998). I accord with this criticism in this thesis. Indeed, the lack of 
attention paid in CDA to the variation in micro-context interpretation has a certain irony. 
Fairclough (1992b: 28), for instance, criticises CL for giving little attention 'to the processes 
and problems of interpretation, either those of the analyst-interpreter or those of the 
participant-interpreter' [my bold]; his agenda for critical media literacy reproduced above 
(1995a: 201-205) includes 'how are texts likely to be interpreted?' [my bold]. The lack 
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of attention to micro-context variation leads Stubbs (1997: 106) to assert that CDA fails to 
meet its own criterion that one should study 'how texts are produced, distributed and 
consumed [my bold] (Fairclough, 1995b: 1)'. 
Widdowson (see above) has probably been the most vocal dissenter from CDA in recent 
years; [see also Carter (1997: 119-121) for discussion of Widdowson's criticisms and 
Fairclough's reply (Fairclough, 1996)]. Amongst many different censures, Widdowson 
criticises CDA and in particular Fairclough (1992a) for ignoring the variation of micro-
contexts of interpretation. Since CDA does not seek to demonstrate concretely the potential 
variety of interpretations derived from a particular text by different readers, flagging the 
notion of interpretative-diversity as CDA does [Fairclough, 1992a: 28 (in 1.2 above) and 
Fairclough, 1996] is merely lip-service. For Widdowson, any interpretation of a text is 
`partial', CDA's interpretations being as partial as any reader's, since facets of a text are 
cognised in line with the analyst's values, motives etc. So, though CDA may regard their 
analyses as showing more generally how a dominant macro-context delimits the micro-
context of interpretation of a non-resistant reader, Widdowson argues that in ignoring the 
details of micro-context interpretation of different readers, a CD analyst merely confirms 
their own political values, i.e., what they offer is merely a partial reading. In effect, CDA, 
then, give too much attention to the macro-context of reading at the expense of the micro-
context. 
As I have said, it is true that the nature of the micro-context of interpretation of different 
readers has not been explored in CDA in any detail. We shall see immediately below, in 1.4 
and 1.5, that this point certainly applies to non-resistant or non-analytical readers. In 1.4 and 
1.5, where I outline some text processing assumptions in CDA for the highlighting of 
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mystifying text, I flag where CDA explicitly uses the notion of a non-resistant reader, 
undeveloped as it is. At other times in 1.4 and 1.5, the notion of a non-resistant reader in 
CDA is merely implicitly understood and so is not given any serious attention. 
There are discrepancies between CL and CDA in their socio-philosophical base, as we have 
seen, as well as a diversity of opinions within (`sociological') CDA. However, on the 
subject of mental representation, cognition, and textual mystification, i.e. the concern of this 
thesis, the CL and CDA theorists I outline in this thesis converge. This is because they share 
a set of implicit symbolic assumptions (see 1.6.1) that derive from the CL work of Kress and 
Hodge (1979) and Fowler et al. (1979). Consequently, (most of the time) my use of the 
contraction CDA is not reductionist but convenient shorthand for notions of mental 
representation and cognition in CDA. I will highlight in chapter 3 how symbolic ideas of 
mental representation underpin most of the approaches to text processing in CDA and thus 
underpin how CDA locates text that is mystifying of subject matter. 
Let me now broadly outline some examples of how CDA locates mystifying text. For 
reasons which will become clear later (see 1.7.3), I also include assumptions of text 
processing in CDA, which do not, at least directly, relate to the issue of textual 
mystification. 
1.4 CDA and the Highlighting of Textual Mystification: Sentential Structure 
What follows consists of examples of text processing assumptions in CDA and thus of how 
CDA locates text which is mystifying of subject matter due to particular choices of sentence 
structure. These examples relate to a) text inference generation, b) nominalisations, c) 
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confusing semantic transitivity with syntactic transitivity. CDA does not have a detailed 
model of processing in mind when locating textual mystification. Rather, as we shall see, 
CDA has a set of 'principles' that guide the analyst as to what is highlighted as mystifying. 
1.4.1 Text Inference Generation 
Inferences as Weaker Representations: Inferences Downgraded 
In CDA, inferences generated in textual comprehension are often regarded as weaker 
representations than the 'surface' sentential structure. Let us now consider some examples. 
The following is an extract from Trew (1979), now regarded as a classic CL article. This 
will also be referred to later in the thesis not only as it has attained the status of a classic, but 
because of its continuous citation, reproduction and endorsement in introductory textbooks. 
The following is, for example, reproduced and endorsed in Toolan (1988: 229-30), Lee 
(1992: 100) and Montgomery (1995: 240). Here now is Trew (1979: 98-9): 
The Times 
RIOTING BLACKS SHOT DEAD BY POLICE AS ANC LEADERS MEET 
Eleven Africans were shot dead and 15 wounded when Rhodesian Police opened fire on a rioting crowd of 
about 2,000. 
`Not only is it [The Times report] in the passive, but the syntactic agent is deleted (`11 Africans were shot dead 
by...') and is identified only weakly by implication through the temporal conjunction with the police opening 
fire ('when police opened fire on a rioting crowd of about 2,000'). Looking at this in purely syntactic terms, 
with the deletion of the agent there is no longer any direct reference to who did the action and there is a 
separation of the action from whomever did it.' 	 [my bold] 
What is suggested by Trew is that the best representation of an event is one where actor and 
process are linked directly and adjacently in the active voice. Any inferencing necessary to 
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link perpetrator and action, something which is not located directly in the 'surface' structure, 
is a weaker representation of the actual event. Trew does not mention explicitly that his 
analysis is based on the response of a non-analytical or non-resistant reader. But I assume 
that he has an implicit non-resistant reader in mind who does not notice that the agency of 
the police is downplayed in the 'surface' syntactic structure, partly because of the weak 
representation they generate. With the agency of the police attenuated, textual mystification 
occurs. Hodge and Kress (1993: 26) hint at a similar assumption and focus on the 'surface' 
structure, when they contend that in passives: 
`the link between actor and process is weakened, that is, the causal connection is syntactically looser.' 
A coincident assumption that inferences are weaker representations can be found in Simpson 
(1993: 171) and in Montgomery (1995: 240) who reproduces and concurs with Trew's 
analysis. Another assumption at work in the above is that inferences are separate from the 
processing of the 'surface' structure of the text. 
In CDA, there is often an over-emphasis on sentential structure at the expense of top-down 
inferential processes. Consider the following from Fairclough (1989: 50-1): 
Quarry load-shedding problem 
UNSHEETED lorries from Middlebarrow Quarry were still causing problems by shedding stones on their 
journey through Warton village, members of the parish council heard at their September meeting. 
The council's observations have been sent to the quarry management and members are hoping to see an 
improvement. 	 Lancaster Guardian, 12 September 1986 
Causality is attributed to unsheeted lorries from Middlebarrow Quarry. This itself contains unspecified 
causality again, for unsheeted implies the failure of a process to happen - someone did not put sheets over the 
loads, when (one assumes) they ought to have done. It is difficult to take literally the notion that the lorries 
28 
are the cause of the problem, and it is evident that in a different representation it could be this 'someone' -
presumably the quarry management or people under their control. Yet the quarry management figure only in 
the second paragraph in this representation as in receipt of the council's observations, a term which again 
avoids attributing any responsibility (it might have been complaints). 
That Fairclough contends, 'it is hard to take seriously that the 'lorry' is the cause of the 
problem' suggests that for Fairclough the 'surface' structure prevails over more top-down 
inferences as to causal responsibility. In other words, the 'surface structure' mystifies as to 
causal responsibility. [This tendency to emphasise 'surface' structure is also seen in 
discussion of `transactives' in Kress (1989a) and Hodge and Kress (1993); see chapter 3 
below.] Finally, like Trew, Fairclough's non-analytical reader is only implicitly understood. 
Inferences as Strong Representations 
In CDA, the notion that inferences make for weaker representations is not the only implicit 
postulate around the issue of inference generation. Consider the following text and 
Fairclough's (1989: 52-3) commentary upon it: 
The Paras' new leader: He'll do his job well says major's wife 
	 1+ Photo of Major Keeblel 
The wife of the new CO of the 2nd Parachute Battalion spoke last night of her fears for her husband's safety. 
As she played in the sunshine with her four children, Jenny Keeble said she hoped her husband would not have 
to go into battle again. She said: 'I pray he and his men have done enough. But if they do go on I know that 
he is a man who will do his job to the best of his ability and I am certain he and the 2nd Parachute Battalion 
will succeed.' 
Major Christopher Keeble, a 40-year-old devout Roman Catholic, is to succeed Colonel Herbert Jones who 
died leading his men against an Argentine machine-gun post in the battle for Goose Green. 
Yesterday Jenny Keeble's family and friends gathered around in the garden of her old vicarage home -a 
rambling Tudor building at Maddington on Salisbury Plain - for a picnic afternoon as she tried to maintain an 
air of normility [sic] for the children's sake. 
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For Fairclough such a text helps to stereotype 'army wives', thereby placing limits upon the 
meanings that readers attach to such an individual as Jenny Keeble. Here is Fairclough again 
(1989: 52): 
Notice that at no point here (or in the rest of the article) is Jenny Keeble explicitly said to be 'a good wife' or 
an admirable person; the process depends entirely on an 'ideal reader's capacity to infer that from the 
list of attributes - she expresses confidence in her husband's professional abilities, she is concerned for his 
safety, she 'prays' he has 'done enough', she tries 'to maintain an air of normality for the children's sake'...the 
process presupposes an ideal reader who will indeed make the 'right' inference from the list, i.e. have the 
`right' ideas about what a 'good wife' is. Texts such as this reproduce sexists, provided that readers 
generally fall into the subject position of the ideal reader, rather than opposing it. 	 [my bold] 
This time the analysis explicitly mentions a non-resistant or `non-oppositional' reader, 
termed 'the ideal reader' by Fairclough. However, this 'ideal reader' is undeveloped from 
a cognitive point of view. Now, compare the above with the postulate of CDA practitioners 
in the last section that the inference being generated is a weaker mental representation than 
mental representation of the 'surface' structure. We find quite the opposite. Indeed, for 
Fairclough, the inference itself is strong enough to lead to the reproduction of sexists. The 
two notions of inference generation with regard to mystification that we have met so far are, 
then, in conceptual tension. As a final point, we can see another conceptual tension over two 
pages of the same book between Fairclough's (1989: 52) top-down emphasis on processing 
(`Jenny Keeble' text) and Fairclough's (1989: 50-1) more bottom-up emphasis on syntactic 
structure (`Quarry load-shedding problem' text). 
Inference as Work vs Automatic Gap-Filling 
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Consider firstly Fairclough (1989: 81): 
There is no sharp dividing line between automatic gap-filling and inferencing, both because there is probably 
a scale from links which need no working out to links which need a lot of inferential 'work', and because a link 
which is supplied automatically by one person may need inferential work from another (or indeed from the 
same person on another occasion). Text 4.2 [a problem-page letter from a teenage magazine] would probably 
not require any inferential work from regular readers of the sort of magazine it comes from, but it might from 
other people. 	 [my bold] 
So, for Fairclough, there are broadly speaking two types of inferencing: 'automatic gap-
filling' which require minimum cognitive labour while 'inferences' are those which incur 
a higher than minimum amount of cognitive labour. The processing assumption above is 
that readers not familiar with the subject matter would still work to generate 'inferences'. 
A further, more implicit assumption is that the reader will work to produce necessary 
inferences to make what Fairclough regards as coherence - as though there is one ideal 
coherence to which all readers will eventually arrive, automatically or through inferential 
work (see also Fairclough, 1992a: 177). Along similar lines, consider the following 
commentary (on problem page advice) from Gough and Talbot (1996: 226), who adopt 
Fairclough's (1989) position on automatic gap-filling vs inferential work: 
Many heterosexual men have a passing curiosity about homosexuality, and that isn't such a bad thing. It 
compels you to make choices. 
...the causal link which is needed to coherently combine these two sentences is not cued by any formal 
element, and this is a point where the reader's complicity is required if the two sentences as they stand 
together are to make sense. The 'missing link' we need to supply is that heterosexuality and 
homosexuality are separate sexualities and that interest in homosexuality is useful inasmuch as it 
reinforces this separate heterosexual identity. For some readers it may require inferential work...Following 
Fairclough's approach, this interpretation would be accounted for using the notion of automatic 'gap-filling' 
between explicit propositions. A reader who is unfamiliar with problem pages...would need to engage in a 
good deal of inferential work to make this connection. 	 [my bold] 
The 'complicit' reader mentioned, in the above, I take to be a non-resistant reader, but like 
Fairclough's 'ideal reader', the 'complicit reader' above is undeveloped from a cognitive 
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point of view. The assumption in the text above is that the non-resistant reader who is 
`unfamiliar with problem pages' will 'work' to produce the inference that 'interest in 
homosexuality (in this context, by adolescent males) is useful in as much as it reinforces this 
separate heterosexual identity'. In doing so, the non-resistant reader becomes ideologically 
positioned. But there is a tension here. While we might suppose that a resistant reader, in 
necessarily being more critical of the text, engages in more cognitive work, a non-resistant 
reader is surely someone who is not making such an effort. 
1.4.2 Nominalisations 
A High Degree of Nominalisation in a Text Requires Extra Processing Effort 
The following involves a discussion by Hodge and Kress (1993: 21) of part of a newspaper 
editorial on the miner's overtime ban during the winter of 1972-73 and in particular the 
sentence from the editorial: 
The Government knows that in early 1972 it was caught out by picketing of power stations which curtailed coal 
deliveries. 
Here is the analysis: 
Picketing...curtailed coal deliveries 
If we asked speakers of English what the meaning of picketing was, they would probably explain it by 
describing the kinds of things involved: strikers, the action, a factory, or, in this case, a coal-depot. The noun 
is a contraction of a significant kind. The single word necessarily implies a particular kind of actor and a 
particular object of action. We might represent the process in this way: 
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strikers picket a factory 
	 picketing 
...there are two major effects associated with that transformation, which amount to a quite radical changing of 
the original form. First, although we know that there was an actor and an affected, the specific identities of 
both have been lost. We can guess about their identity but can never be certain. Second, in the resulting 
surface form the only thing that meets us is the verbal version of the action which was performed, and in this 
way our attention is directed to what is present and directed away from what is no longer there. So the focus 
of the expression has been altered by the speaker, our vision has been channelled and narrowed.' 
For Hodge and Kress, 'strikers picket a factory' is the form (i.e., actors-process-patient) that 
is necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the situation. However, the 'surface' or 
nominalised form here is 'picketing' and so to understand the situation the article is 
reporting, the reader has to make more processing effort to 'recover' the 'deep' form. 
As readers of this editorial we should have to be alert and willing to engage in mental exercise to get beyond 
the seductive simplicity of the final form, with just three entities, and seemingly precise relations, where 
everything seems to be there on the surface...we can see that few commuters on the 8.05 from Brighton 
would have the energy to perform the mental gymnastics required.' 
Hodge and Kress (1993: 22) 	 [my bold] 
This time a non-analytical reader is explicitly referred to (`non-energetic' reader). What is 
alleged here is that through particular syntactic selections, processing can be made more 
laborious to the extent that a non-analytical (`non-energetic') reader is less likely to 'recover' 
the 'deep' meaning. Since the 'deep' meaning is necessary for a 'comprehensive' 
understanding and appreciation of the events being described, if it is difficult to 'recover', 
textual mystification transpires since processing for the 'non-energetic' reader is shallow. 
As a final point in this section, compare the notion of cognitive labour in the above text 
with Fairclough's / Gough and Talbot's assumption that readers are prepared to work at 
producing inferences in 1.4.1. There is a conflict. On the one hand, Hodge and Kress (1993: 
21) argue that non-analytical readers are not prepared to invest much processing labour, but 
on the other, Fairclough (1989: 52) argues that non-analytical readers are prepared to invest 
more than minimum processing labour. 
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Excessive Nominalisation Makes a Text Abstract and Distant from Concrete Events 
For CDA, nominalisations 'objectify' the event being described because of their nominal 
form and in doing so mystify the actualities of the event being described. This argument is 
also found in most practitioners of CL, especially the CL of Kress and Hodge (1979) and 
Fowler et al. (1979). Here firstly are Fowler and Kress (1979b: 208): on the 'objectification' 
effects of nominals: 
Two further effects of nominalisation may be mentioned briefly. The first is objectification, the rendering of 
a process as an object: 'We still need lots of contributions to the jumble sale'; 'our new development, the 
`Interference Absorption Circuit'; Now that you've had your first look at the new Record Saloon'. This in turn 
affects lexicalization, the provision of words and phrases to code new concepts or consolidate existing ones: 
`strict segregation', 'basic approach', 'school dinner services', 'people's trial', 'illegal detention'. 
Lexicalization fixes the object-as-process as a single habitualised entity. 
Indeed, the tendency to regard all nouns as things, to see `thingness' as a necessary and 
sufficient condition for nounhood is an assumption often operative in CDA / CL (see, for 
example, Hodge and Kress (1993). The argument that nominal description of actions 
`objectifies' action and thus creates distance between the event and its appreciation by the 
reader is carried forward into latter day CDA (e.g. Kress, 1989a: 58; Martin, 1989: 43; 
Fowler, 1991: 80; Lee, 1992: 95; Fairclough, 1995a: 112). Lee (1992: 95), flagging Fowler 
and Kress (1979b), states that: 'it is arguable that one effect of the nominalised structure...is 
to reify (my italics) the event in question, and thereby to abstract away from the event, to 
diminish its violent nature'. And in what follows, Martin (1989: 43) specifically relates the 
effect of distancing in reading from the actualities of events (killings of kangaroos and seals) 
to the use of incongruent nominal linguistic forms. Specifically, this effect is produced 
because nominals treat 'killing as a kind of thing': 
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In chapter 2 we also looked at the question of congruence, asking, for example, whether actions were being 
expressed in nouns or verbs. Following this up in Texts 3.1 and 3.2 we can see a big difference in the way in 
which actions are realised. Overall the CWF (seal) article realises actions as nouns twice as often as the ACF 
(kangaroo) editorial. 
The CWF article uses three types of nominal structure in place of verbs to realise actions. One puts the action 
into the modifier of an abstract noun: e.g. sealing operation, killing techniques. Another makes use of a 
nominalised form of a verb: statements, definition, death, coverage, constraints. A third simply realises the 
actions as a noun: the whitecoat harvest, the East Coast seal hunt, the seal hunt. 
Of particular interest is the way in which the two texts refer to the killing of seals and kangaroos. The ACF 
tends to refer to the killing congruently, as a process: the massive level of killing; the favoured killing of 
bigger, heavier male kangaroos; whose lives will be obliterated; killing 3 million kangaroos a year; when 
our prime wildlife is killed on this scale. The CWF text on the other hand tends to refer to the killing 
indirectly, using incongruent forms: killing techniques, the whitecoat harvest, the slaughter of animals, the East 
Coast seal hunt, a slaughtering operation, killing methods, an almost instantaneous death, a humane death, 
the seal hunt, and so on. In this way the ACF text focuses on the process of killing, while the CWF text 
treats the killing as a kind of thing. This has the effect of immobilising the most unsavoury part of the 
seal hunt and helps draw attention away to other 'factual' considerations. 	 [my bold] 
For Martin, then, the high propensity of nominal forms are incongruent representations for 
the actions of the actual event. The use of action categories as modifiers of abstract nouns 
is also incongruent. And the `object-like' killing as a kind of thing' diminishes the actions 
taking place. The implication is that this 'diminishing' will transpire for a non-analytical 
reader, although Martin's analysis makes no explicit mention of a such a reader. 
Recall the 'Quarry Load-Shedding Problem' text that I highlighted in 1.4.1. For Fairclough 
(1989: 50-51): 
...the grammatical form in which the headline ['Quarry load-shedding problem'] is cast is that of a 
nominalization: a process is expressed as a noun, as if it were an entity. 
Fairclough (1989), in the above, is highlighting how the nominalisation, in the removal of 
agent and patient, mystifies the causality of the event. However, if we compare Fairclough 
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above with what I have bolded of Martin, we see there is some conflict. On Fairclough's 
rationale, 'the massive level of killing' would be a nominalisation and thereby incongruent 
with the notion of a process. But Martin asserts that 'massive level of killing' is congruent 
with the notion of a process. Another example of conceptual conflict then. 
1.4.3 How Readers Can Confuse Semantic Transitivity with Syntactic Transitivity 
The final assumption about text processing relates to the possibility that readers can register 
syntactic transitivity in terms of semantic transitivity when the two are not equivalent. As 
an outline of what this entails, consider the following from Kress (1993: 181-2), which is 
an analysis of the clause 'his parents could not afford a uniform', which features in a 
newspaper text: 
My interest here lies initially in the construction of the concept of poverty in the popular media; and my 
specific focus is the clause 'his parents could not afford a uniform' in sentence 1...The cited clause in sentence 
1 presents a syntactic ambiguity. What syntactic analysis / description do we give to afford? Overtly it looks 
to be a transitive verb, with a uniform as direct object, and his parents as subject. A syntactically analogous 
form to that reading of this clause is 'His parents (could not) buy a uniform', which is clearly transitive. 
However, 'affording a uniform' is not clearly transitive; its subject noun is not clearly agentive: His parents 
is not an unambivalently agentive subject. Afford is a state of being, not a process under the control of an 
agent. And clauses which are not clearly transitive do not passivize easily: 'a uniform was (not) afforded by 
his parents' (and similarly with further tests, such as prenominalizing of the adjective), 'The afforded 
uniform...'. Yet many readers of the Daily Express may read across this clause in reading the text, and 
read it as fully semantically transitive, which I shall call, following Hodge and Kress (1993), a `transactive'. 
In support of that reading, these readers might say: 'We scrimped and saved, and we afforded a uniform for 
our children, so why can't they?!' 
There are thus at least two syntactic readings for this clause, very likely corresponding to the readings of 
different audiences - a hypothesis which could be tested.... 
	 [my bold] 
Kress continues. If the clause 'his parents could not afford a uniform' is read as simply 
"involving' subjects' it supports a reading of 'poverty as an event in which participants are 
caught up' (1993: 182-3). However, if agency is assigned to the grammatical subject, as a 
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result of 'reading across' a clause (i.e. by a non-analytical reader), this can support a 
`politically reactionary view' where the poor are responsible for their own poverty. Again 
the influence of the 'surface' structure is salient. The 'surface' structure of subject-verb-
object has the capacity to promote the reading of AGENT-PROCESS-PATIENT, for a non-
analytical reader, and thus lead to poverty as a state in which people are caught up being 
obscured. [In Fowler and Kress (1979a: 42 and Fowler and Kress (1979b: 209), we find a 
similar analysis which relates as much to semantic transitivity as thematization.] In 
highlighting how a subject-verb-object clause can be 'read across', Kress thus indicates how 
a type of shallow processing might occur similar to that highlighted in Hodge and 'Cress's 
(1993: 21) analysis of the 'picketing strikers' text. 
As a final point compare 1.4.1 with this section. We saw in 1.4.1 a conceptual tension 
between i) the notion that text inferences are weaker representations and ii) the notion that 
inferences lead to mystification because of their strength. In the first postulate (Trew, 1979), 
the 'surface' structure of the sentence was regarded as having cognitive salience and that 
which was 'added' (i.e. inferred) was seen as weaker. In Fairclough's analysis of the 'Jenny 
Keeble' text that which was added inferred into the text in top-down processing was seen 
as potent and leading to the reproduction of sexism. In this section, what is 'added' to the 
sentence - the imparting of semantic transitivity to syntactic transitivity - is regarded as being 
more potent than the actual semantic structure. Thus, Kress is in concert with Fairclough 
but not with Trew. 
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I now want to turn my attention to how CDA regards the relationship between metaphor and 
mystification. 
1.5 CDA Highlighting Textual Mystification: Metaphors 
The view that metaphor is merely ornamental, transparent and superficial is rejected in CDA. 
Instead the following view from Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 3) is thoroughly endorsed in 
CDA: 
...metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary 
conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. 
From such a position, CDA argues that certain metaphorical choices can mislead, distort or 
act as a buffer between the reality of the social world and the reader, preventing a 'full' 
appreciation of the event being described; [see Fairclough (1992a: 194-195) as well as 
Fairclough (1989); Kress (1989a); Lee (1992) and Shepherd (1994)]. As a concrete 
example, consider the following from Lee (1992: 91-92). Lee comments upon a newspaper 
report, an extract of which I also produce below: 
The black township of Soweto, which has been simmering with unrest since the riots on June 16 and the 
shooting of 174 Africans, erupted again today...Police with automatic rifles and in camouflage uniform headed 
the marchers off after they had swept through a roadblock. 
For Lee (1992: 93): 
...the metaphorical process...treats the people of Soweto as some kind of natural force, specifically here as a 
volcano which has been 'simmering' with unrest and then 'erupted'. This is echoed in the later report that the 
marchers had 'swept through' a roadblock, a river. Note, too that the emotions of individuals and the actions 
that they give rise to are transferred onto the place where they live. It is 'the township' that has been simmering 
and that now erupts, rather than the Sowetans experiencing feelings of anger and deciding to march. 
The effect of these processes of metaphor and metonymy is arguably to distance the reader from the 
subjects of the report. In speaking of the Sowetans as a natural force and as a place, the emotions of the 
people involved and the decisions which they make to engage in particular actions are eliminated from the 
process of interpretation. The situation is seen as resulting from some kind of inevitable set of natural laws 
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rather than from human feelings and decisions. 	 [my bold] 
This alleged 'distancing' or 'buffering' effect of the metaphors, I treat as a kind of 
mystification of the actual events which took place. Similar ideas on the metaphor of 
`eruptions' are expressed in Fairclough (1995a: 114). Finally, although it is not mentioned 
explicitly, I take the 'reader' posited by Lee to be a non-resistant one. 
In 1.4 and 1.5, I have laid out some examples of how CDA highlights mystifying text for a 
non-analytical or non-resistant reader. [In later chapters, more examples of how CDA 
isolates mystifying text will be provided]. However, we have seen that there is no stable, 
consistent and detailed conception of a non-analytical reader in CDA, often the concept of 
a non-analytical reader is only implicitly understood, and several processing assumptions in 
CDA are in conflict with one another. In 1.7, I shall give an indication of an alternative 
framework I create, in section C of this thesis, for the analysis of mystifying discourse. In 
contrast to CDA, this framework will be based on a detailed and consistent notion of a non-
analytical reader. But before I begin to discuss this alternative framework, I outline in 1.6 
the cognitive theoretical positions found in this thesis. 
1.6 Cognitive Theoretical Positions found in the Thesis 
1.6.1 Symbolicism 
I argue in this thesis that a particular notion of mental representation has been inadvertently 
absorbed into CDA via CL, especially via Chomskyan ideas. This is known as the symbolic 
view of mental representation, or symbolicism for short. I argue also that symbolic notions 
influence how CDA isolates mystifying text. Symbolic modelling of the mind is based on 
the idea that mental processing consists of the manipulation of symbols in accordance with 
a rule-governed system analogous to a syntax. These symbols are held to be storable and 
retainable and thus an enduring set of entities. As we shall also see, the tradition of logical 
empiricist philosophy with regard to the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind 
also permeates cognitive assumptions of CDA. 
1.6.2 Connectionism 
The work in CL on linguistic representation and ideology was produced in the seventies, in 
the shadow of Chomskyan ideas produced in the late 1950s and 1960s, and when classical 
cognitive science dominated. However, an alternative view of cognition emerged in the 
eighties and has flourished in the nineties. This view is known as connectionism and 
challenges many of the precepts of classical cognitive science. In contrast to symbolicism, 
connectionism takes into account the neurophysiological `wetware' of the brain, deriving 
its chief inspiration from neural networks. The currency of connectionism is not symbols 
but excitation and inhibition over networks of neuron-like structures. Again, in contrast to 
symbolicism, thought is not regarded as possessing a 'syntax' since explicit linguistic rules 
need not be mentally represented. Symbolic rules merely approximate the more detailed 
account of data that is provided by connectionist models. In this thesis, I use elements of 
connectionism to problematise the symbolic assumptions of CDA, and in turn the symbolic 
assumptions that affect the criteria for CDA's isolations of mystifying text. Another 
enterprise which came to prominence in the eighties and like connectionism continues to 
flourish is cognitive linguistics. 
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1.6.3 Cognitive Linguistics 
Chomsky's concept of linguistic competence has been criticised by a number of linguists 
who claim that we cannot understand the syntax of a language without appreciating how it 
fits in overall in linguistic performance. Cognitive linguistics is a branch of linguistics that 
denies the autonomy and primacy of syntactic analysis as promoted within Chomskyanism. 
In contrast, semantics is seen as interactive with syntax. Objectivist semantic analysis that 
begins with propositions and assesses meaning in terms of truth conditions is repudiated. 
Cognitive linguists recommend an analysis of language which aims to provide an account 
of how both the grammar and meaning are grounded in such factors as the knowledge that 
the speakers possess, the cognitive models that they construct, and the mappings they make 
between these models. Furthermore, there are many points of convergence between 
connectionism and cognitive linguistics which contrast with symbolicism. Both enterprises, 
unlike symbolicism, do not regard logical reasoning and rule application as fundamental to 
understanding language and they both relate accounts of mental behaviour to our 
neurophysiology. In cognitive linguistics this manifests itself in the way in which basic-
level categories have been studied (see chapter 5). Such categories are seen as being 
intimately associated with the human capacity for motor-interaction and gestalt perception, 
and are the easiest type of category to generate mental imagery from. 
It is not the overall intention of the thesis to offer connectionism and cognitive linguistics 
as the absolute 'truth' of language processing although at times I will indicate the superiority 
of certain aspects of these perspectives over symbolicism. Instead, the purpose of 
introducing these enterprises, in the early parts of the thesis at least, is to problematise the 
taken-for-granted symbolic assumptions of mental representation in CDA, and thus what 
CDA highlights as being mystifying text. At other times in the thesis, I provide a more 
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explicit critique of CDA in relation to other attitudes to text processing and its strategies for 
the highlighting of mystifying text. The critique will sometimes extend to assumptions of 
text processing which do not necessarily have a direct bearing on how CDA highlights 
mystifying text. As a final point, I should stress that the enterprises of connectionism and 
cognitive linguistics are not wholly complementary. The Lakoff and Johnson (1980) view 
of metaphor, I referred to in 1.5, forms part of cognitive linguistic theory. I will indicate, 
however, theoretical tensions between connectionism and cognitive linguistics which 
problematise Lakoff and Johnson's approach to metaphor, and then tease out the 
implications of this for CDA's use of this approach to metaphor. 
In 1.3, I indicated that CDA had paid too much attention to the macro-context of 
interpretation (Foucauldian 'discourse') and not enough to the micro-context of 
interpretation (Widdowsonian 'discourse' - see below 1.7.2). In this thesis, I want to redress 
this balance. After problematising in section B how CDA highlights mystifying text, in 
section C, I create the following: an alternative framework for the analysis of mystifying 
discourse in the micro-context of interpretation by a non-analytical reader. I discuss the 
contents of section C in 1.7 below. 
1.7 An Alternative Framework: The Analysis of Mystifying Discourse Produced in the 
Micro-Context of Interpretation by a Non-Analytical Reader 
1.7.1 Developing the Non-Analytical Reader 
In 1.4 and 1.5, I indicated how CDA, either explicitly or implicitly, tries to gauge how non-
analytical or non-resistant readers might process text and how portions of a text might be 
mystifying for them. However, as we saw, the notion of a non-analytical reader in CDA is 
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undeveloped and inconsistent. In contrast to CDA, section C is centrally concerned with 
developing a detailed and consistent processing framework for a non-analytical reader. This 
non-analytical reader is, broadly speaking, one who has little vested interest in the text and 
is largely unfamiliar with the text's subject matter. I term this reader, the idealised reader 
(IR). The framework of non-analytical IR draws upon work in connectionism, cognitive 
linguistics and recent psycholinguistic research on inference generation, the framework 
consisting of compatible 'principles' from these areas. Like CDA, I do not offer a model 
of text processing but a set of processing 'principles'. I use these framework principles to 
indicate how certain text can lead to mystification in IR 's reading. Or put another way, I 
use the framework principles to guide my analysis of the mystifying discourse (see 1.7.2) 
derived by non-analytical IR in the reading of certain text. The kind of text I focus upon is 
news text. As I have said, connectionism and cognitive linguistics are diametrically opposed 
to the tenets of symbolicism. Owing to their completely different assumptions about mental 
representation and cognition, where my 'framework' detects text that can lead to 
mystification in reading is not necessarily coincident with CDA detections. This fact is 
further reinforced when I show that the recent psycholinguistic evidence I draw upon in my 
framework conflicts with the symbolic assumptions which CDA operates upon in its 
highlighting of mystifying text. 
1.7.2 Discourse vs Text 
As I have said, my framework will be concerned with the analysis of mystifying discourse 
(as opposed to mystifying text). So, before I go any further, I need to provide definitions for 
text and discourse. Following Cook (1994: 24), I define text as 'linguistic forms in a stretch 
of language, and those interpretations of them which do not vary with context.' In reading, 
discourse is created though the interaction of text and context (which can include: co-text, 
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paralinguistics features, intertext, the physical situation, the social and cultural situation, 
interlocuters and their schemata). Again, I follow Cook's definition: 
`Discourse', as opposed to text, is a stretch of language in use, taking on meaning in context for its users, and 
perceived by them as purposeful, meaningful, and connected. This quality of perceived purpose, meaning and 
connection is known as 'coherence'. 'Discourse analysis' is the study and the explanation of this quality of 
coherence. A discourse is a coherent stretch of language. 
Defined in this way as a 'perceived' quality, the coherence of a given stretch of language will vary both with 
its perceiver and with its context. 	 Cook (1994: 25) 
These definitions are in keeping with definitions provided by Widdowson (1995a et alibi). 
For Widdowson (1995a), addressee discourse is defined as the pragmatic process of meaning 
negotiation - what is derived from the text through reading in accordance with the purpose 
and situation of reading. Just to stress this point, for both Cook and Widdowson, discourse 
varies with perceiver and context so that different discourses can be derived from the same 
text.6 To reiterate, my framework is largely concerned with how certain news text leads to 
mystification in a particular reading context - that of a non-analytical reader with little 
vested interest in a text and one who is unfamiliar with its subject matter. So this is why 
(following Cook and Widdowson) I am concerned not so much with mystifying text but 
mystifying discourse, or more specifically, the analysis of the mystifying discourse that the 
idealised reader derives from certain news text. 
1.7.3 Inference Generation as a Part of Discourse 
We saw in 1.4 how appreciation of inference generation amongst different CDA authors was 
inconsistent. It is also, as I will show in this thesis, an impoverished appreciation. There 
is, for example, in CDA, little awareness of inference typology in psycholinguistics (e.g. 
what types of inference are usually automatic) and there is no attempt to indicate how certain 
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types of inference are less probable than others for readers who have little vested interest in 
a text. When inference theory is drawn upon in CDA (e.g. Fairclough, 1989), the age of the 
sources in discourse analysis (e.g. Brown and Yule, 1983) means important experimental 
psycholinguistic work on inference generation which has transpired in the late eighties and 
early nineties is absent. While this more recent experimental work is absent from reference 
books in discourse analysis, it is readily available in recent standard reference books in 
psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology, (e.g. Gernsbacher, 1994; Eysenck and Keane, 
1995; Harley, 1995). Another aim of this thesis, then, is to plug this gap in discourse 
analysis with regard to contemporary experimental research on inferencing in reading. 
The anaphoric inference in, for example, 'The man walked into a bar. He ordered a drink' 
can be taken to be 'an interpretation which does not vary with context' and so fits Cook's 
(1994: 24) definition of text that I gave earlier. However, the inferences I focus on in this 
thesis are ones whose efficacy are dependent on the degree of vested interest in a text and 
a reader's familiarity of subject matter. Because of this variability, in contrast to the 
anaphoric inference above, the inferences I am interested in are more discourse-based rather 
than text-based. I try to show in section C how certain news text would lead a particular 
reader (IR) to derive a mystifying discourse because of the type of inferences this reader 
would or would not produce from such text. The breadth and detail of the IR framework, 
I hope, enables not only a much clearer, consistent and more comprehensive perspective on 
the issue of inference generation / mystification than found in CDA, but also the separation 
of the occasionally sound CDA from unsound CDA on this issue. As a final point in this 
paragraph, in 1.4, I outlined some CDA processing assumptions with regard to inference 
generation which were not directly related to mystification of events. I indicated that reasons 
for doing so would be become clear later. Since a concern of my framework, in section C, 
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is with recent psycholinguistic research in inference generation, we shall see that this will 
reveal CDA's assumptions about inference generation, not necessarily related to 
mystification, to be dubious also. 
1.7.4 Using IR to Highlight `Over-Interpretation' in CDA on Behalf of a Non-Resistant 
Reader 
In one of his critiques of critical discourse analysis, Widdowson (1995a: 169) argues a basis 
for discourse analysis: 
To the extent that critical discourse analysis is committed, it cannot provide analysis but only partial 
interpretation. What analysis would involve would be the demonstration of different interpretations and what 
language data might be adduced as evidence in each case. It would seek to explain just how different 
discourses can be derived from the same text, and indeed how the very definition of discourse as the pragmatic 
achievement of social action necessarily leads to the recognition of such plurality. 
This basis for discourse analysis is similar to what Cook (1994: 25) outlines (see 1.7.2 
above). I accord with this basis for discourse analysis in section C by showing that different 
levels of cognitive effort lead readers to produce inferences of a different cast from the same 
text and thus different discourses. I make the assumption that a 'resistant' reader such as a 
critical discourse analyst makes a good deal of cognitive effort. For CDA, 'non-resistant' 
readers allow news texts to position them into particular interpretations. I assume, then, that 
`non-resistant' readers for CDA make only minimum cognitive effort. Since IR invests 
minimum cognitive effort, IR could be construed as a non-resistant (or non-analytical) 
reader. I show the following: 
i) 	 the inferences IR makes from a news text, in line with minimum cognitive effort, are 
not the same as the inferences a CD analyst makes by proxy for their non-resistant 
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reader since the latter are more in line with a greater amount of cognitive effort. 
ii) 
	
	
since non-resistant IR produces a different discourse from the CDA non-resistant 
reader, it does not necessarily follow that a non-resistant reader would be 
' interpellated' by a news text into the subject position deemed by a CD analyst. That 
is, with the reading of news text, it cannot be assumed, as CDA does, that the macro-
or socio-cultural context weighs so heavily on the micro-context of interpretation of 
a non-analytical reader. 
Overall, from i) and ii), I indicate that CDA is characterised by interpretative gratuitousness 
from the point of view of `non-resistant' IR and that this 'over-interpretation' stems from 
an impoverished appreciation of the micro-context of interpretation of a non-analytical 
reader. 
Because of the constraints of my thesis, my focus on inferencing related to a particular 
reader and my aim to counter the paucity of appreciation of cognitive matters in CDA, I am 
unable to devote as much space as I would like to work in text linguistic analysis, i.e, 
analysis concerned with the formal properties of text. For similar reasons, I am not able to 
pay enough attention to socio-cultural considerations in reading. However, since IR is a 
reader with little vested interest in a text, their reading is not then engaged in the social or 
political sense, mitigating to some extent the absence of attention to socio-cultural 
considerations in this thesis. Indeed, it is in eschewing a socio-cultural approach to reading, 
in favour of a cognitive one, that I am able to show that the macro- or socio-cultural context 
does not in fact weigh heavily on the micro-context of interpretation of a non-analytical 
reader of news text as CDA supposes! As I indicated above, one criticism predominant in 
Widdowson (1994; 1995a; 1995b; 1996; 1997; 1998) is that CD analysts privilege their own 
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interpretations from a particular socio-political view. In contrast to CDA, I do not privilege 
text interpretations in this thesis because of socio-political views. Rather, I openly privilege 
a set of principles of text cognition, for my non-analytical reader, these principles guiding 
my analysis of mystifying discourse. 
1.7.5 Using Empirical Studies to Support My Framework 
In 1.4.3, we saw how, for Kress (1993: 182), syntactic form could be read in two ways and 
that this was 'a hypothesis which could be tested'. Kress did not seek empirical 
substantiation for this - either his own or others. Other CD analysts I examine in this thesis 
do not offer empirical substantiation for their claims either. Indeed, one of the difficulties 
with CDA is that it is adrift from an overt and credible cognitive performance theory. Since 
CDA is sociologically-orientated, there has been little appreciation of matters of cognition 
and mental representation around the issue of mystifying text or mystifying discourse. In 
contrast to CDA, the thesis draws upon current psycholinguistic empirical evidence, and 
upon models of performance in connectionist and cognitive linguistics, in an effort to check 
what are often sketchy, unrigorous and speculative notions of cognition in CDA. Drawing 
upon empirical evidence, albeit not my own, counters the paucity of appreciation of 
cognitive matters in CDA with regard especially to the issue of mystification in reading, 
probing more comprehensively than CDA into the relationship between inference generation 
and mystification in reading. I imagine, though, that some CD analysts may feel that my 
drawing upon recent psycholinguistic evidence for inference generation in text 
comprehension, in other words my cognitive emphasis, is irrelevant to their more 
sociological or socio-cognitive concerns.8 But this would be in tension with CDA's 
processing assumptions derived, albeit with modification, from explicitly cognitive (and thus 
non-sociological sources), e.g Chomsky (see chapter 3) and explicit use of research 
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developed in artificial intelligence, e.g (Schank and Abelson, 1977) (see chapter 3). Stubbs 
(1997: 106) criticises CDA for not making use of independent empirical evidence on the 
relationship between language and thought: 
If language and thought are to be related, then one needs data and theory pertinent to both. If we have no 
independent evidence, but infer beliefs from language use, then the theory is circular. 
Unlike CDA, my drawing upon of recent psycholinguistic work on inference generation tries 
to go some way to satisfying this appeal for independent evidence on the relationship 
between thought and language. Discourse analysis, of course, is not and never will be 
`prototypical science'. But discourse analysis done by proxy for a non-analytical reader can 
still be more 'scientific' if it adheres to the scientific principle that claims be based on 
empirical evidence as opposed to a brand of discourse analysis based solely on the intuitions 
of the analyst. 
1.8 Chapter Outline 
The substantive part of the thesis, as I have said, is in three sections. In terms of word 
length, section A and B form one half of the substantive thesis and section C the other half: 
SECTION A: The Relationship Between Symbolicism, Logical Empiricism, the Classical 
Approach to Categories and CDA 
In chapter 2, I outline symbolicism, as well as the highly interrelated areas of logical 
empiricism and the classical approach to categories. In chapter 3, I demonstrate how many 
of CDA's procedures for locating mystifying text are actually underpinned by symbolic / 
logical empiricist notions. I indicate how many of these notions have been absorbed 
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inadvertently into CDA via their 'borrowing' of Chomskyan ideas. 
SECTION B: Connectionism and Cognitive Linguistics: Problematising Symbolicism etc 
and Implications for CDA 
Chapter 4 outlines some connectionist models. Discussion in this chapter is then applied 
to CDA analyses, problematising the symbolic / logical empiricist notion of mental 
representation on which they rest, and in turn problematising what CDA highlights as being 
mystifying text. Chapter 5 outlines the related perspective of cognitive linguistics and how 
it is in tension with symbolicism / classical approach to categories, and consequently also 
with the ways in which CDA highlight mystifying text. 
SECTION C: Creating an Alternative Framework for the Analysis of Mystifying Discourse 
The chapters in section C build towards an alternative framework for the highlighting of text 
which is mystifying in reading for the idealised reader. In chapter 6, I refer to recent 
psycholinguistic inference typologies and indicate the 'depth' and 'shallowness' of certain 
types of inference generation for readers with little vested interest in a text. I show how this 
psycholinguistic evidence also conflicts with the symbolic / logical empiricist assumptions 
in CDA which govern how mystifying text is highlighted. In chapter 7, I highlight the 
compatibilities between elements from cognitive linguistics, connectionism and the 
psycholinguistic evidence that processing with regard to certain types of inference is 
shallow. In this chapter, I also explore the tensions between connectionism and cognitive 
linguistics. The tensions have ramifications for Lakoff and Johnson's view of metaphor 
which I demonstrate is, ironically, based partially on symbolic assumptions. In 
problematising the Lakoff and Johnson view of metaphor, in turn, I problematise its use by 
CDA. In the final sections of chapters 6 and 7, I demonstrate the 'partiality of interpretation' 
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principle, showing how different discourses can be derived from the same text. To do so, 
I use texts examined in CDA. I show how a CD analysis is a discourse based on a high 
amount of cognitive effort and is one not coincident with the discourse derived from the 
same text by IR who expends minimum cognitive effort. In so doing, I challenge CDA's 
claim to exegetic privilege as a form of critical hermeneutics. 
In chapter 8, I assemble systematically my alternative framework for the highlighting of 
mystifying discourse, drawing upon what is highlighted in chapter 7 - compatible elements 
from connectionism, cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistic evidence for shallow 
processing. In chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, in problematising what CDA regard as being 
mystifying text, I set limits on how far an analyst can make interpretations by proxy for the 
non-analyst. The opposite occurs, however, in chapter 8. Because my framework does not 
have the symbolic basis of CDA, and it places a greater emphasis on different types of 
inference generation, the text my framework highlights as leading to mystification in reading 
would not be highlighted, in the main, by CDA. 
Notes 
1. When the 'hypothesis' reading of Whorf was first suggested in the forties and fifties, positivism prevailed. 
A characteristic of positivism is naturalism - the idea that the methods of the natural sciences can be used in 
the social sciences. A belief in naturalism, then, helped to demand 'scientific' testing of Whorls views (see 
Lucy 1992). Distinct theoretical statements would have been required to facilitate testing and so a sentential 
approach to Whorfs writings, rather than a co-textual one, would have seemed more appropriate. This would 
have reduced Whorls subtlety to some extent. To further facilitate testing, distinct variables would have been 
necessary too. Given the pervasiveness of the separability of language and thought in positivism and a 
sentential approach to Whorls articles, it was without much resistance that 'language' in Whorls writings 
became segregated from 'thought' in order to satisfy this need for discrete variables. With language and 
thought separated, irrespective of the global meaning of Whorls writings, the background naturalism in 
positivism also meant that the concept of causality was imposed upon Whorls work. That is, Whorf was read 
as positing a unicausal link between language and thought, even though there is no indication of such causality 
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in his work. 
2. Trew (1979: 111-2) acknowledges that reading of significance from a metalanguage is not a straightforward 
task: 
`No simple one-to-one correspondence can be set up between the linguistic and theoretical processes, because 
the latter are structured sequences of the former, and can occur in various forms and because individual 
linguistic changes can occur in different kinds of sequence. A single transformation - like passivisation - does 
not have a fully determinate theoretical significance. But if it stands as the first in a sequence of changes that 
include deletion of agents, selective rewording, nominalisation and embedding...then that single linguistic 
change belongs to a structured sequence of changes, which as a whole has determinate theoretical or 
ideological significance.' 
3. Another enterprise which has affiliations with CDA is Critical Applied Linguistics. This enterprise was 
initiated by Pennycook (e.g. 1990 and 1994) and has many similar aims to CDA. Differences, though, lie in 
philosophical leaning. While taking his bearings from CDA, Pennycook argues for a more explicitly 
postmodern underpinning and distances himself from Fairclough's (1992a) use of the concept of ideology 
despite Foucault's deliberate neglect of the term. With regard to textual mystification, Critical Applied 
Linguistics has so far little to add and so does not feature in this thesis. 
4. For criticisms of CDA's relationship to 'critical theory', see Hammersley (1996). 
5. Metaphor is not the only semantic phenomenon highlighted in CDA as leading to mystification. Chilton 
(1988), for example, makes common ground with Orwell's 'Newspeak' and his famous essay 'Politics and the 
English Language' (1946), highlighting how euphemism may prevent readers from actualising the reality of 
an event. Here is Chilton (1988: 80): 
`The Americans were particularly adept at 'pacification' during the Vietnam war, and at many other related 
activities such as 'protective reactions' (bombing raids) and 'urbanization' (the destruction of peasant 
villages).' 
Chilton (1988) highlights the mystifying properties of `Nukespeak' [an obvious echo of Newspeak], a generic 
term for a vocabulary set employed by those with a vested interest in nuclear weapons. Chilton (1988: 80) 
again in referring to Nukespeak writes that: 
`Military jargon of this type amounts to a semi-secret language: it has a precise meaning for the initiated but 
constitutes a misleading smoke-screen for the general public. In addition, such terms are basically euphemisms: 
one may or may not know precisely what they refer to, but either way one is desensitised to the reality of means 
of distracting associations...And then there is a missile that can carry up to ten times the explosive power of 
the 'Little Boy' [the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima] and is known as a 'tomahawk'. The effect...is to 
52 
minimise the horrific destructiveness of the thing - Indian tomahawks are, after all, scarcely more than 
playthings.' 
The power, though, of euphemisms works of course according to the degree of encyclopaedic knowledge 
people have. If one knows the firing of 'tomahawks' can lead to devastation, they are not then 'playthings'. 
With this knowledge, 'tomahawk' - the axe and `tomahawk'- the missile lose any polysemic connection they 
may have had, becoming distinct homonyms. 
6. For the sake of clarity, I think it is worth quoting Widdowson (1996: 58) at length on his definition of 
discourse and how this contrasts with the definition of discourse in CDA, which I referred to in 1.2: 
`Norman Fairclough complains that discourse analysis, on my account, 'is reduced to pragmatics'. Why 
reduced? Discourse, in my conception of it, cannot be reduced to pragmatics. It is, for me, crucially, a function 
of pragmatics: the process whereby different interpretations are drawn from the textual data. Of course this 
process implicates all manner of social factors: assumptions, beliefs, values, ideologies, which would fall within 
a Foucault concept of discourse. So it would seem that we need to distinguish two senses of discourse (see 
Widdowson, 1990). The discourse process in this pragmatic sense (Discourse 1, we might call it) is influenced 
by the different discourses that participants have been socialised in (Discourse 2). But it is not determined by 
them. To suppose that it is is indeed to reduce discourse. And this is probably where my position differs most 
radically from that of Norman Fairclough and his colleagues. So let me make it as explicit as I can. 
I do not believe that individuals simply act out social roles. There are socially constituted Discourses 2 -
conventions of belief, established values which constrain the way people think and use their language to 
achieve meaning. But people's activities are not determined by their ideological allegiances. They are not 
bound by them. You can of course ascribe social roles to individuals and part of their individuality can 
obviously be associated with this group identity. Pragmatics would take account of this in its consideration 
of contextual conditions. But to think of individuals as if they were representative of such groups, as tokens 
of the type, is to deal in stereotypical constructs, well defined social categories.' 
And Widdowson (1996: 59): 
`...individuals are constrained, but they remain individuals none the less: they are not just 'subjects discoursally 
constituted'. This is not to deny the existence of discourses in the Foucault sense as conventionalised modes 
of knowledge (i.e. Discourse 2), nor the importance of studying the discursive construction of social subjects 
at an appropriate level of idealisation. But these discourses are abstract constructs. They can only be 
actualised through discourse as I have defined it, as the pragmatic process of meaning negotiation (i.e. 
Discourse 1).' 
7. The privileging of interpretation can be seen in Fairclough's (1989: 52) analysis of the Jenny Keeble text 
in 1.4.1. Fairclough conflates the abstract qualified category 'good wife', and its specific meaning in the text. 
The abstract and general 'good wife' has often been used to refer to wives who consciously or sub-consciously 
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agreed to: be house-bound, be (mostly) responsible for raising children, have no full-time job, be completely 
responsible for domestic chores etc - as such a willing thwarter of her own potential for the sake of her 
husband. But there is little textual warrant here that Jenny Keeble is that kind of 'good wife' and thus it is 
questionable whether this text would reproduce sexist discourse (i.e. discourse 2 - see note 6) in the way in 
which Fairclough argues. The general category of 'good wife' is sufficiently reduced here to be considered 
reasonably appropriate for any 'good partner' if their 'significant other' were at war. It is because Fairclough 
adopts the exegetic practice of reading a general category into text specificities - conflating the macro-context 
with the micro-context of interpretation - that he reaches the conclusion he does. A need to read the macro-
context into the micro-context becomes patent when we see that some of the 'attributes' of the 'good wife' he 
refers to come from Jenny Keeble's lips rather than a 'sexist' journalist producing a sexist text.' 
8. Occasionally, statements delimiting psychological considerations are made in CDA. Here, for example, are 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 68): 
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`We do not see CDA as a theory specifically of the relation between cognition and text.' 
Section A: The Relationship between Symbolicism, 
Logical Empiricism, the Classical Approach to 
Categories and CDA 
This section comprises two chapters. In chapter 2, I outline symbolicism and areas related 
to symbolicism - logical empiricism and the classical approach to categories. In chapter 3, 
I show how much of CDA, and especially how CDA highlights mystifying text, is 
underpinned by symbolic, logical empiricist and classical assumptions. 
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CHAPTER 2: OUTLINE OF SYMBOLICISM, LOGICAL 
EMPIRICISM AND THE CLASSICAL APPROACH TO 
CATEGORIES 
2.1 Introduction 
Most of this chapter is given over to an outline of the symbolic architecture of the mind or 
symbolicism for short. I also deal with highly related areas including: logical empiricist 
philosophy of language, the 'classical' theory of categories and `syntax-first' approaches to 
processing. I show how many of Chomsky's ideas are consonant with the above areas. I 
shall then go on in chapter 3 to show how: 
i) CDA has inadvertently absorbed many symbolic postulates into their perspective on 
language processing through their 'borrowings' from Chomsky. 
ii) postulates within logical empiricism can be found to underwrite some assumptions of 
language processing for some CDA authors. Some of these logical empiricist postulates 
have been absorbed through 'borrowings' from Chomsky. 
iii) the classical theory of categories can be found to underwrite some assumptions of 
processing for some CDA authors. 
In showing i), ii) and iii), I highlight in chapter 3 how CDA's isolations of mystifying text 
are influenced by symbolic / logical empiricist / 'classical' assumptions. 
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2.2 Symbolic Architecture 
2.2.1 Turing Machines and von Neumann Machines 
Symbolic modelling of the mind within cognitive science is based on the idea that mental 
processing consists of the manipulation of symbols that can be transformed according to 
rules. These symbols are held to be retainable and thus an enduring set of entities. In 
symbolic architectures of the mind, mental representations are viewed as semantically 
interpretable, structured objects consisting of symbols which have parts. As exemplification 
of this notion, here is Cooper (1996: 28): 
The symbol '34' for example, has parts (the symbols '3' and '4'), and the meaning of '34' is a function of the 
meaning of '3' in the tens position and '4' in the units position. The arabic representation of numbers, then, 
is a structured, semantically interpretable representation. 
And for linguistic cognition more specifically, this set of unequivocal algorithms constitutes 
a syntax - i.e. a set of linguistic rules which formally specify a set of operations on linguistic 
symbols. 
The provenance of symbolic modelling lies in the computational theory developed by John 
von Neumann (1947) and Alan Turing (1950) and has been incorporated into nearly all 
existing electronic computers. Sketching out the nature of what has become known as a 
Turing machine will help understanding of the essence of symbolic modelling. A Turing 
machine is not in fact an actual machine at all but an abstract model. It has an infinite 
memory in the form of an infinite strip of tape. It also consists of a type-writing device 
which can type a symbol on the tape, erase such a symbol, and move left and right along the 
tape. By specifying exactly what symbols the typewriter uses, and how it should respond 
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to them as it passes along the tape, the Turing machine converts one set of symbols and 
spaces (`input') into another (`output'). For Turing, the machine was seen as extremely 
powerful since theoretically it could transform any input into any output given some 
computable relation between them. That is, a Turing machine can execute any algorithm (a 
set of computable instructions). However, the power of the Turing machine lies in the 
abstract. The blueprint for most standard modern computers was in fact established by John 
von Neumann. Processing in a von Neumann machine is serially-based on a fetch-
instruction / execute-instruction cycle. The machine fetches the current instruction and then 
moves the instruction indicator to the next directive. It executes the instruction it has just 
retrieved, fetches the next directive and so on. In a strict sense, von Neumann machines are 
less powerful than a Turing machine because they have finite memory. However, in practice 
and particularly with modern computers this is rarely a problem. 
2.2.2 Turing Machines, Symbolicism and Philosophy: General 
The symbolic notion of a Turing machine has been influential in the philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science. One philosopher influenced by the concept of a Turing machine is 
Putnam (1975). For Putnam (1975: chpts. 18, 20, 21) mental cognition is understood in 
terms of the manipulation of symbols via the computation of a set of unequivocal algorithms 
and without recourse to the neurophysiology or `wetware' of the brain. But in many ways, 
the Turing machine is itself a distillation of well-known perspectives in logic and philosophy 
which view the mind most prominently in its capacity to reason and where reason is 
characterised as the algorithmic manipulation of abstract symbols (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
1991: 8). An example of an algorithm within logic is the simple inference rule modus 
tollens: from one proposition of the form, ifp then q, and another of the form — q, we can 
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infer the proposition — p. Within philosophy also, the idea that human cognition is based 
upon symbolic manipulation has been a recurrent one that cuts across the old division 
between empiricism and rationalism (Lakoff, 1987a: 164). It is found in Hobbes ([1651] 
1962: 41) who regarded reason as analogous to mathematical computation. Rationalists 
such as Descartes and Leibniz and empiricists such as Locke and Hume helped to further 
establish this view of cognition as consisting of rule-governed logical manipulation (Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen, 1991: 10). (See also 2.2.4 on logical empiricism below for a more specific 
outline of the relationship between symbolicism and a philosophical position). 
2.2.3 Assumptions about the Mind-Brain in Symbolicism 
One of the ancient 'problems' in philosophy is what is known as the mind-brain problem. 
Reduced to its essence, the mind-body problem revolves around a dichotomy. Is the mind 
a 'ghost in the machine', composed of non-corporeal material, or do mental phenomena 
(beliefs, intentions, etc) have physical instantiations? The positions that answer these 
questions in the affirmative are known as dualism and materialism respectively. Well-
known dualists have included Plato and Descartes and more recently Eccles (1977) and 
Swinburne (1986). Prominent materialists have included Hobbes and more recently, Skinner 
(1957, 1976), Smart, (1959), Quine (1960), Dennett (1978) and Churchland, P.M. (1988). 
As a consequence of a rigid separation between mind and body, dualists regard psychology 
as independent of neurobiology since the latter is concerned much more with mental 
`wetware' and much less with the mental phenomena it 'supports'. Indeed, dualism is a 
commonplace assumption about the mind, supported by a 'folk-psychology' vocabulary such 
as 'beliefs', 'attitude', 'hopes' etc. Since dualism is such a commonplace notion it makes 
the study of mind, in the absence of biological considerations or widely accepted 
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evolutionary principles of selection or descent, appear so natural. 
Now for Putnam (1967) (as well as Fodor (1975) and Pylyshyn (1984)) mental states are 
algorithmic. They need not be implemented in brains, thereby reducing the importance of 
locating mental states with brain states. Thus symbolicism ties in neatly with philosophical 
dualism and 'common-sense' dualism, naturalising the study of the mind independent of the 
brain's wetware. Indeed, computational machines based on the logical foundations of 
Turing machines or on von Neumann architecture for a digital computer have come to be 
regarded for many as sound models for the understanding of mind-brain functions. In 
chapter 4, I outline an approach to cognitive modelling known as connectionism. In contrast 
to symbolicism, connectionism explicitly regards mental states as being dependent on 
neurophysiological ' wetware' . 
I have given a brief sketch of the relationship between symbolicism and philosophy, and 
how symbolicism entails dualism and thus sanctions the study of mind independent of brain 
`wetware'. I mentioned briefly that, in symbolicism, linguistic cognition involves a set of 
unequivocal algorithms which constitutes a syntax - i.e. a set of linguistic rules which 
formally specify a set of operations on linguistic symbols. Section 2.2.5 will give more 
attention to linguistic issues in symbolicism. But firstly in 2.2.4 below, I examine the 
linguistic philosophical position known as logical empiricism. I then go on (in 2.2.5) to 
show how logical empiricism has exerted influence on how linguistic mental representation 
has been cast within symbolic cognitive science. Following this, in 2.3, I show the symbolic 
/ logical empiricist influences on the Chomskyan paradigm upon which CDA borrows. As 
we shall see in chapter 3, in adapting Chomsky, CDA has absorbed many symbolic / logical 
empiricist postulates, these postulates influencing how CDA highlights mystifying text. 
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2.2.4 Logical Empiricism)  
Orientation 
Logical empiricism was a branch of philosophy which is mostly associated with members 
of the Vienna Circle of the 1920s and 30s. Such members included Rudolph Carnap, 
Herbert Feigl, Otto Neurath and Moritz Schlick. It was so called since its practitioners 
sought to apply logical methods to the world of empirical experience. Thus, logical 
empiricism can be viewed as something of an amalgam of the traditional poles of 
empiricism and rationalism. Their demarcation criterion of verificationism, whether 
propositions could be empirically tested or not, adjudicated between scientific knowledge 
and metaphysics or 'meaninglessness'. Logical empiricism espoused physical reductionism, 
that the propositions of sociology, for example, could be analysed into those of physics. 
Logical empiricism was also nominalist and as such opposed to theoretical entities 
postulated to account for the physical world. This nominalism, when applied to the social 
world, emphasised methodological individualism over holism, and thus avoided any 
postulating of a social ontology behind abstract social categories. Not only this but any lapse 
into a hermeneutics of social action was regarded as metaphysical also. 
Russell 
The heritage of logical empiricism lay in work on the interface of logic, mathematics and 
philosophy by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead and the early work 
of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the initial part of this century. Russell and Whitehead (1910) 
aimed to derive mathematics from the fundamentals of logic. Their end-product, the 
Trincipia Mathematica', was to exercise a large influence on Anglo-American-Austrian 
philosophy in the first few decades of this century. For Russell, the real world was made up 
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of 'facts' which are essentially atomic in nature, i.e. cannot be reduced, and the Principia 
Mathematica' provided the basis of a perfect logical language because it mirrored the 
structure of the real world. Russell's perspective became known as Logical Atomism. 
Atomic propositions by definition had a subject-predicate structure. Russell inherited the 
idea of a sentence being a fundamental unit from Frege, and indeed in logical empiricism, 
as a whole, emphasis was placed upon syntactic structure. For Russell, atomic propositions 
were largely analysed in terms of truth-functionality. But for an atomic proposition to be 
meaningful, i.e., to be true or false, the subject should denote an individual entity and the 
predicate refer to some quality of that entity. By these criteria, 'Tony Blair is Prime-
Minister of the UK in 1999' is a valid atomic proposition. But, what of a sentence such as 
`the present king of France is bald' uttered in 1999? The structure may be that of subject-
predicate, but the subject does not have denotation and so the sentence cannot be treated in 
a truth-functional manner. Such a sentence poses problems for Russell's logical atomism 
since by his criteria it is not meaningful. 
For Russell, mathematical logic could provide philosophy with a set of techniques for 
clarifying such a sentence. Russell held that there was an underlying logical structure to the 
sentence 'the present king of France is bald' that, once revealed, would show that the 
sentence is meaningful after all. Russell contended that the underlying logical form of 'the 
present king of France is bald' is actually quite complex and contains the following 
assertions: 
There is an entity x, such that: 
a) x has property K [K = 'king of France'] 
b) there is no other entity y which is distinct from x and has property K 
c) x has property B [ W = 'bald] 
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In logical form this becomes: 
3x [ Kx & -Hy( ( y x ) & Ky ) & Bx ]  
This can be paraphrased as the conjunction of three propositions, or in Russell's parlance, 
a molecular proposition consisting of three atomic propositions: 
There is a king of France 	 and 
There is no one else who is king of France 	 and 
The king of France is bald 
In expanding 'the king of France' to include the existential clause, 'there is a king of 
France', in predicate calculus, Russell was able to claim that the sentence 'the king of France 
is bald' was now meaningful. Why did Russell think this? In a truth table for a conjunction, 
if one of the conjuncts is false, then the truth value for the conjunction is also false.2 On 
Russell's analysis, since the first conjunct (3x Kx ) is false, the whole of the logical form 
of the 'king of France is bald' is also false. Because Russell viewed the meaning of a 
sentence to a large extent in terms of whether truth conditions could be ascribed to a 
sentence, he could then regard 'king of France is bald' as meaningful; (see Levinson (1983: 
171) for more details). 
Wittgenstein 
Russell's student, Ludwig Wittgenstein, sought to develop his tutor's perspective in the 
`Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' (1921). He too inherits from Frege the notion that the 
fundamental unit of meaning is not the word but the sentence. The basis of the `Tractatus' 
was a logical formalising of a tri-partite correspondence between thoughts, sentences, and 
object relations in the world. Like Russell, there is the desire in Wittgenstein to clarify 
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linguistic descriptions of the world by reducing them to their underlying propositions, 
simples with a rudimentary logical syntax. For Wittgenstein, the logical structure of simples 
was concealed by the ordinary language form of a sentence. Another feature of these 
`simples' was that they were logically independent of one another. In the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein expressed the belief that if meaningful discussion was to transpire then a 
sentence would not only have to represent reality, but the sentence and the state of affairs 
it represents must have a common structure. The corollary of this, for Wittgenstein, is that 
since the structure of the language must mirror the structure of the world, then it is possible 
to discern the structure of the world by analysing the structure of sentences. From this, 
Wittgenstein derived his 'picture theory of meaning', where language was a picture of how 
facts about the world were structured and so also a 'picture' of how the world itself was 
structured. 
Carnap 
In turn, the philosophers of the 'Vienna Circle' were heavily influenced by the `Tractatus', 
one member, Rudolph Carnap, believing also that much of philosophy was reducible to 
concerns of logical syntax. Indeed, for Carnap, by refraining from syntactic errors through 
the employment of logical analysis, a philosophical conundrum could be solved or shown 
to be insoluble (Carnap, [1928 ] 1967). For Camap, philosophy had to consist in the logic 
of science, which was itself identified with the logical syntax of a scientific language. 
Carnap (1967) distinguished three kinds of sentences: object, pseudo-object, and syntactical. 
Examples of object sentences are '5 is a prime number' and 'Babylon was a big town'. 
Examples of pseudo-object sentences are 'Five is not a thing but a number' and 'Babylon 
was treated of in yesterday's lecture'. Examples of syntactical sentences are 'Five is not a 
thing-word, but a number word' and 'The word 'Babylon' occurred in yesterday's lecture'. 
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Carnap also made a distinction between material and formal modes of speech. Object and 
pseudo-object sentences were regarded as belonging to the material mode of speech and 
syntactical sentences to the formal mode. The point I want to highlight here is that for 
Carnap, pseudo-object sentences were so called because they were held to be syntactical 
sentences masquerading as object-sentences. As such, they were said to be syntactical 
sentences expressed in the material mode. Translating them into the formal mode revealed 
their syntactical character. It was Carnap's ambition to show that the respectable 
propositions of philosophy, as commonly formulated, were syntactical propositions of 
philosophy misleadingly expressed in the material mode; see Ayer (1982) for further 
discussion. 
Compositionality 
One prominent notion within logical empiricism that is a given with the above thinkers is 
that meaning is compositional. Essentially, this means that logical empiricism operates on 
a 'building-block' attitude to meaning. Within logical empiricism, the world is regarded as 
being constituted by objects with well-defined inherent properties and there are fixed 
relations between objects at any given time. A world constituted by well-defined objects can 
be ascribed discrete names. Since these objects have well-defined inherent properties, then 
each of these properties can be ascribed a one-place predicate corresponding to each of those 
properties. And since the objects stand in fixed relations to one another, then a series of 
many-place predicates can be ascribed so as to correspond to each relation. The natural 
consequence of such a perspective is to regard meaning atomistically - 'in building blocks'. 
From the 'building block' view of meaning within logical empiricism arises a 
correspondence theory of truth. Here are Lakoff and Johnson on the logical empiricist 
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perspective on objects, properties and relations I have just outlined (1980: 202-3): 
Assuming that the world is this way and that we have such a language, we can, using the syntax of this 
language, construct sentences that can correspond directly to any situation in the world. The meaning of the 
whole sentence will be its truth conditions, that is, the conditions under which the sentence can be fitted to 
some situation. 
The Removal of the Human Understander in Logical Empiricism 
However, for a sentence to mirror or successfully correspond to a situation in the world, it 
must fully represent objects, properties and relations, independent of the contribution to 
processing of the human `understander'. Lakoff and Johnson once more on logical 
empiricism (1980: 202): 
The meaning of the whole sentence will depend entirely on the meanings of its parts and how they fit 
together...every sentence of the language must contain all of the necessary building blocks so that, together 
with the syntax, nothing more is needed to provide the truth conditions of the sentence. The 'something more' 
that is ruled out is any kind of human understanding. 	 [my bold] 
Indeed, Carnap's attempt to produce a logical syntax that could be applied to the problems 
of philosophy consisted of these building-block properties with little consideration given to 
the contribution of the human understander. 
I now go on to show how the thread of ideas that runs from Russell through to the Vienna 
Circle has exerted an influence upon the symbolic paradigm in cognitive science. 
66 
2.2.5 The Influence of Logical Empiricism upon the Symbolic Paradigm 
As support for the view that the ideas of logical empiricism have exerted an influence upon 
the symbolic paradigm, here first is Harder (1997: 52): 
The basic problem with the classical computational approach was that it smuggled a number of assumptions 
associated with logical positivism into the supposedly new mental framework, instead of facing the challenge 
of actual mental phenomenon. 
Harder goes on to say that this challenge is met by cognitive linguistics, an enterprise to 
which chapter 5 is devoted. Now consider the following from Gardner (1987: 64-5): 
...a major ingredient in ongoing work in the cognitive sciences has been cast in the image of logical 
empiricism: that is, the vision of syntax - a set of symbols and the rules for their concatenation - that might 
underline the operations of the mind (and a correlative discomfort with issues of mental content)...Thus, when 
Noam Chomsky (1965) posits the basic operations of grammar, when Richard Montague (Thomason 1974) 
examines the logic of semantics, when Allen Newell and Herbert Simon (1972) simulate human reasoning on 
a computer, or when Jerome Bruner (1973) and George Miller (1956) seek to decipher the rules of 
classification, or 'chunking', they are trying to decipher a logic - perhaps the logic - of the mind. This vision 
comes through even more clearly in the writings of Jerry Fodor, who explicitly searches for a 'language of 
thought' and even appropriates certain of Carnap's methods. Thus, a model that proved inadequate for the 
scientific enterprise as a whole still motivates research in circumscribed cognitive domains. 
Let me pick up on Gardner's point that logical empiricism is implicit within Fodor's 
`language of thought' hypothesis. Fodor is a thinker firmly entrenched within the symbolic 
camp. Fodor (1975) offers the view that mental representation occurs within a 'language of 
thought' (often known as mentalese) where mental representations encode propositional 
information via a language-like syntactic structure. The connection between Fodor's 
mentalese and logical empiricism should be apparent. This connection is also evident in a 
more recent articulation of Fodor's position in Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988). Both Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1988) stress the 'syntactic' nature of thought, maintaining that structured symbols 
and computation which is structure-sensitive are key elements in mental cognition. Human 
cognition is wired to assemble complex symbols from rudimentary ones. On the basis of 
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this notion, they hold, similar to the logical empiricists, that thought is compositional. So, 
for Fodor and Pylyshyn, a thought's meaning is regarded as a function of the meaning of its 
parts, molecular representations being formed out of its constituents. The thought that 
`David is tall' is, for instance, a function of the meaning of the thought 'David' and the 
meaning of the thought 'is tall'. Patently, another logical empiricist echo here is of Russell's 
logical atomism where atomic propositions are more primitive than molecular ones. 
Another characteristic of human cognition that Fodor and Pylyshyn highlight is the idea that 
mental representations are systematic; systematic exchange can occur in mental 
representations to yield new representations. So if a system contains a representation xRy, 
where R is a relation and x and y are variables of the same syntactic type, then the system 
has the ability to produce the representation yRx. For example, if we can have the thoughts 
that 'David loves Mary' then we can also have the thought that 'Mary loves David'. For this 
to take place, 'the two mental representations, like the two sentences, must be made of the 
same parts' (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988: 39). Again, like Russell's conception, the referents 
are handled via syntactic concerns rather than semantic ones. Thirdly, Fodor and Pylyshyn 
indicate that mental representations are characterised by productivity. What this means is 
that, despite a finite number of simple concepts, humans can produce an infinite set of 
propositions. Fodor and Pylyshyn reason that a set of infinite propositions which can 
nevertheless be systematically related, as with the above example, can only be explained on 
the basis that they are constructed via repeatable units. Finally, Fodor and Pylyshyn also 
hold that syntax is autonomous and effectively operates an apartheid between semantics and 
syntax. Algorithmic operations are viewed as syntactic and are applied without recourse to 
the semantics of the symbols. This emphasis on syntactic operations is very much a 
characteristic of symbolicism. 
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As I intend to show in chapter 3 how CDA notions of mental representation are essentially 
symbolic / logical empiricist, partly at least because they were derived via Chomskyan 
`borrowings', I need now to manifest the essentially symbolic / logical empiricist nature of 
Chomsky's work. This was already hinted at in the quote from Gardner (1987: 65). Since 
`borrowings' of Chomsky in CDA do not go beyond 1969, the scope of this examination is 
restricted to Chomsky (1957) and (1965), the two most cited works, for example, in Hodge 
and Kress (1993: 35-7). 
2.3 Chomsky and Symbolicism / Logical Empiricism 
2.3.1 Synopsis of Chomsky's Early Positions 
In this section, I sketch the development of Chomsky's thought so as to make evident 
affinities between Chomsky and the symbolic paradigm. I start with Chomsky's famous 
review of B.F.Skinner's Verbal Behaviour. In this review, Chomsky (1959) argued that a 
behaviouristic explanation could not explain the human capacity to learn a language. 
Chomsky highlighted (i) how any natural language has an infinite number of syntactically 
well-formed sentences, and (ii) the fact that speakers can understand and produce sentences 
that they had not previously encountered (Chomsky 1957). Chomsky maintained that the 
output of an infinite set of well-formed sentences could not be stimulated by a set of finite 
learned associations between environmental stimuli and linguistic responses (the 'poverty 
of stimulus' argument). Instead, Chomsky proposed that the potential for producing an 
infinite set of well-formed sentences exists because of an innate capacity rather than one 
which relied upon environmental stimulation. The approach that Chomsky offered to 
replace behaviourism became known as generative grammar. In trying to establish the 
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notion of a generative grammar, Chomsky aimed to show that the current models for 
explaining the generation of an infinite set of well-formed sentences were inadequate for the 
task. The two models which Chomsky isolated as being prominent and at the same time 
problematic were finite-state grammar and phrase-structure grammar. I shall consider each 
in turn. 
Chomsky turned his attention to finite-state grammars since language had been considered 
from this perspective 'in connection with the design of efficient channels of communication 
during the Second World War; and the highly sophisticated mathematical theory of 
communication that resulted (`information theory') was extended to many fields, including 
psychology and linguistics, after the war' (Lyons 1991: 55). A finite-state grammar is 
predicated upon the view that sentences are generated via a selection procedure made 'from 
left to right'. After the first linguistic element has been chosen, subsequent selections are 
made on the basis of previous elements. Take the sentence 'this man is running'. The word 
`this' would be selected from the set of all words occurring at the beginning of a sentence, 
`man' would be chosen as a possible word to follow 'this' (rather than 'men' say) and so on. 
In Syntactic Structures (1957), Chomsky disregards finite-state grammars since they cannot 
capture recursion. Consider the sentence 'The man who was wearing the trilby started to 
wave at me'. For Chomsky, a finite-state grammar cannot capture the syntactic dependency 
between 'man' and 'started to wave' which endures across the intervening defining relative 
clause. Furthermore, a finite-state grammar cannot cope with clausal embeddings that can 
recur interminably (there was an old woman who swallowed a fly, that was eaten by a toad, 
that was eaten by dog etc...). Even though such sentences become more and more difficult 
to cognise, for Chomsky they are technically grammatical; that is, any grammar must be able 
to account for or generate them. 
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I turn now to the other grammar that Chomsky considered problematic - phrase-structure 
grammar. This grammar consists of a fundamental set of strings (a sequence of symbols) 
and a finite set of phrase-structure rules which operate upon the fundamental set to 'rewrite' 
it into another permissible form. Chomsky argued that such a grammar was not only 
maladroit but failed to account for speakers' intuitions that strings like 'David hit Bill' and 
`Bill was hit by David' bear a close relationship to one another. With its roots lying in the 
work of his former tutor, Zellig Harris (1952), in Syntactic Structures, Chomsky laid the 
beginnings of a grammar which aimed to both capture recursion and account for speaker 
intuitions regarding sentential relationships such as that between the active and passive 
voice. This grammar became known as 'transformational grammar'. In a transformational 
grammar, Chomsky contended, a matrix of rules is established so that separate strings can 
be related, and where one sentence, or to be more accurate - the sentence's abstract mental 
representation - can be transformed to generate sentences. Such a transformational or 
generative grammar is a set of algorithms of mathematical exactitude which generates 
sentences in a language without utilising any information extraneous to the system. 
In Syntactic Structures, Chomsky begins with phrase-structure rules which enable the 
generation of the core sentences, or kernel sentences. The kernel sentences are generated 
via a set of algorithms such as the following (which are not intended to be exhaustive): 
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1.  Sentence -4 
2.  NP —> 
3.  VP —> 
4.  N —> 
5.  V --> 
6.  A —> 
7.  Det —> 
NP + VP 
(Det) + (A) + N 
V + NP 
e.g. boy, girl, dog, cat, ice cream 
e.g. eats, likes, bites 
e.g. happy, lucky, tall 
e.g. a, the, one 
So taking the symbol S as the starting point, a kernel sentence such as 'The boy eats the ice 
cream' can be generated. From this platform, the other grammatical sentences of the 
language can be generated not via the transformation of these kernel sentences, but via the 
transformation of a common underlying string. Since transformations are algorithmic in 
nature and operate serially, conversion from one underlying string into another follows an 
established sequence. Transformations were also believed to resolve structural or formal 
ambiguities such as are extant within 'Jimmy saw the girl with the binoculars' through the 
exhibition of different transformational procedures - one where the PP 'with the binoculars' 
is a post-modifier in the NP, 'the girl with the binoculars', and another where 'with the 
binoculars' is a PP constituent of the VP 'saw the girl with the binoculars' and not of the NP 
`the girl'. In 1965, Chomsky tendered a new expression of transformational grammar in the 
form of the 'Standard Theory' in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. The notion of kernel 
sentences was discarded. Instead, the concept of 'deep structure' was introduced where a 
transformational element mutates into other structures, the ultimate being the 'surface 
structure'. 
2.3.2 Affinities Between Chomsky's Early Position and Symbolicism /Logical Empiricism. 
Clearly, there are affinities between Chomsky's approach to language and that of the logical 
empiricists: the concentration on syntax, the exhibition of underlying structure in natural 
language, kernel sentences as simples (akin to Russell's atomic propositions in their subject-
predicate structure, declarative rather than interrogative or imperative, active rather than 
passive etc) the application of formal mathematics to a natural language like English (though 
in Chomsky's case this was 'finite automata theory' and 'recursive function theory') etc. 
Indeed, Hacking (1975: 91) goes as far as to say that: 
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Russell's idea of logical form as opposed to grammatical form is strikingly like Chomsky's idea of depth 
grammar as opposed to surface grammar. 
And Lakoff (1987a: 226), referring to the Chomskyan paradigm but without naming it 
specifically, summarises the influence of mathematics and logic on logical empiricism in 
turn influencing Chomsky's view that languages are viewed principally in terms of formal 
syntax separate from semantics: 
How did it come about that philosophers, linguists, and even many cognitive psychologists have come to view 
natural human languages in terms of formal syntax and formal semantics? 
The principal reason was the rise of mathematical logic, the enormous prestige that it acquired, and the fact 
that it was taught in European and American universities by objectivist philosophers, who viewed it as the study 
of reason. When logic was turned into a form of mathematics by Frege, Russell, Hilbert, and others, the 
axiomatic method was adopted into logic itself... 
The formalist program of separating syntax from semantics accompanied the mathematicization of logic and 
the unification of logic with mathematics. The separation was needed in order to make sense of axiom systems. 
Through the influence of Bertrand Russell, British and American philosophers eventually adopted the 
objectivist equation of reason with mathematical logic. Along with that development came the idea that natural 
languages also had a division between syntax and semantics, with syntax being a matter of uninterpreted 
symbols and semantics providing a separate interpretation. To objectivist philosophers trained in mathematical 
logic, the division came to be seen as natural. 
Ties between Chomsky and the symbolic paradigm of cognitive science include the 
algorithmic nature of transformations, the serial manner of their operation. As Gardner 
argues (1987: 188) 'clearly, Chomsky was a child of the new era of Wiener, von Neumann, 
Turing and Shannon...'3 The cognitive linguist Langacker (1987b: 6) concurs in regarding 
Chomsky as a progeny of the first generation of artificial intelligence: 
...linguistic theory in the generative tradition presupposes the von Neumann architecture, accepting without 
question the need for discrete and explicit rules couched in some 'propositional' format, and which constitute 
an algorithm specifying the sequential manipulation of abstract strings of symbols. 
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and the symbolic grounding of Chomskyan thought is attested to by Brown (1991: 491): 
...although in Syntactic Structures Chomsky was very concerned to explore the mathematical properties of 
PS [phrase-structure] rules, little attention was devoted to the mathematical power of transformations. Once 
the mathematical properties of this kind of rule were explored, it became clear that a grammar with 
transformations has the formal properties of a universal Turing machine: in other words, they are such a 
powerful tool that they can explain nothing except that language can be described in terms of some set of 
rules. 	 [my italics] 
I have established that Chomsky's perspective has been influenced by symbolic cognitive 
science and logical empiricism - both highly interrelated areas. Both these areas are so 
interrelated that often when I use the term symbolic in this thesis, it should be obvious that 
I am referring to logical empiricism as well. In chapter 3, I show how many of the language 
processing assumptions of CDA and in particular how CDA highlights mystifying text are 
predicated upon symbolic / logical empiricist postulates. I indicate how such postulates have 
been absorbed, in part at least, via CDA's use of Chomsky. 
In the next section, I want to outline the classical approach to categorisation which is related 
to both symbolicism and logical empiricism. For instance, as we shall see, Chomsky's 
thinking is bound up with it. Lakoff (1987a) refers to the classical approach to 
categorisation as objectivism. This is because it does not include human understanding, 
being objectively apart from it. In this respect, the classical approach to categorisation 
dovetails also with logical empiricism (2.2.4). In chapter 3, I will indicate how the classical 
approach to categorisation informs some aspects of how CDA highlights mystifying text. 
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2.4 The Classical Theory of Categories 
2.4.1 Aristotle 
What is known as the classical approach to categories is synonymous with Aristotle's ideas 
and it is from its roots in antiquity that this theory of categories derives its name (Taylor, 
1995: 22). In 'Metaphysics', Aristotle draws a distinction between the essence of a thing 
and its accidents. The essence is 'all parts immanent in things which define and indicate 
their individuality, and whose destruction causes the destruction of the whole' (Metaphysics 
5.8.3); that is, the essence is what constitutes and thereby defines the thing. Accidents are 
on the other hand what may be called incidental properties and are not instrumental in 
divining what a thing is; "Accident' means that which applies to something and is truly 
stated, but neither necessarily nor usually' (5.30.1). As illustration, here is one of Aristotle's 
examples: man's essence is 'two-footed animal'. The properties of whiteness, being 
cultured etc are merely accidental since they do not determine whether a thing is a man. For 
Aristotle, both the concept MAN and the meaning of the word man are defined by a `formula 
(logos') of the essence' (7.5.7): 
If 'man' has one meaning, let this be 'two-footed animal'. By 'has one meaning', I mean this: if X means 
`man', then if anything is a man, its humanity will consist in being X (4.4.8). 
To attach the predicate 'is a man' to an entity, the meaning of the word man must be divined, 
that is, the essence of man must be known: 
If anything can be truly said to be 'man', it must be 'two-footed animal'; for this is what 'man' is intended to 
mean (4.4. 14-15). 
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In modern parlance, Aristotle regards 'two-footed' and 'animal' as necessary features and 
jointly the two features are deemed to be sufficient. Indeed, the notion that categories can 
be defined in terms of discrete necessary features which, taken as a set, are sufficient is an 
assumption of the classical approach. This assumption entails an absoluteness to the issue 
of category membership. Any entity which manifests the number of necessary features 
required for sufficiency is ipso facto a member of the category. Vice-versa, if any one of the 
necessary features for sufficiency is absent then category membership is denied. There are 
other aspects of Aristotelian theory which conjoin with the above assumption. These derive 
from the 'law of excluded middle' and the 'law of contradiction' (Metaphysics 4.4). The 
law of contradiction states that a thing cannot be and not be, and the law of excluded middle 
states that a thing must either be or not be. What follows from these 'laws' are that features 
are binary, indicating presence [+] or absence [-] since categories have clear unambiguous 
boundaries. One other aspect that follows from this position is that all members of a 
category have equal status. In other words, if three necessary features are required for 
sufficiency in X, and only two are present in Y then Y cannot be less of an exemplar 
instance of X but rather is barred from category membership. 
2.4.2 Chomsky / Twentieth-Century Linguistics 
Aristotle's model of categorisation has exerted an enormous influence in twentieth-century 
linguistics. Formalist approaches to phonology, syntax, semantics rest on the assumptions 
of the Aristotelian model. These are apparent in the status of grammatical categories in 
Chomsky's transformational paradigm where there is the requirement that membership is 
a clear-cut matter. This is because transformational rules operate on underlying phrase 
markers, independently of the semantics of the lexical items that fill the category slots. 
Because of this, grammatical categories are 'necessarily' clear-cut entities (Taylor 1995: 
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186-7). The 'obviousness' of Aristotelianism can also be seen in phonology and is, for 
example, a basic assumption of Chomsky and Halle (1968: 297): 
In view of the fact that phonological features are classificatory devices, they are binary...for the natural way 
of indicating whether or not an item belongs to a particular category is by means of binary features.' 
Phonemes are classified in terms of binary features which can be present or absent e.g. 
[+HIGH] or [-HIGH]. Another aspect of features is the lack of decomposition, these features 
being said to be primitives. An analysis of semantic categories along the lines of phonology 
has been pursued within the transformational-generative paradigm by Katz (e.g. Katz and 
Fodor 1963; Katz and Postal 1964) and Bierwisch (1967, 1970); it has also been explored 
under the name 'componential analysis' by Nida (1975) and Leech (1981). As illustration, 
consider the category of 'bachelor'. Katz and Postal (1964) represent the meaning of this 
word in terms of four semantic features, namely [HUMAN], [MALE], [ADULT], and 
[NEVER MARRIED]. Together these are a sufficient set of features for capturing the 
essence of bachelor and likewise if any of these necessary features is absent (e.g. [- MALE] 
or [-ADULT], the predicate of BACHELOR cannot be ascribed. Predicate calculus 
translations of sense relations between predicates reflect this 'all or nothing' attitude to 
category membership: 
Hyponymy: 	 V x [ C (x) —> D (x)] 
Synonymy: 
	
V x [C (x) D (x) I 
Converses: 	 V xVy [C (x, y) —› D (y, x)] 
Binary Antonymy: 	 Vx[C(x) —> — D(x) ] 
Chomsky has made claims for the universality of semantic features. Just as the set of 
universal phonological features defines the sound-producing capabilities of man, so the set 
of universal semantic features defines his cognitive capabilities: 
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It is important to determine the universal, language-independent constraints on semantic features - in traditional 
terms, the system of possible concepts. The very notion 'lexical entry' presupposes some sort of fixed, 
universal vocabulary in terms of which these objects are characterized, just as the notion 'phonetic 
representation' presupposes some sort of universal phonetic theory. It is surely our ignorance of the relevant 
psychological and physiological facts that makes possible the widely held belief that there is little or no a priori 
structure to the system of 'attainable concepts'. 	 Chomsky (1965: 160) 
The postulation of universal semantic primitives is not an innovation of generative linguists. 
Leibniz, in the seventeenth century, set himself the task of discovering the 'alphabet of 
human thought' - a set of basic conceptual building blocks, not susceptible to further 
decomposition, whose combination might underlie all possible concepts, (Eco, 1995: 270). 
Chomsky only ever claimed to have produced a model of linguistic competence rather than 
linguistic performance. Despite this, the relevance of transformational grammar for 
sentential production and comprehension was investigated in a series of fairly well-known 
experiments. In the next section, I outline an attempt to implement transformation grammar 
as a model of performance known as the Derivational Theory of Complexity. I then go on 
to outline other performance models which, while not Chomskyan, evoke the symbolic / 
logical empiricist 'spirit' in placing a large emphasis on syntactic considerations in 
processing. Again, similar to previous sections, in chapter 3, when we examine some CDA 
text commentaries, we shall see that much of what is outlined below is reflected in how 
CDA highlights mystifying text. 
2.5 Approaches to Language Processing which Place Emphasis on Syntax 
2.5.1 Chomsky as a Model of Processing - Derivational Theory of Complexity [DTCJ 
The main assertion of the Derivational Theory of Complexity was that the more involved 
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the transformational history of a sentence, the more processing labour would be required. 
Initial evidence (Miller 1962; Miller and McKean 1964; Savin and Perchonock 1965) 
appeared to support the above hypotheses. Miller reasoned that a passive sentence should 
be more difficult to handle than a simple, active, affirmative and declarative sentence. He 
tested this hypothesis by giving subjects two columns of shuffled sentences, and asked them 
to find consonant pairs. In one section of the experiment, actives and passives were shuffled 
so that a passive like 'the rioters were shot by the police' had to be twined with its intended 
`companion' sentence 'the police shot the rioters'. In timing his subjects, Miller found that 
it took nearly twice as long to match sentences which differed by two transformations. On 
this experimental evidence, Miller concluded that transformations were psychologically real. 
Belief in DTC, though, did not last long. Both theories withered under the attack of Fodor 
and Garrett (1966; 1967). Their arguments were as follows. Fodor and Garrett highlighted 
that there could be other reasons for the difference in processing time other than processing 
histories. For example, with the passive there is actor displacement away from the 
beginning of the sentence and so extra cognition time is necessary to locate and then link 
actor to process. Moreover, compared with verb forms in present and past simple tenses 
which are also active, affirmative and declarative, parallel passives introduce auxiliaries, 
elongating both syntax and thus cognition time. That is, the extra processing time needed 
for passives may be unconnected to the intricacy of a transformational history. They also 
found that there was no detectable time difference in comprehension between 'John phones 
up the girl' and 'John phones the girl up'. If DTC was correct, then the second should 
involve more processing labour since a 'particle separation' transformation is entailed. After 
the initial hope and excitement, then, the idea that transformational grammar was a model 
of language production and comprehension was abandoned. For Chomsky, it should be 
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made clear, such refutation would be immaterial since his model was one of competence and 
not performance. In other words, transformational grammar is a description of the 
knowledge of our language rather than an account of parsing procedures. 
2.5.2 Canonical Sentence Structure (CSS) 
I have indicated how Fodor and Garrett (1966; 1967) denied the possibility of there being 
psychologically real transformations. Fodor and Garrett nevertheless claimed that the end-
product of syntactic processing was a syntactic representation equivalent to the deep 
structure as posited by Chomsky (1965). If syntactic parsing did not operate via 
transformations, how was it done? Fodor and Garrett (1967) argued that instead parsing was 
performed by perceptual heuristics or surface structure cues. They detailed a number of 
parsing strategies that used only 'surface syntax' as a cue. One strategy became known as 
canonical sentence structure (CSS). CSS in English is essentially subject-verb-object and 
so, given this, it is reasonable for a comprehender to initially assume that many sentences 
conform to this structure. On such a heuristics, comprehenders intuitively try a simple 
strategy like CSS first, and failing this, move on to other more complex ones. Perceptual 
heuristics as an approach to sentential parsing was further developed in Fodor, Bever and 
Garrett (1974). It is easy to trace echoes here of the symbolic separation of syntax from 
semantics and subsequent emphasis on syntax. 
2.5.3 Modularity Hypothesis 
The general principle that when readers parse they employ 'surface syntactic' cues has 
remained influential in psycholinguistic research and has gradually become more and more 
systematised. It tends to go hand in hand with an espousal of syntactic autonomy - that there 
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exists an autonomous syntactic processor. This assertion is incarnate within the symbolicist, 
Fodor's (1983) modularity hypothesis. For Fodor, modules are discrete centres of cognition 
dedicated to specific cognitive tasks. For example, Fodor posits that there exist different 
modules in the visual system devoted to stereoscopic vision, colour vision etc. Language 
is also regarded as being modular, the syntactic processor being one module amongst others 
in the linguistic system. Input modules are separate from the central processor whose remit 
is to infer inductively from what the modules despatch. Modules are differentiated from the 
central processor in certain respects: 
i) Domain specificity of modules - processing in the syntactic module transpires only in the 
language domain 
ii) Mandatory functioning of modules - processing not under conscious control 
iii) Modules have restricted access to the central processor - only the final yield of 
processing is open to higher-level (top-down) processors which cannot ingress the module 
and affect performance. 
iv) Processing in modules is encapsulated - only following an entire operation is processing 
yield made available to other systems. 
For Fodor, it is the modularity of syntactic processing which sanctions its speed and 
involuntariness; (see Lakoff (1987a: 225) for a discussion of the notion of autonomous 
syntax). 
2.5.4 Late Closure and Minimal Attachment Strategies 
The idea of reader-employment of surface-structure cues was cultivated in different 
directions by Kimball (1973) and by Frazier and Fodor (1978) and Frazier (1987). In Frazier 
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(1987), a somewhat strong version of the autonomy of syntactic parsing prior to semantic 
processing is postulated. Frazier puts forth two strategies for retrieving the underlying 
syntax: 
i) late closure strategy - if grammatically feasible, each new item is hooked to the clause or 
phrase currently being processed. 
ii) minimal attachment strategy - the reader mentally constructs the phrase structure such 
that the number of nodes is kept to a minimum. 
Late Closure 
Frazier appeals to the phenomenon of 'garden-pathing' in substantiating her claims. 
`Garden-path' sentences are those where the smoothness of processing is interrupted 
midstream. The reader is forced to backtrack and use an alternative parsing strategy because 
they have been 'led up the garden-path'. Consider the following sentence: 
Since Jay always jogs a mile and a half seems like a short distance 
For Frazier, this sentence institutes a 'garden-path' effect because readers typically employ 
the strategy of 'late closure'. The reasoning is as follows. Jogs is a constituent of a VP and 
the next input is an NP (a mile and a half). On the strategy of late closure, the new input 
would be fastened to the VP currently being processed. The result is the erroneous 
interpretation where the NP (a mile and a half) is the object of the verb jogs. 
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Minimal Attachment Principle 
In an earlier set of experiments and along with two colleagues, Frazier aimed to highlight 
how readers operate on a syntax-first strategy despite pragmatic implausibility. Rayner, 
Carlson and Frazier (1983) examined subject's eye movements while reading sentences like 
the two below: 
The spy saw the cop with binoculars but the cop didn't see him 
The spy saw the cop with a revolver but the cop didn't see him 
The syntax-first strategy of minimal attachment should lead the parser to attach the PPs 
`with a revolver' or 'with binoculars' to the VP rather than to the NP 'the cop' so as to keep 
the number of nodes to a minimum. This would lead to a pragmatically plausible reading 
in the first sentence but an implausible one in the second. Rayner et al. (1983) found that 
subjects hesitated on 'revolver' in the second sentence but not on 'binoculars' in the first. 
It was concluded that when the minimal attachment principle is consistent with pragmatic 
plausibility, smooth comprehension ensues. Conversely, when the minimal attachment 
principle is incongruous with pragmatic feasibility, comprehension is frustrated. The larger 
conclusion drawn by Rayner et al. (1983) was that syntactic parsing transpires independent 
of and prior to the construction of semantic or pragmatic representations. 
In the last section of this chapter, I want to briefly indicate how the emphasis on syntax in 
accounts of language processing such as outlined above has meant that inferential processes 
have been downgraded in emphasis and importance. Again in the next chapter, we shall see 
that this perspective underlies many of CDA's text commentaries. 
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2.6 A By-Product of Syntax First Processing: Inference Last 
One of the by-products of a syntax first approach to processing in certain psycholinguistic 
quarters and an emphasis on sentential form in general is that inference generation is given 
much less prominence. This can be seen in the stipulation of Fodor's modularity hypothesis 
concerning higher-level (top-down) processing. In other words, the generation of discourse 
inferences would be separate from and only succeed modular syntactic processes. The lack 
of emphasis upon inference generation as a mandatory process is encapsulated in the 
following from Fodor, Fodor and Garrett (1975: 526): 
...the distinction between processes that are involved in understanding a sentence and processes that are 
involved in drawing inferences from it corresponds to a distinction between mandatory, on-line psychological 
processes and optional, long-term psychological processes. For, by hypothesis, the output of the sentence 
comprehension system is that representation of the sentence which must be recovered by anyone who 
understands it. But the application of principles of inference is presumably largely context-determined. What 
inference we draw from what we hear must be a question of what we take to be relevant to the task at hand. 
Thinkers such as Fodor are firmly entrenched in Chomskyan ideas, and so we might regard 
a perspective which regards inferences as being separate from the comprehension process 
proper as being a part of, or an implicit part, at least, of the 'symbolic vision' which awards 
primary status to syntactic representation. 
In this chapter, I have outlined symbolicist / logical empiricist assumptions, the classical 
theory of categories and how the emphasis on syntax has informed some psycholinguistic 
theory. In the next chapter, we shall see that many of the above assumptions inform how 
CDA isolates mystifying text. In chapter 4 and 5, I outline how symbolic / logical empiricist 
/ classical assumptions of processing are problematised by the enterprises of connectionism 
and cognitive linguistics and thus, in turn, CDA strategies for the location of mystifying text. 
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In contrast to what I have outlined in this chapter, we shall see, in chapter 4's discussion of 
connectionism, that far from being downplayed, the issue of inference generation in 
connectionist networks is a prominent one. This is echoed in work on inference generation 
in psycholinguistics in the late eighties and early nineties, which I outline in chapter 6. 
Notes 
1. Logical empiricism is commonly thought of as the second variant of logical positivism (Outhwaite, 1987: 
6). The first variant is associated with Comte in the early nineteenth century. Comte submitted a hierarchical 
conception of science, based on causal laws of phenomena, derived from observation. His main concern was 
with positive knowledge, based directly on experience as opposed to theology and metaphysics. His was also 
a naturalist perspective as are all variants of positivism. For Comte, knowledge progresses when each science 
attains positive knowledge. 'Sociology' (Comte's coinage) is at the bottom of the scientific hierarchy since 
for Comte it is the last to attain positive status. The logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle preferred to avoid 
the term positivism since they regarded Comte's philosophy of history to be itself metaphysical. They differed 
from Comte also in espousing physical reductionism. Logical empiricism became eventually modified into the 
third variant of positivism. This was sometimes referred to as the 'Standard View' in the philosophy of science 
and was most influential for twenty or thirty years during the middle of the century. Philosophers associated 
with this view included Carl Hempel, Ernest Nagel and Karl Popper together with the later work of Rudolph 
Carnap. One of the central elements in the 'Standard View' was a concern with scientific explanation. The 
physical and social sciences were regarded as being devoted to the pursuit of explanations which are formulated 
as general laws or covering laws. To explain an event is to relate it to a general law, analysed as a universal 
generalisation. The freezing of a car radiator, for example, is explained by the general laws governing the 
behaviour of water together with the low temperature (initial conditions). The provenance of this conception 
of explanation lie in Hume's theory of causation where what can be observed are the 'constant conjunction' 
of events such as freezing temperatures and burst radiators rather than the actual causes. In the 'Standard 
View' a case for a strong physical reductionism is rejected but physics still remained the ideal. 
2. Truth values for the logical connector &: 
A B A&B 
T T T 
T F F 
F T F 
F F F 
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3. Gardner (1987: 188) does indicate, all the same, that 'some of his [Chomsky's] specific ideas about how 
language works ran directly counter to information-theory notions.' By this he is referring to Chomsky's 
criticisms of finite-state grammar whose provenance, as I have said, lay within 'Information Theory' (Shannon, 
Weaver et al.). 
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CHAPTER 3: SYMBOLIC, LOGICAL EMPIRICIST, CLASSICAL 
UNDERPINNINGS OF HOW CDA HIGHLIGHTS MYSTIFYING 
TEXT 
3.1 Orientation 
The seminal CL texts - Hodge and Kress (1993) / Kress and Hodge (1979) and Fowler et al. 
(1979) - draw heavily upon early Chomsky (1957, 1965) and adapt his competence model 
to one of performance. Much of this adaptation is still present in the language processing 
assumptions of recent CDA and how CDA locates mystifying text. Having outlined 
symbolicism, logical empiricism and the classical approach to categories in chapter 2, and 
their influence on Chomsky, in this chapter I show how these influences make up many of 
the language processing assumptions of CDA, often via Chomsky. I indicate also how 
symbolicism, logical empiricism and the classical approach to categories influence how 
CDA isolates mystifying text. To begin this chapter, let me outline the relationship between 
CDA and Chomsky. 
3.2 CDA and Chomsky 
3.2.1 Hodge, Kress and Transformations 
Orientation 
Much 'borrowing' of Chomsky's theory of transformations occurs in Hodge and Kress 
(1993), Fowler et al. (1979); a more formal discussion of this 'borrowing' is located within 
Hodge and Kress (1974). In this section, I deal mainly with Kress and Hodge (1979) / 
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Hodge and Kress (1993)1. This is one of the major sources in CDA for the highlighting of 
textual mystification and has gone on to be favourably cited in more recent CDA such as 
Fairclough (1992a) and (1995a). 
Here are Hodge and Kress (1993: 10): 
In our account, transformations are a set of operations on basic forms, deleting, substituting, combining, or 
reordering a syntagm or its elements. So The car was wrecked is transformed from (someone or something) 
wrecked the car, with the actor (someone or something) deleted and the elements of the syntagm reordered in 
the passive. 
Hodge and Kress's signalling of 'actor' rather than 'subject' point to a semantic notion of 
transformations in contrast to Chomsky's syntactic emphasis. Another difference between 
Hodge and Kress's conception of transformations and Chomsky's is that Hodge and Kress 
(1993: 10) do not regard transformations as innocuous operations: 
In transformational theory it is assumed that transformations are always innocent (that is, they do not alter the 
meaning of the basic form) and can always be reversed. In actual discourse this is, sadly, not always the case. 
Transformations serve two functions, economy and distortion, often so inextricably mixed that even the 
speaker cannot separate them. 
The typical function of transformations is distortion and mystification. 
	 Hodge and Kress (1993: 35) 
Transactivity 
Hodge and Kress found much of their examination of texts upon a set of basic models. 
These models are semantico-syntactic and comprise what Hodge and Kress (1993: 9) call 
actionals and relationals. The category of actionals, as the name suggests, subsumes 
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`actions'. Actionals consist of two sub-models, transactives and non-transactives. 
Transactives are explicit about causal relations and non-transactives are not. Take 'the 
batsman struck the ball'. This is transactive because, in the event, action flows from actor 
to affected and so, for Hodge and Kress, this sentence is explicit about causation. 'The 
batsman runs' is non-transactive since the absence of an affected means the sentence is 
inexplicit about the causal process. While transitivity, as traditionally defined, is a syntactic 
notion, transactivity is semantico-syntactic. For Hodge and Kress (1993: 8), while 'the 
parcel weighs ten pounds', 'John plays tennis' and 'Bill resembles his father' are all 
transitive, they are not transactive since action does not flow from an actor to an affected. 
A corollary of all this for Hodge and Kress (1993) is that since transactives are explicit 
about causality, they are the preferred sub-model for describing causal processes. The 
second basic model, relationals, is concerned with the classification system of the language. 
Hodge and Kress differentiate two sub-models: equatives and attributives. Equatives 
pertain to relations between nouns that are commutative, e.g. Philip Brown is the headmaster 
of Belpont Comprehensive. Attributives institute relations between nouns and qualities 
which are not commutative, e.g. Philip Brown is a kind man. 
Mystification and Transformations: Hodge and Kress 's Analysis of a News Text 
Consider now an example of how, for Hodge and Kress, transformations are meant to 
mystifi, or distort. Recall from 1.4.2 the examination by Hodge and Kress (1993: 21) of part 
of a newspaper editorial on the miner's overtime ban during the winter of 1972-73. First, 
here again is the sentence from the editorial: 
The Government knows that in early 1972 it was caught out by picketing of power stations which curtailed coal 
deliveries. 
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and here are Hodge and Kress (1993: 22): 
Picketing curtailed coal deliveries 
has, underlying it, a considerable complexity, a varied history of transformations. As readers of this editorial 
we should have to be alert and willing to engage in mental exercise to get beyond the seductive simplicity of 
the final form, with just three entities, and seemingly precise relations, where everything seems to be there on 
the surface...we can see that few commuters on the 8.05 from Brighton would have the energy to perform 
the mental gymnastics required.' 
Hodge and Kress (1993: 22) 	 [my bold] 
The passage is rich in tacitly logical empiricist and symbolic notions. The notion that a 
`surface form' conceals an 'underlying' form echoes a similar assumption in logical 
empiricism we saw in the last chapter. A symbolic perspective is also echoed since mental 
representation for Hodge and Kress is tacitly sentence-like, where the necessary mental 
exercise will transform the surface form of 'picketing' into 'strikers picket a power station'. 
However, this mental representation is not the same as mentalese. Rather than a 'language 
of thought' we have something like 'thought consisting of language', a notion popularly 
associated with Whorf. And indeed, Whorf (1956) is twined with Chomsky in Hodge and 
Kress (1993) and cited throughout as theoretical substantiation. The result is that the 
underlying view of mental representation in Hodge and Kress (1993) is an amalgam of 
' Whorfianism' and symbolicism. So, rather than advocating mentalese, for Hodge and 
Kress, thought seems to consist of what might be called linguese. 
3.2.2 Linguese 
Following Chomsky's 'surface' and 'deep' structures, Hodge and Kress seem to be 
advocating 'surface' linguese and 'deep' linguese. But Chomsky's distinction between 
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`surface' and 'deep' linguistic structure is itself a logical empiricist notion (redolent of 
Carnap, Russell and the early Wittgenstein) and so a logical empiricist notion has been 
absorbed into Hodge and Kress. However, Hodge and Kress's 'deep linguese' consists of 
language and is not, then, the same as the Chomskyan deep and abstract underlying string. 
Here are Hodge and Kress again (1993: 28): 
All the processes mentioned here work to obscure the originally chosen models; deletion, simplification, 
collapsing of forms into single units, all act to alter the way in which a reader meets the material and tend to 
structure his interpretations in specific ways. He is continually coerced into taking the surface form as the real 
form; and the surface form is a radically transformed version of the originally chosen linguistic form. 
Hodge and Kress seem to imply that graphic symbols are cognitively reiterated as 'surface' 
linguese. Like mentalese, this time, in CDA the sentence is both the vehicle of computation 
and the vehicle of mental content. Returning to the quote in the last section, cognitive 
labour is involved in transforming 'surface' linguese into transactive 'deep' linguese. 
Transactives represent reality more 'fully' (they do not entail distortion of what really 
occurred etc), but for Hodge and Kress (1993), there is a paucity of transactives in the text. 
So, for a reader to have a 'fuller' appreciation of the events in question, considerable 
cognitive effort is necessary to transform the 'surface' linguese into 'deep' transactive 
linguese (`about a dozen times on every full line of newsprint' (Hodge and Kress, 1993: 
22)). Since such effort will not normally be invested (see also 1.4.2), textual mystification 
Occurs. 
3.2.3 Hodge and Kress (1993) and The Derivational Theory of Complexity 
Hodge and Kress's (1993) processing assumption above is very much akin to the 
`Derivational theory of Complexity' (DTC) which we saw in the last chapter. In their 
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formulation of 'transformations', Hodge and Kress (1993: 35) assert the following: 
We take a strongly realist position and regard all transformational analyses as hypothetical reconstructions of 
psychologically real processes. 
But as we saw in chapter 2, the early promise for the psychological reality of transformations 
from the experiments of Miller (1962); Miller and McKean (1964); Savin and Perchonock 
(1965) was dashed comprehensively by the experimental evidence of Fodor and Garrett 
(1966; 1967). And all this is fairly well-known. So, in the light of the psycholinguistic 
evidence against DTC, it is surely misplaced of Hodge and Kress (1993: 35) to claim that 
their position is explicitly 'strongly realist' regarding 'all transformational analyses as 
hypothetical reconstructions of psychologically real processes.' [See Widdowson (1997) for 
a more detailed questioning of the 'psychological reality' of Hodge and Kress's (1993) 
transformational model]. Let me now return to Hodge and Kress's (1993) analysis of the 
miner's overtime ban text. They fix upon the `nominalisation"picketing' and argued that 
the reader would have to spend considerable labour to recover the deep form 'strikers picket 
the power station'; in other words, to transform the 'surface' linguese into 'deep' linguese. 
But if transformations have no psychological reality, then Hodge and Kress's processing 
assumption is dubious to say the least. 
3.2.4 Difficulties with Transactives as a 'Basic Model' 
Hodge and Kress (1993: 60) highlight Chomsky's use of kernel sentences (simple, active, 
affirmative, declarative structures) as some sort of legitimacy for assigning primitiveness to 
transactives: 
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Most linguistic theories assume that there is a limited number of basic sentence patterns or sentence types in 
a language, and that the vast variety of actual utterances are constructed around this basic set. Chomsky's 
Syntactic Structures (1957) used the concept of 'kernel sentence'. Though it had a technical definition 
(sentences derived from the application of obligatory transformations only), in fact this was a set of forms, 
between five and seven, which could not be analysed in more basic terms.2 
But this justification is circular - i.e, most linguistic theories are predicated on basic 
sentence patterns, so it is legitimate for Hodge and Kress to predicate their model on basic 
sentence patterns. One reason that there seems to be no need for 'outside' justification for 
the rudimentary status of transactives is because the concept of a simple, via the weighty 
heritage of logical empiricism, can appear so natural. Because of this circular reasoning, 
Hodge and Kress's simple - the transactive - is merely a variation on simples put forward 
as epistemological primitives over the years by logical empiricists. 
In common with the logical empiricists, Hodge and Kress (1993: 35) see their version of a 
simple as having propositional structure: 
Transformations always involves suppression and / or distortion, but they are normally reversible. The 
standard that acts as the measure of what has been suppressed or distorted is given by the underlying 
structures uncovered by reversing transformations. The 'relevant truth' which acts as a standard then is given 
by full propositions in the form of basic models. 
The above is again circular since from the offset it is presumed that the standard is the basic 
model (transactive or relational) without supplying any evidence to this effect. Reliance on 
the notion of a transactive as an epistemological primitive, as having completeness of a 
`thought' and thus propositional structure, is seen in many other CDA practitioners such as 
Martin (1989: 30-1; 42) and Kress (1989a: 77-78), Fairclough (1992a) and Wodak (1996). 
In chapter 4, we shall see how connectionism represents a challenge to this mode of 
propositional knowledge representation and ultimately to the idea of a simple, be it a kernel 
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sentence or a transactive in the context of text processing.3  
3.2.5 Difficulties with Transactives as the Basis of a Scientific Language 
Hodge and Kress (1993: 40-1) 
Hodge and Kress (1993: 40-1) figure that a scientific language should contain a high 
proportion of transactives. The corollary of this is that the description of scientific processes 
that proceeds through non-transactives is more primitive. As one example of this, they 
describe how the growth of the turnip, in the children's story, 'The Enormous Turnip', is 
described in non-transactive terms, thus mystifying the causal process for the child reader 
(1993: 48-50). Here is a fragment which they focus upon: 
As time went by, the rain fell on the seeds and the sun shone down on them, and the turnips began to grow. 
Hodge and Kress (1993: 50) then compare both transactive and non-transactive descriptions 
arguing that the transactives are now de-mystifying of causality: 
non-transactive: The rain fell on the seeds. 
transactive: 	 The rain (water) moistened the seeds. 
non-transactive: The sun shone down on them. 
transactive: 	 The sun warmed the soil. 
Below I argue that Hodge and Kress's prescription that a scientific language should consist 
of transactives is redolent of logical empiricism. 
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Hodge and Kress & Logical Empiricism 
Despite the titles of Carnap's books, Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935) and The Logical 
Syntax of Language (1937), the nature of semantic categories was also important to this 
logical empiricist in assigning epistemic primitiveness. Primitive statements consisted of 
`physicalist' categories rather than experiential ones. In what follows, I highlight how 
Hodge and Kress (1993) is redolent of Carnaps's 'physicalism'. Firstly, here is Carnap on 
the thesis of physicalism (1935: 89-90): 
...this physical language is the basic language of all science..., it is a universal language comprehending the 
contents of all other scientific languages. In other words, every sentence of any branch of scientific language 
is equipollent to some sentence of the physical language, and can therefore be translated into the physical 
language without changing its content... 
For purposes of elucidation, let us take the following psychological statement: 'At ten o'clock Mr. A was 
angry'. The equipollent sentence of the physical language is: 'At ten o'clock Mr. A was in a certain bodily 
condition which is characterized by the acceleration of breathing and pulsation, by the tension of certain 
muscles, by the tendency to certain violent behaviour, and so on. 
This emphasis on physical categories rather than experiential ones is very much a logical 
empiricist one since it tries to remove the contribution of the human understander as much 
as possible (2.2.4). Now, when we compare the sentences that Hodge and Kress 
recommended as primitive, 'the sun warmed the soil' and 'the water moistened the seeds', 
we see that they are of a less directly experiential nature than their non-transactive 
counterparts, but all the same are not outrightly physicalist. So while Carnap's physicalist 
/ experiential distinction is absolute, we might regard Hodge and Kress's prescription as only 
moving towards physicalist descriptions. Indeed, it could be argued that the clause 'the 
water moistened the seeds' is not demystifying of the causal process and could provide the 
wrong impression about the nature of the causal processes. That is, it is not so much that 
the water moistens the seeds but rather it is the osmotic potential of the seeds' sugars which 
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sets up conditions for drawing water into the seed. So if we are to follow Hodge and Kress's 
quasi-Carnapian line, a more 'representational' sentence might be 'the seed draws water into 
itself. But that sentence still of course does not tell us the precise chemical processes that 
occur within the seed, e.g., water triggers off hydrolytic enzymes which begin to break down 
food stores in the seed; soluble, mobile food molecules are then free to take part in growth 
etc [cf Cook (1994: 75-8) on infinite detail]. 
Quine vs Carnap 
The logical empiricist `Carnapian' assumptions above, upon which Hodge and Kress's 
approach rests, have been criticised by the philosopher Quine (1953). Quine denied the 
feasibility of Camap's project of translating experiential language into a physicalist 
language. For Quine, the sentences that report on our direct sensory experiences are also 
part of a web of other sentences, as part of general theory. So on a Quinian perspective, the 
sentence 'the water moistened the seeds' is not discrete in its correspondence to a part of 
reality. Rather it is 'webbed' with the sentences 'the water moistened the outer-covering of 
the seeds', 'the water hydrated the seeds' sugars' etc... It follows that a sentence like 'the 
water moistened the seeds' only makes sense holistically, within the reader's 'store of other 
sentences'. Since the young children for whom the story is intended will not have such a 
dense 'store' of sentences relating to germination, respiration and photosynthesis, Hodge and 
Kress's transactives will still be 'mystifying' for young children. Another corollary of this 
is that the 'physicalist' sentence provided by Carnap above is also not discrete in its 
correspondence to a part of reality. Rather, each seemingly discrete and final physicalist 
sentence is potentially webbed to a set of other sentences whose detail depends on the degree 
of encyclopaedic knowledge of the person describing the reality. A final corollary of 
Quine's position is that it leads one to see sentences not as discrete representations of reality 
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but as cues of encyclopaedic knowledge (i.e., one's 'store' of sentences). 
Sentences as Representation vs Sentences as Cues 
Consider the following from Slobin (1982: 131-2): 
A sentence is not a verbal snapshot or movie of an event. In framing an utterance, you have to abstract away 
from everything you know, or can picture, about a situation, and present a schematic version which conveys 
the essentials. In terms of grammatical marking, there is not enough time in the speech situation for any 
language to allow for the marking of everything which could possibly be significant to the message. Probably 
there is not enough interest, either. Language evokes ideas; it does not represent them. Linguistic 
expression is thus not a natural map of consciousness or thought. It is a highly selective and conventionally 
schematic map. At the heart of language use is the tacit assumption that most of the message can be left unsaid, 
because of mutual understanding (and probably also mutual impatience). The subset of semantic notions which 
is formally marked in a particular language serves more to guide the listener to the appropriate segments and 
categories of analysis than to fully represent the underlying notions.' 	 [my bold] 
Paraphrasing what I bolded above: sentences evoke encyclopaedic knowledge, they do not 
represent the world.4 Since linguistic meaning transpires within an extant theory, it is patent 
that Hodge and Kress have neglected the cueing aspect of language, its function in evoking 
encyclopaedic knowledge. Or to put it another way, problematically, they are in tune with 
the logical empiricist notion that sentential structure can reflect or represent the situation in 
the world independent of the contribution of the human understander (2.2.4). So, if the 
encyclopaedic knowledge is rich, as would presumably be the case with a reading of the 
story by a botanist, then Carnapian equipollent translation even to the limited extent of 
Hodge and Kress would be otiose. But if encyclopaedic knowledge is impoverished, as is 
the case with children, then Carnapian equipollent translation and thus Hodge and Kress' 
translation into transactives will be otiose too, as we saw in the last section. This is all 
because mental representation is the output of what sentences cue. This mental 
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representation necessarily goes beyond the sentential structure and so is not, as implied in 
Hodge and Kress (1993), a facsimile of sentential structure. The notion of 'language as 
cues' will return when I highlight connectionist approaches to language processing in 
chapter 4. The importance of taking account of encyclopaedic knowledge (i.e., the 
contribution of the human understander) in the issue of textual mystification will be dealt 
with from a more psycholinguistic point of view in chapter 6. 
I have dealt specifically with how Chomskyan 'borrowings' in Hodge and Kress (1993) have 
absorbed logical empirical / symbolic postulates. This is despite Hodge and Kress's (1993) 
more semantic-syntactic notion of transformations. We saw how Hodge and Kress's (1993) 
postulation of 'psychological reality' for their brand of transformations was problematised 
by the discrediting of the derivational theory of complexity. In 2.5.1, I outlined Fodor and 
Garrett's (1966; 1967) rebuttal of the possibility of there being psychologically real 
transformations. Fodor and Garrett (1967) went on to argue parsing was performed by 
perceptual heuristics or surface structure cues, claiming nevertheless that the end-product 
of syntactic processing was a syntactic representation equivalent to the deep structure as 
posited by Chomsky (1965). I indicate in the following how symbolic 'perceptual heuristics' 
also inform processing assumptions in CDA. 
3.3 Perceptual Heuristics and CDA 
In 2.5.2, we saw that Fodor and Garrett (1967) argued instead that parsing was performed 
by perceptual heuristics or surface structure cues. One strategy became known as canonical 
sentence structure which in English is subject-verb-object, Fodor and Garret positing that 
comprehenders initially assume that many sentences would conform to this structure. On 
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such a heuristics, comprehenders supposedly try a simple strategy like CSS first, and failing 
this, move on to other more complex ones. We also saw that the strategies of late closure 
and minimal attachment and the phenomenon of garden-pathing are in accordance with an 
initial preference in comprehension for subject-verb-object structure. 
As we have seen, CDA authors (e.g. Hodge and Kress (1993)) exploit something similar to 
DTC in their analyses of news texts. At other times, something akin to perceptual heuristics 
is drawn upon by CDA authors. Consider the following from Fowler and Kress (1979a: 41-
2), an examination of a fragment from a set of university regulations: 
Consider, for example, the sentence: 
`All students matriculating in the University shall, so long as they remain in attendance, be bound by the 
following Regulations and by such other Regulations as the University may from time to time determine.' 
The deep structure is actually something like: 
The University (AGENT) binds (PROCESS) all students (OBJECT) by Regulations (INSTRUMENT). 
But in the passive surface structure, the nominal designating the object Call students') has been placed in the 
position of theme, i.e. the left-most noun phrase in the sentence, and this is a position normally associated with 
the role of the agent. The syntax strongly encourages one to read the first part of this sentence with the 
expectation that it is going to describe some action carried out by 'all students'; this illusion is heightened 
by the presence of an active verb of a subordinate clause (`matriculating') immediately following 'all students'; 
and by the extreme distance between the subject 'all students' and the main verb 'be bound', a distance which 
forces the reader to cling on to a hypothesis about the way the sentence is going to turn out. The easiest 
hypothesis is that we are waiting for a main verb which will tell us what action 'all students' perform; but this 
hypothesis will prove incorrect, since it is actually the University which is doing something. The reader has, 
however, made strong use of the hypothesis that 'all students' are the agent of the sentence, and is likely 
to retain some sense that the sentence does mean that...' 
	 [my bold] 
Fowler and Kress (1979a: 41-2) conclude that, in making use of the above hypothesis, the 
reader processes 'all students', the people affected by the process, as occupying a syntactic 
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position 'which makes them appear responsible for their own fate'. Also, recall from 1.4.3, 
Kress's (1993: 181-2) analysis of the sentence 'his parents could not afford a uniform' and 
his argument that: 
...many readers of the Daily Express may read across this clause in reading the text, and read it as fully 
semantically transitive, which I shall call, following Hodge and Kress (1993), a `transactive'. In support of 
that reading, these readers might say: 'We scrimped and saved, and we afforded a uniform for our children, 
so why can't they?! 
What characterises these and many other CDA analyses is a syntax-first approach, in line 
with the symbolic separation between syntax and semantics, which we saw in the last 
chapter. In other words, the reader initially follows syntactic cues as part of their perceptual 
heuristics, trying a simple strategy like CSS first. The extra step here for these CDA 
practitioners is that having begun from subject-verb-object as a perceptual heuristic, the 
reader will then 'read across' this syntactic form reading it in semantic transitive terms 
whether the sentence has this semantic structure or not. So for Kress (1993), (and implied 
by Fowler and Kress (1979a)), this perceptual heuristic is capable of misleading - the 
syntactic form itself is so powerful that it suggests semantic (transactive) meaning. In short, 
Kress details a type of shallow processing, since the processing of the actual semantics of 
the clauses outlined is shallower than the processing of the syntax. The theme of shallow 
processing is something I return to and develop in chapter 6. 
The last two sections have been concerned with how logical empiricist / symbolic notions 
of syntax have imbued CDA. In the next section, I show how the symbolic / logical 
empiricist notion of compositionality - lexical categories as mental building blocks - informs 
CDA. 
100 
3.4 CDA and Compositionality 
3.4.1 Orientation 
In 2.2.5, I highlighted the notion of compositionality: that the meaning of a sentence is 
regarded as the meaning of its parts and that these parts are discrete, enduring symbols such 
that 'a word makes approximately the same semantic contribution to the meaning of every 
sentence in which it occurs' (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988). In semantic analysis, 
compositionality seems a reasonable assumption. In order to make a discussion of semantic 
meaning manageable, it seems heuristically acceptable to 'atomise' meanings by removing 
environmental constraints. However, standard semantics differs from CDA in being largely 
unconcerned with the actualities of cognition. As Langacker (1987b: 1) submits: 
...the whole point of truth-conditional semantics is to avoid any postulation of mental constructs in the 
characterization of semantic structure. 
CDA is partly concerned with processing of a non-analytical reader (although, as we saw in 
chapter 1, their non-analytical reader is undeveloped, lacking a systematic psycholinguistic 
account). Because of this concern with the processing of a non-analytical reader, 
compositionality, rather than being a heuristic, has been tacitly treated as being a 
psychologically real facet of cognition in CDA. In order to see this, I consider an extract 
from Fairclough (1995a: 110-3) who presents an analysis of how 'the poor' in the 'Third 
world' are represented in a television documentary. 
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3.4.2 Fairclough (1995a: 110-3) 
Fairclough (1995a: 112) criticises the documentary for representing the poor as passive, 
merely the outcome of a set of circumstances beyond their control, 'as Patients - as people 
who are affected by the actions of others'. Firstly, here is an excerpt from the narration, 
taken from the 'third extract' that Fairclough offers for examination: 
Everywhere in the Third World life in rural areas gets harder - and poor people flock to the city. The urban 
poor get poorer. 
Here now is Fairclough (1995a: 113) who, having commented that the text backgrounds 'the 
poor' as agents of their circumstances (i.e., the agency and responsibility of the 'poor' is not 
made clear), mentions what seems to be an exception to this analysis at first glance: 
...there are only two Actors in the third extract, the New People's Army and, exceptionally, the poor, in the 
poor people flock to the city. Interestingly, the Action here is one more usually associated with sheep -
notoriously passive - than people, so the exception does not really contradict what I have said so far. 
Fairclough naturally assumes that the meaning here of 'flock' is that of a collective of sheep. 
What assumption about cognition and language might enable him to postulate this? One 
supposition would be that compositionality is an actual feature of cognition, symbols being 
discrete and enduring. Fairclough's neglect of how the semantico-syntactic environment 
might close down on the possible meaning of 'flock' is consonant with such a supposition. 
Moreover, compositionality facilitates his choice of the ovine sense of 'flock' so as to suit 
his line. But the standard polyseme of 'flock' (going in large numbers, e.g.: 'people flock 
to football matches on Saturdays'), where the idea of an agentless herd is absent, is surely 
a higher contender for the meaning of 'flock' here. This is because the lexical environment 
of 'flock' effects closure on the possibility that 'flock' refers to a collection of sheep. In 
chapter 4, I examine the connectionist approach to processing which in contrast takes into 
account the 'closing down' effects of lexical environment and does not treat meaning 
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compositionally, treating meaning as subtractive along a linguistic string rather than additive 
as in the above. 
3.4.3 Fowler (1986:• 20) 
As another example of compositionality being drawn into notions of mental representation, 
consider the following from Fowler (1986: 20): 
...consider phrases like 'my wife', 'my son', 'my assistant'. Being any of these people involves activity, 
relationship. But the syntax which is conventional in English - Possessive + Noun - has the unfortunate effect 
of encoding a human relationship as an object, a possession of another person, so that 'my wife' seems to be 
as totally owned by me as my hand or my books or my car. Obviously, this syntactic structure, apparently so 
`natural', embodies a theory of personal relationship as ownership with dominance, with the dominated partner 
reduced to the status of an object. Once recognized, such processes are seen as ideological and objectionable. 
It is claimed that they encourage habits of mind and behaviour which are prejudicial to the dignity and the 
economic progress of the people presented as 'possessed'. 
Notice how the compositional arrangement of the grammar has become conflated with how 
the 'human relationship' is understood. The notion of possession is equated to a discrete 
symbol. Indeed, the symbolic assumption of compositionality - that the symbol 'my' is 
discrete and enduring - is so strong that it goes unnoticed that 'my' is actually a deictic 
determiner whose meaning is reliant on context. Taking Fowler's compositional building 
block approach to meaning to its conclusion, the meaning of 'my' in 'my boss', for example, 
would also have to be regarded as possessive. 
One of the origins of this assigning of meaning to syntactic categories derives from an 
amalgamation of compositionality with Whorfianism' [see 3.2.1 / 3.2.2 and also Hodge and 
Kress (1993)]. In `Whorfianism', language is equated with thought - we think in language 
(i.e. linguese). Even in circumspect discussion of `Whorfianism', Leech and Short (1981: 
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146-7) still assert what is bolded below: 
The classical statement of the view that languages determine the way in which their speakers interpret and 
categorize experience is that of B.L. Whorf (1956). Recent thinking has suggested that there is a great deal 
more in common between languages in this respect than Whorf acknowledges; but whatever stand one takes 
on the issue, the fact remains that we conceptualise in terms of the categories our language provides for 
us. 	 [my bold] 
If we actually think in the categories of our language, that is, if the compositionality of a 
sentence on a page is replicated in thought, then it is not a huge step to believing that the 
syntactic nature of a category is intact in our compositional thought. In other words, our 
thinking will be guided by the syntactic nature of the category. This point has particular 
relevance for 3.5.1 below. 
3.4.4 CDA 's Use of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
Recall that in 1.5, I indicated that CDA draws on Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) perspective 
on metaphor that human conceptual systems, in terms of the ways in which we think and act, 
are at base metaphorical. Here are Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 4): 
...let us start with the concept ARGUMENT and the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. This 
metaphor is reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of expressions: 
ARGUMENT IS WAR 
Your claims are indefensible. 
He attacked every weak point in my argument. 
His criticisms were right on target. 
I demolished his argument. 
I've never won an argument with him. 
You disagree? Okay, shoot! 
If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out. 
He shot down all of my arguments. 
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It is important to see that we don't just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose 
arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our 
own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can 
abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the 
concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument 
- attack, defense, counterattack, etc. - reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor 
is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing. 
Again what underlies the above is the classical assumption that concepts are enduringly 
atomic, i.e., compositional, that they are not influenced by the accommodative effects of 
lexical company (see section 7.2.2). For example, win in 'I'd love to win some money in the 
lottery' surely has little to do with war; cf Lakoff and Johnson (1980) above, 'I've never won 
an argument with him'. 
In 2.4, I outlined the classical theory of categories, which is interrelated to symbolicism and 
logical empiricism. In the next section, I highlight how some postulates of language 
processing in CDA are bound up with the classical theory. 
3.5 CDA and the Classical Theory of Categories 
3.5.1 Nominal Form, Objectifying Effects and Mystification 
As I highlighted in 1.4.2, there is a tendency in CDA to regard all nouns as things, to see 
`thingness' as a necessary and sufficient condition for nounhood. As an example, consider 
the following from Hodge and Kress (1993: 23-4): 
In discussing the next two examples, the miners lift their overtime ban, and the ban cuts production, we begin 
to deal with words whose status as stable nouns is unquestionable...Both ['ban' and 'production] are 
descriptions of actions which involve participants, both in fact are descriptions of transactive actions: 
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someone bans something 	 --> 	 ban 
someone produces something 	 —> 	 production 
In the case of production the —ion ending is an outward sign of its derivation, but ban has no such marking. 
There seems therefore a choice for a hearer as to how he or she might interpret these two words. First, we 
might assume that the speaker had in fact started from the full sentence form..., or at least was aware of the 
expanded form at some earlier stage in the production of the utterance. In this case it would be quite proper 
to regard these as nominalizations, though of a kind which have become so conventional as to be cliches. 
Second, we might assume that speakers use these words, and hearers understand them, as though they were like 
apple or bench, but referring to things which happen to be abstract, not concrete physical things. For this kind 
of speaker or hearer, the linguistic form creates a world of thing-like abstract objects, which are capable of 
acting or being acted on. Here language determines perception in two ways, by creating an alternative world 
which can only be 'seen' in language and by imposing this alternative world, with its apparent solid reality, on 
the material world, so that we no longer see or believe in the world of physical events. 
By nature of the fact that 'ban' and 'production' function as nouns in the editorial, it is 
assumed that they must share the same properties of nounhood as 'apple' and 'bench', i.e., 
`thingness'. As we saw in 1.4.2, for CDA, an excess of nominalisations 'objectifies' events 
being described. This mystifies the nature of the events since, for these authors, events are 
better 'captured' with material action processes. Clearly, the classical theory of categories 
is in the background here, i.e., the all-or-nothing criterion that all nominals are `thingy'. In 
chapter 5, I will outline the enterprise of cognitive linguistics and highlight problems with 
this all-or-nothing criterion for category membership and in turn for what aspects of 
language CDA regards as being mystifying. 
Ascribing meaning to grammatical form, as Hodge and Kress (1993) do, assumes that 
syntactic information and semantic information are discretely processed. This is consonant 
with symbolicism since 'rules of composition, as well as other rules that operate on symbols, 
are syntactic and can be applied without regard to the semantics of the symbols', Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen (1991: 211). An accompanying feature of isolating syntax from the semantics 
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of the sentence and then attributing meaning to the syntax is that the notion of 
compositionality becomes reinforced. This is because while we can imagine such a 
phenomenon as the global semantic meaning of a sentence, it is difficult to imagine the 
`global syntactic meaning' of a sentence. Thus, in focusing on syntax separate from 
semantics, individual syntactic categories inevitably become associated with a discrete 
meaning. 
3.5.2 Nominals and 'Scientific Language' 
Consider the following from Ogborn et al. (1996: 51) (one of whose authors is the CD 
analyst, Gunther Kress): 
Scientific texts are well known for their high concentration of events and processes presented as if they were 
things. Simple examples include evaporation, crystallization, ionization, speciation, oscillation. Any scientific 
textbook or journal will yield a multitude of them, as transparent as 'magnification' or as opaque as 
`commensurability oscillations in the resistivity' (culled from a relatively non-specialized journal). Their 
presence is not due to the barbarous linguistic habits of scientists. They exist in texts and talk as entities 
because they exist in the thinking of scientists as entities. They are...things with which to think. 
This has parallels with section 3.5.1 where nominal expressions necessarily correspond to 
`nominal' thoughts. It also has parallels with 3.2.5 since in the over-emphasis on the form 
of scientific expressions and their capacity to influence thinking, there is a neglect of the 
scientist's own 'scientific knowledge'.5 There is no notion that 'crystallization', 'ionization' 
etc are linguistic cues rather than 'thinking entities'. 
So far we have only looked at how symbolicism / logical empiricism assumptions underpin 
CDA's perspective on sentence processing. I now want to look more broadly at how these 
assumptions underpin their approach to text processing. 
3.6 CDA, Text and Symbolicism / Logical Empiricism 
3.6.1 Lexical Relations in Text 
The following consists of an excerpt from a booklet issued to expectant parents by hospitals 
(Fairclough, 1992a; 170-1), and then some of Fairclough's (1992a: 182-2) commentary upon 
it: 
A complete physical examination will then be carried out which will include checking your breasts, heart, 
lungs, blood pressure, abdomen and pelvis. The purpose of this is to identify any abnormalities which might 
be present, but which so far have not caused you any problems. 	 [my italics] 
Nominalization turns processes and activities into states and objects, and concretes into abstracts. For example, 
it is one thing to refer to concrete processes in pregnancy which may not be developing normally; it is another 
to refer to identifying 'any abnormalities which may be present', which creates a new category of abstract 
entities. The creation of new entities is a feature of nominalization which is of considerable cultural and 
ideological importance. For instance, an advertisement for cosmetic surgery has the headline 'Good looks can 
last you a lifetime!'; 'good looks' is a nominalisation (from concrete relational processes such as 'you look 
good!') which entifies a local and temporary condition into an inherent state or property, which can then itself 
become the focus of cultural attention and manipulation (good looks, can, for example, be cultivated, enhanced, 
looked after; they can be said to bring people good fortune, make them happy, give them trouble). 
Accordingly, one finds nominalizations themselves taking on the roles of goals and even agents of processes. 
(For further discussion of the properties of nominalization, see Kress and Hodge 1979: chapter 2). 
In the text, 'abnormalities' patently lexically is cohesive with 'checking your breasts, heart, 
lungs, blood pressure, abdomen and pelvis'. One readily makes the inference that 
`abnormalities' refers to possible concrete problems with 'breasts', 'heart' etc. So from a 
processing point of view, while 'abnormalities' may be a distinct lexical item as input, this 
is not the same as saying that it is, in processing output terms, 'a new category of abstract 
entities'. Why does Fairclough suppose that 'abnormalities' is 'a new category of abstract 
entities'? One probable explanation is that Fairclough is operating on the symbolic 
assumption that symbols are discrete and enduring in cognition. Another assumption may 
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be the logical empiricist postulate that symbols derive their meaning from referring to the 
world. On this perspective, the use of a category presupposes a referent. For Fairclough, 
it seems, the use of a 'new' category presupposes a 'new' referent. 
Echoes of logical empiricism, similar to that of Fairclough, are found in the following by 
Chilton (1988: 70-1): 
To say that someone or something is sovereign or paramount (in relation to something else) may make some 
sort of verifiable sense; the two words would also be virtually synonymous. Transform them into nouns 
[sovereignty and paramountcy] and you appear to be staking out separate bits of semantic ground with 
corresponding bits of reality. Creating the word seems to create the thing: once created they can be 
manoeuvred to form pseudo-explanations of events and states of affairs. 
In the above from Chilton, we find again something of the logical empiricist insistence that 
linguistic items must have denotations. We have seen something of how category relations 
are treated in CDA. Let us now see how sentential relations are treated. 
3.6.2 Sentential Relations in Text 
What follows is from Clark (1992) and constitutes an extract from the 'Sun' newspaper with 
her critical examination together with Simpson's (1993) supporting critical commentary. 
The main thrust of her critical examination below is to highlight how the agency of the event 
of 'rape' can be mystified through sentential configuration. I highlight this particular work 
here, and refer to it in other chapters of this thesis, since it has had a certain resonance in 
CDA as well as feminist linguistics. Like Trew (1979) it is one of the most referred to CDA 
articles. Clark's analysis is not only reproduced in part and commented upon in Simpson 
(1993) but also in Montgomery (1995). Simpson goes on to extend the analysis. Its 
significance as an article in feminist linguistics has more recently been bolstered in being 
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cited favourably in West, C. et al. (1997). This is a chapter synopsis on feminist discourse 
analysis in a volume edited by the Critical Discourse Analyst, Teun van Dijk. The volume 
consists of chapter synopses of differing strands within discourse analysis. Even more 
significantly, the article is reproduced in Cameron (1998), the second edition of a high-
profile anthology of feminist writings on language. Here is the excerpt from the 'Sun' text 
in Clark (1992: 215): 
1) Two of Steed's rape victims - aged 20 and 19 - had a screwdriver held at their throats as they were forced 
to submit. 
2) His third victim, a 39 year old mother of three, was attacked at gunpoint after Steed forced her car off the 
M4. 
3) Two days later, he gunned down call-girl, Jacqueline Murray, 23, after picking her up in London's Park 
Lane. 
Clark (1992: 215) alleges that in 1) and 2) `...the perception of Steed as rapist is reduced by 
making the sentences passive and deleting him as Agent', that is, the semantic-syntactic 
encoding diminishes Steed's responsibility. Simpson (1993: 170-1) comments upon Clark's 
analysis: 
GOAL 
	
PROCESS 	 CIRCUMSTANCES 
His third victim...mother of three was attacked 	 at gunpoint 
In fact, the agency involved in this process has to be inferred by implication from the process expressed by the 
second clause where Steed does now feature in the role of ACTOR / AGENT: 
AGENT PROCESS GOAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
Steed 
	
had forced 	 her car 	 off the M4 
The message is constructed in such a way as to obscure the relationship between Steed and the attack. The only 
entity upon which Steed acts as AGENT is 'her car', whilst the victim of the attack, although prominent in the 
information structure of the report, is acted upon only by an implicit and unspecified agency. Indeed, so 
obscured is the relationship between attacker and victim that it allows a possible reading wherein someone else 
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attacks the woman at gunpoint while Steed only forces her car off the road...We see a wilful refusal to 'tell it 
like it is'. What, for instance, is so difficult about presenting the details of the story in the following way, 
where the relationship between attacker and victim is not obfuscated: 
(1) Steed held a screwdriver at the throats of two of his victims as he forced them to submit. 
(2) Steed attacked at gunpoint his third victim, a 39-year-old mother of three, after he had forced her car off 
the M4. 
Again, the assumptions here are logical empiricist and symbolic ones. One sonorous echo 
of logical empiricism in Simpson is the assumption that the structure of meaningful 
sentences must mirror the structure of the event (independent of the contribution to 
processing of the human `understander': see 2.2.4). This is because the 'absence' (i.e. 
Steed's agency), on Simpson's account, has to be inferred by implication, i.e. requiring the 
contribution of a human understander. As a result for Simpson, with regard to agency, the 
text is mystifying. [This is an echo of Trew (1979: 98-9) (see 1.4.1) where an inference by 
implication was regarded as being weak.] 
Truth-functionality (a feature of logical empiricism) is a covert issue in the above, also. 
Consider first the following from Ellis (1992: 74): 
When considering entire texts and sequences of interaction, according to standard structural semantics, it is 
necessary for every sentence in a text to be true if the entire text is going to be true. Such a requirement leads 
to some logical inconsistencies that cannot be resolved because the structure of a text, and not only truth values, 
can determine whether or not a sentence is true. 
For 'standard structural semantics', (which has similar foundations to logical empiricism), 
for a text to be true, each of the sentences should be true. The rather odd corollary of this 
is that sentences in a text should be logically independent of one another. Ellis is, of course, 
right to point out that the structure of a text has a bearing on 'whether or not a sentence is 
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true'. But as in logical empiricism and 'standard structural semantics' where simples are 
logically independent of one another, so Simpson sees sentences in terms of logically 
independent simples - his simple being the agent-process-patient structure. He makes no 
allowance for how the local, co-textual meaning, and as Ellis implies, global co-text might 
close down on the meaning of a particular sentence. This is also borne out by the sentential 
alternatives he offers. Indeed, the grip of logical empiricism and the need to find the 
underlying semantic-syntactic form is so strong that Simpson's arithmetic goes astray. The 
number 'two' precedes rape victims and now we have the ordinal 'third'. We are, then, 
expecting the third of his (Steed's) rapes; it cannot logically be anybody else's. So 
Simpson's alternative reading where 'someone else attacks the woman at gunpoint while 
Steed only forces her car off the road' is difficult to accept. 
Recall some of the premises of logical empiricism. The world is constituted by well-defined 
objects with well-defined inherent properties, the result being that objects can be ascribed 
discrete names. Since these objects have well-defined properties, then, each of these 
properties can be ascribed a one-place predicate corresponding to each of those properties. 
And since the objects stand in fixed relations to one another, then, a series of many-place 
predicates can be ascribed so as to correspond to each relation. As we saw in 2.2.4, the 
natural consequence of such a perspective was to regard semantics in a 'building block' or 
compositional fashion. Also, since for meaningful discourse to transpire, sentential structure 
must necessarily mirror the structure of the world; the syntax needs to be composed of 
`simples'. [As we have seen, for Clark / Simpson, these simples are agent-process-patient 
structures.] On this reasoning then, if one of the 'necessary' building blocks required to 
construct a simple is absent [i.e. the 'agent'], as Simpson and Clark highlight, then this 
would render the sentence less meaningful. But not only that. Because it is assumed in 
112 
CDA that the sentence is both the vehicle of computation and the vehicle of mental content, 
then, an absence of a 'necessary' semantic component is consonant with an absence of a 
necessary thought - hence mystification. 
I shall refer again in this thesis to the symbolic assumptions of Clark (1992) and Simpson's 
(1993) analyses when I problematise them from the perspective of connectionism (chapter 
4), cognitive linguistics (chapter 5) and recent psycholinguistic work on inference generation 
(chapter 6). In chapter 6 especially, we shall see that when the contribution of a human 
processor is taken into account, pace Clark / Simpson's logical empiricism, the text is not 
mystifying of Steed's agency for a non-analytical reader (6.6.2). In the final section of this 
chapter, I want to say something more generally about the issue of inference generation in 
CDA and its relationship to symbolicism / logical empiricism. 
3.7 CDA / CL, Inference Generation and Logical Empiricism / Symbolicism 
3.7.1 Orientation 
In 1.4, I outlined how different CL / CDA authors regarded the issue of inference generation. 
Trew (1979) [endorsed by Toolan (1988), Lee (1992) and Montgomery (1995) as well as 
Simpson (1993) in the above] contends implicitly that sentential structure should reflect 
reality. Thus any inferences that have to be generated across sentences or clauses can be 
treated as weak representations. We also saw in 3.2.5 that Hodge and Kress (1993), in 
emphasising the importance of semantic-syntactic structure, implicitly downplay the 
importance of encyclopaedic knowledge in processing and thus inferences generated on the 
basis of encyclopaedic knowledge. CDA's alliance with something akin to the derivational 
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theory of complexity also accounts for the emphasis on propositional form and deeper 
structure. In turn this also means that non-propositional factors such as encyclopaedic 
knowledge and inferences generated on the basis of this knowledge are downplayed. We 
also saw in the last section how inferences were downgraded in Simpson's (1993) analysis. 
It should be apparent by now that this downgrading of inferences more generally in CDA 
is also in line with the syntax-first position of logical empiricism / symbolicism, and the 
notion that sentential structure should reflect events independently of the (inferential) 
contribution of the human understander. Let us see in a little more detail how these 
assumptions have affected the CD analysts in 3.6 with regard to inference generation. 
3.7.2 Returning to Fairclough (1992a); Clark (1992) 
We noticed that Fairclough does not see 'abnormalities' as being `instantiated'6, i.e. that a 
reader would construct an inference across adjacent sentences to the effect that 
`abnormalities' is made more concrete via the information 'your breasts etc...' Consider 
also the following from Clark (1992: 215): 
In both descriptions of the rapes (1) and (2), the perception of Steed as rapist is reduced by making the 
sentences passive and deleting him as Agent. This perception is further reduced by using the euphemism 
`attacked' to mask the terrible details of abduction, repeated rape, and death threats (not mentioned at all in 
this newspaper). 
Again, like Fairclough, the more general category 'attack' is not seen as being 'instantiated' 
by the more specific category 'rape' even though it is in an adjacent previous sentence (see 
3.6.2). So, Clark, like Fairclough, neglects how inferences might be generated across 
sentences in reading. In other words, both Fairclough and Clark are in line with the syntax 
first - inference last perspective which we saw in 2.6 is in the spirit of logical empiricism 
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and symbolicism. Or put another way, what underlies both Fairclough and Clark is the 
logical empiricist assumption that all the information should be 'in' the sentence, i.e., the 
structure of the sentences should mirror reality regardless of the processor's (inferential) 
input. 
3. 7.3 Fairclough, Schank and Abelson (1977) and Inference Generation 
Similar to the authors cited above, in Fairclough's (1989) analysis of the 'Quarry load-
shedding problem' text from 1.4.1, we saw that inference generation was implicitly 
downplayed with an emphasis on 'surface' sentential structure. That is, though the 
sentential structure did not actually represent the causal relationship directly, it was not 
acknowledged that the causal relationship could actually be inferred. By implication, an 
inference as to causal antecedence was seen as a weaker representation than if causal 
antecedence had been directly specified in the sentential structure. However, I also pointed 
out in 1.4.1 that this downplaying of inference generation was in conflict with Fairclough's 
analysis of the 'Jenny Keeble' text where inference generation was emphasised. Indeed, in 
this analysis, the implicit assumption was that inferences were strong representations since 
they could lead to the reproduction of sexists! 
If it is clear that logical empiricist / symbolic assumptions govern why inference generation 
is so downplayed in the examples I cited above, why should then inference generation be 
given prominence in Fairclough's analysis of the Jenny Keeble text? This is because what 
informed Fairclough's analysis of the 'Jenny Keeble' text was the script theory of Schank 
and Abelson (1977). Schank and Abelson (1977) regard the encyclopaedic knowledge 
component in a processor as supplying the bulk of processing requirements. This 
encyclopaedic knowledge component embodies a series of well-delineated knowledge 
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scripts. Scripts delineate information associated with particular events or situations such as 
eating in a restaurant. Scripts are something akin to a complex semantic network that forms 
the parameters of a stereotypical set of events. A restaurant script might house information 
about menu selection, the order of courses, paying the bill, leaving a tip etc. Scripts enable 
a reader to infer stereotypical information when confronted with a text that alludes to a 
restaurant. Schank and Abelson's (1977) assumption is that a cue such as 'restaurant' 
evokes the entire script, the reader making default assumptions that stereotypical events 
transpire. With such an emphasis, Schank and Abelson regard higher-level processes as 
influencing parsing, their model exhibiting strong interaction between semantic and 
syntactic processing. 
To see Schank and Abelson's influence on Fairclough, here is Fairclough's (1989: 160) 
follow-up to the Jenny Keeble text analysis: 
...the text implicitly conveys the meanings that Jenny Keeble is a 'good wife' and admirable person, through 
the expressive values of attributes attached to her. 
...the meaning that Jenny Keeble is a 'good wife' is not explicitly expressed in the text, and it is only because 
interpreters have in their heads a mental representation of what a 'good wife' is stereotypically supposed to be 
that they are able to recognize attributes thereof which occur in the text and so infer the meaning. In terms 
of the preceding section, interpreters make use of a script for 'the good wife'. In fact, schemata and frames 
as well as scripts can be regarded as playing a role in the interpretation of point: they act as stereotypical 
patterns against which we can match endlessly diverse texts, and once we identify a text as an instance of a 
pattern, we happily dispense with the mass of its detail and reduce it to the skeletal shape of the familiar pattern 
for purposes of longer-term memory and recall. 	 Fairclough (1989: 160) [my bold] 
It should now be clear why there exists a conceptual tension towards inference generation 
in Fairclough (1989). That is, when Fairclough draws upon script theory he is invoking a 
top-down approach to processing where syntax and semantics are treated interactively. 
However, other assumptions in Fairclough's work are not top-down based, but in line with 
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logical empiricism and Chomsky where syntax is treated as a separate phenomenon from 
semantics. Indeed, this conceptual tension in Fairclough (1989) is all the more marked since 
Schank (1980: 36) has been publicly hostile to Chomskyan modularity, promoting the view 
that semantics and pragmatics are central in language and downplaying the role of syntax: 
It is impossible to produce a model of language alone...apart from beliefs, goals, points of view and world 
knowledge 	 (1980:36) 
Section C of this thesis builds cumulatively towards an alternative framework for the 
highlighting of mystifying discourse. However, my framework derives from a different set 
of cognitive, philosophical and psycholinguistic assumptions from those of CDA. My 
framework instead draws from compatibilities between connectionism, cognitive linguistics 
and recent psycholinguistic evidence on inference generation. Consequently, my framework 
will not necessarily highlight text which leads to mystification in reading that would be 
highlighted as such by symbolic CDA. 
I have mentioned that Schank and Abelson's (1977) model treats semantics and syntax 
interactively. In the next chapter, I outline the enterprise of connectionism which also 
favours interaction between syntactic and semantic information. I show how connectionism 
problematises many of the precepts of symbolicism / logical empiricism with regard to 
mental representation, in turn problematising the language processing assumptions of CDA 
and thus what CDA highlights as being mystifying text. 
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Notes 
1. Hodge and Kress (1993) is the 'second edition' of Kress and Hodge (1979). However, unusually it is not 
revised and only differs significantly from the first edition through the inclusion of a new final chapter which 
is more oriented to work on CDA in the eighties and early nineties. 
2. In fact, Chomsky had jettisoned the idea of kernel sentences by 'Aspects' (1965). 
3. Widdowson (1998: 140) highlights a contradiction in CDA in relation to the notion of the transactive: 
`In the Hodge and Kress conception, they convert one kind of sentence into another. This would seem to imply 
the existence of neutral non-transformed sentences which are, by definition, innocent of any representational 
significance...even if we were able to identify the neutral sentences, their very existence means that it is in 
principle possible, by a judicious avoidance of transformation, to produce language which is entirely free of 
representational subjectivity. But this contradicts the critical linguistic tenet that there is no neutral language: 
all of it is loaded, 'ideologically saturated' as Kress puts it (Kress 1993: 174).' 
4. Widening the perspective with Peircian categories, while iconic signs can be taken to 'represent' the world 
to varying degrees, symbolic (linguistic) signs do not usually unless they are configured iconically. 
5. On the issue of 'scientific English', consider the following from Halliday (1993: 68) (referred to in Graddol 
(1996: 178) also): 
`What is lung cancer death rates: how quickly lungs die from cancer, how many people die from cancer of the 
lung or how people die if they have it? What is increased smoking: more people smoke, or people smoke 
more? What is are associated with: caused by (you die because you smoke), or cause (you smoke because you 
are - perhaps afraid of - dying?). We may have rejected all but the right interpretation without thinking - but 
only because we know what it is on about already.' 	 Halliday (1993:68) 
Graddol (1996: 178) comments upon this excerpt as follows: 
`...scientific English often requires a certain knowledge and understanding of the subject matter: it may be 
better at high-level, abstract argument than at low-level, explicit description.' 	 [my bold] 
But Graddol betrays some attachment to textual empiricism and thus to logical empiricist / symbolic 
assumptions. Given what we have seen in 3.2.5, especially Quine's critique of Carnap, it should be axiomatic 
that scientific meaning would always require knowledge and understanding of the subject matter - linguistic 
meaning is always an interaction between the language and the cognitive resources. Similar to Graddol, 
Halliday seems to bemoan the lack of explicitness of nominal expressions. But, as we saw with Hodge and 
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Kress, even translation into transactives, i.e. verbal expressions, does not adequately increase the explicitness. 
6. Instantiation is the type of inference generated when a general category is made more concrete in context 
e.g. 'the fish attacked the swimmer' where fish is instantiated readily by the reader as 'piranha' or 'shark' etc. 
Instantiation, along with other types of inference, is dealt with in chapter 6. 
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Section B: Connectionism and Cognitive Linguistics - 
Problematising Symbolicism etc and Implications for 
CDA 
This section comprises two chapters. In chapter 4 and chapter 5, I outline connectionism and 
cognitive linguistics respectively, how they problematise symbolicism, logical empiricism 
and the classical approach to categories, and thus what CDA highlights as being mystifying 
text. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONNECTIONISM - PROBLEMATISING HOW CDA 
HIGHLIGHTS MYSTIFYING TEXT 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I provide a general portrait of an approach to cognitive modelling known as 
connectionism. I also detail two well-known connectionist models of sentence processing, 
namely, McClelland and Kawamoto (1986) and Elman (1990). In the last chapter, I 
highlighted the symbolic assumptions at work in many CDA analyses of mystifying text. 
Symbolicism and connectionism in cognitive science are the two dominant approaches to 
modelling. But on many, if not most, of the central issues in cognitive science they are 
diametrically opposed to one another. The function of this chapter is to problematise the 
symbolic cognitive assumptions of CDA from the most established oppositional paradigm 
and thus problematise what CDA regards as mystifying text. 
I should stress from the outset that in this chapter I do not offer connectionism as some kind 
of universal explanation of all issues of language comprehension. As MacDonald and 
MacDonald (1995: xvi) acknowledge, connectionist architectures show 'promise'; the theory 
of such architectures is 'still in its infancy'. Similarly, as Schopman and Shawky (1996: 70) 
remark: 'the connectionist point of view does not mean that no problems are left, perhaps 
even new ones have been introduced.' Rather my aim in section B, at least, is merely to 
produce a timely situating of the paucity of appreciation of the issue of mental representation 
in CDA within as wide a contemporary cognitive framework as possible. A brief history 
will make this clearer. Many of the assumptions of cognition in current CDA derive from 
the work of Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew (1979) and Hodge and Kress (1979), work 
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which was developed in the seventies. Connectionism only became a serious challenger of 
the symbolic paradigm in the late eighties, continuing to flourish in the nineties. Because 
of this, and because the linguistic models of Fowler et al. (1979) and Hodge and Kress 
(1979) have a sociological orientation, looking at CDA in term of 'neglect' of the issue of 
mental representation would be an unfair ex post facto. The symbolic assumptions operative 
in the above authors would have seemed obvious in the absence of another paradigm. It is 
timely then to consider issues of mental representation in CDA from the perspective of 
connectionism, given its contemporary prominence and the challenge it poses to 
symbolicists. Because of the constraints of this thesis my use of connectionist modelling is 
selective. Consequently my use of the term `connectionist' is short-hand for a selected 
group of connectionist authors. Significantly, though, this group includes one of the 
`fathers' of connectionism, James McClelland. 
4.2. Connectionism: The General Picture 
4.2.1 Orientation: The Interaction of Syntactic and Semantic Information 
In the last chapter, we saw that CDA's approach to locating mystifying text places a great 
deal of emphasis upon syntax and that this was in line with the syntax-first approach to 
processing based on modularity. One of the significant features of connectionism is that it 
regards syntactic and semantic processing as being simultaneous and interactive and so does 
not operate on a syntax-first basis. Non-connectionist research into this kind of interactive 
processing, and thus the non-autonomy of syntax, can be found in Just and Carpenter (1980) 
and Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1980) Crain and Steedman (1985), Altmann and Steedman 
(1988) and Taraban and McClelland (1988). Moreover, I highlighted in 3.6.2 how Schank 
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and Abelson (1977) regard semantics and syntax as interactive in processing. Taraban and 
McClelland are two authors associated with connectionism but the following outline of 
experimental evidence from their paper of 1988, for the interaction of semantics and syntax 
in comprehension, does not have an explicit connectionist emphasis. 
4.2.2 Taraban and McClelland (1988) 
The evidence from Taraban and McClelland's (1988) experiments is offered as refutation 
of the syntax first / minimal attachment perspective (see 2.5.4). The following consists of 
what subjects had to read in one of the experiments in Taraban and McClelland (1988): 
The janitor cleaned the storage area with the 
a) broom 
b) solvent 
c) manager 
d) odour 
because of many complaints. 
For Taraban and McClelland (1988), the above sentence contains a verb which leads to the 
expectation that an instrument will be mentioned in the PP; that is, the PP will attach to the 
VP [and inadvertently in accordance with the minimal attachment principle]. This is shown 
in a). A less expected instrument is shown in b), a less expected role is shown in c), and the 
less expected syntactic attachment (attaching to the NP 'storage area') is shown in d). Now, 
the results indicated a significant increment in reading times for the word (`because') 
following the focal noun when the focal noun was an unexpected role c) or an unexpected 
attachment d). McClelland and Taraban induced that it is semantic content and not syntax 
which determines interpretation. That is, the slow reading times in c) and d) were due to the 
presence of unexpected roles irrespective of whether interpretation is consonant with the 
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minimal attachment principle as in c) or not as in d). Because of this involvement of 
semantic knowledge, in place of the syntax-first model, Taraban and McClelland argue that 
a system of parallel constraint satisfaction (i.e, a basis of connectionism), where syntactic 
and semantic information are processed coterminously, is a more valid explanation of the 
process of sentence processing. 
The papers of McClelland and Kawamoto (1986), McClelland, St. John and Taraban (1989), 
St. John and McClelland (1992), St. John (1992), which are drawn upon in this thesis, also 
deal with interactive processing. Where they differ from Taraban and McClelland (1988) 
is that these authors ultimately attempt some simulation of neural activity. This modelling 
of neural processing is known as connectionism or parallel distributed processing. In the 
next few sections, I outline the basis of connectionist models and then go on to discuss 
connectionist approaches to multiple constraint satisfaction in sentence processing. 
Throughout, I explore the repercussions for the symbolic cognitive postulates of CDA and 
its approach to highlighting mystifying text. 
Firstly, let me outline some common arguments that processing models should attempt to 
simulate neural activity. 
4.2.3 Arguments for Neural Modelling 
We saw in 2.2.3, briefly, reasons why the mind has been treated separately from the brain 
in symbolicism. In symbolicism, change in mental states is achievable through the rule-
governed manipulation of sequences of mentalese-sentence strings. Language cognition on 
the symbolicist perspective is, then, essentially mentalese-sentence-crunching. Since 
mentalese-sentence crunching is algorithmic, it need not be implemented in brains, thereby 
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reducing the importance of locating mental states with brain states. A large number of 
thinkers regard this perspective, however, as suffering from a series of difficulties; for 
example, Anderson and Hinton (1981), Churchland, P.S. (1986), McClelland, Rumelhart 
and the PDP Research Group(1986) and Edelman (1992). Below is a synopsis of these 
difficulties: 
i) Tasks that pose no problems for von Neumann machines (mathematical calculations, 
logical reasoning [cf my outline of Wason (1966) in 6.4.2] are usually either poorly 
performed by humans or require substantial effort. By the same token, tasks which humans 
take for granted (e.g. facial recognition) are poorly simulated on von Neumann architectures. 
ii) The brain is an extremely dense interconnected neural network. Purkinje cell neurons can 
have more than 80, 000 input connections and neurons in the cerebral cortex can have in 
excess of 10, 000 output connections. Its parallel nature conflicts, then, with the serial 
architecture of von Neumann machines. Further evidence for the parallel status of the brain 
comes in the following. Many tasks such as facial recognition and simple responses to 
questions take about 0.5 seconds. On the basis of what is known about neural firing rates, 
conduction velocities and synaptic delays in neurons, this allows approximately 5 
milliseconds per stage in the cognitive process. This would allow only about 100 stages, 
which for a serial program supported on a von Neumann architecture would be far too slow. 
Feldman and Ballard (1982) have coined this the hundred-step rule. 
iii) Neural networks degrade gracefully and are relatively tolerant of localised deterioration 
similar to brains. Von Neumann architectures, however, cannot tolerate localised 
deterioration since this will lead to either total breakdown or significant handicap. 
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iv) The existence of extensive individual variation in cognitive systems negates the 
fundamental postulate of symbolicism that representations have meaning independent of 
their physical instantiation. Human experience is not based on so simple an abstraction as 
a Turing machine; to get our meanings we have to grow and communicate in a society. In 
contrast to computers, the patterns of nervous system response depend on the individual 
history of each system, because it is only through interactions with the world that appropriate 
response patterns are selected. 
v) Basing cognition on mentalese-sentences proves problematic for non-verbal animals. 
Either non-verbal animals do employ mentalese-sentence / logic as a basis for cognition or 
their cognitions are distinct from human cognitions. Neither alternative seems to be 
plausible. The first one is lacking in evidence and the second entails a disruption of 
evolutionary processes. The additional entailment is that evolutionary biology and 
developmental neurobiology are somehow erroneous. Indeed as Churchland, P.S. (1986: 
388) argues: 
Sentence-crunching is certain to have been a latecomer in the evolutionary scheme of things, and it must have 
knit itself into the pre-existing nonsentential cognitive organization or...evolved out of preadaptive 
nonsentential structures. To be sentence-crunching 'all the way down' implies that cognition must have been 
sentence-crunching 'all the way back', which is implausible, or that sentence-crunchers have no cognitive 
heritage from earlier species, which is also implausible given the evolution of the brain. 
The symbolic emphasis on 'sentence-crunching' or the syntax-first approach, as 
inadvertently employed by CDA, does not then sit easily with an evolutionary perspective. 
4.2.4 Modelling Neural Activity 
Firstly, let me outline briefly the characteristics of neurochemical processes. These 
processes are predicated upon a handful of elementary principles. Neurons are simple 
processing elements which gather electrochemical pulses on their input side. If the 
combined total of incoming pulses reaches a particular threshold of activation, a neuron will 
generate an action potential. An action potential is a pulse that is conducted along the axon, 
a long, thin fibre on the neuron's output side. The rate of the action potential is consonant 
with the 'strength' of the signal. Since neurons are massively interconnected in a parallel 
network, the firing or non-firing of particular maps of neurons can either excite or inhibit the 
activity of other neuronal maps. 
Artificial neurons in connectionist networks are much simpler compared to the heterogeneity 
of neuronal structure. A connectionist model consists of a multitude of simple processing 
elements. Each element is known as a node or a unit and each node has many connections 
with other nodes. Nodes affect other nodes through either exciting or inhibiting them. 
Nodes have activation levels, a number usually between the (arbitrary) limits 0 and 1, or -1 
and + 1, which fluctuate along with the activity around a node. The strengths of connection 
between nodes are known as weights and these carry a numerical description according to 
the strength of firing. The weight may be either positive or negative. With two active nodes 
A and B, A will tend to excite B if the weight of the A / B connection is positive. When the 
weight of the A / B connection is negative, A will tend to inhibit B. Because connectionist 
networks are usually densely interconnected, usually any node will be simultaneously 
excited and inhibited by a host of other nodes, the activation of each node calculated as 
weighted sum of its inputs [see figures a) and b)]. Connectionist processing ends when the 
system reaches a stable state; in other words, where activation through the network does not 
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net-input to unit-i = I a, w,, 
= (-1 x —0.5) + (-1 x —0.5) + (+1 x 0) + (+1 x 0.75) 
= 0.5 + 0.5 + 0 + 0.75 
= 1.75 
Figure a) 
A multi-layered connectionist 
network with a layer of input 
units, a layer of internal 
representation units or hidden 
units, and a layer of output units. 
Input patterns can be encoded, if 
there are enough hidden units, in 
a form that allows the 
appropriate output pattern to be 
generated from a given input 
pattern 
Figure b) 
Diagram showing how the inputs 
from a number of units are 
combined to determine the 
overall input to unit-i. Unit-i has a 
threshold of 1; so if its net input 
exceeds 1 then it will respond 
with +1, but if the net input is 
less than 1 then it will respond 
with —1. 
lead to activation strengths in the units being changed. 
Training the Network 
Networks are trained to ensure a particular response in the output layer to activation in the 
input units. The network 'learns' the association between different inputs and outputs by 
adjusting weights between units. In order to achieve such 'learning associations', learning 
rules are used to systematically calibrate the connection strengths between particular nodes. 
When learning rules are implemented, the weights are adjusted until the network effects the 
desired output patterns given particular input patterns. A widely known learning rule is the 
backward propagation of errors rule (BACKPROP). BACKPROP permits a network to 
associate inputs with outputs. Initially, the weight values within the network are 
randomised. In the early learning phase, following introduction of the input pattern, the 
output units often spawn responses that are not the desired outputs. To remedy this, 
BACKPROP compares the undesired output with the desired output, registering the errors. 
What it then does is to backpropagate activation though the network modifying the 
connection strengths until the desired output pattern is produced. What is interesting about 
`learning associations' between input and output in connectionist networks is that cognitive 
processes are portrayed without appealing to the kind of explicit rules (despite the 
unfortunate phrase 'learning rules') characteristic of symbolic models. All the same, when 
the network has 'learned' to create a particular response at the output layer, it may appear 
that a rule of the form 'IF X THEN Y' is being followed. 
In general, two kinds of network have been employed - localised and distributed networks. 
In localised networks each unit stands for an object or property. So in a localised network 
model for word recognition, each unit would represent an aspect about a feature, letter or 
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word (see for example, Feldman and Ballard, 1982; Rumelhart and Norman, 1982; Cottrell 
and Small, 1983). In distributed networks, on the other hand, representation of a particular 
phenomenon is over a coalition of units. In other words, representation is consonant with 
distributed patterns of activation (Rumelhart, D.E, McClelland, J.L. and the PDP Research 
Group, 1986). Connectionist networks have been employed in a variety of ways. One 
example is Sejnowski and Rosenberg's (1987) network, NETtalk. NETtalk is a 
connectionist network which has learnt how to transform graphemes into phonemes. From 
an input of English graphemes, NETtalk is able to produce English phonemes with about 
90% accuracy. NETtalk appears then to have ' learned"English pronunciation rules' 
although of course it has not been programmed with explicit rules. Following a 
BACKPROP learning rule, the network is given graphemic inputs and informed of the 
correctness of the phonemic outputs. On each training, the automatic learning procedure 
modifies the connection strengths, bringing the system closer to the desired output. It is 
following this training, then, that further English graphemic input is able to produce a 90% 
accurate phonemic output. 
4.2.5 Sub-symbols / Microfeatures 
One important characteristic of distributed representations is their sub-symbolic nature. In 
contrast to those operating within symbolicism, connectionists do not regard cognition as 
the computation of structured symbolic strings such as the proposition THROW (JULIE, 
BALL). In contrast, connectionists hold that a predicate such as 'ball', depending on the 
particular situation, semantico-syntactic environment etc, might be construed differently in 
a distributed representation. This is because in a distributed representation concepts are 
profiled in terms of sub-features. Ball for example could be profiled with the following sub-
features for 'sphericalness' / 'non-sphericalness', 'hollowness' / 'non-hollowness', 
129 
`hardness' / 'softness' etc. These sub-features are termed sub-symbols or microfeatures. 
Consider the following: 
i) 	 The toddler kicked the ball 
iii) 	 The batsman struck the ball and it smashed the window 
Looking at 'ball' in terms of microfeatures, the likely meaning of 'ball' in the above depends 
on the environmental constraints. That is, from a connectionist perspective, the environment 
of i) might be said to inhibit the microfeature 'non-hollow' and 'hardness' and excite instead 
`hollowness' and 'softness' where the opposite would be the case for ii). We shall see in the 
next section that the probabilities of sub-symbolic inhibition and excitation are one of the 
fundamentals of a connectionist network. The 'concepts' of ball in i) and ii) in connectionist 
network processing can be activated over a distributed representation. I flag 'concepts' with 
inverted commas since for Smolensky (1988) our conscious, verbal notion of a stable, well-
defined 'ball' is merely an approximation. Instead 'concept' is a convenient fiction that 
stands for the convergence of situationally specific aspects of a ball which are emergent in 
cognition. For Smolensky (1988: 68) the differences between the symbolic and 
connectionist paradigms can be seen in their approaches to context: 
in the symbolic paradigm, the context of a symbol is manifest around it and consists of other symbols; in the 
sub-symbolic paradigm the context of a symbol is manifest inside it, and consists of sub-symbols. [my italics] 
Smolensky's emphasis on the microfeatural level is also endorsed by other cognitive 
scientists: 
In our view, the most interesting relation between subsymbolic emergence and symbolic computation is one 
of inclusion, in which we see symbols as a higher-level description of properties that are ultimately embedded 
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in an underlying distributed system...symbols are not taken at face value; they are seen as approximate 
macro level descriptions of operations whose governing principles reside at a subsymbolic level.' 
Varela, F.J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. (1991: 101-2) 
However, while Smolensky argues that symbols are approximators of sub-symbols, the 
actual relationship between symbols and sub-symbols in cognition still needs to be 
accounted for in much greater detail. 
Let me now consider a connectionist approach to the modelling of sentence processing. The 
connectionist approach to modelling that I want to consider is that of McClelland and 
Kawamoto (1986), one of the most cited articles in connectionism. Indeed, McClelland and 
Kawamoto (1986) derives from the connectionist 'bible' - McClelland, Rumelhart and the 
PDP Research Group (1986). This model has exerted considerable influence, continuing to 
be cited in connectionist literature. In other parts of this chapter, I refer to models of 
sentence processing and text processing which build on McClelland and Kawamoto (e.g. 
McClelland, St. John and Taraban, 1989; St. John and McClelland, 1992). In chapter 7, I 
provide in some detail St. John's (1992) connectionist simulation of a short text to highlight 
how a connectionist model handles inference generation. Here, the reason I outline 
McClelland and Kawamoto (1986) is principally to problematise symbolic assumptions of 
mental representation in CDA and thus what is highlighted in CDA as mystifying text. 
4.3 An Outline of McClelland and Kawamoto's (1986) Connectionist Model of 
Sentence Processing and its Implications for How CDA Highlights Mystifying Text 
4.3.1 Outline of McClelland and Kawamoto (1986) 
This model aims to display in a simplified way how the capacity of PDP models for 
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simultaneous interactive processing of syntax and semantics might be utilised in sentence 
comprehension and in particular in case (semantic) role assignment. McClelland and 
Kawamoto (1986) were interested to see whether a network, following training, could 
generalise its learning to new sentences comprised of novel word combinations and thus 
provide a case-role assignment for these novel sentences. The model is a distributed one and 
comprises two sets of units: one for representing the syntactic structure of the sentence and 
one for representing the case role structure. The model is trained so as to 'learn' the 
association between sentential input and the desired output of correct case-role assignment. 
In testing (i.e. subsequent to training), the model is presented with surface-structure 
sentential input and the output the model produces is examined to see if the model has 
successfully matched case-structure to surface structure. The sentences processed in the 
model comprise a verb and from one to three NPs of which one is always a subject NP. If 
an object NP is present, there may also be another NP as a sub-constituent of a PP. An 
example sentence is 'the boy broke the window with the hammer' 
Words from the input sentences in training are represented as groups of microfeatures. For 
both nouns and verbs, the features are assembled into dimensions, and for each dimension 
there are a set of mutually exclusive microfeatures. I detail the dimensions and 
microfeatures below: 
NOUNS 
DIMENSION 	 MICROFEATURES 
HUMAN 	 human 	 nonhuman 
SOFTNESS 	 soft 	 hard 
GENDER 	 male 	 female 	 neuter 
VOLUME 	 small 	 medium 	 large 
FORM 	 compact 	 1-D 	 2-D 	 3-D 
POINTINESS 
	 pointed 	 rounded 
BREAKABILITY 	 fragile 	 unbreakable 
OBJ-TYPE 	 food 
	 toy 	 tool 	 utensil 
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furniture 	 animate 	 nat-inan 
[nat-inan = natural inanimate] 
VERBS 
DIMENSION 	 MICROFEATURES 
DOER 	 yes 	 no 
CAUSE 	 yes 	 no-cause 	 no-change 
TOUCH 	 agent 	 instrument both 	 none AisP 
NAT_CHING 	 pieces 	 shreds 	 chemical 	 none unused 
AGT_MVMT 	 trans 	 part 	 none 	 NA 
PT_MVMT 	 trans 	 part 	 none 	 NA 
INTENSITY 	 low 	 high 
[AisP = Agent is Patient; NA = not applicable] 
The noun dimensions are fairly self-explanatory. The verb dimensions are regarded as 
capturing aspects of a scenario designated by the verb: 
`DOER' - whether agent initiates an event 
`CAUSE' - whether verb is causal. If not, this dimension indicates whether this is due to an absence of a 
specified cause 'the window broke' or because there is no change 'the boy touched the girl'. 
TOUCH - whether the Agent, Instrument, both, or neither touches the Patient; 
AisP - coincidence of Agent and Patient as in ergatives, e.g. 'The cat moved' 
NAT_CHNG - nature of change in the Patient 
AGT_MVMT - movement of the Agent 
PT_MVMT - movement of the Patient 
INTENSITY - forcefulness of action 
The dimensions and values are chosen on the basis that they are often salient ones, 
particularly in the case of verbs, in semantic role ascription. However, the authors are 
explicit about that fact that these dimensions and microfeatures are not meant to be 
comprehensive (McClelland and Kawamoto, 1986: 278). 
134 
4.3.2 How the Model Shades Meaning 
In the model, a word is represented by a vector (an ordered pattern of distributed 
representation) in which one microfeature of a dimension is ON and the other is OFF. 
Microfeatures that are ON are represented in the vectors as ls. OFF values are represented 
as dots (`.'). In the training inputs, the noun 'ball' was assigned the microfeature SOFT 
(SO). Going back to the noun dimension table above, the microfeatures for SOFTNESS are 
SOFT and HARD in that order. So the training inputted microfeature value of SOFTNESS 
for 'ball' was (1 .) (see below and refer back to the noun dimension table above for the 
significance of HU, GND etc.): 
HU SO GND VOL FORM PO BR OBJ_TYP 
ball 	 . 1 	 1. 	 ..l1 . . 	 . 	 .1 	 .1 	 .1 	  
However, following training, when the model was tested with the sentence The ball broke 
the vase, the output for the SOFTNESS dimension of 'ball' was ( . 1 ); the microfeature 
HARD was activated instead of SOFT. In a sense, this could be treated as an 'error' since 
the model had been trained with the information that 'balls' were SOFT. However, the 
adjustment that the model made was perfectly reasonable since all of the other instruments 
of BREAKING (e.g. 'rock', baseball-bat, 'hammer' etc) were HARD. The model responded 
to this and shaded its interpretation of the meaning of 'ball' in The ball broke the vase 
accordingly. For the model then, while 'balls' may be SOFT, 'balls-used-for-breaking' are 
HARD. This property of the model to shade meaning according to lexical environment is 
impressive to connectionist commentators such as Clark (1989: 109): 
...this property, which comes for free with parallel distributed storage and retrieval (at least with all genuinely 
distributed approaches), allows PDP models to provide a mechanism well suited to supporting a variety of 
important semantic phenomena. Of all the interesting properties of such models, this one, I believe, most 
firmly fixes any conceptual or qualitative advantages that PDP might have over other approaches. And indeed, 
McClelland and Kawamoto (1986: 314) themselves describe the capacity to represent 'a huge palette of shades 
of meaning' as being 'perhaps...the paramount reason why the distributed approach appeals to us'. 
This shading of meaning in the model concurs with the flexibility and holistic grasp that 
humans enjoy and so in a sense the connectionist network's ability to shade meaning can be 
treated as some kind of simulation of what takes place in human brain neural networks: 
...if it is the action in us of something operating according to the principles of such networks that enables us 
to be as flexible and holistic in our grasp of meaning as we are, then the study of such mechanisms surely 
illuminates how we succeed in grasping the meanings we do. 	 Clark (1989: 108) 
A further point to make is that microfeatural shading of meaning is automatic in 
connectionist networks. 'Shading of meaning' in humans intuitively appears to be an 
automatic process. Again, since connectionist networks attempt brain network simulation, 
then, this lends support to the idea that `microfeatural shading of meaning' in the brain really 
is an automatic process. Or to put this another way, non-compositional processing of words 
in a sentence is automatic in a connectionist network, lending support to the notion that non-
compositional processing of words is automatic in humans too. All this conflicts with the 
symbolic notion of compositionality in mental representations we saw in the last chapter. 
4.3.3 Implications for CDA of McClelland and Kawamoto (1986) 
Shading of meaning 
Recall Fairclough's (1995a: 113) analysis of the following piece of text: 
Everywhere in the Third World life in rural areas gets harder - and poor people flock to the city. The urban 
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poor get poorer. 
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Fairclough (1995a: 113), having commented upon the absence of 'the poor' as agents of 
their circumstances, mentions what seem to be exceptions to this analysis at first glance: 
...there are only two Actors in the third extract, the New People's Army and, exceptionally, the poor, in the 
poor people flock to the city. Interestingly, the Action here is one more usually associated with sheep -
notoriously passive - than people, so the exception does not really contradict what I have said so far. 
I commented in 3.4.2 how Fairclough isolates 'flock' from its semantic-syntactic 
environment as though it functioned compositionally in mental representation as a discrete 
symbol. However, the capacity for semantic closure and multiple constraint satisfaction of 
McClelland and Kawamoto's connectionist model, i.e. non-compositional / sub-symbolic 
processing, is incongruous with Fairclough's analysis which is essentially symbolic. In 
3.4.4, I highlighted how Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) view of metaphor, incorporated into 
CDA, rested on the assumption of compositional processing. We shall see in chapter 7 that 
a connectionist approach to metaphor conflicts with Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) approach. 
Attaching Meanings to Syntactic Categories in CDA 
As I have said, McClelland and Kawamoto (1986) were interested to see if their model could 
correctly assign case roles to sentential input. The training input representation of the 
microfeatures of verbs were the same, regardless of context. For 'broke' these were: 
DO CAU TOUCH 
	 N_CHG 	 A_MV 	 P_MV 	 IN 
broke 	 1. 	 1 . . 	 . 1 . . . 	 . 1 . . 	 . . 1 . 	 .1 
The following consists of the microfeature patterns that the model had to choose from in 
testing to see if it could provide a contextually appropriate reading of the verb 'break' in a 
variety of sentences: 
DO CAU TOUCH N_CHG A_MV P_MV IN 
broke 1 	 . 1 	 . 	 . . 	 1 . 	 . 	 . 1 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . . 	 1 . 	 . . 	 . 	 1 	 . . 1 
AVP1 
broke 1 1 	 . 	 . . 	 1 . 	 . . 	 . 	 1 	 . .1 
AVP 
broke 1 . 	 1 	 . . 	 . 	 . 1 . 	 . 	 1 	 . .1 
IVP 
broke 1 . 	 1 	 . . 	 . 	 . 1 	 . . 	 1 . 	 . . 	 . 	 1 	 . .1 
PV 
[A = Agent, V = Verb, P = Patient, I = Instrument] 
Thus, 'brokeAVPF specifies the case frame in which the surface subject is the Agent, the 
surface object is the Patient, and the with-NP the Instrument. In testing, the model 
successfully selected the appropriate output case-frame microfeature representations (slots) 
for the following sentences: 
the boy broke the window with the hammer 	 (brokeAVPI) 
the dog broke the plate 	 (brokeAVP) 
the hammer broke the vase 	 (brokelVP) 
the plate broke 	 (brokePV) 
Let me proceed now to consider what McClelland and Kawamoto (1986: 288) say about the 
success of the model to provide case-frame (`slot') representations for the above sentences: 
Several things should be said about case-frame representations. The first thing is that the slots should not 
be seen as containing lexical items. Rather, they should be seen as containing patterns that specify some of 
the semantic properties assigned by the model to the entities designated by the words in the sentences. Thus, 
the pattern of feature values for the verb break specifies that in this instance (the boy broke the window with 
the hammer) there is contact between the Instrument and the Patient. This would also be the case in a sentence 
like The hammer broke the window. However, in a sentence like The boy broke the window, with no 
Instrument specified, the pattern of feature values specifies contact between the Agent and the Patient. Thus, 
the verb features provide a partial description of the scenario described by the sentence. The noun features, 
likewise, provide a partial description of the players in the scenario, and these descriptions... may actually be 
modulated by the model to take on attributes appropriate for the scenario in question. 	 [my bold] 
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The case-frame representations do not, then, contain discrete lexical items. So there are no 
syntactically intact nouns and verbs in the case-frame output representations. Indeed, earlier 
McClelland and Kawamoto (1986: 283) state that 'the model does not have any prior 
commitment to the idea that the features in the input representation should be preserved in 
the output representation'. Later in the paper, McClelland and Kawamoto (1986: 315-6) 
flesh this notion out by indicating that the results of their connectionist model support the 
view that words (input) are clues to scenarios (output), a notion promulgated by Rumelhart 
(1979): 
...words are clues to scenarios...A sentence assembles some words in a particular order, and each provides a 
set of clues that constrains the characteristics of the scenario, each in its own way. The verb, in and of itself, 
may specify a range of related scenarios and certain constraints on the players. The nouns further restrict the 
scenario and further constrain the players. But the words themselves are no longer present in the scenario, 
nor is there necessarily anything in the scenario that corresponds to the literal meaning of any of the 
words... 
all the words work together to provide clues to the case frame representation of the sentence, and none 
of the words uniquely or completely determine the representation that is assigned to any of the constituents of 
the underlying scenario. 	 McClelland and Kawamoto (1986: 316) 
	 [my bold] 
So, from a connectionist perspective if the discrete input words are no longer present in the 
output, then, nor are the words' compositional syntactic nature. This all conflicts with the 
symbolic compositional assumption that there is a mental reflex for each constituent of a 
sentence. 
Recall, in the last chapter, how CDA authors associated semantic meaning with the nature 
of a syntactic category. This is particularly the case with nominals. In CDA, if an event is 
described with nominalisations, the event is regarded as being objectified, thus mystifying 
the dynamics of the event, e.g. the causal relations etc; see Kress and Hodge (1979) and 
Fowler et al. (1979) and more specifically Kress (1989a: 58); Martin (1989: 43); Fowler 
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(1991: 80); Lee (1992: 95); Fairclough (1995a: 112). Now, for McClelland and 
Kawamoto's (1986), the units of an expression conspire together to produce the scenario 
and in doing so 'the words themselves are no longer present in the scenario'. Both verb and 
noun features provide only partial excitations and inhibitions of activation patterns, and the 
individual 'verbs' and 'nouns' of the input are not even present in the output pattern of 
activation. It follows that, from McClelland and Kawamoto's (1986) connectionist 
perspective on language processing output, it is inappropriate for (symbolic) CDA to focus 
too heavily upon the syntactic nature of the units in an expression. Moreover, it is in turn 
inappropriate to ascribe meaning to the syntactic nature of constituents in a sentence as CDA 
does. Indeed, from a connectionist perspective, syntactic and semantic information are 
always integrated (see also: Churchland and Churchland 1996: 238), further ruling out a 
compositional isolation of a syntactic category and ascribing meaning to it. To sum up: 
McClelland and Kawamoto's (1986) connectionist model problematises the CDA notion that 
when nominals are used to describe events, their syntactic nature mystifies the dynamics of 
the event. The integrative nature of semantic and syntactic information also conflicts with 
the processing assumption of Fowler and Kress (1979a) and Kress (1993) (see 1.4.3 and 3.3) 
that people begin with a perceptual heuristic of subject-verb-object but may read across this 
structure and confuse semantic transitivity (transactivity) with syntactic transitivity. 
Shading of Case Roles 
McClelland and Kawamoto (1986: 312-3) highlight how there are problems with treating 
case roles as being unitary since: 
...some but not all of the Patient properties generally hold for the role nominally identified as Patient. 
Similarly, some but not all of the Agent properties generally hold for the role nominally identified as Agent. 
In certain cases, as with sentences like The boy moved, enough of these properties hold that we were led to 
assign the boy to both roles at once. 
Trying to solve this problem by creating more roles leads to a proliferation: 
...that is ungainly, unwieldy, and inelegant, and that detracts considerably from the utility of the idea of roles 
as useful descriptive constructs. 
However, on a distributed representation made up of microfeatures: 
If each role is represented by a conjunction of role properties, then far more distinct roles can be represented 
on the same set of role units. Furthermore, what the Agent roles of two verbs have in common is captured by 
the overlap of the role features in the representation of their roles, and how they differ is captured by their 
differences. The notion of a role that represents a combined Agent / Patient as in The boy moved is no longer 
a special case, and we get out of assigning the same argument to two different slots. 
McClelland and Kawamoto's (1986) idea of a distributed representation of case-roles (i.e. 
without unitary status) has also been applied by Touretzky and Geva (1987) and is 
highlighted in McClelland, St. John and Taraban (1989). 
McClelland and Kawamoto's (1986) fine-grained approach to case roles thus necessarily 
highlights the reductionism of coarse-grained case roles in a Hallidayan meta-language. Of 
course, the sharpness required of a tool depends on its purpose and if the purpose of a 
Hallidayan metalanguage, as used in CDA, is to highlight the broad semantic structure of 
a sentence, then, this is acceptable. However, what often happens in CDA is that meaning 
is ascribed to the metalinguistic description of a sentence and used to bolster a particular 
interpretation. Often this meaning is in excess of the actual sentential meaning. To indicate 
what I mean, consider the following news text and Trew's (1979: 102-3) analysis: 
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The Riots in Salisbury 
The rioting and sad loss of life in Salisbury are warning that tension in that country is rising as decisive moves 
about its future seem to be in the offing. The leaders of the African National Council have ritually blamed the 
police, but deplore the factionalism that is really responsible. 
No mention is made of 'police' except as those 'ritually blamed' - and note how even in this one reference the 
syntax has 'Africans' as agents and 'police' as affected participants (the victims of blaming!). 
If we were to assign a fine-grained micro-featural profile to 'blame' in the above, we would 
designate no-contact between AGENT and PATIENT. There is also no movement of the 
agent (AGT_MVMT) nor movement of the patient (PT_MVT). It is not, then, an instance 
of prototypical material transitivity. Since there is no PT_MVT, the police are hardly 
candidates for a reading of AFFECTED where the usual fillers are excited. And because of 
this, it is entirely tenuous to equate the semantic meaning of the case-role with 'victims'. 
The coarse-grained analysis can be seen as projecting an extra meaning which suits Trew's 
line. We can see, then, that while grammatical metalanguage describes a clause, a certain 
type of use of the coarse-grained nature of Halliday's semantic metalanguage not only 
describes the clause but can distort the nature of the scenario. 
4.4 Connectionism and Inference Generation 
4.4.1 Orientation 
In this section, I refer to the connectionist models of St. John and McClelland (1992) and 
of McClelland, St. John and Taraban (1989) which both build upon McClelland and 
Kawamoto (1986). Both sets of authors deal with connectionist processing of sentences but 
St. John and McClelland (1992) also deal with short text (`story') processing. Like 
McClelland and Kawamoto (1986), both models are successful at 'extracting' information 
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from a training input consisting of syntactically structured representations without resorting 
to rule-governed internal syntactically structured representations. 
The issue I want to highlight in the connectionist networks of these authors is how these deal 
with inference generation. Given the constraints of the thesis and the fact that I have already 
outlined in some detail a connectionist sentential processing model, I confine myself to the 
broad principles and results of St. John and McClelland (1992) and McClelland, St. John 
and Taraban (1989). [The broad principles of St. John and McClelland (1992) and 
McClelland, St. John and Taraban (1989) derive from McClelland and Kawamoto (1986).] 
This is also because in chapter 7, I provide a more detailed description of St. John's (1992) 
connectionist simulation of inference generation in short text processing whose principles 
are similar to those of St. John and McClelland (1992) as well as McClelland, St. John and 
Taraban (1989). 
4.4.2 Inference Generation in Sentential Processing 
Both St. John and McClelland (1992: 100) and McClelland, St. John and Taraban (1989: 
293) highlight human ability to readily infer other constituents such as instruments when the 
context is sufficiently constraining. So for example in: 
a) The boy spread the jelly on the bread 
b) The knife was covered with poison 
coherence between b) and a) is smooth for the above authors since 'knife' will be readily 
inferred in a). Now, in the connectionist models of McClelland, St. John and Taraban 
(1989) and St. John and McClelland (1992), handling implied constituents is not a problem 
since inferences are an inherent part of sentence processing rather than an extra process. 
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McClelland, St. John and Taraban (1989: 316) explain why it was 'natural' for their 
connectionist network to 'learn' that eating steak always involved a knife as an instrument: 
There is no special 'inference step' required to fill in the knife. This is in part a direct result of the fact that 
there is no prior stipulation that a particular part of the representation of the sentence corresponds to the 
internal reflex of each particular constituent of the sentence. It's just that events described by sentences with 
`ate' as the verb and 'steak' as the object always involve knives as instruments. 
The prior stipulation McClelland et al. (1989) refer to is Fodor and Pylyshyn's classical 
principle of compositionality (see: 2.2.5). Crucially, even though the network does build up 
an internal representation (the current sentence gestalt), the representation is not a classical, 
compositional representation with combinatorial syntax and semantics. 
As already outlined, connectionism, in contrast to classical psychology, seeks to understand 
with reference to underlying neural mechanisms. The central idea of parallel distributed 
processing that information processing arises from the parallel interactions of large numbers 
of simple information processing elements, comes from the observation that the brain is, in 
some ways, just such a system. From such a perspective, then, the above models raise the 
following prospects: 
i) that humans can also understand sentences without representing them in a 
syntactically structured internal 'language' (mentalese). 
ii) in human processing, inference generation is not a special extra step but 
simultaneously integrative with the integrative processing of semantics and syntax. 
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But as Bechtel (1996a: 72) points out, some circumspection is necessary: 
St. John and McClelland's network can only process a small fragment of English, and it remains a question 
whether networks of this kind could eventually handle the full range of complexity found in natural human 
languages. The answer to the question will only come from further empirical investigation. 
Crucially, though, Bechtel does add that human ability should not be exaggerated, mistakes 
being common in the comprehension of complex sentences. Given this, networks should 
not be expected to perform better than humans when inputted with, for example, sentences 
with many clausal embeddings (see note 2 of this chapter). 
Implications for CDA 
The connectionist 'principle' that inferences are inherent to sentence processing and not an 
extra stage conflicts with the downgrading of importance of inference generation in 
symbolicism, the modularity hypothesis etc (see 2.5.3) where syntactic processing is 
emphasised, e.g. Fodor, Fodor and Garrett (1975). It also conflicts, then, with the neglect 
of inference generation in (symbolic) CDA in their focus on surface structure, e.g., 
Fairclough's (1989) analysis of the 'Quarry load-shedding problem' text. 
4.4.3 Strength of Interpretation in Short Text Processing 
McClelland and St. John (1992: 97) point out how 'traditional story processing algorithms 
have viewed comprehension as the sequential building and connecting of text-based 
propositions' (e.g. Charniak, 1983; Schank and Abelson, 1977; van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; 
Wilensky, 1983) as though each sentence were a context-free proposition. And indeed in 
3.6.2, we saw for instance that for Clark (1992) and Simpson (1993), CDA examination was 
along these lines. However, St. John and McClelland's (1992) model does not process 
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sentences in this way. This is because the network exhibits 'parallel constraint satisfaction' 
where interpretation of a sentence is predicated on the strength with which other sentences 
constrain support for that interpretation. Here are St. John and McClelland (1992: 123): 
The strength of support can be observed in how strongly elements of the interpretation are activated. Early in 
a text, there may be little support for any interpretation. This condition will be manifest in the weak activation 
of possible interpretations. As text-based support for an interpretation grows, that interpretation will become 
more active. Further evidence may also revise the interpretation to one that is better supported by the 
combination of new and old evidence. 
Again as in sentence processing, inference generation is inherent to the processing of text: 
By allowing all of the evidence from the text to bear on the whole interpretation as each proposition is 
processed, a globally consistent interpretation is more likely to be found. 
St. John and McClelland (1992: 124) 
So, since the results of computation are not just based on context-free propositions, extra 
computational results (i.e., inferences) are present as a 'natural' consequence. On the same 
basis as before, if connectionist networks can be treated as simulations of brain networks, 
then, this raises the prospect that human text processing works also on the principle of 
parallel-constraint satisfaction. 
Implications for CDA 
In chapter 7, I outline an example of a parallel-constraint satisfaction model of short-text 
processing from St. John (1992) and highlight how the model is able to handle inference 
generation. But for now, I want to dwell on the basic principle of a parallel constraint 
satisfaction model, i.e. the principle of global constraints. In light of what has been dealt 
with in this section, consider again the text from Clark (1992: 215): 
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1) 'Two of Steed's rape victims aged 20 and 19 had a screwdriver held at their throats as they were forced 
to submit. 
2) His third victim, a 39 year old mother of three was attacked at gunpoint after Steed forced her car off the 
M4. 
3) Two days later, he gunned down call-girl, Jacqueline Murray, 23, after picking her up in London's Park 
Lane.' 
and what we have already seen from Simpson (1993: 170): 
Indeed, so obscured is the relationship between attacker and victim that it allows a possible reading wherein 
someone else attacks the woman at gunpoint while Steed only forces her car off the road. 
From the basic principle of parallel constraint satisfaction, global constraints, the 'weights' 
for Simpson's alternative scenario that 'someone else might have attacked' would be very 
low. Simpson's view that it is a possible interpretation is emblematic of the local fixation 
CDA have on individual sentences, as though they were context-free propositions. As we 
saw in 3.6.2, this fixation is influenced by symbolicism, the antithesis of connectionism. 
4. 4. 4 Summing-Up 
In this section, I have highlighted how connectionist models conflict, on the issue of 
inference generation, with symbolic accounts where inference generation is downplayed and 
syntactic processing made prominent. Inference generation is not a special, extra process 
to syntactic processing but, by nature of connectionist models, intrinsic to linguistic 
processing. A corollary then for CDA, from the point of view of connectionism, and 
especially if connectionist networks are seen to simulate human processing, is that 
concentrating on surface structure to the detriment of inferential processes is misleading. 
Having detailed a model of sentence processing in 4.3, and having highlighted the centrality 
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of inference generation to connectionist networks in 4.4, let me now widen out the 
discussion to the issue of mental representation in connectionism and how this differs from 
the symbolic attitudes to mental representation in CDA. 
4.5 Connectionism and Mental Representation and Implications for CDA 
4.5.1 Gross Descriptivism vs Gross Internalism 
In Clark (1996: 1-2), the following positions are listed in a discussion of whether there are 
mental analogues to folk discourse: 
i) Gross Descriptivism: the common-sense constructs (concepts, beliefs, propositionally identified contents etc) 
are nothing but descriptions of large-scale behavioural dispositions of whole agents. According to this view, 
no neat inner analogies to the folk constructs are to be found. 
ii) Modest Internalism: the common-sense constructs serve to pick out transient and / or large-scale features 
of internal (e.g. neural or computational organization). Examples might include the identification of concepts 
with distributed, context-dependent patterns of neural activity (see Clark, A, 1993) or the identification of 
mental images with temporarily time-locked activity in multiple neural regions (see Damasio, 1994). In such 
cases the folk items (images, concepts) do not have neat, highly manipulable and / or spatially localizable inner 
analogues. But there remain fairly robust patterns of widespread neural / computational activity which the folk 
discourse at times succeeds in tracking. 
iii) Gross Internalism: The common-sense constructs (or, in this case, some favoured subset such as concepts 
or (most) lexical items) have matching, highly manipulable, object-like inner analogues, e.g. a complex 
thought, folk-psychologically described might thus appear as a complex inner state with independently 
manipulable parts which match the independently recombinable concepts we deploy in its common-sense 
characterization. 
We can see that CDA, in its highlighting of `transactives' as a privileged representation, 
chimes with 'gross intemalism'. Consider the following from Simpson (1993: 88): 
In this study, the term transitivity is used in a much wider sense than that employed in traditional grammars. 
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Here it refers generally to how meaning is represented in the clause. It shows how speakers encode in 
language their mental picture of reality and how they account for their experience of the world around them. 
Simpson's semantic version of transitivity is more or less the same as Hodge and Kress's 
(1993) transactivity. It should be apparent that Simpson's notion that speakers encode their 
`mental picture of reality' into 'language' is an example of gross internalism. Now, for 
McClelland and Kawamoto (1986: 315-6), 'words themselves are no longer present in the 
scenario'; for McClelland, St. John and Taraban (1989: 316), 'there is no prior stipulation 
that a particular part of the representation of the sentence corresponds to the internal reflex 
of each particular constituent of the sentences.' That is, in their connectionist networks, 
linguistic input is not the same as output. In contrast to Simpson (1993) above, this position 
chimes with gross descriptivism. So, if connectionist networks in some way simulate brain 
networks, then, linguistic symbols are less likely to be encodings of a mental reality, pace 
Simpson, but rather input cues for it. 
Now, consider the following: 
The propositional attitude statement provides a gloss on the system's state, but not a description of its internal 
structure. 	 Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991: 290) 
...the currency of our systems is not symbols, but excitation and inhibition. 
Rumelhart and McClelland (1986: 132) 
Connectionist networks dispense with internalist propositionally based representation 
consisting of symbols. So, from the vantage point of a connectionist network, CDA's simple 
- the transactive - would, then, lose its privileged status. This is not only because 
propositions in connectionism are merely glosses of the system, but because while symbolic 
representations are discrete, highly grammatical and concatenatively compositional (all 
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features of transactives), connectionist distributed representations, on the contrary, are 
continuous, non-grammatical and non-concatenative (Miikkulainen (1993: 21)). 
4.5.2 Representation vs Enactment 
In chapter 2, I referred to the notion of a 'simple' in logical empiricism. The 'simple' in 
logical empiricism is connected with the notion of epistemological foundation. But the 
desire for epistemological foundations is actually prevalent throughout the history of 
philosophy, common to both empiricist and rationalist traditions: 
[philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge, and it fmds these foundations in a study of man-as-
knower, of the 'mental processes' or the 'activity of representation' which make knowledge possible. To know 
is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge 
is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representations. Philosophy's central 
concern is to be a general theory of representation,... 	 Rorty (1980: 3-4) 
But in connectionist philosophy, inspired by a desire to ape in some way the behaviour of 
the brain, there has been a shift away from concerns of representation. The principal activity 
of networks is their self-modification rather than representing the external world. As an 
outline of such a perspective, consider the following from Schopman and Shawky (1996: 69-
70): 
...during the course of learning the neural structure reorganizes itself, so that the result is a changed neural 
structure. This structural change cannot be called a representation of the original input, because the 
restructuring is the outcome of an interactive process between the state of the organism and the input. That 
means that the changed structure does not represent the external world, but it represents - if one wants 
to stick to the term - the interactive process: input-organism's or environment-organism's interaction. 
Thus one can say that it has a relation with the input, the external world...one can say that the learned 
structure-change has its own intrinsic semantics; nothing has to be ascribed to it and it requires no external 
interpretation. The important consequence for our story is that the problem of how to find the semantic 
relation has evaporated. 	 [my bold] 
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Let me just dwell a moment on 'the problem of how to find the semantic relation has 
evaporated'. In 2.2.4, I outlined how logical empiricism strove to mirror a pre-given world 
that is constituted by well-defined objects with well-defined properties, with the objects 
standing in fixed relations. This desire, from the connectionist perspective outlined by 
Schopman and Shawky, is no longer a concern. There is a shift away from the idea of a 
world being independent to the idea that the world is inseparable from the patterns of self-
modification. Like Shopman and Shawky, for Varella et al. (1991: 140) such systems do not 
work on the basis of representation. Crucially: 
...instead of representing an independent world, they enact a world as a domain of distinctions that is 
inseparable from the structure embodied by the cognitive system. 
Viewing cognition in terms of enactment, the realism - idealism dichotomy is circumvented. 
That is, we no longer have to see linguistic description as 'mirroring' the world [realism]; 
nor do we see our linguistic representations of the world as mediating between the world and 
what we can know of it [idealism]. Instead, sentences are enactors of understanding of the 
world, not representations [whether realist or idealist] of the world or of cognitive processes. 
The circumvention of the realist-idealist dichotomy is attractive for another reason. It avoids 
the realist emphasis on 'exact fit'. Since 'connections between actions and the facts of the 
world can be represented as statistical correlations' and `connectionist reasoning is 
evidential rather than logical' (Waltz, D. 1989: 58), instead of exact match we have 
something like best fit. A connectionist perspective on mental representation, then, does not 
require the assumption that the world was contrived to be recognised by humans nor that 
humans are bestowed with a ready-made key to it all. Sentences are not direct reflections 
of structures in the external world, pace a Carnapian logical empiricist perspective and pace 
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the inadvertent use of this perspective in CDA (see chapter 3). 
4.5.3 Connectionism and the 'Representational' Language of Science 
For the connectionist philosopher, Bechtel (1996b), rather than being something innate, 'our 
knowledge of grammar, for example, may consist of knowledge of procedures for 
comprehending and producing sentences in spoken and written speech' (Bechtel, 1996b: 
127). On the basis of such a perspective, then: 
...written documents are not transcriptions of our mental representations, but specifically constructed 
representations with which we have learned to interact. 	 (1996b: 128) 
That is, natural language text provides an externalist rather than internalist system of 
`representations'. Bechtel develops this point by asserting that although scientific theories 
may take a sentential form: 
...these representations are not translations of what is in the heads of the scientists; rather, they are devices 
used by scientists. Scientific theories may take a sentential form even if, in using these theories, scientists rely 
on weights on connections within their heads. Consequently, we should not seek to localize the story of 
scientific development in representations and processes occurring in the head. Instead, we need to take 
seriously the fact that scientists are situated cognizers whose cognitive processes involve interactions with 
external representations as well as physical devices.' 
	 Bechtel (1996b: 141) 
All this problematises the analysis of scientific language in Hodge and Kress (1993) (see 
3.2.5). This is because their analysis of scientific language is predicated upon the notion that 
discrete 'scientific' transactive sentences in texts can reflect reality which in turn become 
a mental representation which is directly reflective of that reality. Bechtel (1996b) would 
also conflict with the notion in Ogborn et al. (1996: 51), outlined in 3.5.2, that nominal 
descriptions of scientific phenomena mean they are treated mentally as 'things': 
151 
Scientific texts are well known for their high concentration of events and processes presented as if they were 
things. Simple examples include evaporation, crystallization, ionization, speciation, oscillation. Any scientific 
textbook or journal will yield a multitude of them, as transparent as 'magnification' or as opaque as 
`commensurability oscillations in the resistivity' (culled from a relatively non-specialized journal). Their 
presence is not due to the barbarous linguistic habits of scientists. They exist in texts and talk as entities 
because they exist in the thinking of scientists as entities. 
As a final point, Bechtel's view of text as not being a transcription of mental representation 
but rather an external device for interaction with a cogniser is on a par with the approach to 
discourse analysis I outlined in 1.7. It is also in line with the notion of language as a set of 
cues rather than as a representational medium (see 3.2.5 and 4.5.2). 
In 4.5, I have broadened out the issue of mental representation by indicating the poles of 
gross descriptivism and gross internalism. Gross descriptivism chimes with the positions 
of connectionist scientists and philosophers I have cited and gross internalism chimes with 
symbolicists. Two symbolicists I mentioned in chapter 2, Fodor and Pyslyshyn (1988), have 
written a well-known critique of connectionism. In the final section of this chapter, I 
highlight this critique and, in the main, how Elman (1990) has tried to answer these 
criticisms by way of demonstration of connectionist networks. I do this also because 
Elman's (1990) response makes very clear the differing perspectives between connectionists 
and symbolicists with regard to the notions of compositionality, systematicity and 
productivity, which I outlined in 2.2.5. 
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4.6 Connectionist Responses to Fodor and Pylyshyn's Arguments against the 
Connectionist Approach 
4.6.1 Orientation 
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) argue that only the classical model, one that incorporates a 
combinatorial syntax and semantics, can account for the systematicity, productivity and 
compositionality of language. These cannot be accounted for on a connectionist model since 
connectionist models do not incorporate a combinatorial syntax and semantics. 
Consequently, connectionism is inadequate on these central characteristics of language. In 
the following, I outline how the results of some connectionist networks offer a response to 
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988). 
4.6.2 Compositionality 
Compositionality refers to the idea that a word contributes the same thing to the meaning of 
all sentences in which it occurs. Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) argue that a model of language 
should be able to account for the phenomenon of compositionality. However, connectionist 
authors would argue that compositionality is an impoverished view of what happens in 
processing. We saw earlier that connectionist networks generate implied constituents [St. 
John and McClelland (1992); McClelland, St. John and Taraban (1989) etc]. This, then, 
conflicts with the notion of compositionality since there is no prior stipulation that a 
particular part of the representation of the sentence corresponds to the internal reflex of each 
particular constituent of the sentence. Furthermore, in McClelland, St. John and Taraban 
(1989), there was a tendency for the network to be too sensitive to context. [See also 7.4.1 
for how the propensity for top-down processes of schema expectation to override bottom-up 
processes is incompatible with the notion of compositional mental representation.] 
153 
4. 6.3 Systematicity 
Systematicity refers to the fact that systematic exchange can occur in mental representations 
to yield new representations. That is, if someone can comprehend 'John loves the girl', they 
can also understand 'The girl loves John'. For this to take place, 'the two mental 
representations, like the two sentences, must be made of the same parts' (Fodor and 
Pylyshyn, 1988: 39). Elman (1990) is in part a response to Fodor and Pylyshyn's criticisms 
that a connectionist network cannot account for systematicity in language because it does 
not operate on the basis of a combinatorial syntax and semantics. Elman addresses the 
question of whether a connectionist model could induce lexical-category structure (e.g. the 
categories of noun and verb) from a series of exposures to sequences of linguistic input. If 
the network were able to induce structure from different linguistic inputs, i.e. that a verb 
typically follows a noun, then it could be said to exhibit systematicity. That is, the network 
could 'understand' sentences such as John loves the girl and The girl loves John because it 
`knows' typically from the corpus sentences it was trained on that one thing (a verb) follows 
something else (a noun) without actually 'knowing' any rules about what constitutes nouns 
or verbs. 
The type of network used is as in the figure c). The network is basically a three-layered 
network with feed-forward connections from input units to hidden units to output units. 
There is an additional set of units, context units, which provide for limited recurrence. The 
context units were set up to copy the activation at the hidden-unit layer, which thus 
simultaneously received the input and the 'temporal context' information (i.e. the copy of 
its own previous state). Because of this, the network is able to handle syntactic sequence, 
i.e., recognises that 'the man likes the woman' and 'the woman likes the man' are not 
equivalent. A lexicon of 29 nouns and verbs is used, and these were composed into a 
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Figure c) 
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The network used in the first simulation. Hidden-unit activations are copied with 
fixed weights (of 1.0) onto linear context units on a one-to-one basis. In the next 
time step the context units feed into hidden units on a distributed basis. 
training corpus of 10, 000 two- and three-word sentences. The sentences reflected certain 
properties of the words. For example, only animate nouns occurred as the subject of the 
verb 'eat', and this verb was only followed by edible substances. Following training, the 
task for the network was to take successive words (from an input of words taken from the 
corpus itself) and to predict the subsequent word by producing it in the output layer. The 
prediction task was chosen partly on the basis that it does seem that much of what listeners 
do involves anticipation of future lexical input at least at an immediate local level (Grosjean 
1980; Marslen-Wilson and Tyler 1980, Salasoo and Pisoni 1985). 
Elman (1990) was not interested so much in what the actual predicted word was in each case 
but with what 'syntactic nature' the network ascribed to the predicted word. On analysing 
the internal representations at the hidden-unit layer, Elman found that it was partitioning the 
space into the recognisable 'syntactic distinctions' nouns' and 'verbs'. Figure d) shows the 
similarity structure of the internal representations of the 29 lexical items. For example, it 
displays very similar hidden-unit activation for 'mouse', 'cat', 'dog' and thus warranting a 
cluster label of 'animal'. Elman (1990: 351-3) asserts that this arises: 
...from the fact that there is a class of items that always precedes chase, break, and smash, it [the network] 
infers a category of large animals' 	 [my italics] 
At a coarser perspective, it displayed a similarity in its treatment of all nouns in the lexicon. 
The same was true for all the verbs in the lexicon. The verb category is broken down into 
those that require a direct object, those that are intransitive, and those for which a direct 
object is optional. As the diagram shows, then, the category structure reflects facts about 
the possible sequential ordering within sentences in the corpus. That is, the network 
155 
Figure d) 
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Hierarchical clustering of mean hidden-unit vectors after presentation of each 
of the lexical items in context. The similarity structure of the space reflects 
distributional properties of the lexical items. 
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`recognises' in this corpus that there are two fairly distinct classes of phenomena, and that 
one class (verbs) typically follows another class (nouns). Crucially, what Elman's network 
demonstrates is its ability to 'realise' syntactic / lexical structure, i.e., that internal structure 
is an emergent feature of his simulation without it having to be built into the simulation in 
the form of explicit rules. In a sense, then, the connectionist network did 'discover' the 
categories of noun and verb. Elman's network, and thus by extension perhaps also brain 
neural networks, exhibit systematicity in 'understanding' sentences such as 'John loves the 
girl' and The girl loves John' ; however, this is not because the two mental representations 
must be made of the same parts, but because the connectionist network 'knows' a verb 
follows a noun from exposure to a large corpus where this is the case. So, while Chomsky 
invoked the 'poverty of stimulus' in linguistic input as support for his argument that 
language acquisition was only possible with innate linguistic competence, Elman's network 
is actually able to induce grammatical distinctions from a limited input (Bechtel, 1996a: 68). 
The network's systematicity, then, has a different basis to Fodor and Pylyshyn's 
systematicity and so Fodor and Pyslyshyn's (1988) stipulation that a combinatorial syntax 
and semantics must inform systematicity does not follow. However the fact that the network 
`has no information available that would ground the structural information of language in 
the real world' is not wholly positive: 
This is both a plus and a minus. Obviously, a full account of language processing needs to provide such 
grounding. On the other hand, it is interesting that the evidence for category structure can be inferred so readily 
solely on the basis of evidence internal to the language. 	 Elman (1990: 353) 
Elman also acknowledges that the model barely scratches the surface 'in terms of the 
richness of linguistic phenomena that characterize natural languages' (Elman, 1990: 376). 
4.6.4 Productivity 
Productivity refers to the fact that, despite a finite number of simple concepts, humans can 
produce an infinite set of propositions. Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) reason that a set of 
infinite propositions can only be explained on the basis that they are constructed according 
to structure-sensitive rules via repeatable units. In a further simulation, Elman (1990) 
showed that a network could acquire a simple grammar by repeated exposure to grammatical 
sentences, but again without generating or applying structure-sensitive rules, in contrast to 
the classical approach. Elman (1990) trained a network, similar to the first simulation (see 
figure e), that is, once more incorporating context units, to discriminate all and only the 
grammatical sentences generated by a simple but productive grammar over a lexicon of 21 
words. The grammar permits considerable complexity in the form of embedded relative 
clauses as in the sentence 'Boys who kiss girl who feeds dog chase cats'. The grammar 
demands, as does the trained network, that the plural verb 'chase' agree with the plural 
subject 'Boys' despite being separated from it by six words, two defining relative clauses, 
and two distracting singular nouns. 
The trained network is presented with a candidate sentence one word at a time, and it yields 
as output (for that word) a list of grammatical categories permissible, at that point, for the 
next word in the sentence. In order to do that, it regularly needs to know not just what the 
current input word is but also what the preceding word was, and sometimes even the two or 
three words before that. It is the recurrent loop, from the middle layer to the 'auxiliary' 
input layer, that gives the network this continuous access to its own recent past. In the 
diagram, what the network returns to along with each new input word is not just the previous 
word, but rather its subsequent 'digest' at the middle layer, a digest that places the previous 
word into the context of its preceding word, and so on. Information about earlier words 
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Figure e) 
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The network used in the second simulation. The architecture is similar to that in 
figure I . Additional hidden layers provide for compression of localist input and 
output vectors. 
survives repeated cyclings through that recurrent loop, and thus exercises an influence on 
the network's response to an input word. 
Since the network was able to generate a list of possible grammatical categories at each stage 
of the input, for Elman (1990), the network could be said to exhibit productivity. Again, like 
the first simulation, the network uses a representational strategy quite different from any 
classical or rule-based approach which Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) argue for. That is, 
Elman's connectionist network exhibits a different kind of productivity to that of Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1988). It does not represent any structure-sensitive rules, nor retrieves and applies 
any such devices in rendering its ongoing verdicts about grammatically permissible next 
words. For Elman, those rules correctly predict the network's behaviour, but they do not 
explain it.2  
4.7 Endpoints 
In this chapter, I have shown how connectionist principles problematise those of 
symbolicism and thus, by extension, how these principles also problematise language 
processing assumptions in symbolic CDA and how CDA highlights mystifying text. I was 
not attempting to promote connectionism as a linguistic panacea since connectionism is still 
in its 'infancy' but rather to show how connectionism problematises the processing 
assumptions of CDA. However, the ability of connectionist networks to shade meaning non-
compositionally and to include inference generation as an integrative part of language 
processing are features which capture the automatic flexibility and holistic grasp of meaning 
in human language processing more readily than approaches we saw in chapter 2. This is 
especially pertinent given that one of the aims of connectionist networks is to provide some 
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simulation of human brain network activity. In chapter 6, we shall see that the capacity of 
connectionist networks to tie in with the above aspects of human language processing is in 
fact supported by psycholinguistic evidence. In the next chapter, I outline the enterprise of 
cognitive linguistics, an enterprise with many similarities to connectionism, and tease out 
how cognitive linguistics problematises the symbolic assumptions of CDA also. 
Notes 
1. McClelland, St John and Taraban (1989: 322) argue that there is an aspect of the productivity of language 
which appears to be better explained by a connectionist approach. This is the use of context to shade meanings 
(see 4.3.2). They refer back to McClelland and Kawamoto (1986) and the example of the 'ball'. In the initial 
inputs, 'ball' was assigned the microfeature 'soft'. However, with the sentence The ball broke the vase, 'hard' 
was activated instead of soft. That is, the network was able to make necessary adjustments so as to produce 
the novel sentence. 
2. Elman's network shows a discrepancy in the type of productivity it manifests and the kind of open-ended 
generative productivity in Chomskyan (competence) models. I have mentioned that 'rules' predict the 
network's behaviour. But in reality, this prediction is by no means perfect. This is because the network makes 
systematic errors. In a long sentence with more than three relative defining clauses, the network loses the 
ability to specify the correct number of the final verb. This is due to the fact that the subject-term information 
that is cycling through the recurrent loop is progressively diluted with each cycle: after three-word cycles, the 
information is effectively gone. Classical algorithms do not show such a failure pattern, but intriguingly 
humans do and so does Elman's network. This lack of open-ended productivity is not only in marked contrast 
with Chomsky's 'classical' model, but also strengthens the case for connectionism over the symbolic paradigm, 
as a better simulation of human language processing, given that limitation on open-ended productivity is a 
characteristic of human cognition as well. 
CHAPTER 5: COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS - PROBLEMATISING 
HOW CDA HIGHLIGHTS MYSTIFYING TEXT 
5.1 Introduction 
In 2.4, I mapped out the classical theory of categories. The salient assumption in the 
classical theory is that categories are defined in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. In the post-war period, a number of philosophers and linguists, gathering 
momentum under the banner of 'cognitive linguistics', have begun to challenge this classical 
postulate. Notable among these challenges is the experimental work of Rosch, and Lakoff s 
(1987a), 'Women, Fire and Dangerous Things'. Lakoff sets out an alternative philosophico-
linguistic position to objectivism which he and Johnson (1987) term `experientialism'. He 
terms the classical theory of categories - objectivism. I will come to an outline of this 
position in due course. But to begin this chapter, I draw attention to two challenges 
cognitive linguistics poses to objectivism. In objectivism: 
i) no members should be better examples of the categories than any other members. 
ii) categories should be independent of the peculiarities of beings doing the categorising i.e. 
should not involve neurophysiology, human body movement, and human capacities to 
perceive, to form mental images etc. 
Cognitive linguistics is founded on the rebuttal of the absoluteness of i) and ii). In 5.2 and 
5.3, I discuss the cognitive linguistic dissension from i) and ii) respectively. 
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5.2 Categories and Prototypicality 
5.2.1 Prototype Effects 
Early Rosch 
In the early to mid-seventies, the results of a series of experiments conducted by Eleanor 
Rosch cast doubt on the notion that category membership was along the lines of Aristotelian 
absoluteness (see 2.4.1). In Rosch (1975b), for example, students were asked to assess the 
`typicality' of members of certain categories. Subjects tended to define categories (e.g. 
`bird') by identifying certain prototypical members of the category (e.g. `robin'), where there 
exists the greatest density of attributes for the category, and they recognise other non-
prototypical members (e.g. ostrich) that differ in various ways from the prototypical ones. 
Rosch's experimental results, then, conflict with the assumption inherent within the 
classical theory that no members should be better examples of the categories than any other 
members. This is not to say that all of the objectivist or classical theory is challenged by 
Rosch's results as Lakoff (1987a: 586) points out. Certain geometrical shapes such as 
squares and spheres etc can be described by a complete set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, although what constitutes the expected size of such shapes, for example, may be 
grounded in prototypicality (Armstrong et al., 1983). 
Referring to Rosch's results, Lakoff (1987b: 63) highlights how prototype effects were 
interpreted in two ways as indicating something direct about the nature of categorisation: 
i) The Effects = Structure Interpretation: Goodness-of-example ratings are a direct reflection of degree of 
category membership. 
ii) The Prototype = Representation Interpretation: Categories are represented in the mind in terms of 
prototypes (that is, best examples). Degrees of category membership for other entities are determined by their 
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degree of similarity to the prototype.  
Later Rosch's More Tentative Position 
In the early part of her career, Rosch accepted the above as valid interpretations of her 
experimental results. Later, Rosch (1978: 40-1) was to form a much more tentative position: 
The pervasiveness of prototypes in real-world categories and of prototypicality as a variable indicates that 
prototypes must have some place in psychological theories of representation, processing and learning. 
However, prototypes themselves do not constitute any particular model of processes, representations, or 
learning. This point is so often misunderstood that it requires discussion: 
1. To speak of a prototype is simply a convenient grammatical fiction; what is really referred to are judgments 
of degree of prototypicality... 
2. Prototypes do not constitute any particular processing model for categories... 
3. Prototypes do not constitute a theory of representation for categories...As with processing models, the facts 
about prototypes can only constrain, but do not determine, models of representation... 
4. Although prototypes must be learned, they do not constitute any particular theory of category learning. 
Lakoff (1987a: 44-5) elaborates upon this position. In the early to mid 1970s, empirical 
goodness-of-example ratings were taken as supporting the notion that a penguin is less a 
member of the category 'bird' than a robin. But this was later regarded as a mistaken 
interpretation of the data because the responses by subjects as to the goodness-of-example 
are just ratings. And indeed as Lakoff (1987a: 45) states, the ratings: 
...are consistent with the interpretation that the category bird has strict boundaries and that robins, owls, and 
penguins are all 100 percent members of that category. However, that category must have additional internal 
structure of some sort that produces these goodness-of-example ratings. 
Lakoff (1987a: 45), then, tallies with Rosch's circumspection. He goes onto state that 
prototype effects are really 'superficial' in the sense that they are by-products of 'internal 
structure'. 
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Idealised Cognitive Models 
One of the aims of Lakoff (1987a) is to outline the sources for prototype effects. For Lakoff 
(1987a: 45), 'prototype effects result from the nature of cognitive models, which can be 
viewed as 'theories' of some subject matter.' The central thesis of Lakoff (1987a) is that 
human knowledge is organised via idealised cognitive models (ICMs) and that prototype 
effects (as well as category structure) are by-products of such cognitive organisation. What 
does Lakoff mean by idealised? He means that the cognitive model is created. For 
example, if the Western seven-day calendric cycle is compared with that of the Balinese, it 
becomes easier to see that the Western model is an idealised model since it does not exist 
independently in nature (Lakoff, 1987a: 68-9). How, for Lakoff, do prototype effects arise? 
Lakoff (1987a: 70) gives the example of the category 'bachelor', arguing that it is defined 
with respect to an ICM of human marriage in a typically monogamous human society, and 
a typical marriageable age. It is as a result of this ICM that fuzzy cases can arise: 
homosexuals, the pope' etc. For Lakoff (1987a: 70) an ICM: 
...may fit one's understanding of the world either perfectly, very well, pretty well, somewhat well, pretty badly, 
badly, or not at all. If the ICM in which bachelor is defined fits a situation perfectly and the person referred 
to by the term is unequivocally an unmarried adult male, then he qualifies as a member of the category 
bachelor. The person referred to deviates from prototypical bachelorhood if either the ICM fails to fit the 
world perfectly or the person referred to deviates from being an unmarried adult male. 
Prototype effects arise because of the degree to which the ICM fits our knowledge (or 
assumptions) about the world. They arise in the comparison between two cognitive models 
in the above - one for bachelor and one characterising one's knowledge about an individual, 
say the pope. To allow such a comparison, Lakoff (1987a: 71) thus argues that 'one needs 
the concept of 'fitting' one's ICMs to one's understanding of a given situation and keeping 
track of the respects in which the fit is imperfect.'2 
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Barsalou (1983) 
For Lakoff (1987a: 45-6), the work of Barsalou (1983) confirms that prototype effects arise 
from the nature of cognitive models. Barsalou focuses on 'ad-hoc categories' - non-
conventional categories which are created 'on the fly' for some particular goal in a particular 
context, e.g. 'things to take from one's home during a fire'. Certain features (e.g. one's 
children) can be regarded as prototypical and others (e.g. a box of paper clips) as non-
prototypical. However, despite the fact that the category is non-conventional, it can be said 
to have a prototype structure. For Barsalou, such a non-conventional category is determined 
by goals and goals are part of a speaker's cognitive models. From a Lakoffian perspective 
then, prototype effects arise when the 'on the fly' created ICM fails to adequately fit the 
understanding and goals of the situation. The importance also of goals in the type of 
prototype effects created becomes clear when we see that in Rosch's early experiments the 
respondents' goal was to deliver ratings of typicality of particular categories. 
Context (co-text) -Dependency Of Prototype Effects 
What Barsalou's non-conventional examples also indicate is that prototype effects are 
context-dependent. Context can also include co-text. Co-textual influence on prototype 
generation is appreciable in the following taken from Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 43-4) (see 
also Roth and Shoben, 1983): 
i) The hunter took his gun, left the lodge and called his dog 
ii) She took her dog to the salon to have its curls reset 
The first dog, prototypically would be a retriever, while the prototype for the second 
sentence might be a pekinese. Outside of the above co-texts, a retriever could be construed 
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as a prototypical dog but a pekinese is unlikely to be. What these examples indicate is that 
Rosch was right to adopt a more tentative position since the influence of context (including 
co-text), engagement of cognitive models and specific goals indicate that prototypes are 
created 'on the fly' rather than being stored representations; see also Rosch (1978: 42-3) for 
a discussion of the role of context in prototype effects. All this is not to deny the reality or 
salience in human reasoning of prototype effects, only that these effects depend on other 
phenomena for their emergence. The importance of prototypes and their relation to human 
reason is indicated in the following from Lakoff (1987a: 45): 
In many cases, prototypes act as cognitive reference points of various sorts and form the basis for inferences 
(Rosch 1975a, 1981). The study of human inference is part of the study of human reasoning and conceptual 
structure; hence, those prototypes used in making inference must be part of conceptual structure. 
The importance of prototypes to inference generation will become apparent in section C of 
this thesis. We shall see also in section 5.4 that the internal structure upon which superficial 
prototype effects depend relates to our neurophysiological propensities for motor-interaction 
and gestalt perception. 
Having introduced the phenomenon of prototypicality, in the next section I outline the 
relationship between prototypicality and syntactic categories and highlight implications for 
CDA. 
5.2.2 Prototypicality and Syntactic Categories: Implications for CDA 
The work of Hopper and Thompson (1985) has indicated that the status of a word within its 
respective grammatical category is by no means a fixed property of the word in question. 
The semantically relevant properties - in the case of nouns, the extent to which the noun 
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refers to an identifiable, enduring thing, with verbs whether the verb refers to a specific 
dynamic event - can vary. On a similar note, here also is Lakoff (1987a: 57) 
...it is important to see that prototype effects occur not only in nonlinguistic conceptual structure, but in 
linguistic structure as well. The reason is that linguistic structure makes use of general cognitive apparatus, 
such as category structure. 
Consider the following sentences: 
i) The lorry shed its load on the building site 
ii) Load-shedding is frequent on the building site 
In i), 'shed' and 'load' are fairly prototypical. Consistent with this is the fact that both verb 
and noun can take on the whole range of typical verb and noun properties. The verb is 
marked for tense, polarity, mood and voice. 'Load' could also appear as singular or plural, 
and be preceded by a determiner, adjective(s) etc. In sentence ii), though, 'load' does not 
refer to a discrete identifiable object, and neither does 'shed' refer to a single identifiable 
event. Symptomatic of this loss of semantic categoriality is the fact that neither word can 
be inflected or modified. It follows that 'load-shedding' is a non-prototypical noun. Recall 
from 1.4.2, Fairclough's (1989: 51) analysis of the headline 'Quarry load-shedding 
problem': 
...the grammatical form in which the headline is cast is that of a nominalization: a process is expressed as a 
noun, as if it were an entity. 
The assumption here is that mystification can occur because the reader is prevented from 
seeing reality in active terms. Understanding of the dynamism of the reality (i.e., the nature 
of causal relationship and agent responsibility) is prevented by the 'objectifying' effects of 
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the nominalisation. But we have seen that, on the basis of Hopper and Thompson's analysis, 
load-shedding' suffers decategorisation. In also functioning as a modifier, it loses some of 
the morphological and distributional attributes of the noun class. In chapter 3 and 4, we saw 
that much of CDA's approach to mental representation was predicated upon the internalise 
view of mind. Adopting this CDA-ratified perspective, since 'load-shedding' is a non-
prototypical nominal, the reader's mental representation of load-shedding' would not for 
a CD analyst, at least, be that much of an 'entity'. 
The oddness of seeing all nouns as entities can be seen by considering a noun such as 
`departure'. On Hodge and Kress's argument, readers would have to override its semantic 
meaning by treating the nominal 'syntactic meaning' as completely separate and somehow 
make the idea of, say, the 'train departure' difficult to understand as an event. The absurdity 
of such a suggestion is even more evident when we consider the lexemes 'verb' and 
`nominalisation', the latter being a central facet of Hodge and Kress's conceptual apparatus. 
Does the nounhood status of 'verb' impede understanding that a great number of verbs are 
processes? Does the nounhood status of `nominalisation' prevent understanding that this 
term refers to a process - i.e. the process of making verbs into nouns? On Hodge and 
Kress's reasoning the answer would have to be in the affirmative, but this paradoxically 
would problematise their use of the concept `nominalisation' since its grammatical form 
would mystify understanding of how such processes are supposed to mystify! The 
problematising I applied to Fairclough can also be applied to Fowler's (1986: 20) treatment 
of 'my wife' (see 3.4.3). In other words, Fowler ignores the fact that there are prototypical 
uses of 'my' to indicate possession (e.g, 'my wallet') as well as non-prototypical uses (`my 
round of drinks') where possession diminishes as a feature of the situation. Similar points 
can be made against how Hodge and Kress (1993: 23-4) regard nouns such as 'ban' and 
`production' (see 3.5.2): 
...as though they were like apple or bench, but referring to things which happen to be abstract, not concrete 
physical things. 
In the light of all this, and as I argued in chapter 4, it is unwise to simply 'read off 
metalinguistic descriptions of syntax as is common in CDA. 
Recall from 5.1 how in objectivism: 
Categories should be independent of the peculiarities of beings doing the categorising i.e. should not involve 
neurophysiology, human body movement, and human capacities to perceive, to form mental images etc. 
I now move to a discussion of the basic level of categorisation, a type of category salient in 
cognitive linguistic explanations, which is linked to human neurophysiology and thus in 
tension with the above precept of objectivism. 
5.3 Basic-Level Categories 
5.3.1 Orientation 
To begin this section, let me outline the work of Berlin et al. (1974). The aim of this project 
was to scrutinise the 'folk taxonomy' used by Tzeltal people, a community in southern 
Mexico, for classifying and naming the plants in their environment and compare this 
taxonomy with Western scientific classifications. It was found that Tzeltal plant categories 
were most numerous on the generic level with 471 genera, e.g., corn, bean, pine, willow. 
In contrast, the number of superordinate categories was exceedingly low - no more than 
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four plant names - tree, vine grass, broad-leafed plant. 'Species' was well represented but 
membership was more restricted than on the generic level, there being 273 species, e.g. 
genuine pine, red pine, white bean, common bean etc. The subordinate level to the species 
level was minimal, consisting of five plant names, e.g. red common bean, black common 
bean. Generic categories were not only more numerous but were the ones that were most 
commonly chosen by Tzeltal speakers. Moreover, in Tzeltal, culturally salient categories 
are much more likely to be generic categories than superordinate ones. For example, 'corn' 
and 'beans' form two basic ingredients of the Tzeltal diet. 
What is interesting about the folk taxonomy in Tzeltal compared to folk taxonomies used 
by English speakers is that the latter's cognitively basic level is also the generic level. 
Generic category names such as 'dog', 'car' are first learned by children, are used frequently 
and consist of simples (i.e, undecomposable morphemes) (Brown, 1958, 1965). This also 
applies for Tzeltal generic categories. Speakers also tend to prefer category names such as 
`dog' and 'car' in neutral contexts or when introducing new categories into conversation 
(Cruse, 1977). Brown's observations about the use and acquisition of cognitive categories 
together with Berlin et al's investigation of the Tzeltal seems to indicate that the generic or 
intermediate level of categorisation is more important. This is partly due to the fact that 
categories at this level not only have cultural salience but biological salience also. Such 
categories are used to refer to objects and actions which are bound up with motor interaction 
(Lakoff, 1987a: 37). Following Lakoff (1987a), I shall refer to the salient generic-level of 
categorisation as the basic level. 
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5.3.2 Direct Understanding of the Basic Level 
For Lakoff (1987a: 302), meaningfulness involves the structuring of experience. Some types 
of experience are preconceptually structured because of our neurophysiological capacities 
for motor interaction, gestalt perception and mental imagery. For Lakoff (1987a: 292), 'a 
sentence is directly understood if the concepts associated with it are directly meaningful', 
i.e., if it involves basic-level categories. As an example, consider the difference in direct 
understanding between the pig ate the carrot (which uses basic-level categories) and the 
organism ingested the food (which uses superordinate categories). 
It is because of the capacity of basic-level categories to give rise to direct meaningful 
sentences that basic-level metaphors are comprehensible. Here is Lakoff (1987a: 303): 
In domains where there is no clearly discernible preconceptual structure to our experience, we import such 
structure via metaphor. Metaphor provides us with a means for comprehending domains of experience that 
do not have a preconceptual structure of their own. 
But basic-level metaphors may not only communicate conceptual content but interactional 
properties also. As an example of a basic-level metaphor, consider the 'internal mouse' on 
a laptop computer. It has become common to refer to the small mound in the keyboard as 
the 'mouse' as an extension of 'external mouse', itself a metaphor. Obviously this piece of 
rubber bears no relationship to the 'external mouse', i.e. it does not have the inherent 
properties - made of hard plastic, has a ball mechanism underneath etc. But referring to this 
laptop item with the basic-level category 'mouse' enables the hearer to realise the particular 
motor-interactionality and purposive properties associated with a laptop. That is, in context, 
when instructed as to the name of the small mound, perceptual properties (it looks like a 
mouse) are inhibited and purposive properties (it serves the purpose of an external mouse) 
and motor-activity properties (with some adjustment, you handle it like an external mouse) 
are activated.3 
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5.3.3 Cognitive Economy of the Basic Level 
The basic level is where perception of obvious differences amongst organisms and objects 
is salient, consonant with 'the most obvious discontinuities in nature' (Kay 1971: 878). 
Experimental evidence suggests that there are more attributes associated with the basic level 
than with the superordinate level (Rosch et al. 1976). In other words, the basic level is 
informationally rich. Compare, for example the basic-level category 'dog' to the 
superordinate category 'mammal'. In contrast to the basic level, it should be apparent that 
the superordinate covers such a disparate array of items that any similarities are only 
apparent from a general perspective, i.e., there is no common shape for the category which 
could be applied to dogs, elephants, giraffes etc; see section 5.6 for discussion of the 
superordinate level. Conversely, we find the basic level easy to understand because we 
understand objects on this level of categorisation (e.g. dog) in terms of an overall shape, that 
is holistically via a gestalt (Lakoff, 1987a: 33). Like basic-level categories, subordinate 
categories (e.g. 'retrievers') do possess a common defining shape. However, the 
differentiating power of subordinates does not match that of basic-level categories. 
Differentiation between 'retrievers' and 'poodles' is much less than between 'dogs' and 
giraffes' for example (Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 69). 
As I have said earlier, it is on the basic level that we motor-interact with objects and 
organisms, e.g. where cats are stroked, spoons are held etc (Rosch et al. 1976). Moreover, 
it is on the basic level that objects and organisms can be distinguished by the differences in 
how humans interact with them. For the subordinate level, though, 'it is difficult to imagine 
that different kinds of cats are stroked in different ways' (Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 69). 
Conversely, it is difficult to distinguish between superordinate categories (e.g. 'furniture' 
and 'mammals') in terms of one's motor-interaction. 
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To sum up, compared to the superordinate and subordinate levels, i) we readily understand 
basic-level objects in terms of their overall shape, holistically via a gestalt; ii) we readily 
make distinctions between basic-level objects in terms of the differences in our motor-
interactions with these objects. So, the basic level is not only informationally rich but also 
more readily yields information compared to the superordinate and subordinate levels. In 
other words, the basic level is the category level where the largest amount of information 
about an item is understood with the least cognitive labour (cf 'Relevance Theory': Sperber 
and Wilson, 1995). This characteristic of the basic level has been termed cognitive economy 
(Rosch, 1978) and, as Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 68) assert, this phenomenon 'probably 
explains best why the basic level is particularly well suited to our cognitive needs.' 
5.3.4 Challenging Objectivism 
Let me now indicate how what I have outlined challenges the objectivist approach to 
categories that was outlined in chapter 2. For Lakoff (1987a: 32), Berlin's research into the 
Tzeltal taxonomy can be considered as a response to the classical doctrine of natural kinds 
- that to a large degree the world comprises natural kinds of things and that languages consist 
of names (`natural kind terms') that fit those natural kinds. Typical natural kinds would 
include cows, dogs, tigers, gold, silver, water, etc. Cognitive linguistics takes issue with the 
doctrine of natural kinds since it highlights how we interact with the world rather than how 
categories naturally fit the world independent of the user. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 119-
121) provide a good example of how objectivist views of categories omit any treatment of 
interactional properties by referring to the concept of a 'fake' gun. On an objectivist 
entailment, 'This is a black gun ENTAILS this is a gun' and 'This is a fake gun ENTAILS 
this is not a gun'. Fakeness is taken to be an inherent part of the gun, i.e. it will not fire real 
bullets. But the gun's fakeness is not so simple. This is because while 'fake' negates a 
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gun's inherent properties, it still preserves interactive properties. I elaborate upon Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980: 121) in the following: 
FAKE preserves: 	 perceptual properties (a fake gun looks like a gun) 
INTERACTIVE 	 motor-activity properties (you handle it like a gun) 
PROPERTIES 	 purposive properties (it serves some purpose of a gun - to threaten or scare). 
FAKE negates: 	 mechanical properties (a fake gun doesn't shoot) 
INHERENT 
PROPERTIES 
Lakoff and Johnson suggest that from this we conceptualise a gun in terms of a 
multidimensional gestalt of properties where the dimensions are perceptual, motor-activity, 
purposive, functional, mechanical etc. What is interesting is that most of these properties 
are not an inherent part of the gun but interactional properties. This causes a problem for 
the objectivist Aristotelian view of 'essence' (see discussion in 2.4.1) and thus for deciding 
on set membership of a category according to attributes of an object. Objectivism discounts 
the mind of the observer since, from an ontological viewpoint, it only deals with what Searle 
(1995) calls the ontologically objective. The interactional properties of an object are what 
Searle terms the ontologically subjective [although ontologically interactional would be 
more felicitous]. One very well-known view of meaning associated with the Wittgenstein 
(1953) of the 'Philosophical Investigations' is that the meaning of a word is bound up with 
its use. Certainly, this is a valid observation. But it can be made more specific from the 
perspective of cognitive linguistics. It needs to be supplemented with an account of how 
basic-level categories are associated with motor-interactional use.4  
From the perspective of objectivism, it would be expected that the categories that were 
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easiest to process would correspond to conceptual primitives which by definition would have 
no internal structure. However, basic-level categories are centrally placed in taxonomic 
hierarchies and possess a fair amount of internal structure. Even though they are not, then, 
primitives, they actually have the structure which humans find easy to process, easy to learn, 
remember etc. As Lakoff (1987a: 199) says: 'In short, what should be cognitively complex 
from an objectivist point of view is actually cognitively simple.' The ease of processing 
stems from their connection with motor-interactivity and thus ontologically subjective 
properties. But the (objectivist) predicate calculus description of the hyponymy sense 
relation, Vx[C (x) —> D (x)}, where C could be a basic-level category like 'chair' and D a 
superordinate like 'furniture' reflects only ontologically objective properties. 
The relatively new perspective on categorisation, which takes into account the ontological 
subjectivity associated with basic-level categories, Lakoff (1987a) terms experientialism. 
In experientialism, meaningful thought is embodied, conceptual systems growing out of 
bodily experience and the interactions of the body with the environment. Since in 
experientialism, language is bound up with other aspects of cognition, it conflicts with the 
modular hypothesis promoted by Chomsky that syntax is a separate system independent of 
the rest of cognition (Langacker, 1987a; Lakoff, 1987a: 225-6). On these grounds, then, 
cognitive linguistics problematises the attributing of meaning in CDA to the nature of a 
syntactic category separate from its actual semantic meaning. Thus, what was 
problematised on these grounds by connectionism in chapter 4 is also problematised by 
cognitive linguistics, e.g., the assumption of Kress (1993) (see 1.4.3) that people may read 
across the syntactic structure 'subject-verb-object', and in doing so, inadvertently bestow the 
semantic structure of 'agent-process-patient' even if this is not actually the semantic 
structure of the clause. In chapter 7, I draw out more explicitly similarities between 
connectionism and cognitive linguistics. However, I also explore tensions between 
connectionism and cognitive linguistics which problematise the approach to metaphor in 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff (1987a) and its use in CDA. 
5.3.5 The Role of Context and the Basic Level 
As a coda to this section on basic-level categorisation, it should be stressed that degree of 
expertise of a particular domain will affect what is regarded as the basic level, and 
accordingly the basic level is fluid in accordance with expertise and cultural models. As 
Harley (1995: 195) points out: 
Birdwatchers, for example, know nearly as much about the subordinate members such as blackbirds, jays, and 
Dartford warblers, as they do about the basic level. 
Similarly, Rosch (1978: 42) indicates that a man in a furniture store surrounded by an array 
of chairs will obviously be speaking and thinking at a level subordinate to the basic level. 
In the next section, I demonstrate the link between the basic level and prototypes. 
5.4 The Symbiosis of the Basic level and Prototypes 
5.4.1 Orientation 
I mentioned in 5.2 that prototype effects are superficial, based on internal structure. I now 
want to look at one provenance for these effects - our neurophysiological capacity for motor-
interaction, gestalt perception, image generation. It is because these give rise to basic-level 
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effects that prototype effects are associated with the basic level. Here are Ungerer and 
Schmid (1996: 72): 
The basic level provides the largest amount of relevant and digestible information about the objects and 
organisms of the world (e.g. information about bird-like animals) or, to put it more technically, it offers the 
largest bundles of correlated attributes. These attributes are accumulated in their most complete form in the 
prototype (ROBIN in the case of BIRD) and expressed by the category name (e.g. bird). 
Another reason is because: 
The basic level is where the overlap of shapes is so great that it permits reliable gestalt perception, which is 
particularly easy for prototypical examples (like the ROBIN). 
The symbiosis between prototypicality and basic-level categorisation can be seen clearly if 
a basic-level expression is used to refer to a non-prototypical instance. Here is Lakoff 
(1987a: 452): 
...if a sparrow lands on the front porch, it is not misleading to report this by There's a bird on the porch. But 
it would be quite misleading to use such a sentence to report that an eagle had landed on the porch or that a 
penguin had waddled up the front steps. Similarly, if John hit a baseball with a bat in the usual way by 
swinging the bat at the ball, we could straightforwardly report that John hit a ball. But if he hit a beachball 
with a pizza platter, or if he hit a ball by throwing a rock at it, it would be misleading to describe such an event 
to someone who didn't see it as John hit a ball, even though such a description, strictly speaking, would be 
true. Hit a ball has an associated conventional image that characterizes the normal case, and with no further 
modification we assume that the normal case holds. Thus, conventional images are used to understand even 
the simplest, most straightforward sentences with no idioms in them. 
A corollary of all this is that prototypes are more likely to be generated from basic-level 
categories than non-basic-level categories. To understand the readiness of generation of 
prototypes from the basic level compared to the superordinate level, again compare 'the pig 
ate the carrot' with 'the organism ingested the food'. 
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5.4.2 Causation as Interaction 
I now come to making explicit the relationship between prototypes and the basic level of 
categorisation with regard to causation. For Lakoff (1987a: 54) prototypical causation is 
understood in terms of a cluster of 'interactional properties' since prototypical causation 
`appears to be direct manipulation'. The cluster acts as a gestalt which is psychologically 
simpler than its parts. I list the properties of prototypical causation below: 
1. There is an agent that does something. 
2. There is a patient that undergoes a change to a new state. 
3. Properties 1 and 2 constitute a single event; they overlap in time and space; the agent comes in contact with 
the patient. 
4. Part of what the agent does (either the motion or the exercise of will) precedes the change in the patient. 
5. The agent is the energy source; the patient is the energy goal; there is a transfer of energy from agent to 
patient. 
6. There is a single definite agent and a single definite patient. 
7. The agent is human. 
8. a. The agent wills his action. 
b. The agent is in control of his action 
c. The agent bears primary responsibility for both his action and the change. 
9. The agent uses his hands, body or some instrument. 
10. The agent is looking at the patient, the change in the patient is perceptible, and the agent perceives the 
change. 	 [my bold] 
Lakoff (1987a: 55) continues by highlighting how the most representative examples of 
`humanly relevant causation' possess all of the above properties, citing the examples 'Max 
broke the window', 'Brutus killed Caesar'. I have bolded condition 9 - that the agent uses 
his hands, body or some instrument - to highlight the link between the basic level of 
categorisation, prototype theory and causation. Prototype effects, with regard to causation, 
are by-products of our internal neurophysiological capacity for motor-interaction, which in 
turn is associated with the basic level. For Lakoff (1987a: 51): 
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... interactional properties form clusters in our experience, and prototype and basic-level structure can reflect 
such clusterings. 	 [my italics] 
Lakoff (1987a: 55) continues: 
Many languages of the world meet the following generalization: The more direct the causation, the closer the 
morphemes expressing the cause and the result. This accounts for the distinction between kill and cause to die. 
Kill expresses direct causation,5 with cause and result expressed in a single morpheme - the closest possible 
connection. When would anyone ever say 'cause to die'? In general, when there is no direct causation, when 
there is causation at a distance or accidental causation... 
From this Lakoff concludes that: 
...the best example of the conceptual category of causation is typically marked by a grammatical construction 
or a morpheme and that the word cause is reserved for noncentral members of the conceptual category. 
5.4.3 Implications for CDA 
Recall from 1.4.2 the following from Martin (1989: 43): 
The CWF article uses three types of nominal structure in place of verbs to realise actions. One puts the action 
into the modifier of an abstract noun: e.g. sealing operation, killing techniques. Another makes use of a 
nominalised form of a verb: statements, definition, death, coverage, constraints. A third simply realises the 
actions as a noun: the whitecoat harvest, the East Coast seal hunt, the seal hunt. 
...The CWF text...tends to refer to the killing indirectly, using incongruent forms: killing techniques, the 
whitecoat harvest, the slaughter of animals, the East Coast seal hunt, a slaughtering operation, killing 
methods, an almost instantaneous death, a humane death, the seal hunt, and so on. In this way the ACF text 
focuses on the process of killing, while the CWF text treats the killing as a kind of thing. This has the effect 
of immobilising the most unsavoury part of the seal hunt and helps draw attention away to other 'factual' 
considerations. 
I reproduce this extract again as it neatly encapsulates symbolic assumptions which are 
scattered elsewhere in CDA. I deal with one of these immediately below and refer to the 
other two later in this chapter. From a cognitive linguistic perspective, 'killing techniques' 
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can hardly be said to be mystifying of the 'unsavoury part of the seal hunt'. Since 'kill' 
encapsulates both cause and effect (Lakoff, 1987a: 55) and is associated with a high degree 
of interactionality, the syntactic position of 'killing' in 'killing techniques', and its capacity 
to mystify, diminishes in significance. 
Recall Hodge and Kress's (1993: 8) stipulation (3.2.1) that transactives are a privileged 
mode of representation where there is 'action going from an actor to an affected'. Hodge 
and Kress's (1993) viewpoint is merely linguistic. For them, the agent and patient of the 
actual circumstances and the process that links them should be indicated by the presence of 
the semantic roles of agent and patient linked adjacently in a clause. We saw in chapter 3 
how their focus assumes that graphic linguistic structure is cognitively reiterated intact into 
linguese mental representation. However, from a cognitive linguistic perspective, the 
rationale for highlighting transactives in Hodge and Kress (1993) does not include the 
notions that prototypical causation involves: an experientially simple gestalt, basic-level 
categories, and 'direct manipulation' via hands, body, an instrument etc. Their focus ignores 
the broader cognitive (interactional) perspective of processing in which syntactic structure 
is only one aspect. 
As a more concrete example, recall the following from Trew (1979: 98-9), which I 
highlighted in 1.4.1 and referred to in 3.6.2 in order to indicate symbolic assumptions of 
processing in CDA: 
Eleven Africans were shot dead and 15 wounded when Rhodesian Police opened fire on a rioting crowd of 
about 2,000. 
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We saw that Trew assumes that because of the passive-agent deletion in the first clause, the 
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`police' as 'agents' of the shooting needs to be inferred from the second clause; however, 
this would be a weak mental representation and so agency is mystified. On the basis of 
CDA's internalist postulates of mental representation, a better version for Trew would 
presumably be: 
Rhodesian Police shot dead 11 Africans and wounded 15 when they opened fire on a rioting crowd of about 
2,000. 
But from a cognitive linguistic point of view, mental representation of both sentences would 
include the same `neurophysiological understandings' related to gestalt formation, motor-
interaction etc regardless of the different semantic-syntactic structures. In other words, the 
CDA perspective does not take into account ontologically subjective properties and so in this 
respect acts inadvertently in an objectivist manner. This extra neurophysiologically related 
phenomena in mental representation, similar for both sentences, thus diminishes the 
significance that CDA attach to sentential structure. 
Having shown the symbiosis of the basic level of categorisation with prototypes, I now go 
on to consider another type of symbiosis: the cognitive interdependence of basic-level nouns 
and basic-level action categories. 
5.5 Cognitive Interdependence of Basic-Level Nouns and Basic-Level Action 
Categories 
5.5.1 Basic-Level Action Categories 
Aside from basic-level categories which are associated with physical objects, Lakoff (1987a: 
270-1) also argues that actions and properties can be basic-level: 
We have basic-level concepts not only for objects but for actions and properties as well. Actions like running, 
walking, eating, drinking, etc are basic-level, whereas moving and ingesting are superordinate, while kinds of 
walking and drinking, say, ambling and slurping, are subordinate. Similarly, tall, short, hard, soft, heavy, light, 
hot, cold, etc are basic-level properties, as are the basic neurophysiologically determined colors: black, white, 
red, green, blue, and yellow. 
A few words of caution on the prospect of basic-level actions. Clearly, to be directly 
meaningful, to produce a sharply defined gestalt, 'drinking' is more likely to be treated as 
being basic-level in the presence of basic-level objects such as 'cat', for example, in 'the cat 
drinks'. Conversely, it is easier to decide on the status of objects as being basic-level, since 
we motor-interact with objects much more so than with 'actions'. Now, when attribute lists 
of respondents for basic-level action categories like 'eat' or 'drink' are compared with 
related object categories such as 'bread' and 'soup', there is considerable overlap between 
the two. As Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 104) state: 
The names of some basic level food categories will be found in the attribute list of EAT, and conversely, the 
names of basic-level action categories like EAT will certainly rank among the more important of the attributes 
of the basic level food categories. 
The conclusion that Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 104) draw from this is that there is a strong 
cognitive interdependence between action and object basic level categories.6 
5.5.2 Basic-Level Event Categories 
The cognitive interdependence of basic-level action and basic-level object categories can 
also be seen in basic-level event categories, e.g. the category of breakfast where there is a 
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fusing of objects and activities (Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 104). Breakfast is a complex 
basic-level category since it comprises basic-level object categories (spoon, cup, table etc) 
and basic level action categories (e.g. eat, drink, cut). Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 105) cite 
the experiments of Rifkin (1985) as supporting the view that event categories such as 
`breakfast' are basic-level. Using an attribute listing test, Rifkin (1985) demonstrated that 
subjects could supply large numbers of attributes for basic level event categories such as 
`breakfast', 'lunch', 'dinner', 'seeing a movie', 'taking a shower', 'murder', 'rape' and that 
such attributes did not just include object categories but action categories. For instance, 
subjects included for the (basic-level event) category of 'murder' both 'gun' and 'kill'. 
When subjects were asked to supply attributes for related superordinates 
`entertainment', 'hygienic activity', and 'crime'), their number was much smaller. For 
subordinates such as 'quick breakfast', subjects did not provide significantly more attributes 
than basic-level categories. Here are Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 105) on basic-level events: 
Checking our examples of basic-level events against the other two criteria of basic level categories, prototype 
structure and gestalt perception, we have no difficulty in imagining more or less typical instances of breakfast 
or murders, and in categorizing these events as holistic gestalts. 
5.5.3 Implications for CDA 
The cognitive interdependence of basic-level noun and verb categories have again 
consequences for CDA's emphasis that actions should be described by verbs only; for 
instance, Martin's (1989: 43) claim (5.4.3) that 'seal hunt' is mystifying because its nominal 
form is incongruent with action needs rethinking. 'Seal hunt' would constitute a basic-level 
event category where action and object categories are fused and so, from a cognitive 
linguistic perspective, its nominal compound status is not mystifying of the action that 
transpires. In other words, while 'seal hunt' is a nominal, cognition of 'seal hunt' goes 
beyond its nominal status. Seeing 'seal hunt' through the perspective of cognitive linguistics 
again demonstrates CDA's tendency to read off meaning from a metalinguistic description. 
In chapter 4, I problematised the symbolic postulates operating in Simpson (1993: 170-1) 
[which develops Clark (1992: 215); see 3.6.2] from a connectionist point of view. I will 
now do the same from a cognitive linguistic point of view. Recall from 3.6.2 two sentences 
from the Sun text that Clark (1992) analyses: 
1) 'Two of Steed's rape victims - aged 20 and 19 - had a screwdriver held at their throats as they were forced 
to submit. 
2) His third victim, a 39 year old mother of three, was attacked at gunpoint after Steed forced her car off the 
M4. 
Now also recall from the same section Simpson's (1993: 169-171) extension of Clark's 
(1992) analysis: 
We see a wilful refusal to 'tell it like it is'. What, for instance, is so difficult about presenting the details of the 
story in the following way, where the relationship between attacker and victim is not mystified: 
1) Steed held a screwdriver at the throats of two of his victims as he forced them to submit. 
2) Steed attacked at gunpoint his third victim, a 39-year-old mother of three, after he had forced her car off the 
M4. 
The basis of Simpson's 'non-mystifying' sentences is that the 'agent-process-patient' 
structure more readily reflects reality. But what is interesting about both of the 'improved 
sentences' is the absence of the category 'rape' which was present in the original Sun text 
(i.e., 'two of Steed's rape victims'). 'Rape' can be considered a basic-level event category 
(Rifkin, 1985) and so consists of a fusion of basic-level action and object categories, i.e., 
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cognition of the noun 'rape' goes beyond its nominal status. So, in the original version, its 
`nominalisation' status would not be mystifying of the activity taking place. Now, in 
sentence 2, without the basic-level event category 'rape', the action category 'attack' is not 
sufficiently constrained to indicate that the attack was sexual. By stressing the capacity for 
a sentence's semantic-syntactic structure to 'reflect' reality (in logical empiricist vein) but 
not dealing with what the cognitive ouput of the sentence is likely to be, Simpson's sentence 
2 is ironically mystifying of what took place. 
Having examined the basic level of categorisation in some detail, let me now give some 
attention to the superordinate level of categorisation. 
5.6 Superordinates 
5.6.1 Superordinate Noun Categories 
How do superordinate categories compare to basic-level ones? Well, as I said earlier (5.3.3), 
there is no common shape and correspondingly no shared gestalt underpinning hyponyms 
of the superordinate. Rather, as Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 74) state, the gestalt properties 
of the superordinate are 'borrowed' from basic-level hyponyms. This 'borrowing', they refer 
to as parasitic categorisation. What this 'borrowing' also does is to highlight salient 
attributes of the basic-level hyponyms. So for example, in calling a car a vehicle, what is 
automatically stressed is the function of 'moving persons or things around' (Ungerer and 
Schmid, 1996: 78).7 This 'borrowing' of attributes from the basic level means, again, that 
the basic level is the conceptually prominent level. Because of the phenomenon of parasitic 
categorisation, a crucial difference emerges between basic-level categories and 
184 
superordinates. Parasitic categorisation and the lack of a common gestalt means that 
hyponyms of the superordinate are only related via what Wittgenstein (1953: 32) referred 
to as family resemblances (Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 98), Wittgenstein's example being 
`game'. Wittgenstein meant by this that "games' form a family' but that there was no 
necessary feature for all games. Rather different games are related through criss-crossing 
similarities between their different aspects. 
Now, because basic-level categories, by definition, have a common gestalt, hyponyms of the 
basic-level category 'chair', for example, can be linked together via prototype structuring, 
i.e., there is a common gestalt for 'wooden-hard-backed chair', 'beanbag', 'bench', 'arm-
chair', 'dentist's chair', 'electric chair' etc, where the prototype would be equivalent to 
`wooden-hard-backed chair'. For the superordinate 'furniture', [or Wittgenstein's 'game] 
with no common gestalt, it resists the formation of a prototype, there being one or a few 
category-wide attributes which are salient. That basic-level categories manifest 
prototypicality and non-basic-level categories may not is often unnoticed and 
misunderstood. For example, Hampton (1981) argues [cited in Harley (1995: 195) under 
the headline 'Problems with the prototype model'] that abstract concepts resist the formation 
of prototypes, e.g. it being difficult to talk meaningfully of a prototypical `truth'! 
5.6.2 Superordinate Verb Categories 
For Lakoff (1987a: 270-1) and for Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 102), nouns are not the only 
type of superordinate category. Verbs such as 'cause' and 'become' can be seen as 
superordinate verbs because: 
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...their main function is to highlight one very general attribute which is part of a whole range of basic-level 
action categories...Other candidates for superordinate action categories with a salient general attribute are 
HAPPEN, BECOME, BEGIN and STOP. 
However, it is often the case that the superordinate status of a verb is less stable than that of 
a superordinate noun. For regarding a verb as superordinate, the following admonitions of 
Ungerer and Schmid's (1996: 104) are worth bearing in mind: 
Of course, it is possible to assemble a hierarchy of actions, by arranging categories like STRIDE, WALK, 
MOVE, or MUNCH, EAT, CONSUME on the subordinate, basic, and superordinate levels respectively, but 
these hierarchies will more likely than not be scientific constructs and will not necessarily reflect the cognitive 
framework of the ordinary language user. In addition, these action hierarchies seem to be even more patchy 
than their counterparts in the domain of objects and organisms. 
So we leave action categories with a feeling that they include a number of basic activities which are probably 
perceived in terms of prototype categories, but that the analysis becomes less conclusive as we turn to 
superordinates and subordinates and, more generally, to lexical hierarchies of action categories. 
5.6.3 Translating Superordinates into the Basic Level 
Consider now the following well-known (inconsiderate) text from Bransford, J. and 
Johnson, M. (1973: 400): 
The procedure is actually quite simple. First you arrange things into two different groups. Of course, one pile 
may be sufficient depending on how much there is to do. If you have to go somewhere else due to lack of 
facilities, that is the next step; otherwise you are pretty well set. It is important not to overdo things. That is, 
it is better to do fewer things at once than too many. In the short run this might not seem important, but 
complications can easily arise. A mistake can be expensive as well. At first the whole procedure will seem 
complicated. Soon, however, it will just become just another facet of life. It is difficult to foresee any end to 
the necessity for this task in the immediate future, but then one never can tell. After the procedure is 
completed, one arranges the material into different groups again. Then they can be put into their appropriate 
places. Eventually they will be used once more, and the whole cycle will then have to be repeated. However, 
that is part of life. 
The text is initially difficult for many to understand. One way of understanding the 
comprehension difficulty is because of the excess of superordinate / abstract categories, e.g. 
186 
`things', 'groups', 'complications'. In referring to the above text, Rosch (1978: 45) makes 
the point that: 
...what Bransford and Johnson call context cues are actually names of basic-level events (e.g. washing clothes) 
and that one function of hearing the event name is to enable the reader to translate the superordinate terms into 
basic-level objects and actions. Such a translation appears to be a necessary aspect of our ability to match 
linguistic descriptions to world knowledge in a way that produces the 'click of comprehension'. 
When the basic-level category 'washing clothes' is introduced, the superordinates can be 
`translated', making the text easier to understand; (see 7.3.1 for a more detailed commentary 
on the above text and how cognitive linguistic explanation relates to inference generation 
and shallow processing). 
5.6.4 Implications for CDA 
Repercussions for CDA? In the light of the above, consider the following from Fairclough 
(1995a: 112): 
A lot of nominalizations in a text...make it very abstract and distant from concrete events and situations (Kress 
and Hodge 1979). 
Let us look again at the Bransford and Johnson text from Fairclough's perspective. So, for 
example, 'the procedure is actually quite simple' contains the `nominalisation"procedure' 
and indeed this `nominalisation' appears on two other occasions. `Denominalising' 
`procedure' to its verb form, we might arrive at the second person 'how you proceed is quite 
simple...', and something similar can be done for the other two instances. But is this any 
easier to understand just because a participant has been included and the verb 'proceed' is 
employed? Even though now there is less interpersonal distance, ideational distance still 
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exists not because of the nominalisation 'procedure' but because of the type of nominals, 
i.e., superordinate categories, which remain superordinate in verb form. The basic-level 
event category 'washing clothes' consists of a fusion of basic-level object categories and 
basic-level action categories which are cognitively interdependent. Given this cognitive 
interdependence, 'washing clothes' is able to lead to a rich gestalt. Conversely, since 
superordinates are not cognitively interdependent with one another, a rich gestalt is not 
forthcoming which explains why the text is difficult to process. Again, a corollary of all this 
is that it is easy to see how narrowly oriented CDA is in its syntactic focus away from larger 
cognitive concerns. 
Having discussed the phenomenon of basic-level categorisation, let me now consider how 
cognitive linguists treat compound nouns together with implications for CDA. 
5.7 Cognitive Linguistics and Compounds: Implications for CDA 
Consider the following from Lakoff (1987a: 147): 
It is often the case that meanings of compounds are not compositional; that is, the meaning of the whole cannot 
be predicted from the meanings of the parts and the way they are put together. The parts do play a role in the 
meaning of the whole expression - they motivate that meaning... 
Lakoff (1987a: 144) gives a series of examples of which 'red hair' exemplifies the point 
perfectly. Because 'red hair' is not focal red, we cannot treat 'red hair' compositionally in 
terms of the intersection of a set of red things and the set of hairs. If then we cannot treat 
compounds compositionally, i.e. treating components of the compound atomically, then we 
are unlikely to see compounds strictly speaking in terms of modifier and head. Ungerer and 
Schmid (1996: 93) support this with an analysis of the category 'wheelchair' arguing that: 
...the cognitive categories underlying compound terms like WHEELCHAIR do not only rely on the two 
categories suggested by the linguistic form, but draw on a large number of other cognitive categories.' 
They highlight the other 'cognitive categories' as 'invalid', 'hospital', 'engine'. Non-
objective interactional and experiential properties such as a patient's motor-interaction with 
a wheelchair or a nurse's pushing of a wheelchair also go beyond the surface compound 
form. Similar to Lakoff (1987a), the cognitive linguist, Langacker (1987a: ch. 12) indicates 
that a 'building block' or compositional approach to compounds is inadequate. Instead, he 
prefers to think of the components of a compound in what he terms the scaffolding 
metaphor, i.e., disposable when no longer needed. Seeing compounds in terms of the 
scaffolding metaphor rather than building block metaphor places a greater emphasis on how 
cognition output does not necessarily mirror linguistic input.8 To sum up at this stage, here 
are Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 95): 
(1) The standard view which posits a basic head item and a strictly specifying modifier element is far too rigid. 
With many compounds, even with model cases like apple juice, the modifier category supplies more than just 
the specifying attribute; these additional attributes may not all be 'objective' properties, but are often 
associative and 'experiential'.' 
(2) The basic item, i.e. the dominant source category, is not necessarily expressed by the second element of 
a compound. Depending on the salience of the categories involved, the cognitive category corresponding to 
the first element may be equally important (as illustrated by raincoat) or even dominant (our examples were 
coat collar, shoelace and washing machine). 
So we must be careful in analysing compounds in terms of a modifier and a head of a NP. 
Now, recall from 5.4.3 Martin's (1989: 43) point about how it is incongruous, in 
descriptions of action, to put 'the action into the modifier of an abstract noun': e.g. 'sealing 
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operation, killing techniques, slaughtering operation, killing methods'. The assumption here 
is that because 'killing' and 'slaughtering' are modifiers, i.e. subservient to the head in an 
NP, that somehow this mystifies the 'unsavoury part of the seal hunt'. Patently, from what 
we have seen of the cognitive linguistic perspective on compounds, this is not the case. 
Again, my analysis here supports my analysis of Martin (1989) in 5.4.3 and 5.5.3 and thus 
problematises the imparting of semantic meaning to a grammatical metalanguage and 
making tacit internalist claims of a relationship between syntactic structure and mental 
representation. 
5.8 Endpoints 
From the above, it is apparent that the basic level is a privileged level of categorisation since 
i) we derive meaning from basic-level categories directly (Lakoff, 1987a: 279) and ii) basic-
level categories are characterised by cognitive economy - a high level of information yield 
with the least amount of cognitive effort. For Lakoff (1987a: 271): 
...it is basic-level physical experience that I believe will ultimately provide much of the basis for an 
experientialist view of epistemology that supersedes objectivism without giving up on realism. 
The basic level is epistemologically privileged for Lakoff not because it provides a mirror 
of nature in the sense that logical empiricist simples (see chapter 3) were thought to be 
epistemologically privileged but because of the basic level's association with motor-
interaction, image generation, gestalt perception etc, which assists the reader's or listener's 
understanding. In chapter 3, we saw CDA's logical empiricist fixation with having 
sentential structure 'reflect' the 'structure of the event'. In this chapter, we have seen how 
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this does not take into account the larger cognitive issue of how basic-level cues assist 
understanding through being associated with motor-interaction, common gestalt etc. 
Moreover, this diminishes the significance in CDA of supposing that certain sentential 
structure can lead to mystification. Similar to what I said about connectionism in chapter 
4, I have not offered cognitive linguistics as a 'linguistic panacea'. I do believe that the 
linking in cognitive linguistics of language with our neurophysiological capacities is a 
positive development from modular theories of language. However, in chapter 7, we shall 
see that not everything about cognitive linguistics is a positive development when I show 
how the Lakoff and Johnson (1980) view of metaphor conflicts with connectionism. 
In 4.5.1, I cited Clark's (1996) outline of three positions on mental representation. The two 
positions which are polarised are 'gross descriptivism' (connectionism), and 'gross 
internalism' (symbolicism). We saw that CDA in its highlighting of `transactives' as a 
privileged representation chimes with 'gross internalism'. The midway position, Clark 
(1996) phrased as 'modest internalism' and I quote this again: 
Modest Internalism: the common-sense constructs serve to pick out transient and / or large-scale features of 
internal (e.g. neural or computational organization). Examples might include the identification of concepts with 
distributed, context-dependent patterns of neural activity (see Clark 1993) or the identification of mental 
images with temporarily time-locked activity in multiple neural regions (see Damasio, 1994). In such cases 
the folk items (images, concepts) do not have neat, highly manipulable and / or spatially localizable inner 
analogues. But there remain fairly robust patterns of widespread neural / computational activity which the folk 
discourse at times succeeds in tracking. 
The cognitive linguistics emphasis on the basic level of categorisation would seem to place 
it in the modest internalism camp in terms of its place within Clark's mental representation 
scheme. That is, in cognitive linguistics there is a rejection of gross internalism. But at the 
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same time, representation in cognitive linguistics cannot be regarded as simply gross 
descriptivism since there is a strong connection between one type of category - the basic 
level - and neural activity, e.g. capacity for image generation, motor-interaction etc. 
Notes 
1. But from the perspective of discourse, it would be strange to regard 'the pope' as a non-prototypical 
bachelor in the same way that a penguin is a non-prototypical bird. Indeed, Lakoff's semantic analysis neglects 
the potential discourse meaning of 'bachelor' which often indicates much about the speaker's or writer's 
attitude. 
2. Let me provide another situation where prototype effects are generated (this time a 'mind-reading trick') 
with an explanation in terms of ICM theory. A fuller appreciation of this may be derived from actually 
following the 'mind-reading instructions' below. Choose a number between 1 and 10. Multiply this number 
by 9. If you have a 1-digit number, leave it alone. If you have a 2-digit number, then add together the 
individual digits. From this sum, subtract 5. On the series, if A=1, B=2, etc, the number you have corresponds 
to a letter of the alphabet. Now, quickly, think of a country beginning with that letter. Locate the next letter 
along in the alphabet. Quickly, think of an animal beginning with that letter. Now think of a colour you would 
associate with that animal. 
[see 'note 2 continued' below] 
3. In the same way that a mouse can be a small piece of rubber on a laptop, a 'tricycle' can also be a 'bicycle'. 
Of course neither of these 'equivalences' can transpire on the basis of a necessary and sufficient set of 
conditions describing ontologically objective properties. It is, for example, a necessarily ontologically 
objective or inherent property that a 'bicycle' has two wheels. However, since ontologically subjective 
properties are habitually taken into account in everyday classification, a 'tricycle' may qualify is a 'non-
prototypical bicycle' due to similar motor-interactions etc. Consider also the following lateral thinking puzzle: 
A man has some wood. On Monday, he shapes it into a cube. On Tuesday he shapes it into a sphere and on 
Wednesday into a pyramid. He does not touch it nor uses an instrument of cutting etc. How does he do it? 
[See 'note 3 continued' below]. 
4. One salient method of classification in the west is found in Roget's Thesaurus. In Roget, knowledge is 
divided into six classes, [Abstract Relations; Space; Matter; Intellect; the exercise of the mind; Volition; the 
exercise of the will; Emotion, Religion and Morality], which are then systematically sub-divided into 'sections', 
further sub-divided into 'heads' and so on. But what is interesting about the cultural and biological salience 
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at the basic level is that it is not captured by Roget's classification. Roget's taxonomy can thus be construed 
as objectivist since it seeks independence from both cultural and cognitive salience, from how we interact with 
the world. In other words, independence from the category employer. 
5. In relation to the verb 'kill' and Lakoff s comments, consider Orwell (1969: 146) on what he terms 
`operators or verbal false limbs': 
`These save the trouble of picking out appropriate verbs and nouns, and at the same time pad each sentence 
with extra syllables which give it an appearance of symmetry. Characteristic phrases are: render inoperative, 
militate against, make contact with, be subjected to, give rise to, give grounds for, have the effect of play a 
leading part (role) in, make itself felt, take effect, exhibit a tendency to, serve the purpose of etc., etc. The 
keynote is the elimination of simple verbs. Instead of being a single word, such as break, stop, spoil, mend, 
kill, a verb becomes a phrase, made up of a noun or adjective tacked on to some general-purposes verb such 
as prove, serve, form, play, render.' [my bold] 
What Orwell is hinting at here with 	 'break' etc is that they are more cognitively rich categories because 
they are not like the 'general purpose' or superordinate 'render inoperative'. Orwell, however, does not 
distinguish between morphological simplicity and the cognitive richness of a category. 'Stop', for example, 
may be morphologically simple but in cognitive linguistic terms it is a superordinate since it only highlights 
one very general attribute of a range of basic-level action categories (see 5.6.2 and Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 
102). So, 'stopping the car' does not produce as rich a gestalt as, say, 'parking the car'. 'Stopping the car', 
in this instance, is an ad hoc superordinate of 'parking the car'. 
6. Gumenik (1979), cited in Garnham (1985: 164), investigated the cueing process for sentence recall. He was 
able to show, for example, how 'architect' is as good a cue for the predicate 'planned the house' as the sentence 
`the man planned the house'. This demonstrates that there is cognitive interdependence between the noun 
`architect' and the verb phrase 'planned the house'. Gumenik also showed that 'arctic' as well as 'Eskimos' 
is a better cue than 'group' for 'the group built their houses out of ice', which indicates that adjectives can be 
cognitively interdependent with nouns and verbs also. 
7. The capacity of superordinates to highlight a function and thus downplay others may also serve a pragmatic 
deictic role in the same way that use of distal rather proximal demonstrative pronouns expresses emotional 
displacement e.g. 'Get that dog out of here' (see: Wales (1989: 112)). Consider the following. On being 
stopped by the police while driving, I was directed as follows: 'Could you step out of the vehicle, sir'. The use 
of 'vehicle' is marked since under normal circumstances the basic-level category of 'car' is the more likely. 
In this situation, the superordinate 'vehicle' highlights the function of transport but also necessarily downplays 
the motor-interactional properties associated with the basic-level 'car'. The effect, immediately, is one of 
`dislocation' from the car. Since the police are implicitly not recognising how a human being interacts with 
the car, more formal relations are being instituted. 
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8. That ultimately the syntactic structure of a compound depends on its discourse meaning rather the other way 
around is often exemplified in quips, e.g., a mother taking her problem boy to the 'child psychologist' only to 
find out the psychologist is the same age as her son. It is only as a result of the inversion of expectation that 
`child' is treated as the modifier of the NP head 'psychologist'. 
note 2 continued: 
And the answer is: Denmark, Elephant and Grey. 
On Lakoff s scheme, all the countries beginning with 'ID' can be defined in a classical way via a condition 
which is both necessary and sufficient. However, many if not most European dwellers will possess an ICM 
where certain countries are more prominent. For this reason, Denmark will be more salient than Diego Garcia, 
for instance. It is because of this particular ICM that prototype effects can emerge, even though the category 
satisfies classical criteria, i.e. Denmark belongs to the set of all countries beginning with the letter `D'. The 
corollary of all this is that the prototype model is not as simplistic as it often treated. Some categories such as 
colour categories are scalar, where degrees of membership vary. Other categories such as countries beginning 
with the letter `13' have clear parameters, but within these parameters, graded prototype effects can arise. 
note 3 continued: 
The man is able to do the above because the wood is actually sawdust which he pours in to moulds in the 
shapes of cube, sphere and pyramid. The problem is difficult to solve because sawdust is non-prototypical 
wood from the point of view of motor-interaction and to many will be seen as having no function at all. 
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Section C: Creating an Alternative Framework for the 
Analysis of Mystifying Discourse 
In section A, I highlighted how CDA operated upon symbolic assumptions of mental 
representation. In section B, I outlined how cognitive linguistics and connectionism both 
problematise these assumptions, and in turn what CDA treat as being mystifying text. The 
derivational theory of complexity, on which some CDA strategies seem to be based, was 
discredited in psycholinguistic experiments regardless of the problematising effects of 
connectionism and cognitive linguistics. In section C, the focus is primarily on inference 
generation and how this relates to mystifying discourse. As yet, the understanding of 
inference generation in CDA is either neglected or superficially treated. However, an 
understanding of inference generation is crucial to any account of reading as Sanford (1990: 
515) asserts: 
The ubiquity of inferences in text comprehension makes the study of text comprehension look like a subset of 
the study of inference making. 
In chapter 8, I will relate the issue of inference generation directly to a discourse analytical 
framework for highlighting how certain news text can lead to mystification in reading of the 
events being reported. The framework will enable the analysis of the mystifying discourse 
produced by a non-analytical reader who has little vested interest in the chosen news texts 
and is largely unfamiliar with their subject matter. The framework is derived from chapter 
7 which highlights compatible elements from connectionism, cognitive linguistics and 
psycholinguistic evidence for shallow processing with particular regard to inference 
generation. The framework has, then, a non-symbolic basis. So the text the framework 
highlights as leading to mystification in reading of the events reported would not necessarily 
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be highlighted by CDA. Chapter 6 surveys recent psycholinguistic evidence for shallow 
processing, particularly with regard to inference generation, so that it can be drawn upon in 
chapter 7 and form an important part of my framework in chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 6: PSYCHOLINGUISTIC EVIDENCE FOR SHALLOW 
PROCESSING WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO INFERENCE 
GENERATION 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with recent psycholinguistic evidence for shallow processing with 
particular regard to inference generation in reading. The notion of inference generation is 
present in the analysis of text by certain practitioners of CDA as we saw in 1.4. However, 
in CDA, there is little appreciation of the complexities and typology of text inference theory, 
or of recent psycholinguistic experimental data which has informed text processing theory. 
There is also little appreciation in CDA of how certain inferences are more likely to be 
generated for particular readers than others. Because of the constraints of the thesis, and 
what I try to achieve in chapter 8, I confine myself principally to four types of inference: 
causal antecedence, causal consequence, instrument and instantiations, i.e., inferences that 
are referred to in my framework in chapter 8. In the final section of this chapter, I shall show 
how the psycholinguistic research on inference generation in this chapter conflicts with 
assumptions of inference generation in CDA. Moreover, I show how this psycholinguistic 
evidence for inference generation, as well other evidence of text processing, conflicts with 
the symbolically underpinned strategies in CDA for highlighting mystifying text. 
The experimental evidence I outline here is of course experimental and suffers from the 
standard problems of all psycholinguistic data generated under laboratory conditions. For 
example, actual skimming and scanning strategies in reading are difficult to replicate; 
artificially constructed texts may be lacking an interpersonal function found in most 
everyday texts (e.g, persuasion); the texts are of limited size and may even consist of single 
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sentences. Reading of course is a vastly complicated phenomenon and psycholinguistic 
experiments naturally are limited to dealing with a selection of variables. However, the 
evidence I marshal below possesses validity in the sense that it is largely consensus evidence 
in current psycholinguistics and is unobscure, readily available in standard psycholinguistic 
and cognitive psychology reference books (Gernsbacher, 1994; Eysenck and Keane, 1995; 
Harley, 1995). Because it is, as I say, largely consensus evidence, it has a consistency which 
compares favourably with the rather inconsistent psycholinguistic assumptions of processing 
in CDA which were outlined in chapter 1. Moreover, because CDA draws upon sociological 
theory to the detriment of psychological theory, my use of psycholinguistic evidence 
provides some sort of balance, facilitating articulation of problems with CD analyses, which 
are felt intuitively. This has already been demonstrated in one respect when I indicated in 
3.2.3 how the derivational theory of complexity, a model of processing analogous to that 
used implicitly in CDA, is countered by experimental evidence. By extension, then, this 
experimental evidence was also in conflict with CDA's `DTC model'. 
6.2 Inferences in Text Comprehension and Likelihood of Their Generation 
6.2.1 Coherence vs Elaborative 
A common distinction drawn in psycholinguistics is one between coherence inferences and 
elaborative inferences. Consider the following from Potts et al. (1988: 405) [see also 
Sanford (1990: 516-7)]: 
i) 	 No longer able to control his anger, the husband threw the delicate porcelain vase against the wall. 
It cost him well over one hundred dollars to replace. 
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The inference that the vase broke is needed to make coherence. Such an inference is 
sometimes known as a necessary inference. It is also known as a backward inference since 
the reader works anaphorically to make coherence. Now consider a variant on the above: 
ii) 	 No longer able to control his anger, the husband threw the delicate porcelain vase against the wall. 
He had been feeling angry for weeks, but had refused to seek help. 
Here the inference that the vase broke elaborates upon the text and is thus also known as an 
elaborative inference since it is dependent upon information not made explicit in the text 
and draws therefore much more on encyclopaedic knowledge than the inference in i). 
Conversely, the inference in i) is not elaborative since it relies less on encyclopaedic 
knowledge and more on the textual material, making a connection between two pieces of 
text. The inference that the vase broke from ii) is essentially predictive and cannot be tied 
backwards to any supporting textual material. It is, then, also known as a forward inference. 
As we shall see when we consider causal inferences in more detail (6.2.3), elaborative 
inferences can be backward ones also! 
6.2.2 Psycholinguistic Evidence Supporting the Likelihood of Generation of Inferences 
Orientation 
Inferences habitually generated in reading, that psycholinguists have a reached a firm 
consensus about, include referential inferences (e.g. anaphora'), case structure role 
assignment and causal antecedence (see Eysenck and Keane, 1995: 311). These are all 
coherence inferences, assisting the reader's local and global construction of coherence. As 
we saw in the previous section, elaborative inferences do not appear necessary to the 
coherence of a text because they are essentially forward rather than backward. Below, I 
outline positions which aim to predict when such non-necessary or elaborative inferences 
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might be produced. 
The Early Constructionist Position 
The constructionist position is derived from the work of Bransford, (e.g. Bransford, Barclay 
and Franks (1972)) and later developed by others (e.g. Johnson-Laird, 1980). Bransford et 
al. argued that the comprehension process requires that the reader be actively involved so 
that information not explicitly textually rendered can be 'filled in'. A crucial aspect of the 
constructionist position is that there will be a rich set of elaborative inferences 
accompanying the generation of coherence inferences. Much of the early research that was 
marshalled in support of the constructionist position involved the use of memory testing for 
inference generation. For example, Bransford et al. (1972) gave their subjects sentences 
such as: 
Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam beneath them. 
contending that the inference generated would be that the fish swam under the log. To test 
this they used a recognition memory test and provided subjects with the sentence: 
Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam beneath it. 
most of whom replied they were confident this inference was the original sentence. 
Bransford et al. (1972) judged that text inferences were stored in memory in the same way 
as text information. But it soon became clear that on occasion, inferences might not actually 
be made at the time of comprehension but as a result of prompting during recall. The issue 
has been examined in detail (e.g. Singer, 1980) with findings suggesting that many 
inferences associated with recognition memory tests indicate reconstructive work of the 
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subject during recall. Memory measures can then be only indirect measures of 
comprehension and may give a distorting picture of the comprehension process. This may 
lead to over-estimation of the role of inference construction in comprehension. As a 
consequence, recognition memory tests are used much less in inference research (Eysenck 
and Keane, 1995: 308). 
The Minimalist Hypothesis 
Because of the problem with cue-recall experiments, certain theorists have argued that the 
constructionist position lacks compelling evidence. Principal amongst its detractors are 
McKoon and Ratcliff (1992: 442) who offer an alternative viewpoint - the minimalist 
hypothesis: 
In the absence of specific, goal-directed strategic processes, inferences of only two kinds are constructed: those 
that establish locally coherent representations of the parts of a text that are processed concurrently and those 
that rely on information that is quickly and easily available. 
The minimalist hypothesis and the constructionist position both agree that coherence 
inferences are readily generated. Where the minimalist hypothesis and the constructionist 
position differ most starkly is in the area of which elaborative inferences can be considered 
to be automatic. For constructionists, automatic elaborative inferencing in reading is rife 
whereas under the minimalist hypothesis, automatic elaborative inferencing is much more 
restricted. That is, when the reader has no specific goal, automatic elaborative inferences 
are those which are dependent on information that is quickly and easily available. Indeed, 
in a series of experiments, McKoon and Ratcliff (1986, 1989a) demonstrated that elaborative 
inferences were only partially realised because information was not quickly and easily 
available for subjects. They had subjects read short texts containing sentences similar to: 
The director and the cameraman were ready to start shooting when suddenly the actress fell from the 14th 
storey. 
This was followed by a lexical decision task where target words had to be ascertained very 
quickly as being present or not. Each test word was succeeded by a signal, and subjects were 
told to provide a response immediately after registering the signal. Target words such as 
`dead', were consistent with the predicted elaborative inference for causal consequence, i.e. 
that the actress had died. McKoon and Ratcliff (1986, 1989a) found that target words which 
were consistent with a predicted elaborative inference were only weakly identified as being 
present in the text. This was in line with the predictions of the minimalist hypothesis: 
...the inference about death is not necessary for local coherence if the text ends with the sentence about the fall. 
The event of falling from a 14-storey building is not familiar enough to make the inference easily available. 
So the minimalist hypothesis predicts that the inference about death will not be included automatically in the 
mental representation. 
	
McKoon and Ratcliff (1992: 457-8) 
The advantage of such a lexical decision task, where only one word cue is employed, is that 
it reduces the chances of an inference being constructed at the time of the test. This is in 
contrast to the memory-recognition test of Bransford et al. (1972) where, in the test, subjects 
were presented with a whole sentence. While in essence the above experiment is a kind of 
memory recognition test, for McKoon and Ratcliff (1992: 458): 
The delay between test word and signal was short enough that slow, strategic processes (that might construct 
inferences at the time of the test) were eliminated. 
Hence for McKoon and Ratcliff (1992: 458) this 'speeded recognition memory test' avoids 
the problems of inferences constructed at the time of the test. The experiments of McKoon 
and Ratcliff (1986, 1989a) demonstrate that elaborative inferences are not inferrable when 
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they rely on information which is not very familiar. The elaborative inference under analysis 
above is actually a particular kind of elaborative inference - a causal consequent inference. 
We shall see below that this type of inference is not usually constructed (6.2.4). 
As a final point, some of the experiments in McKoon and Ratcliff (1986) were followed up 
in Potts et al. (1988). Recall from 6.2.1 the texts I provided to show differences between a 
coherence inference and an elaborative inference. The experimental evidence of Potts et al. 
(1988), goes even further than of McKoon and Ratcliff s, indicating that the elaborative or 
predictive inference that the vase broke in the text: 
ii) No longer able to control his anger, the husband threw the delicate porcelain vase against the wall. He had 
been feeling angry for weeks, but had refused to seek help 
was not generated on-line at all, not even generated weakly. 
Automatic vs Strategic Inferences 
I have indicated that the minimalist hypothesis is concerned with predicting whether 
inferences will be automatic or not for a reader with no particular reading goals. Of course, 
if a reader is goal-oriented, being willing, then, to invest more cognitive effort in reading, 
then some elaborative inferences generated may not be automatic. McKoon and Ratcliff 
term these non-automatic inferences strategic inferences. Examples of strategic inferences 
are the 'implications' drawn by the journalist in the following news text: 
The Guardian Friday April 30 1999 p.13 
HESELTINE SAYS TORIES NOW LIKE LABOUR IN 1980s 
Michael White Political Editor 
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Michael Heseltine, the former deputy prime minister, last night likened the Conservative party's present state 
to the Labour plight of the 1980s - implying that the party would ultimately recover support but casting a 
shadow over the future of William Hague [strategic inference]. 
In an analysis which will have brought little cheer to the embattled Tory leader, Mr Heseltine told BBC1's 
Question Time that public opinion was 'febrile' and would swing back to the Tories. 
`It's not too far from reality to say that the Labour Party in the 1980s did go to very low levels of electability, 
but they recovered. They recovered when the mood changed against the government of the day. It will turn 
against the government of this day and when it does the Conservatives will be back in power.' 
The analogy, however, carried the clear implication that Mr Hague is a Neil Kinnock figure, who may reshape 
his ailing party but will ultimately be jettisoned before it takes power [strategic inference]. Alternatively, 
as some believe, he may even be his party's Michael Foot, battling to keep factions in check and drifting even 
further from electability.' 	 [my italics] 
The above inferences are elaborative inferences since they elaborate upon the text and so are 
not necessary for coherence. However, they are less likely to be drawn by a reader who is 
not goal-oriented, one with little vested interest in the text. In other words, they are unlikely 
to be automatic elaborative inferences. Presumably, the strategic elaborative inferences 
above are in line with the vested interest of the Guardian journalist to show the weakness 
of William Hague's position as leader of the Tory party. 
Vonk and Noordman (1990) 
I have outlined psycholinguistic evidence to the effect that elaborative inferences are not 
automatic when the scenario is unfamiliar to a reader and the reader has no specific goal. 
I have also indicated how elaborative inferences may be generated strategically if the reader 
has a vested interest in the text and is, thus, willing to invest cognitive effort. I now want 
to profile reasons why even coherence inferences are not necessarily constructed. The 
experimental work of Vonk and Noordman (1990) presupposes that generation of coherence 
inferences is to a large extent dependent on the reader's familiarity with the material, 
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regardless of whether explicit cohesive markers are present. Vonk and Noordman (1990) 
examined the processing of sentences containing the conjunctions because and but. They 
considered sentences such as: 
Chlorine compounds are frequently used as propellants because they do not react with other substances. 
In order to establish coherence for this sentence, the inference that needs to be generated is 
that good propellants do not react with other substances. Vonk and Noordman wanted to 
know whether this inference would be produced on-line. Using another sentence: 
John is a linguist, but he knows a lot about statistics. 
Vonk and Noordman were interested in knowing whether the inference necessary for 
coherence, that linguists do not know much about statistics, would also be generated. They 
used a combination of on-line reading time and question-answering time analyses. 
Inferences were presented as statements to be verified after reading sentences like the ones 
above. In some cases, inferences were already explicitly stated in the material to be read by 
subjects, and in other cases not. It was found that subjects answered more quickly in the 
verification stage when the inferences had been explicitly present in the reading material. 
The significance of all this? Vonk and Noordman concluded that when the material of the 
text is unfamiliar even coherence inferences are not always constructed. With unusual 
material, readers have a 'tendency to satisfy themselves with rather shallow processing' 
(Vonk and Noordman, 1990: 462), especially if the reader has no particular reading purpose. 
The reasoning behind this was that readers may satisfy themselves that the text is to some 
extent coherent because cohesive markers are present (as in the above examples)2. In more 
detail, here are Vonk and Noordman (1990: 462-3): 
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The control of inferences depends to a considerable extent on the reader's purpose and the reader's knowledge. 
Inferences are made on-line if they are related to information that is relevant to the reader's purpose, and 
inferences are more likely to be made if they deal with familiar topics. 
These results suggest that reading is a process in which a balance between costs and benefits is achieved. The 
benefits consist of the information extracted from the text; the costs are related to the extra mental processes 
that this requires. The reader seems to be rather parsimonious in processing. This is indicated by the 
absence of the inferences in normal reading expository text. [Experiments 1 and 2]. If the information is 
more relevant to the reader's purpose, the benefits are higher and inferences are made on-line 
[Experiments 3 and 4]. If the inferences are related to information that is familiar to the reader, the 
costs may be lower, which enables on-line inferences [Experiment 5]. It should be noted that the 
interpretation of the latter result is not that these inferences are made because they do not require time. They 
do, in fact. Readers engage in inference processes because the costs are relatively low when the inferences are 
related to available knowledge... 	 [my bold] 
And summing up here are Sanford and Garrod (1994: 705): 
Vonk and Noordman suggest that in normal reading, processing may be SHALLOW if the material is 
unfamiliar and the reader does not have a vested interest in the material. 
I have dealt very generally with the likelihood of coherence inferences and elaborative 
inferences being produced. When I introduced both types of inference in 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, 
I was actually dealing with a specific kind of coherence inference and a specific kind of 
elaborative inference, respectively causal antecedence and causal consequence. In the next 
two sections, I want to refer in more detail to the nature of these causal inferences 
particularly in relation to the likelihood of their generation. 
6.2.3 Antecedent (Backward) Causal Inferences and the Likelihood of Their Generation 
I follow van den Broek (1994: 561-573), again in Gemsbacher (1994), breaking down causal 
antecedent inferences into three types: 
i) connecting inference - the reader establishes a link between the current focal event and prior information thus 
instituting a causal antecedent for the new event. 
ii) reinstatement - information from prior text which is currently not activated can be reactivated by the reader 
in order to establish a causal antecedent. 
iii) elaborative - the reader utilises background knowledge to establish a likely but unmentioned causal 
antecedent. 
[Notice iii). Although causal antecedent inferences are necessary for coherence, and so are 
also backward inferences, they may also be elaborative. In other words, elaborative and 
forward inferences are not necessarily equivalent descriptions.] A hypothesis of Keenan et 
al. (1984) was that if readers do institute causal antecedent inferences, (i.e., identifying 
causal relations between adjacent sentences), then the stronger a causal relation in memory, 
the easier it would be for the reader to recognise it (see also Myers et al., 1987). In Keenan 
et al. (1984), subjects were shown sentence pairs that Keenan et al. regarded as differing 
according to the strength of the causal relation in memory. For Keenan et al., causal strength 
decreased from 1 to 4: 
level 
1 	 Joey's big brother punched him again and again. 
The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
2 	 Racing down the hill, Joey fell off his bike. 
The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
3 	 Joey's crazy mother became furiously angry with him. 
The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
4 	 Joey went to a neighbor's house to play. 
The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
Reading times for the second sentence were recorded and the hypothesis of Keenan et al. 
(1984) was confirmed since reading times for the second sentence increased from scenarios 
1 to 4. Further investigation found that a stronger memory connection was established for 
the high-causal relation sentence compared to low-causal pairs. Taken together, these 
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investigations suggest that readers automatically make causal antecedent inferences between 
adjacent sentences when the causal relation is strong in memory. When the causal relation 
is weak, the processing becomes shallow. Looking at the results of Keenan et al. (1984) 
from the perspective of van den Broek (1994) we can say the following. Readers have little 
problem instituting connecting causal antecedent inferences across sentences. However, the 
strength or shallowness of the elaborative causal antecedent inference is dependent on the 
strength of the causal relation in memory. This is in line with Vonk and Noordman (1990) 
above - i.e., coherence inferences become shallower the less the material leads to accessing 
of well-known encyclopaedic knowledge. An important corollary follows from all of this. 
Earlier I said that coherence inferences are necessary inferences. But the evidence of Vonk 
and Noordman (1990) indicates that coherence inferences are not always necessary. While 
one coherence inference - connecting causal antecedence - is automatic, another type of 
coherence inference - elaborative causal antecedence - depends on its automaticity on 
familiar information being accessed in memory. 
6.2.4 Causal Consequent Inferences and the Likelihood of Their Generation 
In 6.2.2, we saw that the inference that the actress had died from the sentence: 
The director and the cameraman were ready to start shooting when suddenly the actress fell from the 14th 
storey. 
was only weakly identified or, put another way, was produced shallowly. This was in line 
with the predictions of McKoon and Ratcliff s minimalist hypothesis since the event of 
falling from a 14-storey building is not familiar enough to facilitate the production of the 
inference and is also not essential for coherence. The above inference is, more specifically 
speaking, a causal consequent inference. McKoon and Ratcliff s (passim) position that 
causal consequent inferences are not usually generated if the situation is unfamiliar is in 
consensus with the position of the later constructionists - Graesser, Singer and Trabasso 
(1994), a constructionist response to McKoon and Racliff s minimalist hypothesis. The 
following is from Graesser et al. (1994: 382) on why causal consequents are not usually 
constructed: 
...because there are too many alternative hypothetical plots that could potentially be forecasted, because most 
of these alternatives would end up being erroneous when the full story is known or because it takes a large 
amount of cognitive resources to forecast a single hypothetical plot (Graesser and Clark, 1985; Johnson- 
Laird, 1983; Kintsch, 1988; Potts, Keenan, and Golding, 1988; Reiger, 1975). 	 [my bold] 
I have indicated that causal consequent inferences are not normally generated by readers 
unfamiliar with subject matter. But, it is further the case that causal consequent inferences 
are very shallowly generated at best, for a reader with little vested interest in a text, i.e. a 
reader who is not prepared to invest 'a large amount of cognitive resources' [see also the 
quote from Sanford and Garrod (1994: 705) in 6.2.2]. Of course, a reader with more vested 
interest, and thus one more willing to invest cognitive effort, can generate a causal 
consequent inference strategically. But, there are other conditions that make the automatic 
generation of causal consequent inferences more likely. The next two sections on 
`topicalisation' and 'the degree of contextual constraints' deal with this issue. 
Topicalisation 
Sanford (1990: 519-20) draws attention to how sentences with different attentional foci can 
affect the likelihood that automatic elaborative inferencing (causal consequence below) can 
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occur. He considers the following sentence (similar to that used by Potts et al. (1988) - see 
6.2.1 above): 
i) Unable to control his anger, the husband threw the delicate porcelain vase against the wall 
Sanford highlights the topicalising adverbial [reason] clause; the sentence is about the 
inability of the husband to control his anger and less about the vase and so he conjectures 
that we are less likely to form the causal consequent inference that the vase broke. By 
reconfiguring the sentence below, Sanford tries to highlight the breaking of the vase through 
the downplaying of anger control: 
ii) The husband had been unable to control his anger, and he hurled the extremely delicate and very valuable 
antique porcelain vase at the brick wall. 
Throwing the vase becomes a second conjoined sentence, the initial adverbial having been 
removed. The verb is now hurled, suggesting more intensity, and the richness of the 
modification 'up-plays' the significance of the object (see also: Sanford and Garrod, 1981: 
171-185). The inclusion of the material of the wall may also contribute to the possibility 
that the causal consequence inference will be automatically constructed. Sanford (1990: 
520) concludes as to the significance of topicalisation when considering the likelihood of 
an inference: 
...the point is that unless the attentional focus initiated by a sentence is considered, just because an inference 
is plausible does not mean that it will be made or that it will be fully developed... 
Basically, inferential activity should be a function of the structure of the text, of the choice of words, and of 
the topicalization devices used by the writer. It should not surprise anyone that elaborative inferences can be 
made; the questions are how the state of an inference relates to focus and how focus relates to language input. 
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Highly Constrained Context 
Both McKoon and Ratcliff (1992: 458) [minimalists] and Graesser et al. (1994: 382) 
[constructionists] aver that causal consequents can be automatically generated if the context 
is highly constrained, thus making background knowledge more 'easily available'. As an 
example of a highly constrained context consider the following from Keefe and McDaniel 
(1993: 454): 
After standing through the three-hour debate, the tired speaker walked over to his chair. He realized that his 
valiant effort was probably in vain. 
Keefe and McDaniel (1993) found in experiments that the causal consequent inference - the 
speaker sat down - was inferred a significant number of times. This can be put down to the 
fact that subjects were drawing on knowledge of a familiar scenario. But the high degree 
of semantic associative richness between 'chair' and 'sitting' also constrains context and 
contributes to production of the elaborative inference. 
In a related experiment, McKoon and Ratcliff (1989a) also indicated that the degree of 
semantic associative richness present affects the likelihood of automatic elaborative 
inference generation. For example, in a lexical decision task 'sew' was readily recognised 
after subjects had read the sentence: 
The housewife was learning to be a seamstress and needed practice so she got out the skirt she was making and 
threaded her needle. 
suggesting the inference had been made on-line. In comparison with their earlier 
experiment, McKoon and Ratcliff point out that 'dead' is weakly associative with the 
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`actress fell from the 14th storey' sentence, explaining why it is not generated on-line. 
To sum up. The possibility of a causal consequent inferences being automatically generated 
seems to depend upon how constrained the context is and how familiar the scenario is to the 
reader. A high constraint is created if there is a high degree of semantic association, if the 
situation is well-known, and there is only one obvious consequence. Topicalisation also 
needs to be considered as a factor in automatic causal consequence generation. 
Let me now move to consider another type of elaborative inference - instantiation. 
6.2.5 Instantiation and Likelihood of Generation 
Instantiation transpires when a superordinate / general category (e.g. vehicle) is processed 
more specifically from its context. 'Vehicle' in: 
The vehicle hovered over the crowd 
is most probably processed as a helicopter, balloon etc and is unlikely to be processed as a 
car, a bus etc (Garnham, 1985: 162). Investigators into instantiation inferences have 
commonly constructed sentences with general and specific categories: 
1. Julie was convinced that spring was near when she saw a cute red-breasted bird in her yard 
2. Julie was convinced that spring was near when she saw a cute red-breasted robin in her yard 
Reading time for an ensuing sentence such as 'the robin pecked the ground' has been shown 
to be about the same when it followed sentences like 1 and 2 (Garrod, O'Brien, Morris, and 
Rayner, 1990, McKoon and Ratcliff, 1989b, O'Brien, Shank, Myers, and Rayner, 1988), 
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suggesting that 'bird' is automatically instantiable on-line in a sentence like 1. Singer's 
(1994) synoptic treatment of recent work in 'discourse inference processes' in Gernsbacher's 
(1994) 'Handbook of Psycholinguistics', a standard reference book, also avers that there is 
strong support for automatic instantiation of general categories on-line. For McKoon and 
Ratcliff (1989b: 1143), that general object categories are automatically instantiated on-line 
is in line with the minimalist hypothesis: 
If a specific inference is provided by easily available general knowledge from long-term memory, then it will 
be constructed even if it is not required for coherence. 
In other words, if features of the meanings of words are automatically encoded into memory, 
then according to the minimalist hypothesis, they must have been easily available during 
comprehension. As another example, McKoon and Ratcliff (1989b: 1145) found that the 
instantiation inference 'piano stool / organ stool' was automatically produced by subjects 
in the following: 
Susie pulled out the bench, sat down, and called to everyone in the family to gather around: 'It's Christmas —
I'll play and we'll all sing carols'. 
In the above, instantiation depended on the readily available encyclopaedic knowledge of 
Christmas (family gatherings in the home etc), that people sit at pianos, carols are often 
accompanied by pianos in the home etc: 
Processing and the Order of General Category / Instance 
Finally, in this section, I want to consider how the order in which an instance and a general 
category noun are expressed in a text affects processing time. In an investigation of 
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superordinate category instantiation, Garnham (1981) used a measure known as self-paced 
reading time where: 
If subjects are allowed to control the rate at which text is presented to them, the time which they spend reading 
a particular portion of that text can be used as a measure of on-line processing load. 
Garnham (1981: 377) 
Consider the following: 
1. a) The denim would fade in the sun. b) The cloth was kept in big rolls. 
2. b) The cloth was kept in big rolls. a) The denim would fade in the sun. 
Garnham found that there was no difficulty in processing in 1 [when b) followed a)] but that, 
in 2, a) was read much more slowly in following b). Garnham (1981: 383) concluded that 
subjects take a longer time reading a sentence with an instance noun, if it follows a sentence 
in which its referent was only described as belonging to a more general category. Garnham 
does qualify these results by indicating that they only hold if co-text for the first sentence 
does not hint what type of instance the category member is. So for example, if in 2 above, 
b) was replaced by 'the cloth was made into jeans', the general category 'cloth' receives 
some instantiation towards the specific category of 'denim'. 
To sum up, the results of Garnham / McKoon and Ratcliff etc indicate that instantiation is 
for the most part an automatic process when appropriate knowledge is readily accessible, 
appropriate contextual information is present, and when instances precede superordinates. 
As a corollary, text which introduces a superordinate term which is then followed by an 
instance (and in the absence of appropriate encyclopaedic information) could then be said 
to be inconsiderate (Sanford and Garrod, 1981: 196-8). I move onto discussion of one more 
elaborative inference - instrument inferences. 
6.2.6 Instrument Inferences and the Likelihood of Their Generation 
Consider the following: 
The accountant dried his hands 
A reader may infer that the accountant was using a towel to dry his hands. In other words, 
`towel' is an instrument inference. Early investigations on instrument inferences suggested 
that instrument inferences were not automatically produced during reading. In the 
experiments of Singer (1979a; 1979b), verification times for the instrument word were 
longer with an implied rather than explicit instrument, indicating that 'instruments' are not 
inferred automatically during reading. Later research suggested that instrument inferences 
are automatically produced if the context is sufficiently rich or constrains the instrument. 
When it is the case that the instrument is necessary for understanding, verification times for 
instrument words in some findings (Singer, 1980) were similar to verification times for 
explicitly indicated words. For example, with sentences such as 'The worker drove the nail' 
and 'The tool was too small for the task', the word 'hammer' was generated in equal 
proportion when mentioned or not. Other research has also indicated the effects of context 
on instrument inference production. An instrument has a higher probability of being inferred 
when it has been referred to already in the text (Lucas et al., 1990) or when context 
constrains towards a specific instrument. O'Brien et al. (1988) employed passages to 
determine whether readers automatically made any type of instrument inferences: 
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1) 	 All the mugger wanted was to steal the woman's money. 
2a) 	 But when she screamed, he stabbed her with his weapon in an attempt to quiet her. 
3) He looked to see if anyone had seen him. 
4) He threw the knife into the bushes, took her money, and ran away. 
[2b) 	 But when she screamed, he assaulted her with his weapon in an attempt to quiet her.] 
[my bold] 
O'Brien et al. (1988) considered reading times for the last sentence, 4) when the passage was 
read by different subjects with either 2a) or 2b). When the passage was read with 2b), the 
last sentence took longer to read. O'Brien et al. (1988) deduced that this was because the 
inference that the weapon was a knife was produced only while 4) was being read. In 
contrast, after finding a quicker reading time for 4) when 2a) was used, they deduced that 
this was because 'knife' had already been generated before 4) was read. Processing of 1) 
and 2b was, then, more shallow than with 1) and 2a). 
Garrod and Sanford (1982) also produced evidence that implied instruments are 
automatically generated on-line. Sanford (1990: 518-9) attempts to answer the question why 
the results of Singer (1979a) differ from those of Garrod and Sanford (1982). Sanford 
(1990) draws attention to the fact that a subsequent experiment by Cotter (1984), using both 
sets of materials, showed that the Garrod-Sanford and Singer results were replicable within 
the same study, ruling out spurious explanations. Sanford reasons that the difference 
appears to be that with the Garrod-Sanford set, the instruments are 'part of the meaning' of 
the verbs (e.g., key is 'part of the meaning' of unlock), whereas for Singer's verbs, this is not 
the case. [A similar set of reasoning is provided in Sanford and Garrod (1994: 703), a review 
of inference generation in the reference book, Gernsbacher (1994).] 'Part of the meaning' 
is rather clumsy from a semantic perspective. A better explanation would be to see the 
evidence in terms of a degree of semantic association. The instrument 'key' is more readily 
generated from a scenario with the verb 'unlock' because of the strong semantic association 
between 'key' and 'unlock'. Strong associations mean knowledge is automatically available 
so automatic instrument generation on this basis is in line with the minimalist hypothesis. 
6.2.7 Summing-Up of the Psycholinguistic Research on Inference Generation 
I have drawn attention to the following inferences: causal antecedent, causal consequent, 
instantiation, and instrument. I have also drawn upon the minimalist hypothesis that states 
in the absence of specific goal-directed strategic purposes only two types of automatic 
inferences are produced: 
i) local coherence inferences 
ii) elaborative inferences that rely on information that is readily and easily available 
When a reader is goal-directed and willing to spend more time and effort in processing, then 
other elaborative inferences generated are not automatic but strategic. There is a 
psycholinguistic consensus that connecting causal antecedent inferences are normally 
constructed since they are coherence inferences. But the strength of elaborative causal 
antecedent inferences is dependent on the degree of causal relation in memory. A weak 
causal relation leads to shallow production of an elaborative causal antecedent inference. 
Elaborative causal antecedent inferences are not always necessary then. Instrument 
inferences, instantiations and causal consequent inferences are elaborative inferences, falling 
in to the second category above. Instantiations are automatically generated if they depend 
upon well-known knowledge. The same applies for instrument inferences, particularly when 
the scenario is constrained by a high degree of semantic association. There is also a 
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consensus on the generation of causal consequents that they are not normally constructed or 
only shallowly at best. Part of the reason for this is because readers, without a specific goal, 
are parsimonious in processing and so refrain from the labour-intensive forecasting of 
consequents. The generation of causal consequents is much more likely to be strategic 
rather than automatic. The inferences I have referred to will inform my framework in 
chapter 8 for the analysis of mystifying discourse, providing a more consistent basis than 
found in CDA for the appreciation of inference generation in text comprehension and how 
inference generation relates to mystifying discourse. For the sake of clarity, I list in tabular 
form the inferences that will inform my framework in chapter 8. 
INFERENCE GENERATION IN TEXT COMPREHENSION RELEVANT TO THIS THESIS 
AUTOMATICALLY 
GENERATED: 
NECESSARY FOR LOCAL 
COHERENCE 
AUTOMATICALLY 
GENERATED: 
WHEN INFORMATION IS 
QUICKLY 	 AND 	 EASILY 
AVAILABLE 
USUALLY HAVE TO BE 
STRATEGICALLY 
GENERATED 
1. connecting causal antecedents 1. elaborative causal antecedents 
2. instantiations 
3. instruments 
strength of 1, 2 and 3 relies on 
ready availability of information. 
1. causal consequents 
I have highlighted the issue of shallow generation of causal consequent and elaborative 
causal antecedent inferences. The issue of shallow processing is continued into the next 
section where instead of inferences, I look at how top-down processing can lead to shallow 
processing of lexical items. 
6.3 Shallow Processing of Text through Top-Down Processing 
6.3.1 Sanford and Garrod's (1981 / 1994) Primary Processing Principle 
Sanford and Garrod (1981) argue that a central aspect of comprehension is that when it is 
possible, and as soon as possible, linguistic input will be related to background knowledge, 
the resulting representation being used to assist the comprehension of subsequent text. This 
is known as the primary processing principle. The primary processing principle, then, has 
much in common with the minimalist hypothesis in this respect.3 For Sanford and Garrod 
(1994: 710), the need to link linguistic input quickly to background knowledge accounts for 
the fact that it is common for top-down processing to prevail over the processing of syntax, 
that 'pragmatic mapping can override syntax'. As examples of this phenomenon, Sanford 
and Garrod offer the common misperceptions of 'Ask not what you can do for your country; 
ask what your country can do for you' and 'can a man marry his widow's sister?'. Sanford 
and Garrod (1994: 710-1) conclude: 
...the problem seems to be that existing stereotyped knowledge of the situations seems to override sufficient 
processing detail to enable the anomaly to be detected...processes necessary for true coherence can be 
incomplete, and that a sense of coherence is achieved on the basis of a good fit between some elements of the 
sentences concerned and stereotyped knowledge. This is consistent with the primary processing principle of 
mapping... 
Shallow processing can occur with the sentences given above because extant stereotyped 
knowledge of the particular situations for both prevails over the processing necessary to be 
alerted to the aberration. 
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Sanford (1990) / Barton and Sanford (1993) make use of a well-known puzzle to illustrate 
how top-down processing prevails over lexical registration. The puzzle is as follows: 
There was a tourist flight on its way from Vienna to Barcelona. On the last leg of the journey, it developed 
severe engine trouble over the Pyrenees. The pilot lost control, and it crashed, right on the border. Wreckage 
was equally strewn in France and Spain, and one question facing the authorities was where the survivors should 
be buried. What was the solution? 
In Barton and Sanford's (1993) experiment, a two-thirds majority (67%) did not detect the 
anomaly that 'survivors should be buried'. This could be explained by invoking the potency 
of top-down driven expectation, in this case that dead people follow crashes. So since 
`survivors' is part of the semantic field of air crash, readers might admit it as a legitimate 
filler for the patient of 'bury'. To test the argument that the anomaly is not detected because 
of the potency of top-down-driven expectation, Barton and Sanford (1993) conducted a 
similar 'detection experiment' except this time using the scenario of a bicycle accident 
instead of an air crash. Detection rates for 'survivors being buried' following bicycle 
accidents averaged 80% compared with 33% for the air crash. It seemed, then, that top-
down processing influences detection rate since one would not usually expect death to 
accompany a bicycle accident, while one would in a plane crash. In a further study of the 
air-plane crash text, 'survivors' was replaced by 'surviving dead', clearly in this context 
contradictory. Since this phrase is irregular anyway, if the meaning of 'surviving dead' is 
fully analysed by subjects when they read the text, then the detection rate should be high. 
Barton and Sanford (1993) found the opposite, however, only 23 % detecting the anomaly. 
The result seems to suggest that if one element of the noun phrase, in this case 'dead', is 
able to fit expectation to an adequate degree, then the noun phrase is in effect only analysed 
in a shallow manner. A possible objection to this experiment is that it is not so much that 
readers fail to notice that survivors would not be buried or that they cannot be dead, but that 
readers edit such phenomena in real discourse, treating them as mistakes; [see, though, the 
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section on `Reder and Kusbit, 1991' in 6.3.2 below]. However, the strength of the objection 
still rests on the fact that top-down has precedence over bottom-up processing. 
6.3.2 'Moses Illusion' 
Erickson and Mattson (1981) 
Erickson and Mattson's (1981) investigations into partial processing led to the coinage of 
the 'Moses Illusion'. They asked their subjects to respond to: 
How many animals of each sort did Moses put on the ark? 
Erickson and Mattson found that a large number of subjects processed this in a shallow 
manner since they did not detect the anomaly. Erikson and Mattson argued that this was 
because of the closeness between Moses and Noah in memory. From the perspective of 
Sanford and Garrod's primary processing principle, this would be accounted for as follows. 
Readers make an effort to immediately relate textual information to the familiar (familiar, 
in this case, to those with some knowledge of the Old Testament); the necessary partiality 
that ensues will mean that anomalies will often go undetected. Indeed, Erickson and 
Mattson go on to state that the Moses Illusion suggests that natural language processing 
involves incompleteness on a more general level. In other words, readers will embrace a 
particular term providing there is a high degree of fit with their expectations in that context, 
and a full analysis of the meanings of terms usually does not occur. 
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Reder and Kusbit (1991) 
Reder and Kusbit performed a series of experiments in order to try and ascertain 
explanations for the Moses illusion. One explanation might be that readers do notice the 
anomaly but do not report it, assuming the text is co-operative in the sense of not violating 
Gricean maxims. To test this, Reder and Kusbit asked one group of respondents to spot 
irregular items in sentences, and another group to ignore anomalies and answer questions 
as though they were semantically adequate. However, subjects who had been requested to 
detect anomalies still erred, overlooking many of them. Reder and Kusbit noted that the 
detection tasks were time consuming, suggesting the difficulty of such a process. This in 
turn suggested the high degree of overriding capacity of top-down processing over bottom-
up analysis. Overall, for Reder and Kusbit, these results lent support for the following: 
subjects who originally did not report the 'Moses Illusion' most probably had not noticed 
the anomaly. 
Topicalisation Leading to Less Shallow Processing 
In another experiment related to the 'Moses Illusion', Bredart and Modolo (1988) showed 
that error detection in the Moses Illusion depends on whether the crucial name is a syntactic 
focal point. In contrast to the sentence: 
Moses put two of each kind of animal on the Ark. 
which Erickson and Mattson had used, Bredart and Modolo (1988) used: 
It was Moses who put two of each kind of animal on the Ark. 
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In the immediate sentence above, the cleft transformation highlighted 'Moses' and led to 
higher detection rates. In other words, the topicalisation of 'Moses' leads to less shallow 
processing. 
6.3.3 Flores d'Arcais 
Other evidence that registration of syntax is not necessarily prominent in processing comes 
from Flores d'Arcais (1987). He makes a distinction between computation and use of the 
results of computation. On the basis of findings, he argues that while readers make full 
computation of syntax, the results of this computation are not necessarily used. This is 
because: 
...what makes good readers good is their ability to deal more efficiently with 'higher order' kind of strategies, 
thus relying less on the results of syntactic computation. 	 Flores d'Arcais (1987: 632) 
For Flores d'Arcais, readers rely firstly on top-down strategies and use bottom-up strategies 
when top-down sources are impoverished, etc. Indeed, from the results of one experiment, 
Flores d'Arcais (1987: 632) suggests that: 
...readers who are good at extracting information from rapidly presented texts seem to be less sensitive to 
syntactic violations than less efficient readers. 
This supports the results of experiments we have seen above. On a similar point, evidence 
cited in Garnham (1985: 138-141) suggests that what people remember about a sentence is 
not its syntactic structure, nor its semantic meaning verbatim, but its message constructed 
through an interaction between the sentence and the reader's cognitive resource.4 
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6.3.4 Summing-Up 
From the evidence discussed in 6.3, top down processing can prevail over the registration 
of syntax and lexical items such that they are processed in a shallow or partial manner. So, 
we should also be sceptical about regarding the mental representation of lexical items in a 
sentence as being necessarily compositional. In the Barton and Sanford (1993) experiment, 
while a two-thirds majority (67%) did not detect the anomaly 'burying survivors' in the air 
crash scenario, of course 33% did detect this irregularity. We cannot, then, take it as an 
absolute that top-down expectancy always overrides the semantic meaning of a lexical item 
for every reader. However, to detect the anomaly, the reader has to be able to analyse 
`survivors' and 'buried' compositionally or 'fully', something that the majority patently did 
not do. We saw also that Reder and Kusbit (1991) reported that detection of anomalies, 
which would necessarily involve compositional analysis, was time consuming. To sum up: 
i) it would appear that it is more usual for the mental representation of a reader to be non-
compositional with regard to lexical items in a text and ii) to detect anomalies, the necessary 
compositional analysis is in line with extra cognitive effort. 
Returning to the Erickson and Mattson (1981) experiment, the evidence is generalised to 
apply to all readers when of course the processing presupposed a particular kind of reader 
- i.e. one versed, at least a little, in the Old Testament. The same goes for the Christmas 
scenario of McKoon and Ratcliff (1989b: 1145) that we saw in 6.2.5. The danger, of course, 
with generalising the results of such experiments is that inter-individual variation as well as 
intra-individual variation is downplayed. For example, if Reder and Kusbit (1991) had 
offered large cash awards for all the anomalies that their subjects were able to spot, these 
subjects would have had a greater vested interest and so would more likely have engaged 
with the text with greater cognitive effort. It is a basic assumption, though, of this thesis that 
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degrees of reading scrutiny and vested interest in texts vary both inter and intra-personally. 
As we shall see in the last section of this chapter, I argue that a CD analyst has a vested 
interest in the text they examine. This leads them to derive a different discourse from a 
reader with no specific reading goal for the same text because the former derives strategic 
inferences (as well as automatic inferences) and the latter only automatic inferences. 
I want now to deal with the issue of shallow registration of form and structure in the context 
of classical (logical) processing. In doing so, I will outline the likelihood of classical 
(logical) processing in readers. 
6.4 Classical Processing and Shallow Processing 
6.4.1 Semantic Value 
Consider the following from Sanford (1990: 522) on the partial processing of the 'burying 
the survivors' text we saw above: 
If the processing of inferences is incomplete, in what way is it incomplete? Linguistic elements can fill roles 
that they do not really fit on the basis of partial matches. What kind of relation can be said to result? In terms 
of conventional AI, the role could be said to be an IS-AN-INSTANCE-OF relation. Yet this may not make 
much sense. With the airplane scenario, if one asks explicitly, 'do you bury survivors?' subjects recognise how 
silly the problem was. An alternative to the full relation is that the pattern match produces the equivalent of 
a link, but one that does not have a semantic value (i.e. survivors is simply associated with the slot for patient). 
This is very different from the classical view of inference, of course, which would require the derivation 
of a predicate with a semantic value. 	 [my bold] 
Evidence from Sanford (1990) and Barton and Sanford (1993) indicates that readers are 
often shallow with regard to the construction of semantic value. Since on the classical 
225 
picture, the derivation of a predicate requires 'whole' semantic value, the classical theory 
is directly confronted by Barton and Sanford's (1993) experimental evidence. For Sanford 
(1990: 526-7): 
...it seems likely that the brain is poor at inference in the classic sense of making full-blown inferences but is 
well adapted to making simpler mappings between things. In the discourse context, the brain is good for 
mapping segments of discourse onto existing knowledge but is perhaps less good for generating novel 
inferential outcomes. 
6.4.2 Formal Deductive Inferences 
Sanford (1990) illustrates the above distinction he makes as follows. In a problem where 
a subject is informed that Fred is taller than Bill, Bill is shorter than John, and so on, 
subjects may be able to recognise this as a transitive inference problem. But unless a subject 
was expecting to be questioned, there would be little inference construction as to the 
transitive relations. 
I would argue that such a case shows that, for what is only a little more effort in terms of inference operations, 
there is a large difference in difficulty between having a representation for a transitive inference problem and 
knowing that a problem belongs to the transitive inference class. 	 Sanford (1990: 527) 
Instituting logical relations on Sanford's account is something that requires extra processing. 
This view is supported by a well-known experiment by Wason (1966) which I outline 
below. 
We saw in chapter two that on the classical account, mental computation is the manipulation 
of symbols according to a structured rule system. If this were the case, then trivial deductive 
inferences should present no significant problem for humans. However, evidence as to how 
humans deduce counters this assumption. This is particularly the case with reasoning 
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involving material implication or the if.. then [p --> q] construction. One of the most famous 
demonstrations of this is the `Wason selection task' (1966). Subjects were given four cards, 
each with a number on one side and a letter on the other. They were presented with the rule 
- 'if there is a vowel on one side, then there is an even number on the other' - and four 
cards showing an 'A' (p), a 'K' (-p), a '2' (q) and a '7' (- q), (where p is a vowel and q an 
even number). The problem: which of the cards must you turn over to see whether the rule 
is true or false? From the classicist position, processing would be consistent with the truth 
functionality ofp -+ q, i.e: 
p->q 
	 p-+q 
TTT 	 VTE 
TFF 	 VFO 
FTT 	 CTE 
FTF 	 CTO 
Most subjects stated that the A and the 2 need to be turned over. But the logical response, 
the A and the 7, was produced in only 4 % of subject responses. Substituting the symbols 
V for vowel (T) and C for consonant (F), E for even (T) and 0 for odd (F), we can see more 
clearly which cards have to be overturned to disprove the rule. Material implication is true 
when p is true and q is true, i.e. when there is a vowel on one side and an even number on 
the other. Clearly, A needs to be turned over. This of course confirms the rule, but we need 
to turn over another card to see if the rule can be disproved. Material implication is false 
when p is true and q is false, that is, when there is a vowel on one side and there turns out 
to be an odd number on the other. So the 7 needs to be turned over since if there were a 
vowel on the other side, then this would disprove the rule. Most people do not select the K 
since the rule says: `if a card has a vowel on one side', and since this card does not have a 
vowel on one side, it makes no difference what is on the other. But why do so many people 
erroneously choose the 2 when they commit the logical offence of affirming the 
consequent?5 In other words: p —> q q —› p. 
When more realistic and `contentful' materials were used, reasoning scores drastically 
improved. Wason and Shapiro (1971) employed the following rule: 'Every time I go to 
Manchester I travel by car'. When subjects were given four cards indicating travel 
destinations on one side and modes of transport on the other, and instructions akin to the 
above, 63% of subjects produced the logical response. It seems, then, that the more sense 
of the materials subjects can establish, the more likely they are to perform logically. 
However, this is anomalous from the classical position, since logical inferencing is meant 
to depend on form and not content. Wason's experiments, then, mount a challenge to the 
classicist view of cognition as autonomous symbol manipulation. Reasoning seems to be 
very much dependent on assimilating the problem to encyclopaedic knowledge rather than 
penetrating to the formal structure of the problem sentence. Common-sense reasoning 
strategies involving induction and default inference are hardly formalisable in logic (from 
the philosophy of logic: Harman, 1986; from the philosophy of science: Kuhn 1970; from 
cognitive science: Oaksford and Chater 1991). In a sense then, common-sense reasoning is 
shallow with regard to formal logical structure when the scenario is unfamiliar. As a coda 
to the above, I am not suggesting that the majority of people have difficulty in processing 
logically. Rather, this kind of processing will incur a higher than normal degree of cognitive 
labour if the reader does not have familiar knowledge to draw upon. By the same token, this 
processing labour may not be forthcoming from a reader who has little interest in a text. 
Thus, logical processing, and so the detection of logical offences, is facilitated by a high 
level of interest in the text, as well as familiarity of context. This ties in with the possibility 
of anomaly detection (Moses Illusion / 'survivors buried') since this too can be dependent 
on a vested interest in the text, in turn in line with extra processing effort. 
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I now go on to outline evidence for the selectional processing of narrative with regard to 
main characters and thus the shallow processing of secondary characters. 
6.5 Selectional Processing of Narratives 
6.5.1 Main vs Secondary Characters 
There have been various studies that have shown how references to main and secondary 
characters are treated differently in reading. Anderson, Garrod and Sanford (1983) 
investigated the differences in processing of 'main' and `scenario-dependent' characters. 
The latter were characters which depend upon a particular scenario. So for example, if John 
visits the cinema and is shown to his seat by the usherette, then John would constitute a main 
character, since his action is outside the limits of the cinema whereas the usherette is bound 
to the scenario of the cinema. Using a self-paced reading approach, Anderson et al. 
ascertained that sentences containing pronominal anaphoric references to main characters 
were read more quickly than those with references to scenario-bound characters. This 
suggests that readers are more 'involved' in processing with main characters than with 
secondary characters. In a similar experiment, Morrow (1985) explored the processing of 
a main character, a character which was the theme of the first three sentences of a short 
narrative. Below is the narrative used by Morrow (1985) where different subjects were 
presented with the text in its different variations [(A) or (B) or (C)] : 
Paul caught the flu and was feeling pretty awful. He told his eldest son Ben to keep the house quiet. He got 
up from bed to go to the bathroom, irritated by the noise. Traffic was rushing by the house. The kids were 
arguing in the den. 
(A) That noisy Ben was messing up the kitchen. 
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or 
(B) Noisy Ben was tramping around in the kitchen. 
or 
(C) Ben was wondering when his father would feel better as he ate in the kitchen. 
The floor felt cold on his feet. 
Whose feet are referred to? 
The narrative presents the main character (Paul) and the subsidiary character (Ben). (A) 
introduces Ben from Paul's attitude, (B) is similar to (A) but presents the subsidiary 
character as being more active, but (C) allows Ben to have a perspective. So with (A) and 
(B), the subsidiary character is backgrounded while it is more foregrounded in (C). In 
response to the probe question, 'Whose feet are referred to?', Morrow found that choice of 
main character (Paul) as referent was high in (A) (97%) and (B) (84%), but low in (C) 
(34%). Morrow concluded that when the subsidiary character is backgrounded from the 
perspective of the main character that the reader's perception of states is bound up with the 
perspective of the main character. A straightforward objection to this experiment is that the 
reader's perception of states is generated after the probe question and so we cannot infer that 
the experiments indicates what transpires normally in the heads of readers. An experiment 
where this objection does not apply, because it is on-line reading which is being gauged by 
measurement of reading time, is included in the following section. 
6.5.2 Proper Names vs Role-Descriptions 
Garrod and Sanford (1988) performed a reading time investigation into how setting 
information or atmosphere affects the processing of characters [see also the experimental 
evidence of Sanford, Moar and Garrod (1988)]. Below is an example of a text used by 
Garrod and Sanford (1988): 
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Lunch at the cafeteria 
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Alistair hung up his coat and picked a tray. 
The waitress smiled as she poured the coffee. 
The atmosphere was hot and sticky. (optional) 
He took the cup or 	 She offered the cup. (character mention) 
He mopped his brow 	 or 	 She mopped her brow. (target sentences) 
The main character is Alistair since he has a proper name, whereas the subsidiary character 
is 'the waitress' since it is a merely role description. The critical target sentence can refer 
to either the main or subsidiary character. In order that the referent of the target sentence 
does not surprise the reader, the same referent is mentioned in the previous sentence. So 
when the character mention sentence is 'He took the cup', the target sentence is 'He mopped 
his brow'. The reading times of subjects were ascertained for the target sentence 'he 
mopped his brow' referring to the main character (Alistair) and the target sentence 'she 
mopped her brow' referring to the secondary character (waitress). This was done with the 
atmosphere sentence either present or absent. Consequently, there were 4 sets of reading 
times: 
Reading Times (ms) for the TARGET SENTENCES 
Main Character (Alistair) 
Target: He mopped his brow 
Secondary Character (waitress) 
Target: She mopped her brow 
With Atmosphere Statement 1379 1430 
Without Atmosphere Statement 1650 1463 
The results show that when the atmosphere sentence is absent, reading times are 
significantly slower when the main character (Alistair) is referred to in the target sentence 
but this is not the case when the subsidiary character (waitress) is referred to in the target 
sentence. Here are Sanford and Garrod (1994: 709): 
The results thus fit intuitions that the behaviour of the main character needs causal explanation, not that of the 
secondary characters. Certainly, the actions of main characters are typically either explained or motivated 
directly in stories and narratives, whereas those of secondary characters are not. The present results suggest 
that this goes hand in hand with an automatic selective process which seeks the formation of richer structures 
around main characters. 	 [my bold] 
For Sanford and Garrod (1994), then, the experiment showed that subjects focused more on 
the main character since they were actively seeking to supply a causal explanation for why 
he mopped his brow in the absence of information that the atmosphere was hot and sticky. 
When the target sentence referred to the waitress, the absence of the 'atmosphere sentence' 
did not affect processing time, indicating that the behaviour of secondary characters do not 
usually require causal explanation. 
The expectation that the actions of main characters should be explained is in line with other 
experiments cited in this section in the sense that main characters are an automatic focus for 
readers (see Sanford and Garrod, 1994 above). The corollary of this is that inferences 
surrounding secondary characters are normally generated in a more shallow manner 
compared to that of main characters since causal explanations are not normally sought for 
secondary characters. This is not to say that a reader with a vested interest is not able to seek 
causal explanations for secondary characters. However, these processes would be strategic 
rather than automatic and would thus require more effort. (See also Stevenson (1993: 119) 
on the issue of reader-focus on characters in narrative). 
In the last section, I compare the psycholinguistic evidence I have produced for shallow 
processing of text with certain cognitive assumptions in CDA (many of which were outlined 
in chapter 1), teasing out the implications of this chapter for CDA. 
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6.6 Implications of This Chapter for CDA 
6.6.1 Orientation 
In order to facilitate comparison of psycholinguistic evidence for shallow processing with 
processing assumptions in CDA, I will use what I call the idealised reader (IR), a reader 
based on the psycholinguistic evidence outlined above. This is a reader who has little vested 
interest in a text and is not particularly goal-driven. This reader is, then, one who would not 
make strategic inferences, but only automatic inferences. I also assume this reader would 
be largely unfamiliar with the subject matter of the texts below although I do assume IR to 
have encyclopaedic knowledge that would be expected of an adult (unless otherwise stated). 
Such a reader, then, is in line with the formulation of the minimalist hypothesis but also 
with the results of experiments where top-down processing overrides bottom-up factors and 
where there is a lack of detection of logical offences. IR is also in line with the automatic 
seeking of causal explanations for main characters. Below, I use IR to focus more keenly 
than CDA on the micro-context of interpretation. I am concerned broadly speaking with the 
following: 
1) In chapters 4 and 5, I showed that what symbolic / logical empiricist / classical CDA 
regards as mystifying text was not from the perspective of connectionism and cognitive 
linguistics. Below, I show that what CDA regards as mystifying text is also not the case 
from the perspective of IR - i.e. the psycholinguistic evidence for shallow processing I have 
amassed in this chapter also conflicts with symbolic etc assumptions in CDA. This is the 
topic of 6.6.2. 
2) I make the assumption that a 'resistant' reader (in the parlance of CDA: 1.2.2) makes a 
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good deal of cognitive effort. In CDA, 'non-resistant' readers allow texts to position them 
into particular interpretations. I assume, then, that 'non-resistant' readers for CDA make 
only minimum cognitive effort. Since IR invests minimum cognitive effort, IR could be 
construed as a non-resistant (or non-analytical) reader. I show below that CDA explanation 
(interpretation-2) of how a non-resistant reader is constrained by the macro-context into 
accepting the subject position of the text is not coincident with IR' s discourse derivation 
from the same text. This is because CD analysis done by proxy for a non-analytical reader 
includes the generation of strategic inferences (in line with a large degree of cognitive 
effort), when non-analytical IR only generates automatic inferences, (in line with only 
minimum cognitive effort). This is the subject of 6.6.3. 
6.6.2 How the Idealised Reader Problematises what CDA Regards as Mystifying Text 
Cause-Effect 
Recall the extracts from Trew (1979), from 1.4.1, and Simpson (1993), from 3.6.2, as to how 
CDA isolates text which is mystifying of causality. Their focus was sentential. Causality 
was transparent if the (transactive) AGENT- PROCESS-PATIENT construction was used. 
Causality that had to be inferred across clauses or sentences was somehow weaker than an 
AGENT-PROCESS-PATIENT clausal construction. Now, consider again the following 
from Keenan et al. (1984) that I outlined in 6.2.3: 
level 
1 	 Joey's big brother punched him again and again. 
The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
2 	 Racing down the hill, Joey fell off his bike. 
The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
3 	 Joey's crazy mother became furiously angry with him. 
The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
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4 	 Joey went to a neighbor's house to play. 
The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
The form of 'the next day his body was covered with bruises' is similar to that of the passive 
voice although in this context 'covered' is functioning as a stative adjective6. [I treat 
`covered' as a stative adjective rather than the past participle of a passive partly because of 
the time interval in this context; the fact that one cannot cover in real time another body with 
bruises. In contrast, in a sentence such as 'In the initiation ceremony, the fresher was pelted 
with tomatoes, covered in gunge, hosed down with water and chained to a lampost for 4 
hours' where a succession of actions is highlighted, I understand `[was] covered' in terms 
of an action and thus an agentless passive and not a state.] 
The agentless passive is a feature which CDA has often isolated as being salient since agents 
can be deleted with passives, with ensuing mystification of agency. Even though 'was 
covered', in Keenan's et al.'s (1984) texts, describes a state and not an action, because 
equally the agent of the bruising is absent from the sentence it enables us to say more 
precisely (as I will show) why use of the passive can be 'mystifying' and sometimes not. 
The issue relates to the strength of causal relation in memory. In Keenan et al.'s (1984) 
experiments, the 'agent' was readily inferable across sentences in 1) above because the 
causal relation was strong in memory. That is, not only could a connecting causal 
antecedent inference be instituted (which we saw earlier are usually effortless for readers) 
but a strong elaborative causal antecedent inference could also be inferred since background 
knowledge was strong here. However, an agent was less sharply inferred in 4) since the 
causal relation was not so strong. That is, while the connecting causal antecedent inference 
was inferred, the elaborative causal antecedent was weak since causal relation in memory 
was weak. So what do we conclude? By extension, passives accompanied by agent deletion 
can be mystifying (to varying degrees) at least to the identity of causal antecedence if the 
causal relation in memory is not so strong. This possible mystification has, then, nothing 
to do with the fact that agency has to be inferred across clauses or even sentences, pace 
CDA. 
Trew (1979: 98-9) 
Consider again Trew's (1979: 98-9) example, backed up by Lee (1992: 100) and 
Montgomery (1995: 240), that the identity of the agent of the killing is only weakly 
implicated in: 
Eleven Africans were shot dead and 15 wounded when Rhodesian Police opened fire on a rioting crowd of 
about 2,000. 
Not only is it [The Times report] in the passive, but the syntactic agent is deleted...and is identified only weakly 
by implication through the temporal conjunction with the police opening fire... 	 Trew (1979: 98-9) 
The Times uses passives (Rioting blacks shot dead by police, Eleven Africans were shot dead). The effect of 
the passives is to further attenuate the agentivity of the police... 	 Lee (1992: 100) 
...although the police are clearly the agent in an active construction, it is one in which they 'open fire on', a 
process which is significantly more neutral as to its consequences than 'shooting dead'. 
Montgomery (1995: 240) 
[Simpson (1993: 170) rests on the same assumption that inferences generated across clauses 
are weak representations. This was outlined in 3.6.2]. Two points. Firstly, as Keenan et al. 
(1984) showed, agency is inferable across sentences and so by extension across clauses. 
Secondly, the causal relation between 'Police' or anybody else 'opening fire' and people 
being 'shot dead' is, I would assert, a fairly strong causal relation in the memory of many 
people. Although IR is largely unfamiliar with the subject matter of a text, as I have said, 
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IR has 'normal' encyclopaedic knowledge of an adult. Thus, in the discourse IR derives 
from the text, the causal antecedent is not, then, 'identified weakly'. A connecting causal 
antecedent inference is not only instituted by IR but a strong elaborative causal antecedent 
inference also. In other words, what Trew regards as being mystifying of agency is not the 
case from the perspective of IR. 
Trew's analysis, as we saw (3.7.1) (and Simpson's (1993)), is predicated upon a symbolic 
I logical empiricist over-emphasis on sentential structure, (as well as internalist assumptions 
of mental representation), over consideration of the contribution of the human understander. 
On this assumption, then, Trew, and the other authors cited, misleadingly ignored the 
contribution of the human understander, given that such a contribution is supported by 
psycholinguistic evidence. In this particular case, the contribution of the human 
understander is their strength of causal relation in memory and their capacity to generate 
inferences across clauses and sentences. Indeed, if as Flores d'Arcais (6.3.3) says: 
...what makes good readers good is their ability to deal more efficiently with 'higher order' kind of strategies, 
thus relying less on the results of syntactic computation. 	 Flores d'Arcais (1987: 632) 
CDA are misguided in focusing so much on sentential structure. Full use of syntactic 
computation is not the norm for someone reading quickly for general information, with 
otherwise little vested interest in the text, since they are relying much more on 'higher-order' 
or top-down strategies. 
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Hodge and Kress (1993) 
As another example, consider the following from Hodge and Kress (1993: 48) which I 
outlined in 3.2.5: 
As time went by, the rain fell on the seeds and the sun shone down on them, and the turnips began to grow. 
Hodge and Kress (1993: 50) then compare both transactive and non-transactive descriptions: 
non-transactive: The rain fell on the seeds. 
transactive: 	 The rain (water) moistened the seeds. 
non-transactive: The sun shone down on them. 
transactive: 	 The sun warmed the soil. 
They argue that the non-transactives used in the story mystify the nature of the causality 
whereas the transactives do reveal the causality. From the perspective of the 
psycholinguistic evidence provided here, the richness of the causal antecedent inferences 
would depend on the strength of causal relation in memory. [I highlighted in 3.2.5 how 
Hodge and Kress (1993) neglected the issue of how language cues encyclopaedic 
knowledge]. Although IR is an adult, the same basic principles apply to children (though 
of course children do not have what constitutes normal adult knowledge). A young child, 
I presume would not have rich knowledge of the cause-effect involved in respiration, 
germination, photosynthesis etc. We can suppose that in discourse they would not make rich 
backward elaborative causal antecedent inferences but merely make connecting causal 
antecedent inferences, i.e., connecting turnip growth to the rain and the sun but not really 
knowing why. Hence, Hodge and Kress's (1993) notion that transactives demystify the 
causal relations is incorrect. Again, the psycholinguistic evidence conflicts with the 
symbolic / logical empiricist over-emphasis on sentential structure in CDA, as well as 
internalist mental representation, over considerations of the contribution of the human 
understander. In this particular case the contribution of the human understander is their 
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strength of causal relation in memory. That is, Hodge and Kress (1993) neglect how mental 
representation is the output of what the sentences cue, i.e., weak causal relations in 
children's memories in the case of germination, respiration, photosynthesis etc. Mental 
representation necessarily goes beyond the semantic-syntactic structure of a sentence and so 
is not, as implied in Hodge and Kress (1993), a facsimile of semantic-syntactic structure.' 
Simpson (1993: 170-1) / Clark (1992) 
In chapter 3, I showed how Clark (1992) and Simpson's (1993) analyses of a news text were 
underpinned by symbolic postulates. In chapter 4 and 5, I showed how these symbolic 
postulates were problematised by connectionism and cognitive linguistics respectively and 
thus what these authors regarded as mystifying text. In the last section, the psycholinguistic 
evidence for causal antecedence inference generation not only conflicted with Trew (1979: 
98-9) but also with Simpson (1993: 170). Below, I show how psycholinguistic evidence - 
but this time relating to instantiation inferences and selective processing of main characters 
- also conflicts with Simpson's (1993), and Clark's (1992) symbolic analyses and again what 
they regard as being mystifying text. 
Selective Processing of Main Characters 
Consider the following from Clark (1992: 215) again: 
1) Two of Steed's rape victims - aged 20 and 19 - had a screwdriver held at their throats as they were forced 
to submit. 
2) His third victim, a 39-year-old mother of three, was attacked at gunpoint after Steed forced her car off the 
M4. 
3) Two days later, he gunned down call-girl, Jacqueline Murray, 23, after picking her up in London's Park 
Lane. 
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Clark alleges that `...the perception of Steed as rapist is reduced by making the sentences 
passive and deleting him as agent'. That is, the semantic-syntactic encoding diminishes 
Steed's responsibility. We saw in 3.6.2 that what underlay Clark / Simpson's analyses was 
the symbolic / logical empiricist assumption that a sentence should fully represent events and 
independently of the contribution of the human understander. In the next paragraph, I take 
into account the contribution of the human understander with regard to processing of main 
characters. 
In the above, Steed is a proper name and the other referents, apart from Jacqueline Murray, 
are role descriptors, 'rape victims' and 'mother of three'. If we go back to the 
psycholinguistic evidence for name / role descriptor, we see that Steed is, then, the main 
character. IR automatically seeks causal explanation of Steed's actions in discourse 
derivation from the text. Steed, then, is unlikely to be seen as absent from the discourse 
perspective of IR when sentence 2 is processed, pace Clark and Simpson. That is, again, the 
psycholinguistic evidence from this chapter conflicts with the symbolic / logical empiricist 
assumptions of CDA. 
Now, Simpson (1993: 170) offers reinforcement of Clark's analysis: 
...so obscured is the relationship between attacker and victim that it allows a possible reading wherein someone 
else attacks the woman at gunpoint while Steed only forces her car off the road. 	 [my bold] 
Since 'someone else' (see bold above) is not given a name, 'someone else' would have to 
be a secondary character. But IR, with little vested interest in the text, only automatically 
seeks causal explanation around main characters. It follows that the alternative 
interpretation that Steed forced the 'victim' off the road while 'someone else' attacked her 
is a purely strategic elaborative inference, generated by an analyst investing time and effort 
in the text. Not only is there little textual warrant for this 'alternative reading', but non-
analytical IR would not produce such a reading. 
One further remark. CDA makes the point that since nominalisations remove participants, 
events are made more distant. CDA tend, however, to conflate ideational distance with 
interpersonal distance. I have no problem with nominalisations producing interpersonal 
distance since formal and so 'distant' letters are characterised by a higher degree of 
nominalisation, and thus deletion of participants, than informal letters. In other words, I 
have no problem with the fact that interpersonal distance is created though the absence of 
participants. But this does not mean, as I showed in chapter 4 and 5, that ideational distance 
is necessarily created by nominalisations through the absence of participants and the 
presence of 'object-like' nominals. All the same, in contrast to CDA, what I have tried to 
show in this chapter is that ideational distance can be related to a particular discourse 
derivation even if participants are present. That is, just because participants are present in 
a text does not necessarily mean that there are no differences in the 'depth' to which 
different participants are processed in discourse. Secondary characters are automatically 
read in a more shallow way, than primary ones, for a reader who has little vested interest in 
a text. Or put another way, in the discourse of such a non-analytical reader, secondary 
characters are ideationally distant. 
Instantiation 
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Consider again (from 3.7.2) the following from Clark (1992: 215), which comments on the 
Steed text above: 
In both descriptions of the rapes (1) and (2), the perception of Steed as rapist is reduced by making the 
sentences passive and deleting him as Agent. This perception is further reduced by using the euphemism 
`attacked' to mask the terrible details of abduction, repeated rape, and death threats (not mentioned at all in 
this newspaper). 
I pointed out, in 3.7.2, that there was no mention of how 'attack' might be instantiated by 
the concrete details in the text. This is partly because of logical empiricist / symbolicism 
assumptions common in CDA that all the information should be 'in' the sentence, i.e., the 
structure of the sentences should mirror reality regardless of the processor's (inferential) 
input. But we have seen that instantiation takes place automatically when it is based on 
well-known encyclopaedic knowledge. In the minimalist hypothesis, this includes 
information already established in the text (McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992: 440). Thus, IR's 
discourse would readily include instantiation of 'attack' (sentence 2) via the more specific 
`rape' information (from sentence 1), especially given that when Steed 'attacks', he is 
attacking his third victim, having raped his first and second. [This also applies to Fairclough 
(1992a: 170-1) and what I said about instantiation of the category 'abnormalities' (3.6.1)]. 
From all of this, we can see that Simpson's (1993: 171) second alternative sentence for the 
Sun text: 
2) Steed attacked at gunpoint his third victim, a 39-year-old mother of three, after he had forced her car off the 
M4 
in containing the more general 'attack', but lacking a reference to 'rape', is actually 
`euphemistic' in Clark's sense; or in terms of inference generation, 2) lacks enough 
information to instantiate 'attack' and so ironically mystifies in discourse as to the nature 
of the 'attack'. 
242 
6.6.3 Conflict between the Discourse of the Idealised Reader and CDA Explanation 
(Interpretation-2) for a Non-Resistant Reader 
Fairclough (1995a: 122-3) 
Recall from 1.4 Fairclough's line that if the textual material is unfamiliar, then, readers 
would commit themselves to inferential labour to 'fill in' implicit links'. Now, let me 
reproduce part of a text which Fairclough (1995a: 122-3) analyses and then some of 
Fairclough' s analysis: 
[MIX to pipes in slum area of Manila, pan to wide-shot slums] 
[Narration] 
1) Everywhere in the Third World life in rural areas gets harder - and poor people flock to the city. 
2) The urban poor get poorer. 
[Close-up child standing in pipe; Slum area, mother and child] 
3) When rice prices go up, hunger and unrest grows. 
4) In the city, the people can usually be kept in their place. 
Cohesion relations are largely implicit in this sequence. For example, I interpret the clauses of the first three 
sentences as in relation of enhancement, and more specifically cause-effect relations, but they lack markers of 
causal cohesion. In sentence 1, the two clauses are linked by the all-purpose conjunction and, which leaves 
implicit the cause-effect relation (poor people flock to the city because life in rural areas gets harder). I also 
see an unmarked cause-effect relation between the second clause of sentence 1 and sentence 2 (the urban poor 
get poorer because so many people flock to the city). Again, although the first clause of sentence 3 is marked 
with a temporal conjunction (when), there is an implicit causal relation between the two clauses (hunger and 
unrest grow because rice prices go up). It takes quite an inferential leap on the interpreter's part to 
establish a coherent meaning relation between sentences 3 and 4. I interpret this an extension-type relation 
of an adversative type (unrest grows, but the people can usually be kept in their place; or although unrest 
grows, the people can usually be kept in their place). The connection between these sentences rests upon a 
`bridging assumption' (Brown and Yule 1983, Fairclough 1992a): that popular unrest gives rise to a problem 
of order, and the need for official action to try to contain it. 	 [my bold] 
Before I continue with quotation from Fairclough, let me highlight Fairclough's point above 
that 'it takes quite an inferential leap on the interpreter's part to establish a coherent meaning 
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relation between sentences 3 and 4'. I will come to the significance of this highlighting 
shortly. Fairclough continues: 
Overall, this part of the extract addresses an ideal interpreter who is familiar with a particular preconstructed 
`script' (Montgomery et al. 1989) that is being evoked here: a predictable sequence of events leading from rural 
poverty to urban squalor and unrest and consequential problems of order. The ideal interpreter is relied 
upon to fill in the gaps, make explicit what is left implicit, and construct a coherent, preferred, meaning 
for the text. 
But this is not just a matter of textual economy, not bothering to spell out what can be taken for granted. It is 
a moot point how many real audience members might, if asked, actually agree with the stereotypical 
narrative of Third World urban problems which constitutes the script. But the text takes the script as 
universally given for its audience, and so positions audience members that they are induced to draw 
upon it to arrive at a coherent interpretation...Local coherence relations in cases of this sort can therefore 
contribute significantly to textual processes of ideological interpolation (Althusser 1971): audience members 
are, so to speak, called upon to acknowledge the framework of ideological common sense (in this case, the 
Third World script) within which they are positioned. Such texts can cumulatively shape the knowledge, 
beliefs and values of audience members. 	 [my bold] 
Examining the above, we can suppose that Fairclough has a non-resistant or non-analytical 
reader in mind, gleaned from what Fairclough's says about it being a 'moot point how many 
real audience members might, if asked, actually agree with the stereotypical narrative of 
Third World urban problems which constitutes the script.' That is, if such a reader were 
prompted to think about the stereotypical narrative of Third World urban problems, they 
might not agree with it, given the extra cognitive effort incurred by the prompting. But 
without such prompting they will be compliant with the way in which the text 'positions' 
them. 
For Fairclough, a reader (`the ideal interpreter') will invest the necessary cognitive labour 
to make the 'bridging assumption' he outlines between sentences 3 and 4. As I have 
highlighted, Fairclough is explicit that this involves a fair amount of cognitive labour (`quite 
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an inferential leap'). But we saw from the experiments of Vonk and Noordman (1990) (see 
6.2.2) that even coherence inferences (i..e., 'bridging assumptions') can be shallow if the 
textual material is not so familiar. And indeed, I would argue that for many readers, 
`problems of order following popular unrest and the need for official action to try to contain 
it' is hardly an everyday, familiar scenario. So Fairclough over-estimates the amount of 
cognitive work readers are prepared to invest since the 'inferential leap' would not be made, 
at least, by a reader with no specific goal, with little vested interest in the text, and one 
largely unfamiliar with subject matter (i.e. IR). 
For Fairclough, the absence of cohesive markers is significant since readers are, then, 
induced to draw upon a particular script of the third-world in order to 'arrive at a coherent 
interpretation'. But as we saw in the experimental work of Vonk and Noordman (1990) 
(6.2.2), even if cohesive markers are present, if the reader is unfamiliar with the textual 
material, then, coherence will inevitably be shallow, readers satisfying themselves that the 
text is coherent because it is cohesive.8 IR's discourse, then, conflicts with Fairclough's 
explanation (interpretation-2). But Fairclough's explanation itself, it could be argued, rests 
on a conceptual tension. In being willing to make the cognitive effort, to make 'quite an 
inferential leap', one might assert that Fairclough's 'ideal interpreter' (see bold above) is 
someone with a vested interest in the text. But at the same time, for Fairclough, the 'ideal 
interpreter' is a non-resistant reader, someone who passively accepts the positioning of the 
text and thus someone who presumably does not make a great deal of cognitive effort, i.e. 
one who would not make 'quite an inferential leap'. 
Gough and Talbot (1996) 
Now recall from 1.4 the problem page advice commented upon by Gough and Talbot (1996: 
226): 
Many heterosexual men have a passing curiosity about homosexuality, and that isn't such a bad thing. It 
compels you to make choices. 
...the causal link which is needed to coherently combine these two sentences is not cued by any formal 
element, and this is a point where the reader's complicity is required if the two sentences as they stand 
together are to make sense. The 'missing link' we need to supply is that heterosexuality and 
homosexuality are separate sexualities and that interest in homosexuality is useful inasmuch as it 
reinforces this separate heterosexual identity. For some readers it may require inferential work. 
...Following Fairclough's [1989] approach, this interpretation would be accounted for using the notion of 
automatic 'gap-filling' between explicit propositions. A reader who is unfamiliar with problem pages...would 
need to engage in a good deal of inferential work to make this connection. 	 [my bold] 
The notion of a non-resistant reader here is more implicit than in Fairclough's text above 
but, all the same, the phrase 'the reader's complicity' indicates Gough and Talbot do have 
a non-resistant reader in mind. The assumption in the above, as we saw in 1.4.1, is that 
readers will 'work', even if they are 'unfamiliar with problem pages', to produce the 
inference that 'interest in homosexuality (in this context, by adolescent males) is useful in 
as much as it reinforces this separate heterosexual identity'. In doing so, the reader becomes 
ideologically positioned. But the inference that interest in homosexuality reinforces 
heterosexual identity is a causal consequent inference. As we saw (6.2.4), causal 
consequents are normally weakly generated since they are not required for coherence. This 
would be especially the case for IR, a reader with little vested interest in a text and largely 
unfamiliar with subject matter, or in this case a reader `unfamilar with problem pages'. 
Furthermore, like 'popular unrest leading to problems of order etc' the above inference is 
a rather non-everyday, abstract one that the minimalist hypothesis would discount as likely 
to be generated unless the reader had quite a specific goal in mind. The psycholinguistic 
evidence, then, contradicts Gough and Talbot's line. 
246 
Thus, what Gough and Talbot have produced is a strategic inference and one not generated 
by IR since only automatic inferences are a part of their discourse derivation. This strategic 
inference generation most probably reflects Gough and Talbot's (1996) own vested interest 
in the text, leading them to derive a different discourse from IR in their explanation of the 
text for a non-resistant reader. As a final point, Gough and Talbot's position (as well as 
Fairclough's earlier) seems somewhat akin to that of the early constructionists (6.2.2) where 
there are few restrictions placed around the types of elaborative inference produced, a 
position which the later constructionist position has moved away from (6.2.2)9. 
Fairclough (1995a: 113) 
Recall from 3.4.2 and 4.3.3 the following excerpt from Fairclough (1995a: 113): 
Everywhere in the Third World life in rural areas gets harder - and poor people flock to the city. The urban 
poor get poorer. 
Fairclough argued that 'flock' is 'associated with 'sheep - notoriously passive', thus 
reinforcing the perspective in the rest of the text that the 'poor' are not agents of their 
circumstances. There is no explicit positing of the perspective of a non-resistant reader. The 
perspective, however, is implicit - Fairclough is analysing the text presumably to indicate 
the reading of someone who does not oppose the text's 'view' of the poor. We saw, in 3.4.2, 
that an assumption which enables him to do this is that of compositionality where symbols 
are discrete and enduring. Compositionality, then, facilitates his choice of the ovine sense 
of 'flock' so as to suit his line. However, in 4.3.3, I showed how a connectionist perspective 
conflicted with Fairclough's explanation. 
But how does all of this fit with IR? The low detection rates of lexical anomalies in the 
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experiments of Reder and Kusbit (1991) (6.3.2) and Barton and Sanford (1993) (6.3.1) 
suggest that it is automatic for the mental representation of a reader to be non-compositional 
with regard to lexical items in a text. This was because of top-down processing prevailing 
over the processing of discrete lexical items. I highlighted previously that to detect 
anomalies such as 'surviving dead', the necessary extra cognitive effort was in line with 
compositional scrutiny of the text. That is, compositional analysis and processing are 
strategic and not automatic. However, since IR invests minimum cognitive effort, IR's 
processing is automatic, thus consisting of non-compositional mental representation. So, 
for IR, the mental representation of 'flock' has partial value and not the 'full' semantic value 
of 'collection of sheep'. This, then, conflicts with Fairclough's analysis of 'flock', which 
presupposes compositional mental representation in the mind of a non-resistant reader. In 
conclusion, Fairclough has produced a strategic inference to suit his line and so Fairclough's 
discourse is at odds with the discourse derived from the text by IR. As a final point, since 
the text is accompanied by pictures [MIX to pipes in slum area of Manila, pan to wide-shot 
slums], presumably the pictures of slums (which also presumably show people living in 
them) will be involved in the top-down processing, once more making the ovine reading less 
likely for non-strategic IR. 
6.7 Summary 
There is not much citation of psycholinguistic work on inferencing in the CDA literature, 
so I have tried to broaden the discussion and prepare the ground for chapters 7 and 8. In the 
last section, broadly speaking I have shown three things: 
i) psycholinguistic data from this chapter conflicts with symbolic / logical empiricist inspired 
CDA. IR is a reader based on this psycholinguistic data. Thus, what symbolic / logical 
empiricist CDA regards as 'mystifying' text is not from the perspective of IR - i.e., does not 
lead to a mystifying discourse for IR. 
ii) different levels of cognitive investment in a text lead to different discourses being derived 
from the text. In the last section, the different discourses were the non-shallow discourse 
generated by proxy for non-analytical readers by CD analysts, and the shallow discourse 
generated by proxy for IR by myself 
iii) CD analysts wrongly assume that the high cognitive effort they invest in interpretation 
by proxy for a non-resistant reader is replicated by such a reader who may have little vested 
interest in a text and so invest much less cognitive effort. By exploring the micro-context 
of interpretation (in contrast to CDA), I have shown that a non-analytical reader (i.e. IR) is 
not positioned by the above texts into making a particular interpretation as deemed by the 
CD analysts cited above. In other words, for the texts discussed in 6.6, (where readers are 
not coerced into interpretations), the assumption in CDA that the macro-context governs the 
micro-context of interpretation of a non-analytical reader is problematised. 
Other similar things follow from the above: 
- Since different levels of vested interest and thus different levels of cognitive labour lead 
to different (by proxy) interpretations, the principle of 'partiality of interpretation' from the 
same text has thus been demonstrated. 
- CDA 'over-interpret' by proxy for the non-resistant reader. 
- Since the discourse of non-analytical IR (i.e one in line with empirical psycholinguistic 
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evidence) conflicts with the discourse of the CDA non-analytical reader (i.e, a reader not 
supported by empirical psycholinguistic evidence), the notion that there is critical 
hermeneutic exegetic privilege in the above CDA explanations is considerably weakened. 
In chapter 7, I shall highlight compatible elements in the psycholinguistic evidence in this 
chapter for shallow processing and the enterprises of connectionism and cognitive linguistics 
that were discussed in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. In chapter 8, these compatibilities will 
augment the basis of the idealised reader, creating a more systematic and comprehensive 
alternative framework for the analysis of shallow discourse. While I have shown in this 
chapter that the texts analysed by CD analysts are not mystifying of subject matter for IR, 
I will use this framework in chapter 8 to highlight text which is mystifying of subject matter 
for IR, but text which would not be highlighted as such by CDA. 
Notes: 
1. Although I do not deal with anaphoric references in this chapter since they do not inform my framework 
in chapter 8, there is ample evidence that coherence anaphoric inferences are made on-line (e.g. Dell, McKoon 
and Ratcliff, 1983). 
2. Vonk and Noordman's (1990) experiments highlight one essential difference between cohesion and 
coherence. 
3. Sanford and Garrod (1994: 704) point out that the 'primary processing principle' differs from the minimalist 
hypothesis 'in philosophy' since it makes: 
`...the assumption that grounding incoming text in background knowledge is necessary to achieve a sense of 
understanding and to achieve coherence in many instances.' 
However, Sanford and Garrod (1994: 704) also acknowledge that: 
`...once possible elaborative inferences are based on the availability or accessibility of general knowledge, the 
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minimalist position and the primary processing accounts are not so easy to distinguish.' 
4. Of course there are occasions when sections of texts are remembered verbatim: e.g. texts of personal 
significance, or statements of high interactional value (see: Keenan, MacWhinney and Mayhew: 1977). This 
can also apply to highly-patterned language read for the first time, e.g. lines from a poem or a song, some 
newspaper headlines, etc. But with regard to the last section of this chapter, since CDA has tended to deal with 
news texts of a reasonable length, rather than just headlines, I make the assumption that such texts will usually 
hold little personal significance for the reader or are so unpatterned and of such length that they would not 
ordinarily be remembered verbatim. 
5. One of the conclusions that Wason drew from this research was that humans find it much more natural to 
search for proof than to search for disconfirmation / falsification, conflicting with Popperian methodology in 
the philosophy of science. 
6. Take the subject + [be] + past participle form - the window was broken. How are we to analyse this? Is 
this a description of an action - an agentless passive where the past participle is the 3rd form of a verb and [be] 
an auxiliary verb? Or is it a description of a state where the past participle is an adjectival complement and 
[be] a copula? The answer is that analysis must take into account context and human motivation, i.e, 
discourse. For example, for 'the window was broken' where the context is a burglary, a detective may be more 
interested in the person who was responsible for the breakage rather than the state of the window and so see 
the form 'was broken' in terms of an agentless passive. Alternatively, imagine the context of a car safety 
experiment which is testing whether a particular windscreen glass is strong enough for a certain impact. In a 
report that 'the window was broken', 'broken' would be understood in terms of a stative adjective since the 
state of the window is more important than the agent of the breaking. 
7. For descriptions of scientific phenomena, it is often irrelevant whether sentences are transactive or non-
transactive if there is an absence of sufficient knowledge to draw upon. This is well exemplified by the 
following folk-explanation - The ice cooled his forehead. The transactive status of the sentence means that for 
Hodge and Kress (1993), at least, the causal relation is explicit, satisfying their criterion that this is a scientific 
statement. But the causal relation of the folk-explanation is wrong. Ice does not cool a forehead. Instead, heat 
from a forehead disrupts the bonds between water molecules in ice leading to melting. It is because heat is 
transferred to the ice, rather than the ice doing something to the forehead, that the temperature of the forehead 
reduces. For conflict between folk and scientific understanding of causality, see Wolpert (1992). 
8. Fairciough's (1989) distinction between automatic connections and inferences which require interpretative 
work (and thus the idea that readers are willing to invest in such inferential 'work' even if they are unfamiliar 
with subject matter) is found in Brown and Yule (1983). Here are Brown and Yule (1983: 266): 
`...the more interpretative 'work' the reader (hearer) has to undertake in arriving at a reasonable interpretation 
of what the writer (speaker) intended to convey, the more likely it is that there are inferences being made.' 
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Indeed, Fairclough (1989: 108) cites and endorses Brown and Yule's (1983) chapter 7 as 'a helpful discussion 
of inferencing, and its relation to automatic gap filling'. Gough and Talbot's (1996) position on inferences is 
derived from Fairclough (1989) which in turn derives from Brown and Yule (1983); see Gough and Talbot 
(1996: 226). Brown and Yule (1983) was published before the papers associated with the minimalist 
hypothesis and the later constructionists, these being published in the late 80s and early 90s. Consequently, 
Fairclough's sources are not up-to-date and consensus thinking on inference generation. Brown and Yule's 
position, and in turn Fairclough's, is contradicted not only by the minimalist hypothesis and the later 
constructionists but by Sanford and Garrod's (1981 / 1994) primary processing principle and Vonk and 
Noordman (1990). 
9. The later constructionists, Graesser at al. (1994: 384) indicate that the types of inference that are generated 
on Schank and Abelson's (1977) model include elaborative inferences such as causal consequence: 
`This model asserts that reading is expectation-driven in addition to explanation-driven. That is, readers 
generate expectations about future occurrences in the plot, and these expectations guide the interpretation of 
clauses in a top-down fashion (Bower et al., 1979; DeJong, 1979; Dyer, 1983; Schank and Abelson, 1977). 
Expectations are formulated whenever higher order knowledge structures are activated, such as a script or a 
theme. For example, if a story activates a RESTAURANT script and the text mentions that two characters 
entered a restaurant together, then the reader would form expectations that the characters will eat, talk and be 
served food. If a story activates a REVENGE theme and the text specifies that character A hurts character B, 
then the reader would form the expectation that character B will hurt character A.' 
However, the fact that Schank and Abelson's (1977) model includes fully formed causal consequent inferences 
is in direct conflict with both the later constructionists and the minimalists. Now, Schank and Abelson (1977) 
is cited in Gough and Talbot (1996: 228) which is unsurprising when we consider that Schank and Abelson 
script theory is drawn upon in Fairclough (1989), a source work for Gough and Talbot (1996). It is likely, then, 
that Fairclough (1989) and thus Gough and Talbot (1996) take for granted that causal consequents are 
produced since Fairclough directly and Gough and Talbot indirectly draw upon Schank and Abelson (1977). 
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CHAPTER 7: HIGHLIGHTING COMPATIBLE ELEMENTS IN 
CONNECTIONISM, COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS, AND 
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC EVIDENCE FOR SHALLOW PROCESSING 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapter 8, I will enhance the idealised reader (IR) framework to show how certain news 
text will lead to mystification for that non-analytical reader, news texts which would not be 
highlighted as such by CDA. As we saw in the last chapter, the IR framework is (so far) 
based on psycholinguistic evidence for shallow or selective processing. When I enhance the 
IR framework in chapter 8, it will also include compatible 'principles' from connectionism 
and cognitive linguistics which are in turn compatible with the psycholinguistic evidence for 
shallow processing discussed in the last chapter. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
prepare for chapter 8 by indicating compatibilities between all these areas. However, in 7.5, 
I outline tensions between connectionism and cognitive linguistics with regard to treatment 
of metaphor and explore the ramifications of this for CDA's use of Lakoff and Johnson's 
(1980) approach to metaphor. 
7.2 Compatibility of Connectionism with Cognitive Linguistics 
7.2.1 General Compatibilities 
There are many parallels between cognitive linguistics and connectionism. The cognitive 
linguist, Langacker (1987a), argues that it is unhelpful to treat syntax as autonomous and 
thus separate from semantics, and as we have seen already (chapter 4), connectionist models 
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do not treat syntax and semantics in this way. Cognitive linguistics and connectionism also 
intersect in their eschewing of logical reasoning and rule application as being central to an 
understanding of language performance (cf. Wason, 1966 and in 6.4.2). On this comparison 
and on the shunning of 'propositional formats' and transformational derivation (such as 
inherent in the derivational theory of complexity, a performance theory similar to that used 
by CDA) and the notion that linguistic systems are recurrent patterns of activations, here is 
the cognitive linguist, Langacker (1987b: 6): 
...cognitive grammar (at least my own formulation of it) is basically compatible with the connectionist 
philosophy. First, cognitive grammar makes no qualitative distinction between rules and their instantiations 
- rules are simply schematized expressions; moreover, the `schemas' in question are thought of as being 
`immanent' to their instantiations, not as separate or discrete structures. Second, only elements with semantic 
and / or phonological content are permitted, and they are characterized directly in terms of such content, not 
in a propositional format. Third, analyses are based on the overt form of expressions; derivation from abstract, 
`underlying' representations is precluded, as is any sort of algorithmic computation. Finally, a linguistic system 
is viewed as simply an inventory of 'cognitive routines', which are interpretable as recurrent patterns of 
activation that are easily elicited by virtue of connection weights; the construction of complex expressions 
reduces to the co-activation of appropriate routines and 'relaxation' into a pattern of activation that 
simultaneously satisfies all constraints. 
So Langacker, then, explicitly recognises compatibility between cognitive linguistics and 
connectionism. Similar explicit recognition of these compatibilities is found in the 
connectionist philosophers, Churchland and Churchland (1996: 238), who draw parallels 
with the work of the cognitive linguists (Lakoff, Langacker, Bates, Fauconnier) and how 
they, like connectionists, have not treated syntax and semantics as being separable; see also 
Harris (1990), Langacker (1987a: sec. 12.3), Langacker (1997), Regier (1996), Schopman 
and Shawky (1996) for discussion of cognitive linguistics in the context of connectionism. 
As we saw in 4.2.5, one of the pioneers of cognitive linguistics, Rosch, endorses the 
connectionist view that symbols are 'approximate macrolevel descriptions of operations 
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whose governing principles reside at a subsymbolic level' (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 
1991: 101-2). Also for the cognitive linguist, Lakoff (1987a: 338): 
Our results...do not contradict what have come to be called `connectionist' theories... 
In section, 7.5, I shall show that there are in fact some tensions between connectionism and 
the cognitive linguist, Lakoff, particularly with regard to approaches to metaphor. 
7.2.2 Surface Structure (Linguistic Input) Not Equivalent To Process Output 
Accommodation 
Another area of compatibility between cognitive linguistics and connectionism is in the 
notion of accommodation. For the cognitive linguist, Langacker (1987a: 76-7), 
`accommodation' refers to the adjustment of a lexeme's meaning according to the lexical 
company it keeps. For example, 'ball' in 'the toddler kicked the ball' and 'the final ball of 
the over was a googly' are likely to be different. The connectionist Elman (1992: 170) 
makes explicit mention of Langacker's concept of 'accommodation', citing Langacker 
(1987a: 76-7) at length, which I reproduce below: 
It must be emphasized that syntagmatic combination involves more than the simple addition of components. 
A composite structure is an integrated system formed by coordinating its components in a specific, often 
elaborate manner. In fact, it often has properties that go beyond what one might expect from its 
components alone. Two brief observations should make it clear why this is so. First, composite structures 
originate as targets in specific usage events. As such they are often characterized relative to particular contexts 
with properties not predictable from the specifications of their components as manifested in other 
environments. A related point is that one component may need to be adjusted in certain details when integrated 
with another to form a composite structure; I refer to this as accommodation. For example, the meaning of 
run as applied to humans must be adjusted in certain respects when extended to four legged animals such as 
horses, dogs, and cats (since the bodily motion observed in two legged running is not identical to that in four 
legged running); in a technical sense, this extension creates a new semantic variant of the lexical item. 
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Indeed, Elman's model was able to simulate accommodative effects (Elman, 1992: 170).1  
Langacker's concept of 'accommodation' also dovetails with the capacity of McClelland and 
Kawamoto's (1986) network to shade meaning, which we saw in 4.3.2. For example, in the 
initial input, all 'balls' were assigned the microfeature 'soft.' But for the sentence 'the ball 
broke the vase', the network assigned the microfeature 'hard' to 'ball' since it knew from 
the training corpus that all things for breaking were 'hard'. This shading of meaning in a 
connectionist network is an automatic process. 'Shading of meaning' in humans intuitively 
appears to be an automatic process also. If connectionist networks can be treated as a 
simulation of brain networks, then, McClelland and Kawamoto's (1986) simulation lends 
support to the notion that shading of meaning or accommodation in a brain network is an 
automatic process. 
Safe-Combination Metaphor vs Building-Block Metaphor 
Elman (1990: 378) offers the 'safe-combination' metaphor as an explanatory metaphor for 
language processing in connectionist networks: 
`A metaphor that captures some of the characteristics of this approach is the combination lock. In this 
metaphor, the role of words is analogous to the role played by the numbers of the combination. The numbers 
have causal properties; they advance the lock into different states. The effect of a number is dependent on its 
context. Entered in the correct sequence, the numbers move the lock into an open state...The numbers are 
`present' insofar as they are responsible for the final state but not because they are still physically present.' 
The safe-combination metaphor contrasts with the classical 'building-block' metaphor, 
(which I referred to in 2.2.4). In the building-block metaphor for language processing, 
process output still 'contains' the building blocks of linguistic input. However, in the safe-
combination metaphor for language processing, linguistic input is responsible for the final 
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state and so is not 'present' in this final state. Linguistic input is not the same as the process 
output. This contrasts with how CDA often treats semantic-syntactic surface structure as 
equivalent to process output as we saw in chapter 3. Langacker's (1987a: ch. 12) 
`scaffolding' metaphor, which we saw in 5.7, has much in common with Elman's 'safe-
combination' metaphor. He views the (linguistic input) components of a compound as 
`scaffolding', i.e. disposable when no longer needed. Seeing compounds in terms of the 
scaffolding metaphor rather than building block metaphor places a greater emphasis on how 
cognition output does not necessarily mirror linguistic input. For example, if one of the 
lexical items in a sentence is a basic-level category then it will be in cognitive 
interdependence with either action and object basic-level categories that are not present in 
the linguistic input. 
7.2.3 The Functionalism of Cognitive Linguistics and Connectionism 
Elman (1990: 378-9) then goes on to highlight the functional aspect of the connectionist 
approach to language comprehension: 
This view of language comprehension emphasizes the functional importance of representations and is similar 
in spirit to the approach described in Bates and MacWhinney 1982; McClelland, St. John, and Taraban 1989; 
and many others who have stressed the functional nature of language. Representations of language are 
constructed to accomplish some behaviour. Obviously, that behaviour may range from daydreaming to verbal 
duels, from asking directions to composing poetry. The representations are not propositional, and their 
information content changes constantly over time in accord with the demands of the current task. Words serve 
as guideposts that help establish mental states that support this behaviour; representations are snapshots of 
those mental states. 
As Elman says, the functional importance of language is something which other 
connectionists, McClelland, St. John and Taraban (1989) (see 4.4), have emphasised also. 
But as we saw in chapter 5, the prominence of this aspect of language is compatible with 
a similar emphasis in cognitive linguistics, where in contrast to classical semantics, it draws 
attention to the interactional properties of an object. That is, language may be used not just 
to institute a conceptual state in a reader's or listener's mind but to institute a functional 
state. Recall from 5.3.2 the example of the 'internal mouse' on a laptop computer which has 
different inherent properties to an external mouse. Referring to this item as a 'mouse', that 
is, employing a basic-level category, enables the hearer to realise the particular motor-
interactionality associated with a laptop; in other words the actual function of the mouse. 
The hearer experiences no difficulty in activating the referent's function and allowing it to 
prevail over its form; the hearer perceives there to be no conflict. 
Generation of Instruments 
As we saw in 6.2.6, humans have the ability to generate instrument inferences readily if the 
context constrains. In 4.4.2, we also saw that connectionist networks are successful in 
replicating this human ability. McClelland, St. John and Taraban's (1989) connectionist 
network was able to generate readily the instrument inference 'with a knife'. In a sense, also 
McClelland and Kawamoto's (1986) network (see 4.3) was able to fill in the 'missing 
instrument argument' for 'the boy broke the window', 'inferring' that the boy broke the 
window 'with something hard'. 
So connectionist models can replicate human ability to generate instruments. What now 
about the relationship between cognitive linguistics and instrument generation? Recall the 
experiment from 4.2.2 of Taraban and McClelland (1988). The evidence from Taraban and 
McClelland's (1988) experiments was offered as refutation of the syntax first / minimal 
attachment perspective (2.5.4). Consider again the following which subjects were asked to 
read in the experiment: 
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The janitor cleaned the storage area with the 
a) broom 
b) solvent 
c) manager 
d) odour 
because of many complaints. 
For Taraban and McClelland (1988), the above sentence contains a verb which leads to the 
expectation that an instrument will be mentioned in the PP; that is, the PP will attach to the 
VP [inadvertently in accordance with the minimal attachment principle]. The experimental 
evidence bore out Taraban and McClelland's suppositions that 'with the broom' is the most 
expected role. This can be explained from a cognitive linguistic perspective. In 5.4.2, we 
saw that, for Lakoff (1987a: 54), prototypical causation is understood in terms of a cluster 
of 'interactional properties' since it involves a high degree of direct physical manipulation, 
the agent using his hands, body or some instrument. The function of the janitor also cues 
in that direction. It is not surprising, from the perspective of cognitive linguistics, then, that 
people choose 'broom' more readily than 'manager' or 'odour' and why Taraban and 
McClelland regard 'broom' as the most expected. 
7.2.4 Prototypes 
In 5.4, I highlighted the relationship between basic-level categories and prototype effects, 
e.g., that prototype effects are more readily generated from basic-level categories than 
superordinate ones. Though the provenance of prototype theory is the cognitive linguistics 
of Rosch etc, connectionism and prototype theory are not incompatible. Here is Harley 
(1995: 196): 
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[Connectionism]... is not necessarily a competitor to the prototype theory; one instance of a category might 
cause one pattern of activation across the semantic units, another instance will cause another similar pattern 
and so on. We can talk of the prototype that defines that category as the average pattern of activation of all 
the instances. 
Let me just flesh out this relationship between connectionism and prototypes. In essence, 
because of the distributed encoding of a set of exemplars, the microfeatures common to the 
exemplars become strongly associated. In other words, common microfeatures form strong 
mutually excitory links. A prototype emerges thus, an automatic consequence of 
connectionist networks. Interestingly, the prototype does not need to coincide with any 
concrete instance exposed to the system. This is because the prototype is the statistical 
central tendency of the various microfeature dimensions of the exemplars (Clark, 1993: 22). 
Prototype emergence goes hand in hand with generalisation. A net is said to be able to 
generalise if it can handle novel cases. For example, McClelland, Rumelhart, and the PDP 
Research Group (1986, chp17) were able to produce a 'dog-recognition network' which 
recognised a three-legged dog as a dog, something that would seem to negate against 
`dogness' on the classical perspective where meaning is predicated upon necessary features. 
From a connectionist point of view, a triped dog is still a dog because it still shares the vast 
majority of microfeatures of the prototypical dog. The fact also that prototypes emerge in 
connectionist networks dovetails with the averring of the cognitive linguist, Rosch (1978) 
(see 5.2.1), that prototypes are not stored representations. 
I have outlined some general compatibilities between connectionism and cognitive 
linguistics. In sections 7.3 and 7.4 respectively, I outline how cognitive linguistics and 
connectionism respectively relate to the psycholinguistic evidence I outlined in the last 
chapter for shallow processing. 
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7.3 Cognitive Linguistics and Shallow Processing 
7.3.1 Cognitive Linguistics, Instantiation and Shallow Processing 
As we saw in 6.2.5, instantiations are elaborative inferences where a general category is 
made more concrete. For instance, in 'the vehicle hovered over the crowd', likely inferences 
for 'vehicle' are that it is a balloon or a helicopter. In line with the minimalist hypothesis 
of McKoon and Ratcliff (6.2.2) in the absence of specific reading goals, instantiations will 
be readily generated when information is quickly and readily available. Recall now from 
5.6.3 the well-known (inconsiderate) text from Bransford and Johnson (1973: 400): 
The procedure is actually quite simple. First you arrange things into two different groups. Of course, one pile 
may be sufficient depending on how much there is to do. If you have to go somewhere else due to lack of 
facilities, that is the next step; otherwise you are pretty well set. It is important not to overdo things. That is, 
it is better to do fewer things at once than too many. In the short run this might not seem important, but 
complications can easily arise. A mistake can be expensive as well. At first the whole procedure will seem 
complicated. Soon, however, it will just become just another facet of life. It is difficult to foresee any end to 
the necessity for this task in the immediate future, but then one never can tell. After the procedure is 
completed, one arranges the material into different groups again. Then they can be put into their appropriate 
places. Eventually they will be used once more, and the whole cycle will then have to be repeated. However, 
that is part of life. 
In referring to the above text, Rosch (1978: 45) makes the point that: 
...what Bransford and Johnson call context cues are actually names of basic-level events (e.g. washing clothes) 
and that one function of hearing the event name is to enable the reader to translate the superordinate terms into 
basic-level objects and actions. 
What Rosch terms 'translation' is actually the generation of instantiation elaborative 
inferences via the basic-level event category, 'washing clothes'. Now, by relating cognitive 
linguistic explanation to the minimalist hypothesis, let me go further than I did in 5.6.3 as 
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to why a basic-level category leads to translation (instantiation) and ready comprehension, 
and also why the superordinate categories (e.g. 'procedure', 'groups', `things'...) above lead 
to shallow comprehension. 
Firstly, let me just recap for a moment on the nature of basic-level categories which were 
examined in chapter 5. The basic level of categorisation is characterised by cognitive 
economy (Rosch, 1978). It is the level of categorisation where the largest amount of 
information about an item can be obtained with the least cognitive effort. Basic-level 
categories (eg. 'chair') are also associated with prototype effects. Since prototypes are by 
definition familiar, use of basic-level categories will facilitate instantiation since, from the 
minimalist hypothesis, instantiation is dependent on accessible knowledge. Furthermore, 
such instantiation can be taken as being automatically generated (i.e. with minimum 
cognitive effort) in line with the cognitive economy principle. Superordinate categories are 
not associated with a prototype and not characterised by cognitive economy. To yield a large 
amount of (familiar) information from them, a higher degree of cognitive effort is required 
in comparison to processing of basic-level categories. But again in line with the minimalist 
hypothesis, if a reader has no specific goal (i.e., does not invest high cognitive effort), in the 
absence of sufficient basic-level categories, superordinates do not lead to ready accessing 
of information. In other words, on their own superordinates such as in the Bransford and 
Johnson (1973) text are more likely to lead to shallow comprehension and thus mystification 
for a reader who does not make much cognitive effort. Of course, with the inducement of 
a cash prize for the 'answer' to Bransford and Johnson's (1973) text, a higher degree of 
cognitive effort is prompted, leading to a greater likelihood of the general categories being 
instantiated regardless of basic-level categories being absent. However, these would be 
instantiations strategically generated rather than automatically. 
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As a caveat to the above, I should say that basic-level categories are not necessarily all that 
is needed to instantiate a general category. The context will also need to be sufficiently 
constraining. But at least basic-level categories, which exist in relationships of cognitive 
interdependence with other basic-level categories, are more likely to contribute to 
instantiation. Or indeed, contexts which indicate motor-interactivity (i.e. associated with 
basic-level categories) are more likely to lead to instantiation of a general category. For 
example, McKoon and Ratcliff (1989b: 1145) found that the superordinate category 
`furniture' was readily instantiated by experimental subjects in the following: 
While the movers took a break, Betty went to her room for a quick nap, thankful that at least one piece of 
furniture had not been loaded yet. 
From a cognitive linguistic perspective this can be explained by Betty's motor-interactive 
behaviour. 
7.3.2 Cognitive Linguistics, Instrument Inferences and Shallow Processing 
Recall from chapter 6 the section on instrument inferences (6.2.6). An instrument has a 
higher probability of being generated when it has been referred to already in the text (Lucas 
et al., 1990) or when context is sufficiently constraining (O'Brien et al., 1988). We looked 
at how O'Brien et al. (1988) employed passages to determine whether readers made any type 
of elaborative inferences: 
1) 	 All the mugger wanted was to steal the woman's money. 
2a) 	 But when she screamed, he stabbed her with his weapon in an attempt to quiet her. 
3) He looked to see if anyone had seen him. 
4) He threw the knife into the bushes, took her money, and ran away. 
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[2b) 	 But when she screamed, he assaulted her with his weapon in an attempt to quiet her.] 
[my bold] 
When subjects read 1) + 2a), they confirmed O'Brien et al.'s hypothesis that 'knife' would 
be automatically inferred. We saw in 5.5.1 that, from the point of view of cognitive 
linguistics, there is a strong cognitive interdependence between action and object basic level 
categories. And this 'cognitive interdependence' explains the ready generation of an 
instrument. For example, 'stabbed' gives rise to extra information since it suggests motor-
interactionality, and leads to the generation of a gestalt and therefore ease of understanding. 
1) + 2b), however, did not strongly suggest 'knife' to subjects since 'weapon' and 'assault' 
are superordinate categories. That is, the superordinate categories in the above lead to 
shallower processing than in 1) + 2a) since the instrument inference is not generated. The 
same reasons as to why, outlined in 7.3.1, apply. 
In chapter 6, I outlined Sanford's (1990) reasons why Garrod and Sanford's (1982) 
experiments supported the generation of implied instruments on line whereas Singer's 
(1979) experiments did not. For Sanford (1990), the difference appears to be that with the 
Garrod-Sanford set, the instruments are 'part of the meaning' of the verbs (e.g., key is 'part 
of the meaning' of unlock), whereas for Singer's verbs, this was not the case. 'Part of the 
meaning' can be seen in cognitive linguistic terms. The instrument 'key' is readily generated 
from the verb 'unlock' because 'key' and 'unlock' exist in a relationship of cognitive 
interdependence, given that 'key' is basic-level and yields high information from minimum 
cognitive effort. 
7.3.3 Cognitive Linguistics, Causal Consequents and Shallow Processing 
I indicated in 6.2.4 that, where a situation is not highly familiar, causal consequent 
inferences are likely to be only shallowly generated, at best, by a reader with no specific 
reading goal, given the extra processing effort involved in forecasting possible outcomes. 
Conversely, a causal consequent inference is only likely to be generated on-line, by a reader 
with no specific goal, if it is highly constrained by a context which is very familiar, and few 
if any other consequences would occur. I provided an example of a highly constrained 
context found in Keefe and McDaniel (1993: 454): 
After standing though the three-hour debate, the tired speaker walked over to his chair. He realized that his 
valiant effort was probably in vain. 
When the above was given to subjects, Keefe and McDaniel (1993) found that the causal 
consequent inference - the speaker sat down - was inferred a significant number of times. 
This was put down to the high level of semantic association between 'chair' and 'sitting'. 
But a cognitive linguistic explanation can also be furnished here. In the above, there is 
cognitive interdependence between the basic-level category 'chair' and the verb 'sit' since 
`sitting' is a motor-interactive (ontologically subjective property) of a chair. Thus, the 
information 'sitting' becomes available readily with the information 'chair', with only a 
small investment of cognitive labour (again basic-level categories being characterised by 
cognitive economy). Or in terms of the minimalist hypothesis, the causal consequent is 
generated because necessary information can become quickly available. 
Imagine now the above text from Keefe and McDaniel (1993: 454) with 'his chair' replaced 
by the superordinate 'the furniture': 
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After standing though the three-hour debate, the tired speaker walked over to the furniture. He realized that 
his valiant effort was probably in vain. 
In terms of the minimalist hypothesis, superordinate categories do not make necessary 
information available for reasons we saw in 7.3.1. The causal consequent of 'sitting' is 
unlikely to be generated automatically with little effort. So, in the absence of sufficient 
information to instantiate them, and for a reader who makes minimum cognitive effort, 
superordinates are only likely at best to lead to shallow generation of causal consequents. 
[Naturally, though, the causal consequent of 'sitting' above could be generated 
strategically]. 
7.4 Connectionism and Shallow Processing 
7.4.1 Connectionism, Moses Illusion and Shallow Processing 
In 6.3, invoking psycholinguistic experimental work, we saw that because of commonplace 
top-down driven expectation in language processing, mental representation is likely to be 
non-compositional. [Conversely, compositional analysis of a sentence is in line with a 
greater investment of cognitive effort]. Now, interestingly, in connectionist networks, 
sentence processing is also non-compositional. In the connectionist network of McClelland, 
St. John and Taraban (1989), there was a tendency for the network to be too sensitive to 
context, particularly with the sentence 'the adult ate the steak with daintiness': 
...in that in fact it [the connectionist network] allows context sometimes to override the correct interpretation 
of a word...After the presentation of with daintiness, the activation of steak on probing for the patient is 
weakened. In fact, at earlier points in learning, the model actually activates soup more strongly than steak after 
with daintiness is presented. 	 McClelland, St.John and Taraban (1989: 322-3) 
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McClelland et al. (1989) point out that while this behaviour can be seen as erroneous, it is 
nevertheless compatible with a common type of human error where top-down processes of 
schema expectation override bottom-up processes, i.e. with the psycholinguistic evidence 
I outlined in 6.3. Indeed, McClelland et al. (1989: 323) explicitly cite Erickson and 
Mattson's (1981) evidence (which we saw in 6.3.2) for the common shallow processing of 
sentences such as: 'how many animals of each kind did Moses take on the ark?'. For 
McClelland et al., errors of the Moses Illusion type indicate that the classical theme of 
compositionality misconstrues the contributions of words to how sentences are processed, 
and the frequency of the Moses Illusion implicitly lends support for the connectionist stance 
which eschews output compositional representations. Similar points concerning the 
compatibility of connectionist processing and the routineness of shallow processing of the 
Moses Illusion type are made in St. John (1992). 
One of the drawbacks of connectionist models is that if they are taken as simulating brain 
networks, then their simulation is only one of automatic brain processing rather than more 
consciously directed strategic brain processing. However, since I am only concerned with 
automatic processing in section C, this drawback is not significant for my thesis. So, 
irrespective of this disadvantage, the non-compositional processing of McClelland, Taraban 
and St. John's (1989) connectionist network still lends support to the psycholinguistic 
evidence that non-compositional language processing is also automatic in humans. 
7.4.2 Connectionism, Sanford and Garrod's Primary Processing Principle and Shallow 
Processing 
We saw in 4.5.2 how in connectionist systems, 'connections between actions and the facts 
of the world can be represented as statistical correlations' (Waltz, D. 1989: 58). There is an 
emphasis on a good fit between language and the world rather than an exact match, the latter 
being a facet of symbolicism. In 6.3.1, we saw that Sanford and Garrod (1994: 710-1) place 
emphasis on coherence being achieved 'on the basis of a good fit between some elements 
of the sentences concerned and stereotyped knowledge'. It is this common need of readers 
merely to find a 'good fit' which accounts for the error in the 'air crash survivors' puzzle 
(see 6.3.1). In a reference to the pliz7le, Sanford and Garrod (1994: 713) state: 
Because survivors is a word which fits with an air crash, it is accepted as a filler for the patient slot of the verb 
to bury. 	 [my bold] 
In fact, Sanford and Garrod (1994: 715) are explicit about the link between the shallow 
processing of the connectionist network of McClelland, Taraban, and St. John (1989), 
alluded to in the last section (see also 4.4), and shallow processing of the 'survivors puzzle': 
Our interpretation of the survivors problem data is as follows. First, the data show that in the presence of 
sufficient expectation of accident victims who are dead, the analysis afforded to items which should be 
consonant with that expectation receives relatively shallow processing. Another way to think of it is that these 
items exert little bottom-up impact because contextual inferences are so strong. The kind of mechanism we 
have in mind is that described by McClelland, Taraban, and St.John (1989).2 	 [my bold] 
7.4.3 Connectionism, The Minimalist Hypothesis and Shallow Generation of Forward 
Elaborative Inferences 
Orientation 
In 6.2.2, we saw how there was a consensus in psycholinguistics (the minimalist hypothesis 
/ later constructionism) that causal consequent inferences are at best only shallowly or 
partially generated for a reader with little vested interest. For minimalists and later 
constructionists, causal consequent inferences are much less probably generated than causal 
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antecedent inferences. In 3.7.3, I referred to Schank and Abelson (1977), where inference 
generation is regarded as an all-or-nothing process. In other words, inferences cannot be 
drawn partially. 
Now consider the following from the connectionist authors St. John and McClelland (1992: 
122): 
In parallel constraint satisfaction,...as in sentence comprehension, inference-making is inherent to processing 
the explicit text. The combined set of constraints from the text are used as evidence to support an interpretation 
that best satisfies the strongest and the most constraints from the text. Each part of the text supports many 
aspects of the interpretation. A specific proposition, therefore, will constrain the interpretation to represent 
the information it contains explicitly, and also constrain it, to varying degrees, to represent correlated 
information. All of this correlated information constitutes inferences. 
The reader's hope is that by the end of the story, sufficient constraints have been provided by the text for a 
complete interpretation to be computed. The interpretation would, at that point, contain fully activated 
coherence inferences, partially activated prediction [elaborative] inference, and resolved pronouns. 
[my bold] 
Because the processing of connectionist nets is based on weightings: 
...the constraints in a parallel constraint satisfaction model can represent the likelihood of information. 
Interpretations can then be activated according to their degree of support from the text and their likelihood to 
occur. 	 St. John and McClelland (1992: 123) 	 [my bold] 
Due to its capacity to capture probabilities, then, a connectionist network seems suitable for 
capturing the probabilistic nature of inference generation which we saw in the 
psycholinguistic evidence from chapter 6. Indeed, in St. John and McClelland (1992: 121), 
there is explicit reference to McKoon and Ratcliff (1986), the originators of the minimalist 
hypothesis, and their experiment where death after a 14-storey fall was only weakly inferred 
as a causal consequent inference (see 6.2.2). 
St. John's (1992) Short Text Processing Model and the Minimalist Hypothesis 
In what follows, I outline a model for the processing of a simple text from St. John (1992) 
to indicate how a connectionist model is especially suited to what the minimalist hypothesis 
predicts, i.e., that forward-elaborative or predictive inferences are generated in a more 
shallow manner than backward coherence inferences. Before I do so, let me highlight some 
preamble of St. John before he describes the model. I do this since it will bear upon how I 
assess the model later. After citing similar experimental evidence as I did in the last chapter 
(see 6.2), St. John (1992: 274) contends that: 
...prediction inferences are activated only weakly according to their support from the text... 
Coherence inferences are a different matter and St. John (1992) cites the same evidence I did 
(i.e. Potts et al., 1988; see 6.2.2) in chapter 6 for the relative ease of activation of coherence 
(causal antecedent) inferences: 
Coherence inferences, on the other hand, are fully activated and inferred (Potts et al., 1988; Singer, 1990). 
Following the same line of argument, the strength of coherence inferences results from their stronger support 
in the text. 
Both of these positions are in tandem with the minimalist hypothesis. St. John's (1992: 274) 
conclusion from all this is as follows: 
To simulate this interpretation of the empirical results, models of text comprehension should incorporate a 
mechanism that uses the degree of support provided by the text to determine the activation level of inferences. 
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And now to the model. The connectionist model is inputted with a short text consisting of 
the following three sentences: 
Albert and Clement decided to go to a restaurant. 
The restaurant was expensive. 
Clement paid the bill. 
The model uses information from the training corpus to `answer' questions' such as 'who 
ordered?', 'who paid?' etc (see below). For example, the model 'infers' that Clement will 
order cheap wine and that this restaurant is far away since, in the corpus, expensive 
restaurants are usually far away. Inferencing as to tip size is more complex. Its size depends 
on three factors: who tips (based on who paid), whether that person is generous or not and 
the restaurant quality since in the training corpus, tips were not left in cheap restaurants. As 
in his preamble, St. John (1992: 284) makes a distinction between coherence and prediction 
(forward-elaborative) inferences in the model, referring the reader to the table: 
Coherence inferences concern propositions that lie between explicit text propositions. Prediction inferences 
concern propositions that lie after the final explicit text proposition. For example, ordering is a coherence 
inference because it occurs before the explicit proposition about paying. Tipping is a prediction inference 
because it occurs after paying. In the Story Gestalt model, all inferences are processed the same way. Any 
information correlated with the explicit text is activated immediately as the text is read. 
I would agree with St. John (1992) that ordering by the agents is a (causal antecedent) 
coherence inference (see 6.2.3) since it 'causes' the paying of the bill. I also agree that 
tipping is a forward-elaborative or predictive inference since it elaborates on the text and 
so is not necessary for coherence. Having highlighted some of the St. John (1992) preamble, 
let us see in detail how his particular connectionist network captures the shallow generation 
of predictive inferences. Here is St. John's (1992: 283) simulation of inference generation: 
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Inference 
Questions 
Input Text 
Albert and Clement decided to go to a restaurant. 
The restaurant was expensive. 
Clement paid the bill. 
DECIDED TO GO ORDERED 
agent: Clement .9 agent: Clement .8 
Albert .4 Albert .1 
and .9 
destination: patient: cheap wine .6 
restaurant .9 expen. wine .1 
QUALITY PAID 
patient: restaurant .9 agent: Clement .9 
value: expensive .9 Albert .1 
patient: bill .9 
DISTANCE TIPPED 
patient: restaurant .9 agent: Clement .9 
value: far .9 Albert .1 
patient: waiter .9 
manner: small .4 
big .1 
not .0 
The numbers indicate the probability activation of active concepts following questions 
relating to the headings in capitals. In DECIDED TO GO above, there are two agents, as 
indicated by the and unit, whereas elsewhere there is only one agent. 
Let me now comment on the above results. When we inspect TIPPED, the lower 
probabilities for manner do reflect the fact that predictive (forward-elaborative) inferences 
should have more shallow activation levels than coherence inferences. In other words, this 
is in line with the psycholinguistic evidence of the last chapter. [However, the high 
activation of Clement as tipper is out of step with tipping as a predictive inference. The 
activation level of Clement as tipper would, all the same, be greater than for Albert, as 
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reflected in the model, since Clement ordered and paid the bill.] 
We have seen that the prospect of instrument inference generation is proportional to how 
readily familiar encyclopaedic knowledge can be accessed and the degree of contextual 
constraints on this scenario. St. John and McClelland (1992: 100) are aware that instrument 
inferences are related to a high degree of contextual constraint: 
Psychological evidence indicates that missing constituents, when strongly related to the action, are inferred and 
added to the description of the event. McKoon and Ratcliff (1981) found, for example, that 'hammer' was 
inferred after subjects read 'Bobby pounded the boards together with nails'. 
However, absent from St. John and McClelland (1992), as well as St. John (1992), is the 
notion that instruments are more likely to be generated also when they rely more on familiar 
encyclopaedic knowledge. [Nor do they try to simulate the fact that elaborative causal 
antecedent inferences are stronger when the causal relation is stronger in memory, i.e. more 
familiar, as the experiments of Keenan et al. (1984) showed; see 6.2.3]. But the 
probabilistic nature of connectionist models could in principle capture this. Sanford and 
Garrod point to the possibilities of something like this direction (1994: 704): 
The primary processing account assumes that a text is easy to read if it can be mapped onto familiar 
background knowledge structures and that the writer should try to make such mappings possible. It does not 
assume that all background knowledge representations will be equally rich or detailed (Sanford and Garrod, 
1981: 125-31). Furthermore, with the advent of connectionist realizations of schemata, it is easy to envisage 
how various aspects of a scenario may be differentially accessible at various points in processing, which is not 
unlike McKoon and Ratcliff s [minimalist hypothesis] views on incomplete inferences. 
If with the implementation of connectionist realisations of schemata, the richness of 
background knowledge can be made 'differentially accessible', this lends support to the idea 
that differential accessibility in a connectionist network could in principle be configured 
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according to the nature of the cognitive categories employed. In other words, i) basic-level 
categories would lead to a readier accessing of well-known knowledge and familiar 
scenarios, so as to generate implied instrument inferences from basic-level categories such 
as 'nails' as in the above and ii) superordinates would make the accessibility of well-known 
knowledge and familiar scenarios more difficult. 
7.4.4 General Corollary 
Connectionist models, because they deal in probabilities and because they deal in constraint 
satisfaction, can handle a NON-all-or-nothing approach to inference generation inherent 
within the minimalist hypothesis. A further corollary is that from a connectionist point of 
view, since the difference between coherence and predictive inferences is one of probability, 
predictive inferences being more shallowly generated than coherence inferences, it is quite 
unrealistic to see a clear dividing line between coherence and predictive inferences. As St. 
John and McClelland (1992: 131) indicate: 
One process, activating the story based on constraints from the input, is used to produce a complete 
interpretation. Representing the explicit text, drawing prediction inferences, drawing coherence inferences, 
and resolving pronouns all result from this same process. 	 [my bold] 
All this ties in with Smolensky's (1987) connectionist notion that the term inference is 
merely a higher-level description, a useful label that bears 'only approximate relations to the 
underlying computational structure' (cited in Clark, 1989: 111-2). Moreover, it is in concert 
with the psycholinguistic work of Vonk and Noordman (1990) (see 6.2.2) who show that the 
coherence (necessary) inference / predictive (forward-elaborative) inference distinction does 
not have a readily definable boundary, a notion which is supported by Sanford (1990: 521), 
the co-originator of the primary processing principle. 
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I have indicated the compatibilities between connectionism, cognitive linguistics and the 
psycholinguistic evidence for shallow processing of chapter 6. In chapter 8, I will use these 
compatibilities to enhance the IR framework for the highlighting of text which leads to 
mystification in reading, text which would not necessarily be highlighted in CDA. I now 
want to highlight tensions between connectionism and cognitive linguistics with regard to 
treatment of metaphor and draw out implications for CDA. 
7.5 Tensions between Connectionism and Cognitive Linguistics: Implications for CDA 
7.5.1 Tensions between Connectionism and Cognitive Linguistics in Treatment of Concepts 
Orientation 
As we have seen there are many similarities between connectionism and cognitive 
linguistics. Indeed, Lakoff (1987a: 338) is fairly confident of this [see 7.2.1]: 
Our results...do not contradict what have come to be called `connectionist' theories... 
However, with regard to metaphor, I show how Lakoff does contradict connectionism. 
Problems for How Metaphor is Treated in Cognitive Linguistics 
Recall from chapter 1 how one of the salient premises of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) is that 
human conceptual systems, in terms of the ways in which we think and act, are at base 
metaphorical.3 Metaphor for these authors is not regarded then as being ornamental or 
superficial. Here are Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 4) again (see chapter 3 (3.4.4)): 
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...let us start with the concept ARGUMENT and the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. This 
metaphor is reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of expressions: 
ARGUMENT IS WAR 
Your claims are indefensible. 
He attacked every weak point in my argument. 
His criticisms were right on target. 
I demolished his argument. 
I've never won an argument with him 
You disagree? Okay, shoot! 
If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out. 
He shot down all of my arguments. 
It is important to see that we don't just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose 
arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our 
own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we fmd a position indefensible, we can 
abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the 
concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument 
- attack, defense, counterattack, etc. - reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor 
is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing. 
We saw in chapter 3 that there is an underlying classical assumption of compositionality 
here that concepts are enduringly atomic, that they are not influenced by the accommodative 
effects of lexical company (see section 7.2.2). For example, 'win' in an alternative co-text 
such as 'I won some money in the lottery' has little to do with war (cf Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) 'I've never won an argument with him', above). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) seem 
to regard the sense of 'win' as being steadfastly connected with war, not seeming to realise 
that its sense is affected by its lexical company. In effect what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
have done is establish that all of the lexical items in italics can be found in the semantic field 
of 'war' and import their martial meanings intact into the semantic field of arguments. But 
these lexical items could be a part of other semantic fields: 'film-making' or 'football' for 
`shoe; 'diseases' or 'bodily disorders' for 'attack'; 'computers' for 'wipe out' etc. Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980) do not consider these semantic fields perhaps because such 
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consideration would not suit the line they take. 
Consider now the following from the connectionist philosopher, Clark (1989: 110-11) who, 
in referring to the connectionist network of McClelland and Kawamoto (1986) (see chapter 
4), sees metaphor in a different way from Lakoff and Johnson, by relating it to the 
accommodative effects of lexical company: 
(1) The boy kicked the ball 
(2) The ball broke the window 
(3) He felt a ball in his stomach 
Sentence (1) and (2) are from McClelland and Kawamoto (1986: 315). In case (1) we may imagine a soft, toy 
ball. In case (2) we imagine a hard ball (a tennis or cricket ball). In case (3) we have a metaphorical use: there 
is no ball in his stomach, but a feeling of a localized, hard lump. Everyday talk and comprehension is full of 
such shading effects according to overall context. Surely we don't want to commit ourselves to 
predetermining all such uses in advance and setting up a special chunk for the semantic meaning of each. 
The PDP approach avoids such ontological excess by representing all these shades of meaning with various 
patterns in a single set of units representing microfeatures. The patterns for sentences (1) and (2) might share, 
e.g., the microfeature values spherical and game object, while the pattern for sentences (2) and (3) share the 
values small and hard. One interesting upshot here is the lack of any ultimate distinction between metaphorical 
and literal uses of language. There may be central uses of a word, and other uses may share less and less of 
the features of the central use. But there would be no firm, God-given line between literal and 
metaphorical meanings; the metaphorical cases would simply occupy far-flung corners of a semantic-state 
space. There would remain very real problems concerning how we latch on to just the relevant common 
features in understanding a metaphor. But it begins to look as if we might now avoid the kind of cognitivist 
model in which understanding metaphor is treated as the computation of a nonliteral meaning from a stored 
literal meaning according to high-level rules and heuristics. Metaphoric understanding, on the present model, 
is just a limiting case of the flexible, organic kind of understanding involved in normal sentence 
comprehension. 	 [my bold] 
On Clark's perspective, metaphor might be termed extreme shading or microfeatural 
sparseness. The advantage of the microfeatural perspective is that the meanings of words 
are not wholly predetermined - only certain microfeatures will be activated according to 
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context. However, in conflict with this connectionist microfeatural approach (see what 
Clark (1989) says in bold above), Lakoff and Johnson (1980) above predetermine the 
meanings of the words in italics by ascribing 'whole' semantic value to them. Clark (1989) 
is intellectually honest when he says that there would remain the very real problems for 
connectionists to explain how we latch on to just the relevant common features in 
understanding a metaphor. And as I have said before, I am not trying to claim that 
connectionism effortlessly offers explanations for all aspects of cognition. However, as 
Clark indicates above, connectionism conflicts with 'the computation of a nonliteral 
meaning from a stored literal meaning according to high-level rules and heuristics'. Such 
a perspective relies upon concepts being seen as atomic and enduring in order that they can 
be manipulated according to set of rules. The cognitive linguistic programme may have 
dispensed with the notion of cognition as the rule-governed manipulation of symbols. But 
the cognitive linguists, Lakoff and Johnson, are still wedded, at least with regard to 
metaphor, to a classical assumption of symbols being atomic and enduring. Despite what 
Lakoff (1987a: 338) says, then, he does 'contradict' connectionism. 
The Idealised Reader and Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
In chapter 6, (6.6), I introduced the notion of the idealised reader (IR), a non-analytical 
reader with little vested interest in a text and thus one who is parsimonious with their 
processing, generating only automatic inferences. In chapter 6, we saw that the low 
detection rates of lexical anomalies (e.g. 'surviving dead') in the experiments of Reder and 
Kusbit (1991) and Barton and Sanford (1993) suggest that it is automatic for the mental 
representation of a reader to be non-compositional with regard to lexical items in a text. 
This is due to top-down processing prevailing over the processing of discrete lexical items. 
I highlighted also that to detect anomalies such as 'surviving dead' each word had to be 
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fully analysed, i.e. compositionally. Compositional analysis, thus, requires effort and so 
compositional processing is strategic and not automatic. Related to this, in 7.4.1, we saw 
how the non-compositional processing of McClelland, Taraban and St. John's (1989) 
connectionist network and the capacity of McClelland and Kawamoto's (1986) network to 
shade meaning lends support for the fact that non-compositional language processing is 
automatic in humans. 
Now, since IR' s processing is automatic, non-compositional mental representation is, then, 
in line with this reader's minimum investment of cognitive effort. Let me return to Lakoff 
and Johnson's (1980) approach to metaphor. From the perspective of IR, to view the 
meanings of 'win', 'wipe out' and 'shoot' compositionally in relating them to the semantic 
field of war, regardless of the accommodative effects of their contexts, is hardly an 
automatic thing to do. It must, then, be that Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) analysis of the 
above sentences is strategic and so is not in line with the automatic non-compositional 
mental representation of a reader who does not invest much cognitive effort.4 
Barsalou vs Lakoff 
In common with connectionism, Barsalou (1987; 1989) points out that how people represent 
a concept alters according to lexical environment. Earlier Anderson and Ortony (1975) had 
given an indication of this phenomenon in a series of experiments. They showed that when 
subjects are asked to memorise sentences like 'the man lifted the piano' and the 'man tuned 
the piano' that 'something heavy' is a superior recall cue to the former than 'something with 
a nice sound' and vice versa. Barsalou (1982) refers to this phenomenon as 'context-
dependent information'. That is, only a portion of the knowledge associated with a 
particular category becomes activated according to the particular context. In 5.2.1, I 
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highlighted Barsalou's notion that many concepts are actually created 'on the fly'- ad-hoc 
categories - formed according to specific goals, as a function of context dependence, e.g. 
`things to take with you in event of a fire'. I also highlighted how Lakoff (1987a: 45-6) 
regarded his work as being in line with that of Barsalou (1983). For Barsalou (1989), 
humans possess in long-term memory a large amount of loosely organised knowledge 
associated with a category. The connectionist philosopher Bechtel (1990: 266) sees 
Barsalou's perspective as compatible with that of connectionism: 
It is somewhat difficult to make sense of this [Barsalou's] view within a rule-based account of cognition, since 
concepts would seem to be the atoms of such systems, but much easier to make sense of from a connectionist 
perspective where what exists in long-term memory are only connections. These enable the subject to produce 
representations that play the role of concepts and may be used in solving problems for which even rules might 
be invoked, but the concepts need not be fixed, atomic structures as they are in most rule-based accounts. 
Thus, implementing concepts in a connectionist system might allow us to explain in a straightforward manner 
some characteristics of concepts that might be otherwise difficult to explain. 
Stillings, N.A. et al. (1995: 96-7) also makes the link between Barsalou's dynamic theory 
of concepts and connectionism. In the last section we saw that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
implicitly regard concepts as being enduringly atomic, seemingly underwritten by the 
classical assumption of compositionality. Despite Lakoff regarding his work as being in line 
with that of Barsalou, Barsalou's non-classical approach and compatibility with 
connectionism pose difficulties for Lakoff s view of metaphor.5  
In 7.5.3, I tease out the implications of the above for CDA's use of Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980). While teasing out these implications in that section, I will also draw upon the 
distinction between explanatory and constitutive metaphors. This is what I address 
immediately below in 7.5.2. 
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7.5.2 Explanatory vs Constitutive Metaphors 
One of the mistakes of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) perspective is a conflation of 
explanatory and constitutive metaphors. An explanatory metaphor is one which assists the 
understanding without permeating that understanding. A constitutive metaphor is one where 
the metaphor does not explicate the theory but is part of the theory itself The tendency in 
Lakoff and Johnson is to regard all metaphors as being constitutive. I derive the distinction 
between explanatory and constitutive metaphor from Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 147-9). 
However, the discussion that follows is my elaboration upon this distinction. On hearing 
`you could cut the fog with a knife' we act on this material to realise the thickness of the fog 
but do not imagine that the fog was actually a solid. We have the experiential encyclopaedic 
knowledge that this is not true. This is, then, purely an explanatory metaphor to explicate 
the thickness of the fog. A constitutive metaphor is one where we are unable to readily 
access experiential encyclopaedic knowledge. Consequently it is unsurprising that many 
metaphors of science are 'constitutive of the theories they express rather than merely 
exegetical' (Boyd, 1993: 486; see also Kuhn, 1993; Scholl, 1993 for similar perspectives). 
Kuhn gives the example of 'the atom as miniature solar system', the sun as nucleus and 
electrons as planets. This, however, conflicts with models of the atom inspired by work in 
quantum mechanics etc. As a more technological example, consider the example of the 
computer virus metaphor. Here are Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 147-8): 
Though ordinary language users will not know much about the organism called virus, they may have a rich if 
indirect experience of its unpleasant effects on humans and animals...The metaphorical explanation may 
ultimately remain vague, but it seems to satisfy the conceptual needs of average computer users, so for them 
these metaphors do not fulfil an explanatory function but are constitutive for the conceptualization of computer 
malfunctioning. 
Interestingly, what Ungerer and Schmid contend with regard to satisfaction of conceptual 
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needs ties in neatly with the notion of shallow processing and a reader's natural parsimony 
in processing if they have no specific goal (chapter 6). [For example, consider the 
generation of partial semantic value (Sanford, 1990), and Vonk and Noordman's (1990) 
experimental data where processing became shallow because the textual material was 
difficult to relate to background knowledge.] One more example of where constitution can 
occur is in the philosophy of mind. For similar reasons to the previous discussion, it is 
difficult to derive direct experience of the mind. Metaphors of mind such as the mind as a 
computational device as we saw in chapter 2 are more likely to lead to constitution for the 
non-specialist. 
Now, consider constitutive metaphors from the perspective of Sanford and Garrod's primary 
processing principle. In the example of 'the mind as a computational device', if familiar 
knowledge cannot be engaged, the primary processing principle is defeated. Of course, for 
the specialist, familiar knowledge can be engaged. We can see, then, that there is in fact a 
continuum running from explanatory to constitutive which depends on whether 
comprehension is in accordance with the primary processing principle or not. A metaphor 
where there is a high degree of engagement from experiential knowledge will be more 
explanatory while a metaphor with a low degree of engagement of experiential knowledge 
will be more constitutive. When the primary processing principle is defeated, this also 
means that the accommodative (7.2.2) effects of lexical company are hindered. 
Consequently, in such cases, processing is likely to be to some extent compositional.6 
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7.5.3 Implications for How CDA Treat Metaphor 
Orientation 
In what follows, I consider how use of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) has led two CDA authors 
to regard metaphors much more in terms of constitution and not explanation. Secondly, I 
indicate how CDA examination of metaphor in certain texts does not accord with how the 
`non-resistant' idealised reader (IR), referred to in 1.7 and 6.6 (i.e, one who makes minimum 
cognitive effort), would read these texts. In other words, I show how the CD analyst and IR 
would produce different discourses from the same text, and that therefore a CD analyst 
cannot necessarily be said to be explaining (interpretation-2) how a non-resistant reader, 
such as IR, is positioned by the text. 
Lee (1992: 90-92) 
Consider the following news text and the analysis by Lee (1992: 90-92), which I outlined 
in chapter 1, in the light of my discussion on metaphor above [Lee (1992) endorses Lakoff 
and Johnson's (1980) view of metaphor]: 
The black township of Soweto, which has been simmering with unrest since the riots on June 16 and the 
shooting of 174 Africans, erupted again today. 
At least three Africans were shot dead, according to witnesses, although police deny this. The black hospital 
of Baragwanath nearby was reported to be 'overcrowded' with injured Africans. 
The Minister of Justice, Mr Jimmy Kruger, announced in Pretoria this evening that he is reimposing the ban 
on public gatherings which lapsed last Saturday. The ban will continue until the end of the month. The 
nightmare of many whites in Johannesburg of a black march on their city almost came true today when between 
20, 000 and 25, 000 angry Africans began moving in procession out of Soweto toward John Vorster Square, 
police headquarters in Johannesburg, where they planned to protest against the detention of black pupils. 
Police with automatic rifles and in camouflage uniform headed the marchers off after they swept through a 
roadblock... 	 [my bold] 
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... metaphorical process that treats the people of Soweto as some kind of natural force, specifically here as a 
volcano which had been 'simmering' with unrest and then 'erupted'. This is echoed in the later report that the 
marchers had 'swept through' a roadblock, like a river. Note, too, that the emotions of individuals and the 
actions that they give rise to are transferred onto the place where they live. It is 'the township' that has been 
simmering and that now erupts, rather than the Sowetans experiencing feelings of anger and deciding to march. 
The effect of these processes of metaphor and metonymy is arguably to distance the reader from the subjects 
of the report. In speaking of the Sowetans as a natural force and as a place, the emotions of the people involved 
and the decisions which they make to engage in particular actions are eliminated from the process of 
interpretation. The situation is seen as resulting from some kind of inevitable set of natural laws rather than 
from human feelings and decisions. This tendency to downplay the agentive element in events initiated by 
relatively powerless groups is a general one. 	 [my bold] 
Although it is not mentioned explicitly, I take the 'reader' posited by Lee to be a non-
resistant one, given the rationale of CDA to highlight how text can position non-resistant 
readers. 
Consider what I highlighted in bold from the perspective of IR. 'Volcano' is an elaborative 
inference which could only be generated by the parsimonious processor, IR, if the semantic 
constraints were sufficiently rich. Recall from 6.2.4 the example of high semantic 
association from McKoon and Ratcliff (1989a) in the sentence from which 'sew' is inferred: 
The housewife was learning to be a seamstress and needed practice so she got out the skirt she was making and 
threaded her needle. 
From a cognitive linguistic perspective, 'sew' was readily generated because of the high 
degree of cognitive interdependence between 'sew' and 'needle' and the fact that the 
cognitive interdependence is predicated on motor-activity. On this basis, for non-resistant 
IR, who invests minimum cognitive effort, we can see, then, that 'volcano' would be a weak 
inference at best. Indeed, IR, possessing normal adult knowledge that people are not 
volcanos etc, would regard the metaphors, 'simmering', 'erupt' etc as explanatory metaphors 
rather that than being constitutive, pace Lee. So Lee has not actually indicated how a non-
resistant reader, who invests minimum cognitive effort, processes the text. Rather, he has 
produced a strategic inference in order to suit his line of interpretation. That is, he rather 
`unshallowly' imports the meanings of `erupt' and 'simmer' compositionally from the 
semantic fields for 'volcano' and 'natural forces'. But this is in fact rather arbitrary, since 
alternative semantic fields could easily be found for 'simmer' (cooking), 'erupt' (teeth; skin 
problems) etc. Crucially, though, it is not in line with the more shallow discourse derived 
by IR where the mental representation of lexical items in a sentence is automatically non-
compo sitional .8  
Fairclough (1989: 120) 
Consider the following from Fairclough (1989: 120): 
As the cancer spreads [headline] 
As the riots of rampaging youths spread from the south, even the most optimistic have fears for the future, 
afraid worse is yet to come. How far can the trouble spread? If it comes to Scotland, where will it strike? 
The metaphorical representation of social problems as diseases illustrated here is extremely common. Notice 
it incorporates a metaphor for disease itself, as a vague, subhuman and unthinking force (where will it strike). 
The ideological significance of disease metaphors is that they tend to take dominant interests to be the interests 
of society as a whole, and construe expressions of non-dominant interests (strikes, demonstrations, 'riots') as 
undermining (the health of) the society per se. 	 [my bold] 
The first thing to notice is that Fairclough does not flag explicitly the notion of a non-
resistant reader. But we may suppose that, for Fairclough, a non-resistant reader would read 
the text in the manner of his explanation, letting themselves be positioned by the text into 
drawing upon the macro-context script of 'social problems as diseases'. Now, in the above, 
Fairclough performs a logical operation 'cancer is a disease' along the lines of V(x) [H (x) 
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—> S (x)] where H is a hyponym and S a superordinate.9 As I indicated in 6.4, readers are 
usually shallow with regard to logical operations (Sanford, 1990; Wason, 1966) when they 
have little vested interest in a text. Since IR is one who has little vested interest in a text, 
we can suppose that IR would not generate the logical inference that Fairclough does. Also, 
since IR possesses normal adult experiential knowledge that countries are not bodies, IR (as 
well as any reader) is unlikely to treat 'cancer' as being a constitutive metaphor. We saw in 
5.3.2 that metaphors can be functional in that they act as cues for us to realise functions. 
Since 'cancer' is unlikely to be constitutive to readers, that is, its ideational function does 
not predominate, its function is instead likely to be interpersonal, being eye-catching, having 
impact because of its emotive connotations etc. And this seems borne out by the position 
of 'cancer' in the most interpersonal aspect of news text - the headline. Fairclough, 
however, fails to see this since he does not distinguish between the headline and the text in 
terms of function, regarding both in ideational terms. For example, Fairclough regards the 
`it' of 'where will it strike?' in the text body as referring to 'cancer' in the headline, when 
surely it refers to 'trouble' in the immediately previous sentence. Similarly in the Lee news 
text, words like 'erupt' etc are also presumably chosen for their ability to have connotative 
impact, i.e. their interpersonal function, when instead Lee regards them from an ideational 
perspective. 
Fairclough continues thus (1989: 120) [in an analysis which is endorsed by Weber (1996: 
7)]: 
An alternative metaphor for the 'riots' might for instance be that of the argument — 'riots' as vociferous protests 
for example. Different metaphors imply different ways of dealing with things: one does not arrive at a 
negotiated settlement with cancer, though one might with an opponent in an argument. Cancer has to be 
eliminated, cut out.' 
Recall from chapter 6 the psycholinguistic evidence that for a reader with no specific goal, 
causal consequent inferences are shallowly generated at best. So, while Fairclough generates 
the causal consequent 'cancer has be eliminated', non-analytical IR would not. In fact, 
Fairclough has produced a strategic inference in line with his own vested interest in the text, 
i.e., to boost the line he has adopted.°  Such an inference, however, is not in line with the 
much less vested interest in a text by non-resistant IR. Thus, in this respect, Fairclough's 
non-resistant reader and non-resistant IR produce different discourses. 
The Similarity between Lakoff and Johnson & Fairclough and Lee 
It should be apparent that Fairclough and Lee have much in common with Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) in not emphasising the micro-context of interpretation and the reader's 
potential for closure. Instead, both Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and the above authors operate 
at a macro-level of analysis where linguistic specificities are seen in terms of their 
membership of larger sets of phenomena. What I hope I have shown above is that these 
macro-phenomena are merely macro-constructs, constructed in line with the presumption 
in both CDA authors and Lakoff and Johnson (1980) that macro-phenomena allegedly guide 
our thinking and govern the micro-context of interpretation.11 Having indicated how 
metaphors which CDA regard as constitutive are actually explanatory, finally let me use this 
distinction to highlight a scenario where CDA is correct to regard a metaphor as being 
constitutive. 
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Prospects for Constitutive Metaphors in CDA 
Consider now the following from Fairclough (1992a: 208): 
The vocational preparation product is usually a programme. Its design and implementation are therefore 
central parts of the marketing process, and should start from the needs of potential customers and clients and 
the benefits for which they are looking. (Further Education unit 1987: 51) 
The message to course designers and teachers is a more elaborate variant of the marketing maxim 'Give the 
customers what they want'. Such wordings effect a metaphorical transfer of the vocabulary of commodities 
and markets into the educational order of discourse. But in contemporary Britain the metaphor is more than 
just a rhetorical flourish: it is a discursive dimension of an attempt to restructure the practices of education on 
a market model, which may have (as this extract suggests) tangible effects on the design and teaching of 
courses, the effort and money put into marketing, and so on. 
Investigation of the social world involves the problematic investigation of the ontologically 
subjective while physical world investigation is an attempt to know the ontologically 
objective (Searle, 1995). The largely uniform nature of the ontological objective (at the 
macroscopic level) in the physical world means a reasonable likelihood of generalisation 
from experimental data. But the fluidity of the ontological subjective in the social world 
means that generalisation from one's experiential knowledge is not always secure. Because 
of this, the use of the 'market' metaphor, for example, may then defeat the primary 
processing principle, leading to constitutive conceptualisation for a non-analytical reader. 
Another way of seeing this is to say that for a non-analytical reader, constitutive metaphors 
might be said to give rise to a form of shallow processing since experiential knowledge 
cannot so readily be accessed. 
Summing-Up 
i) Fairclough / Lee and IR derive different discourses from the same text. 
ii) Different levels of cognitive investment in a text lead to different discourses being 
derived from the text. Above, the different discourses were the non-shallow discourse 
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generated by proxy for non-analytical readers by CD analysts and the shallow discourse 
generated by proxy for IR by myself. 
iii) As in 6.6, CD analysts wrongly assume that the high cognitive effort they invest in 
interpretation by proxy for a non-resistant reader is replicated by such a reader who may 
have little vested interest in a text and so invest much less cognitive effort. By exploring the 
micro-context of interpretation (in contrast to CDA), I have shown that a non-analytical 
reader (i.e. IR) is not positioned by the metaphors in the above texts into making a particular 
interpretation as deemed by the CD analysts cited above. In other words, for the texts which 
Lee and Fairclough analyse in 7.5.3, (where readers are not coerced into interpretations), the 
macro-context does not necessarily govern the micro-context of interpretation of a non-
analytical reader. 
Again, as in 6.6, other things follow from the above: 
- since different levels of vested interest and thus different levels of cognitive labour lead 
to different (by proxy) interpretations, the principle of 'partiality of interpretation' from the 
same text has thus been demonstrated. 
- CDA (Fairclough and Lee) 'over-interpret' by proxy for the non-resistant reader. Indeed, 
both CDA authors as well as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) implicitly read macro-concepts into 
the micro-context of reading, without taking into account the nature of readers and their 
capacity for linguistic closure. 
- since the discourse of non-analytical IR (i.e one in line with empirical psycholinguistic 
evidence) conflicts with the discourse of the CDA non-analytical reader (i.e. a reader not 
supported by empirical psycholinguistic evidence), the notion that there is critical 
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hermeneutic exegetic privilege in the above CDA explanations is considerably weakened. 
In discussions of metaphor, the mistake CDA makes is to ignore the issue of richness of 
experiential knowledge and thus to see metaphor as always constitutive. But importantly, 
pace CDA, it is not metaphors which construct conceptualisation. Rather, metaphors are 
merely cues from which the reader constructs conceptualisation. If someone says, 'I've 
been watching soap operas all evening and I'm feeling mentally flabby' - the metaphor is not 
mentally flabby. Rather it is in the processing that the listener has to produce to inhibit the 
usual physical notion of flabbiness and leave other associations of flabbiness such as 
inactivity etc that could be associated with the mental domain. Conceptualisation, though, 
may become constitutive because the primary processing principle is defeated in cases where 
experiential encyclopaedic knowledge cannot be accessed. By using the distinction between 
explanatory and constitutive metaphors yoked to the primary processing principle, I have 
been able to separate an example of sound CDA from unsound CDA. 
7.6 Endpoints 
In chapter 6, we saw how psycholinguistic evidence for inference generation etc was 
incompatible with certain symbolic / logical empiricist text processing assumptions in CDA. 
In chapters 4 and 5, I used connectionism and cognitive linguistics to problematise the 
symbolic postulates on which CDA was based. But we can now go further than 
`problematising'. With regard to psycholinguistic evidence for shallow processing, at least, 
cognitive linguistics and connectionism are much more compatible than symbolicism (the 
conflict between cognitive and connectionism on metaphor processing aside). The 
alternative framework I construct in the next chapter, for the highlighting of mystifying 
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discourse, from the compatibilities I have demonstrated above will, then, be a non-symbolic 
one. This framework will be a more developed and systematic version of the processing 
profile of IR. Partly because it is a non-symbolic framework, it will highlight text that leads 
to mystification in IR's reading, text which symbolic CDA would not necessarily detect. 
Notes 
1. Another cognitive linguist, Lakoff (1987a: xiv), like Langacker, positions against the notion of cognitive 
`building blocks': 
`Thought has gestalt properties and is thus not atomistic; concepts have an overall structure that goes beyond 
merely putting together conceptual 'building blocks' by general rules'. 
2. With more patent endorsements of connectionism, here is Sanford (1990: 527): 
`In general, the ease of recognizing the classes of problems and situations which one knows (cf Sanford, 1987), 
compared to the slowness of overt logical inference, provides strong grounds for looking toward parallel 
pattern matching as a support for understanding rather than toward a uniform type of inference making.' 
[my bold] 
`The argument that there are two kinds of inferential mechanism, a fast pattern-matching facility and a facility 
corresponding to a slower, classical inference engine of understanding, is not new. In essence, the argument 
is basic to all schema theories of understanding (such as Schank and Abelson's 1977, script theory) and was 
put forward in a psychological context by Sanford and Garrod (1981). Indeed, the process fmds its natural 
formulation at a subsymbolic level, which studies of connectionism are beginning to make clear and which 
discourse psychologists would be unwise to resist.' 	 [my bold] 
Another link between Sanford and Garrod and connectionism is with regard to the nature of pronoun 
inferencing. Here are Sanford and Garrod (1994: 701) on Garrod and Sanford (1994): 
`In the chapter by Garrod and Sanford (this volume), a discussion is given of the idea that reference resolution 
is really just part of a more general process of interpretation, and not prior to more general interpretation. This 
view is quite different from the ones discussed up to now which see coreference (argument repetition) as 
essentially prior to other sorts of interpretation...' 
But this idea that coreference processing is coterminous with that of other sorts of interpretation is actually a 
facet of St. John and McClelland's (1992: 131) connectionist model (see chapter 4). Consider the following 
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which refers initially to the model's absence of distinction between elaborative and coherence inferences: 
`The model, however, makes no distinction between these inferences. One process, activating the story based 
on constraints from the input, is used to produce a complete interpretation. Representing the explicit text, 
drawing prediction inferences, drawing coherence inferences, and resolving pronouns all result from 
this same process.' 	 [my bold] 
In both Garrod and Sanford (1994) and St. John and McClelland (1992), pronoun resolution is not regarded 
as separate but as just part of 'a more general process of interpretation'. 
3. I confine discussion to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and not more recent work on metaphor, e.g., Kittay 
(1987) and Gibbs (1994) since this is not drawn upon in CDA. 
4. I should qualify all this by saying that only metaphoric processing for which top-down strategies can be 
engaged [i.e. for conventional metaphors] is automatically non-compositional. Novel metaphors such as in 
poems etc do not necessarily lead to immediate engagement with standard top-down strategies. In such cases, 
the 'literary metaphor' can draw the reader into analysis and thus into investing more cognitive effort. 
Processing, then, with 'literary metaphors' is more likely to be initially compositional (and thus bottom-up) 
compared with conventional metaphors. However, this is consonant with strategic, effortful processing and 
not automatic processing. 
5. Another advantage of the connectionist approach over an 'atomic' view of concepts is that it explains 
Rosch's (1978: 40-41) later qualifications over prototype theory (see 5.2.1). Since prototypes 'emerge' on the 
Barsalou / connectionist perspective, this clearly twines with Rosch's admonitions that prototypes are 'fictions' 
and not 'stored representations'. 
6. Consider the following from Kress's (1989a: 1), 'Linguistic Processes In Sociocultural Practice': 
`I had tried to think of a title which did not separate 'language' from 'society' or 'culture', or language from 
its 'context', or talk about language and its social functions, or any of these formulations. The fact that I have 
not succeeded in my wish will be everywhere apparent in the book. Indeed, the very structure of the English 
language, with its preference for nominal, object-like forms rather than for the process-oriented forms of verbs, 
makes it a difficult and perhaps impossible task. So, quite often where I have used ungainly and awkward 
circumlocutions, that has been my reason: to try and invent ways of talking in which the linguistic and the 
social appear as one (though the last formulation signals yet another failure!).' 
I would argue that Kress's 'failure' lies not with the propensity for object-like forms in English but with the 
difficulty of conceptualising 'language', 'society', 'culture', given the level of their abstraction from our direct 
experiential knowledge. One reason why these concepts are difficult to conceptualise is their super-basic-level 
nature, and so prototypes (i.e, familiar and 'graspable') are difficult to generate from them. Cognitive 
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interdependence exists between basic-level nouns and verbs. Thus, from a linguistic compositional input of 
basic-level nouns, a linguistic output can ensue which goes beyond the original compositional input. In 
contrast, there is little cognitive interdependence at the super-basic level. So, while 'culture', 'society' and 
`language' may be linked together grammatically or morphologically (sociocultural), conceptualising them in 
unison, going beyond the original compositional input, is another thing all together. To sum up: we are thus 
most likely to understand a book title like 'Linguistic Processes in Sociocultural Practice' in a compositional 
manner unless we make the considerable effort not to. 
7. Similar extrapolation from 'eruptions' to 'natural disaster' are expressed in Fairclough (1995a: 114). 
8. The partiality of Lee's analysis is visible. Lee (1992: 93) argues that 'this tendency to downplay the 
agentive element in events initiated by relatively powerless groups is a general one'. But the ability of the 
`angry Africans' to organise a huge march (20 000 - 25 000) and 'plan' a protest is in conflict with Lee's 
supposition that agency is mitigated in the metaphorisation. 
9. Sontag (1988) is endorsed in Fairclough (1992a: 197-8) and Shephard (1994). Consider the following from 
Sontag (1988: 28-9): 
Rull-blown [AIDS] is the form in which the disease is inevitably fatal. As what is immature is destined to 
become mature, what buds to become full-blown (fledglings to become full-fledged) - the doctors' botanical 
or zoological metaphor makes development or evolution into AIDS the norm, the rule.' 
Like Fairclough (1989: 120), Sontag performs a compositional analysis, extrapolating from the particular to 
more general categories, along the lines of V(x) [H (x) —> S (x)], using the general categories of 'botanical 
terms' or 'zoological terms'. But as I indicated in 6.4, logical relation inferences are not normally 
automatically produced (Sanford, 1990; Wason, 1966). To sum up, what Sontag produces is a strategic, 
effortful inference to suit her own line of interpretation and, thus, an inference which is not consonant with the 
result of automatic or minimum cognitive investment natural language processing. 
10. Consider a perspective where cancer is removed via chemotherapy. In chemotherapy, the 'whole' of the 
patient suffers. If Fairclough had generated 'chemotherapy' in his strategic inference rather than the surgeon's 
knife, then this would have had to imply the bizarre situation that the whole of the country would 'suffer' while 
the 'cancer' of the specific part of the country was being dealt with. Fairclough's choice of 'surgeon's knife' 
in his strategic inference, then, is doubly strategic since it supports the line he is taking more so than a strategic 
inference which alluded to 'chemotherapy'. 
11. Lee (1992: 71) is explicit about metaphoric processes working at a macro-level: 
`Some time ago, as I drove into an underground car park, my seven-year-old daughter asked me why the car 
radio had suddenly stopped working. My spontaneous (and probably somewhat unhelpful) reaction was to say 
that it was because of 'radio shadow' ...one domain of experience (that of radio transmission) is being 
structured in terms of a different domain of experience (the perception of light) through the use of language. 
The metaphorical process is operating at a more general level. 
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CHAPTER 8: AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
ANALYSIS OF MYSTIFYING DISCOURSE PRODUCED BY A 
NON-ANALYTICAL READER 
8.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters, I have indicated many problems with how CDA highlights mystifying 
discourse. In this chapter, I construct an alternative framework from the compatibilities I 
showed between psycholinguistic evidence for shallow processing, connectionism and 
cognitive linguistics. The rest of this chapter will be given over to use of the framework to 
highlight how certain text can lead to mystifying discourse, though, on the whole, text which 
CDA would not detect as such. Firstly, to assist the reader, let me condense some of the 
arguments in previous chapters as to why CDA fails as a framework for highlighting 
mystifying discourse and thus why an alternative framework is necessary. 
8.2 Why an Alternative Framework for the Analysis of Mystifying Discourse is 
Necessary 
8.2.1 An Alternative Non-Analytical Reader 
In 1.4 and 1.5, I showed how there were several conflicting notions of a non-analytical 
reader in CDA and several conflicting assumptions of what constitutes the processing make-
up of a non-analytical reader. In chapter 6, I showed how many of these assumptions were 
inconsistent with more recent psycholinguistic evidence, this evidence problematising how 
CDA highlights mystifying text. I also showed that because CDA has not given enough 
attention to the nature of the micro-context of interpretation, they regard the inferences they 
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make, as readers with a vested interest in a text, as being equivalent to those made by a non-
analytical reader who may have little vested interest in a text. CDA's non-analytical reader, 
then, has not been adequately developed. There needs, then, to be an alternative framework 
for the highlighting of how certain text can lead to mystification in reading (lead to 
mystifying discourse) based on a non-analytical reader who has a developed and consistent 
processing profile and in line with the psycholinguistic evidence I highlighted in chapter 6. 
Widdowson (1996) contains a critical examination of Fairclough's analysis of a text, which 
supplies information to pregnant women. He criticises Fairclough for 'interpretation by 
proxy' arguing that Fairclough should enquire as to the perlocutionary effect of the text on 
mothers rather than estimating what it may be. Analysts cannot be expected to be reliable 
in interpreting by proxy for discourse communities they do not belong to. This is why, for 
Widdowson, ethnographic studies should be performed on how texts are interpreted by 
members of discourse communities not inhabited by analysts. Naturally, this is the best 
procedure. It would of course be arduous, though, to conduct such ethnographic studies 
following every text analysis. Indeed, ethnographic study would not be so necessary if the 
analyst was actually a potential addressee of the text under scrutiny. I explained above why 
there needs to be an alternative framework for the analysis of mystifying discourse and that 
in contrast to CDA it should be based on a non-analytical reader who has a developed and 
consistent processing profile. What needs to be added, then, is that this is only for text for 
which an analyst could be considered a potential addressee. 
8.2.2 An Alternative Vocabulary for Inference Generation 
We have seen how attitudes to inference generation in CDA are inconsistent with one 
another and that there is little awareness of inference typology in psycholinguistics. The 
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absence of any systematic vocabulary for inference generation in CDA based on 
psycholinguistic evidence means that their text analysis: i) neglects the standard inferences 
readers make, such as instantiations; ii) makes the mistaken assumption that causal 
antecedent inference constructed over adjacent clauses or sentences are necessarily weak 
inferences and thus mystifying of causality; iii) assumes that non-analytical readers invest 
the same cognitive effort as analysts, both generating strategic inferences. Furthermore, 
when inference theory is drawn upon in CDA (e.g. Fairclough, 1989), the age of the sources 
in discourse analysis (e.g. Brown and Yule, 1983) means important work on inference 
generation which has transpired in the late eighties and early nineties is absent. If inference 
generation is to be linked to mystification in reading, then, a greater level of consistency and 
awareness of different types of inferences are needed as well as a vocabulary for inference 
generation based on more recent psycholinguistic evidence. 
8.2.3 The Incompatibility of Symbolic Postulates on Which CDA is Based with 
Psycholinguistic Evidence of Chapter 6 
When the psycholinguistic evidence of chapter 6 conflicts with the notion in CDA that 
inferences generated across clauses or sentences are weak representations, it also conflicts 
with the symbolic / logical empiricist basis of this that syntactic structure has priority in 
mental representation. We also saw in chapter 6 how for a reader investing minimum 
cognitive effort, mental representation of a sentence is automatically non-compositional. 
But this conflicts with the symbolic notion common in CDA that mental representation of 
sentences is compositional. In operating on symbolic postulates which conflict with 
psycholinguistic evidence, CDA has been using non-performance approaches to language 
processing. This is partly because such postulates have been absorbed from non-
performance based theories of language in logical empiricism and early Chomsky. 
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Now, with regard to psycholinguistic evidence for shallow processing, we saw in chapter 7 
that cognitive linguistics and connectionism are much more compatible than symbolicism. 
For example, connectionist networks automatically shade meaning non-compositionally. 
For both connectionism and cognitive linguistics, linguistic input is not the same as process 
output, thus also dovetailing with the psycholinguistic evidence for automatic top-down 
processing. While CDA often draws upon non-performance approaches to language 
processing, the aspects of connectionism and cognitive linguistics I highlighted in chapter 
4 and 5 are concerned with performance. In chapter 6, I outlined psycholinguistic evidence 
that inferences in reading are ubiquitous and varied, leading Sanford (1990: 515) to go as 
far as saying that studying text comprehension was like 'a subset of the study of inference 
making'. Connectionism is in line with the prominence of inference generation in 
psycholinguistics since in connectionist networks inferences are not ancillary to processing 
(pace symbolicism) but are an inherent aspect of language processing coterminous with the 
processing of syntax and semantics. 
To sum up: a framework for the highlighting of mystifying discourse which is inspired by 
the psycholinguistic evidence of chapter 6, and one based on a non-analytical reader who 
makes minimum cognitive effort, is incompatible with the symbolic notion of compositional 
mental representation and also the downplaying of inference generation in favour of 
symbolicism inspired syntax-first strategies. However, such a framework is compatible with 
connectionism and cognitive linguistics. 
8.3 An Alternative Framework for the Analysis of Mystifying Discourse 
8.3.1 Orientation 
The alternative framework I offer for the analysis of mystifying discourse takes into account 
the recommendations of 8.2. The basis of the alternative framework is the non-analytical 
idealised reader (IR) I introduced in 6.6 and 7.5, a reader who has little vested interest in a 
text and is largely unfamiliar with its subject matter. In this chapter, I will build upon the 
processing profile of IR and also delineate this profile in a more concise and systematic 
manner than hitherto. Because IR is largely unfamiliar with the subject matter of a text, I 
concentrate on news text and in particular 'hard-news' stories', which I assume IR would be 
unfamiliar with. I also choose news texts since they have no real specific addressee and so 
it would not be incongruous of me, the analyst, to interpret news texts 'by proxy' for IR. In 
other words, I too could be a possible addressee of 'hard-news' stories in newspaper texts. 
Consider now the following from Brown and Yule (1983: 266): 
While...it is, in principle, impossible to predict the actual inferences a reader will make in arriving at an 
interpretation of a text, we may be able to make predictions regarding particular aspects of individual texts 
which readers will generally have to interpret on the basis of inference. Such predictions will be closely related 
to some concept of 'depth of processing'. Clearly, the reader who casually skims across the news 
article...while sitting in the dentist's waiting room, is likely to be 'reading' the text in a qualitatively different 
way from the reader who is anticipating being asked comprehension questions after he has finished the text. 
I concur with the argument of Brown and Yule that predictions about the actual inferences 
a reader makes 'will be closely related to some concept of 'depth of processing". I show 
that the cast of inferences IR generates from certain news text, in line with this non-
analytical reader's propensity for shallow processing, means subject matter is mystified for 
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IR. As I have said, my focus is on a reader with little vested interest in a text and one who 
is largely unfamiliar with subject matter. But this does not preclude the fact that different 
readers with different motivations will produce different discourses from the texts I analyse 
below. And indeed, at times I will indicate that the texts I examine below may not lead to 
mystification for readers who are more familiar with the subject matter and have a vested 
interest in the text. In other words, just like my analyses of CDA commentaries in chapters 
6 and 7, the analyses below are in line with the 'partiality of interpretation' principle. 
In the next section, I detail a processing profile for IR by listing compatible processing 
`principles' from cognitive linguistics, connectionism and psycholinguistic evidence for 
shallow processing. These principles are the framework that guides my discourse analysis 
of IR. The psycholinguistic evidence I marshal for this framework has validity in the sense 
that it is largely consensus evidence in current psycholinguistics and is unobscure, being 
readily available in standard psycholinguistic and cognitive psychology reference books 
(Gernsbacher, 1994; Eysenck and Keane, 1995; Harley, 1995). Because it is, as I say, 
largely consensus evidence, it has a consistency that compares favourably with the rather 
inconsistent psycholinguistic assumptions of processing in CDA which were outlined in 
chapter 1. 
Since IR is based on the compatibility between psycholinguistic evidence for shallow 
processing and by definition non-symbolic elements from cognitive linguistics and 
connectionism, use of IR necessarily prohibits modes of analysis which are predicated on 
symbolicism. Thus, I do not follow a CDA approach to analysis, e.g., I make no separation 
between syntactic meaning and semantic meaning. Consequently, my highlighting of text 
from which IR derives a mystifying discourse does not necessarily coincide with what CDA 
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highlights as being mystifying text, given their symbolic processing assumptions. This lack 
of coincidence also transpires because my framework deals more systematically than CDA 
on the issue of inference generation in text processing and its relation to mystifying 
discourse. All the same, my use of 'principles' of analysis mirrors that of CDA since (with 
the CDA authors I have discussed in this thesis, at least) a specific text comprehension 
model is not used. Rather CD analysis has transpired though a set of principles about how 
reading takes place, e.g. syntax-first strategies. 
8.3.2 The Processing Profile for the Idealised Reader: The Framework Principles 
The following principles were demonstrated to be compatible in chapter 7. I separate them 
into their respective provenances below to ease the reader's comprehension: 
Psycholinguistic Principles 
1) IR is a relatively parsimonious processor. Since IR has no specific reading goal, IR has little vested interest 
in a text. IR thus reads in line with the minimalist hypothesis since IR's reading only involves automatic 
inferences. These include coherence inferences as well as elaborative inferences generated where information 
is quickly and easily available. 
2) IR's reading does not involve generation of strategic inferences (unlike CD analysts) since these involve 
time and work. 
3) Instantiations of superordinate / general / abstract categories are a type of elaborative inference which are 
usually automatic for IR if relevant encyclopaedic knowledge is readily available. 
4) Causal antecedent inferences are usually automatic. They can be divided as follows: 
connecting - the reader establishes a link between the current focal event and prior information thus instituting 
a causal antecedent for the new event. 
reinstatement - information from prior text which is currently not activated can be reactivated by the reader 
in order to establish a causal antecedent. 
elaborative - the reader utilises background knowledge to establish a likely but unmentioned causal antecedent. 
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Connecting causal antecedent inferences are readily instituted by IR. But the strength of the elaborative causal 
antecedent inference is dependent on the strength of causal relation of the particular scenario in memory, 
e.g, A punches B. The next day B is covered in bruises. [inference - the punching caused the bruises is strong]; 
A goes to a neighbour's house to play. The next day A is covered in bruises [inference - playing caused the 
bruises is less strong]. 
5) Causal consequent inferences are usually not generated by IR or generated only weakly by IR when the 
situation is not highly constrained and very familiar, given the processing effort incurred in forecasting 
potential consequents. 
6) For IR, causal antecedent inferences are usually much more probably generated than causal consequent 
inferences. 
7) Topicalisation in a sentence will affect the generation likelihood of causal consequent inferences. 
8) IR tries to relate textual material as soon as possible to background knowledge (primary processing 
principle). 
9) IR automatically makes richer conceptualisation around main characters of narratives at the expense of 
secondary characters. 
10) IR is a shallow processor of logical form if the context is unfamiliar. The logical offence of affirming the 
consequent can be expected in unfamiliar contexts, or in contexts in which the reader has little vested interest. 
11) Lexical items from a sentence do not figure compositionally in IR's mental representation of a sentence. 
12) Instrument inferences are likely to be generated by IR when knowledge is quickly and readily available 
such as when the instrument is part of a well-known semantic field, e.g., unlock (with a key), stab (with a 
knife), shoot (with a gun). 
13) IR is largely unfamiliar with the subject matter of the textual material under analysis, but possesses 
otherwise 'normal' adult encyclopaedic knowledge. 
Connectionist Principles 
1) linguistic input (sentential structure for example) is not equivalent to process output in IR's discourse. With 
this as a guiding line, I do not read off meaning from the application of a metalanguage. I also do not seek to 
find significance in sentential form (pace CDA) separate from other factors. 
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2) inferences in IR' s discourse are inherent to processing, so syntax, semantic and inferential processing are 
interactional. 
3) Unlike for some CDA authors, inferences are not weak representations per se. They can, however, be 
weakly generated, e.g. causal consequent inferences. Connectionist models capture the strength / weakness 
aspect of inference generation because of their capacity to capture probabilities. 
4) Connectionist network output of a sentence is automatically non-compositional in line with IR's non-
strategic processing. This does not preclude an analyst's compositional examination of a sentence, though. For 
instance, I analyse compositionally basic-level and superordinate categories in the texts that follow. But I do 
not make an equation between my compositional analysis of a category and compositional mental 
representation in the discourse IR produces. 
Cognitive Linguistic Principles 
1) the basic level is the category level where the largest amount of information about an item is understood with 
the least cognitive labour - i.e., basic-level categories are characterised by cognitive economy. 
2) basic-level categories are more directly understood with minimum cognitive effort since they lead to 
generation of prototypes, and thus the familiar, through being associated with our neurophysiological capacity 
for motor-interaction, gestalt perception and image generation. The converse of this is that a context where 
motor-interactivity etc is emphasised (though perhaps without use of basic-level categories) will also be 
`directly understood'. 
3) superordinate / general / abstract categories are not characterised by cognitive economy. To yield more 
information, they require more cognitive effort than with basic-level categories. On their own, or in context 
where there is an absence of sufficient basic-level categories or sufficient constraints, and when minimum 
cognitive effort is invested, they are unlikely to lead to elaborative inference generation. 
4) prototypical causation involves 'direct manipulation' by an agent. 
5) The framework prohibits the notion that use of a basic-level nominal produces objecting effects since 
basic-level object categories and basic-level action categories are cognitively interdependent. 
6) metaphoric constitution is more likely to transpire when experiential background knowledge cannot be 
accessed, i.e. when the primary processing principle is defeated. 
303 
7) linguistic input (surface structure) is not equivalent to process output. With this as a guiding line, I do not 
read off meaning from application of a metalanguage. 
8) syntax and semantics processing is interactional, i.e. 'syntax-first' approach prohibited. 
I recognise that the vocabulary of the framework mediates between the text and my analyses. 
For instance, I use the terms 'coherence' and 'elaborative' even though there is no absolute 
distinction between these inferences. However, I retain the use of these terms for heuristic 
reasons, making it easier to articulate the probability of inference generation. I also continue 
to use the term 'inference' for heuristic reasons even though on a connectionist perspective, 
inferences are inherent to processing, being high-level descriptions, approximating 
underlying processing. The connectionist background to the framework suffers from being 
selective. It draws principally on work by McClelland and his collaborators. This selectivity 
is unavoidable given the constraints of what I am able to accomplish in the thesis. However, 
my choice of McClelland is significant in that he is one of the fathers of connectionist 
approaches to language processing. In previous chapters I have criticised CDA for their 
sentential focus. This was in relation to CDA asserting that a certain kind of semantic-
syntactic form was the best representation of events, i.e., AGENT-PROCESS-AFFECTED. 
Like CDA, I too focus on sentences in my analysis. However, sentences are merely the 
starting point of my analysis. Where I differ from CDA is that I am interested in the holistic 
processing output of a sentence for IR (i.e. including inference generation). I follow the 
connectionist and cognitive linguistic principle that treats syntactic and semantic information 
as well as inferences interactively and so do not make an equation between just sentential 
form and mental representation (pace CDA). 
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One of the aims of this thesis has been to counter the rather impoverished appreciation of 
305 
cognitive matters and the inconsistent processing assumptions in CDA as well as to reveal 
underlying, unrecognised, notions of mental representation in CDA. Given this aim, and the 
constraints of the thesis, I have not been able to devote attention to the socio-cultural 
situation of readers. Also because I limit IR to having little vested interest in a text, my 
framework is limited in trying to reflect the range of interpersonal and intrapersonal 
variation in reading. IR is, all the same, a part of intrapersonal reading variation; I assume 
most readers, at some point, must have read news text non-analytically. To substantiate this 
point, here are McKoon and Ratcliff (1992: 440) whose minimalist hypothesis informs much 
of my framework: 
For different readers, minimalist processing with little strategic processing will occur in different situations. 
For some readers, it might be a rare occurrence; for others, it might happen in such situations as reading a 
magazine on an airplane, reading the newspaper though the morning fog over breakfast, or reading texts in a 
psychological experiment. 
Recall also from chapter 1 how Hodge and Kress (1993: 22) indicate the possibility of such 
`morning fog' minimalist processing, in the case of those who would demur at the labour 
involved in de-transformation: 
As readers of this editorial we should have to be alert and willing to engage in mental exercise to get beyond 
the seductive simplicity of the fmal form...where everything seems to be there on the surface... 
...few commuters on the 8.05 from Brighton would have the energy to perform the mental gymnastics 
required. 
	 [my bold] 
Of course it could be argued that even for 'morning fog' readers some of the inferences 
generated are likely to be strategic inferences. That is, in reality it is more likely that a non-
analytical reader produces fewer strategic inferences than automatic ones, and is more likely 
to have non-compositional than compositional mental representation. In this respect, then, 
IR is indeed idealised. Nevertheless, basing such a reader on only automatic processing in 
6.6 and 7.5 enabled us to see the tendency in CDA to regard interpretation by non-analytical 
readers as being equal to the higher level of cognitive work of the analyst. That is, the 
device of IR is useful in shedding light on the micro-context of interpretation of a non-
analytical reader, something neglected in CDA. It is on this basis, then, that I use the device 
of IR in what follows in this chapter. One final point in this paragraph is that I prefer to use 
the phrase 'non-analytical reader' to describe IR rather than 'lay-reader'. 'Lay-reader' is 
simply too large a category. Lay-readers can take up a variety of positions on a text; they 
can be non-analytical to varying degrees but they can also read analytically also to varying 
degrees (see: Wallace, 1992: 45-7; Widdowson, 1984a). Furthermore, an 'off-duty' CD 
analyst could read non-analytically. 
As I have said, because of the constraints of my thesis, my focus on inferencing related to 
a particular reader and my aim to counter the paucity of appreciation of cognitive matters 
in CDA, my framework does not pay enough attention to socio-cultural considerations in 
reading. However, since IR is a reader with little vested interest in a text, their reading is 
not then engaged in the social or political sense, mitigating to some extent the absence of 
attention to socio-cultural considerations in this thesis. It could be argued, indeed, that my 
eschewing of a socio-cultural approach to reading, in favour of a cognitive one, has been 
justified. This is because I was able to show that the macro- or socio-cultural context does 
not in fact weigh heavily on the micro-context of interpretation, by a non-analytical reader 
of news text, as CDA supposes! So, CDA is an inappropriate mode of discourse analysis 
for the reading of news text. What I have said about the absence of socio-cultural 
consideration in IR applies also to my analyses in chapters 6 and 7 of CDA commentaries 
and their text data, via the perspective of IR. 
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Because my framework is overt about its cognitive and philosophical make-up, it is 
transparent why I think IR would process in one way as opposed to another and why I 
prohibit modes of processing such as an all-or-nothing approach to inference, compositional 
processing, whole semantic value etc.2 That is, any disagreement with my analysis of the 
texts in this section is, I hope, much more likely to be with the framework rather than with 
any of my own personal attitudes which may inadvertently slip in. Of course, it is quite 
possible that I put 'pressure' on my 'principles' to fit my intuitively formed ideas about the 
text data below. There is always this danger. To try to overcome this, I try to link my 
analysis as explicitly as possible to the framework principles which I have laid bare, unlike 
CDA, which is permeated with unrecognised symbolic assumptions. In this way, in contrast 
to CDA, it should be more apparent if inadvertently I have smuggled in other assumptions 
`to suit a particular line'. I acknowledge, however, that my selection of texts for analysis 
may be governed by own predilections. 
8.3.3 Reinforcing the Distinction between Discourse Analysis and Text Linguistics 
Consider the following from Widdowson (1997: 153): 
Text does not signal its own meaning, so linguistic analysis, no matter how detailed, cannot result in 
understanding of how and why a text means what it does. 
Indeed I would argue that the more detailed the linguistic analysis, the further one is likely to get from the 
significance of the text. And this follows because only some of the semantic meaning encoded in linguistic 
form is activated as contextually appropriate on a particular occasion. 
IR (albeit with a focus on cognition rather than socio-cultural cognition) can be taken as a 
set of contextual conditions. Widdowson's points above also concur with my highlighting 
of the different discourse derived by the detailed analysis, higher cognitive effort and thus 
strategic inferencing of the CD analyst in contrast to the 'significance of the text' for the 
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lower cognitive effort making, non-analytical IR. Furthermore, Widdowson's point that 
`only some of the semantic meaning encoded in linguistic form is activated as contextually 
appropriate on a particular occasion' ties in with the psycholinguistic evidence we saw in 
chapter 6 for the partial activation of semantic value. Since only some semantic meaning 
is activated in the shallow reading of IR, reading off significance from a text metalanguage 
by proxy for IR is likely to misrepresent IR's discourse. This is because text metalanguage 
does not take account of how automatic processing is non-compositional. In relation to this 
point, we saw in 4.3.3 how Trew applied Hallidayan metalanguage to a text and proceeded 
to read off significance from this metalanguage without taking into account the micro-
context of interpretation of a non-analytical reader. Trew, then, effectively over-interpreted 
the text for a non-analytical reader. A corollary of all this is that although some linguists 
(e.g. Stubbs, 1983) make no distinction between text linguistics and written discourse 
analysis, the distinction is actually a real and valid one. Text linguistics is concerned more 
with the formal properties of a text, with the whole semantic potential of text. It is analyst 
centred. (Micro-) discourse analysis is concerned with how different readers on different 
occasions read texts. It is (particular) reader centred. Since my focus below is on the 
relationship between a particular reader's mystifying discourse and inference generation, this 
explains why I do not devote much attention to a more text linguistic focus. 
The rest of this chapter is devoted to showing how the IR framework is able to highlight text 
which leads to mystifying discourse for a non-analytical reader with little vested interest in 
a text and largely unfamiliar with its subject matter. 
8.4 'Protest Mob Storm Tube HQ' News Text: Evening Standard 7 August 1996 
8.4.1 How the Text Leads to Mystification for IR as to the Nature of Causal Antecedence 
and Causal Consequence 
Consider the following text which began on page 1 of the Evening Standard 7 August 1996 
and ran onto page 2. Page 1 was dominated by the report and the headline and sub-headline 
were in very large type. 
Evening Standard Text 1 
PROTEST MOB STORM TUBE HQ 
Demonstrators fight past security men to occupy chiefs office 
by Luke Blair, Nick Pryer and Allan Ramsay 
PAGE ONE 
1. Protestors today smashed their way into London Underground headquarters as a mass demonstration on 
the streets and the Tube strike brought central London to a standstill. 
(CONFLATED CAUSAL CONSEQUENTS + FRONTING OF 'MASS DEMONSTRATION] 
2. An angry mob overpowered security guards at the LU head offices above St James's station and rushed up 
seven floors to march into the chairman's office. 
3. There they threw papers around and unfurled banners from the windows declaring 'Don't squeeze the tube.' 
(ABSENCE OF PROTESTORS' PERCEPTION THAT LU MANAGEMENTS RENEGING ON A PAY 
DEAL (CAUSAL ANTECEDENT) leading to an inevitable strike PRODUCES EXTRA TRAFFIC 
POLLUTION (CAUSAL CONSEQUENT), i.e. CARS LEAD TO POLLUTION, TUBES DO NOT] 
4. LU chairman Peter Ford said: 'I was astonished when they burst into my office. 
5. I asked them what they wanted and they didn't seem too sure. 
6. 'They started chanting slogans, throwing paperwork around and opening the windows and unfurling banners 
outside'. 
7. 'I was worried that they would damage my family photographs so I asked them to respect them and they did. 
8. I explained that I was a keen cyclist and asked them if there were any points I could clarify about the dispute. 
9. 'I even told them how much Underground drivers earn. 
10. Then they said they wanted to lock the doors but I told them if this was a non-violent protest they would 
have to play by the rules, which they did.' 
11. Police were later questioning a number of the protestors. 
12. At the same time, during the height of the rush hour, several hundred cyclists 
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PAGE TWO 
from the same group of protestors - Reclaim the Streets - converged on Trafalgar Square. 
13. The protest, ironically aimed at combating car use and supporting public transport, 
(ABSENCE OF PROTESTORS' PERCEPTION THA T LU MANAGEMENTS RENEGING ON A PAY 
DEAL (CAUSAL ANTECEDENT) leading to an inevitable strike PRODUCES EXTRA TRAFFIC 
POLLUTION (CAUSAL CONSEQUENT), i.e. CARS LEAD TO POLLUTION, TUBES DO NOT] 
caused massive knock-on effects on routes already overloaded with the Tube strike traffic. 
(PRESENCE OF AN ACTUAL CAUSAL CONSEQUENT] 
14. Scuffles broke out as anarchist cyclists confronted police and angry motorists. 
15. They were greeted by shouts of abuse, fist waving, and a cacophony of tooting car horns from cabbies and 
drivers as they deliberately dismounted and remounted and pedalled slowly around the Square. 
16. Edmund King, head of campaigns for the RAC, said: 'I'm appalled by the action of a bunch of anarchists 
stopping the traffic. 
17. It's ironic that they are campaigning against pollution when they've caused 10 times more in Trafalgar 
Square by blocking the traffic.' 
[PRESENCE OF A PERCEIVED CAUSAL CONSEQUENT BY NON-5YMPA THIZER] 
18. After an hour the cyclists peeled off down Whitehall to Parliament Square where they again slowed traffic. 
(PRESENCE OF AN ACTUAL CAUSAL CONSEQUENT] 
19. Tempers rose to boiling point when several vanloads of police trapped the demonstrators in a bus lane. 
20. A stand-off followed, with lines of officers blocking both ends of the street. 
[I telephoned 'Reclaim the Streets' (RTS) and a spokesperson informed me that the purpose 
of the protest was three-pronged: i) to show solidarity with the tube strikers who were 
campaigning for a better pay deal and decided to strike after the London Underground (LU) 
management withdrew a pay offer; ii) to highlight how the extra pollution caused by more 
cars being on the road because of the tube strike was ultimately a result of LU management 
reneging on a pay deal; iii) to support the tube as a form of public transport over polluting 
car culture and its others negative effects e.g. noise, danger for pedestrians]. 
Establishing the Nature of the Protest 
From the processing profile of IR, we know that: 
i) instantiation of general categories / superordinates is a fairly automatic process if it is 
dependent upon knowledge which is readily available. 
ii) IR automatically searches for a causal antecedent (as in fact would any reader). Here is 
Graesser et al. (1994: 379): 
Comprehenders attempt to explain why episodes in the text occur and why the author explicitly mentions 
particular information in the message. Thus, comprehension is typically guided by why-questions rather than 
other types of questions (e.g. what-happens-next, how, where, or when). There is extensive evidence that 
causal explanations of actions, events, and states play a central role in our understanding of narrative (Black 
and Bower, 1980; Bloom et al., 1990; Bower et al., 1979; Fletcher, 1986; Graesser, 1981; Rumelhart, 1975; 
Schank, 1986; Singer, 1990; Trabasso and Sperry, 1985; Trabasso et al., 1989; van den Broek, 1990)... 
iii) IR tries to relate textual material to background knowledge as soon as possible (Sanford 
and Garrod's primary processing principle). 
Now consider the first three sentences and my bolding in the following: 
1. Protestors today smashed their way into London Underground headquarters as a mass demonstration on the 
streets and the Tube strike brought central London to a standstill. 
2. An angry mob overpowered security guards at the LU head offices above St James's station and rushed up 
seven floors to march into the chairman's office. 
3. There they threw papers around and unfurled banners from the windows declaring 'Don't squeeze the tube'. 
Initially there is no mention of the nature of the protestors. So, rather anomalously, we have 
mention of a general category before the instance. The text, it could be argued, is 
inconsiderate in that it places general categories before instances which as we saw in 
Garnham's (1981) experiments leads to a processing jolt and extra processing time (see 
6.2.5). By sentence 3, there is still no mention of the nature of the protestors. There is 
though mention of 'tube strike' (1) and 'don't squeeze the tube' (3). As I have said, IR will 
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seek the nature of the causal antecedent, posing why-questions (Graesser et al., 1994: 379 
above) in the discourse they derive from the text [cf the notion of 'discourse as dialogue' in 
Hoey (1983: 168-188); Widdowson (1984b: 39-53), and Cook (1994: 48-51)1, constructing 
an elaborative causal antecedent inference in line with familiar encyclopaedic knowledge. 
Now, in the absence of information as to the true nature of the protest on page one, and the 
combination of i), ii), iii) above, IR will quickly try to relate the text material to the familiar. 
It is likely that IR will see the protestors as strikers, i.e., will instantiate 'protestors' and the 
other general categories as striking London Underground employees. In other words, IR 
generates an elaborative backward causal antecedent inference from background knowledge 
that strikers are usually angry, disaffected etc. Given that causal antecedent inferences can 
be generated readily, the exploitation of what is an automatic inference (i.e. IR initially 
setting up an incorrect causal antecedent) can be seen in a sense to be insidious. 
There is however a picture of some cyclists in traffic with one car foregrounded and with the 
caption: 'Demonstrating cyclists surround a motorist at Trafalgar Square today'. But there 
is no strong evidence on page one for IR to think that the 'demonstrating cyclists' in 
`Trafalgar Square' are the same people as the 'protestors' in the LU management's office 
other than the briefest hint when Peter Ford explained that he was 'a keen cyclist'. But even 
this comes as late as line 8. Moreover, for IR to link these demonstrators with the protestors 
who invaded LU underground, and create a rationale for why 'demonstrating cyclists' would 
invade LU underground headquarters, is not in line with their processing labour profile. 
Indeed, as we saw with the 'survivors' text in chapter 6, global expectation can frustrate 
anomaly detection (i.e. mention of cyclists) at a local semantic level. As Sanford and Garrod 
(1994: 717) aver: 
...processing at a local semantic level, where case assignment and other attachments take place, can be 
dominated by more global aspects of coherence establishment. In particular, if a text statement fits well with 
a piece of pre-established knowledge or can be understood easily on the basis of pragmatics, then that link 
seems to be made, even if there are details of a local nature which are inconsistent with that interpretation. 
We shall see in a later section on the processing of 'characters' in the text that 'cyclists' are 
backgrounded in another way in IR's discourse. 
For the nature of the protest to become clearer, IR has to turn to page two. But when IR 
turns the page, the reasons behind the protest are complex. The protestors are from 'Reclaim 
the Streets' and the protest is 'aimed at combating car use and supporting public transport' 
(13) but there is no explicit mention that the protestors are also supporting the tube strike. 
On page one in (3), there is of course the declaration on a banner 'don't squeeze the tube'. 
But previously for IR this was from the perspective of striking LU employees and so IR 
would have to incur processing labour to reactivate this information in the context of 
environmental protestors. This would most likely also involve the extra physical effort of 
turning back to page one. 
Revision of Interpretation through Text Bias 
I do not deny that IR will revise interpretation; (they may of course simply abandon the text). 
But the revision only takes place once IR moves from the front page (the text takes up 
almost all of it) and then onto the second page where the text layout is smaller. Moreover, 
when there is finally enough information for revision of the causal antecedents, the text 
immediately biases against the 'Reclaim The Streets' (RTS) protestors. For example (12), 
there is topicalisation of 'At the same time, during the height of the rush hour, several 
hundred cyclists...' etc making the height of the rush-hour the focus rather than what RTS 
were trying to achieve. Other biases include: the protestors 'caused massive knock-on 
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effects on routes already overloaded with the Tube strike traffic' and descriptions of the 
cyclists as 'anarchists', the abuse they receive from drivers, cyclists going on to slow traffic 
etc. Edmund King signals his distaste where his comments reiterate the reporting: 
`anarchists', 'caused more pollution', 'irony'. So to sum up, IR can revise their 
interpretation but this revision occurs in the context of a great deal of text bias against the 
`protestors'. Since also it has taken until the second page to find out the nature of the 
`protestors', the significance and reasons for the protest are considerably mystified and 
downplayed in the discourse IR derives from the text. 
The RTS (Perceived) Cause-Consequent 
Let us examine the issue of causal consequence in the text. The issue, it will become 
apparent, is a complex one. From the phone call I had with an RTS spokesperson, the 
perspective of RTS is the following: it is London Underground (L U) management who 
caused the extra traffic pollution since they caused the tube strike by reneging on a pay deal, 
leading to a great increase in the number of commuters going to work by car; (see the 
spokesperson for RTS in 'The Guardian' article below for substantiation of this). However, 
this perceived cause-consequent is not explicitly mentioned in the text. 
Consider now, sentences 13 and 17: 
13. The protest, ironically aimed at combatting car use and supporting public transport, caused massive knock-
on effects on routes already overloaded with the Tube strike traffic. 
(PRESENCE OF AN ACTUAL CAUSAL CONSEQUENT] 
17. It's ironic that they are campaigning against pollution when they've caused 10 times more in Trafalgar 
Square by blocking the traffic.' 
[PRESENCE OF A PERCEIVED CAUSAL CONSEQUENT BY NON-SYMPATHIZER] 
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Here are clearly described causal consequents of the 'Reclaim the Streets' action. The first 
is not in dispute since it is indicated elsewhere, e.g. in a Guardian article, which we shall 
later examine. The second is a perceived cause-consequent by Edmund King, someone 
clearly out of sympathy with the protest. It could be argued, then, that this text is biased 
against the protestors since their perceived cause-consequent is absent while a perceived 
cause-consequent of a non-sympathizer is present. 
Text Presence Bias —> Discourse Bias 
It should be clear now that there are different types of bias with regard to the Evening 
Standard text. On the one hand, there is bias which is present in the text. For example, the 
connotations of 'mob' and the commonplace derogatory sense of 'anarchist' [as opposed to 
the advocate of a particular political system ironically not based on chaos] are both negative 
ones and thus biased against the RTS protestors. These particular connotations are also 
consistent ones in news texts. Given the definition of text in 1.7.2, 'linguistic forms in a 
stretch of language, and those interpretations of them which do not vary with context' 
(Cook, 1994: 24), we can call the connotative bias in 'anarchist' and 'mob' examples of text-
presence bias. Of course, if a particular reader's processing concurs with the text presence 
bias against the protestors, then that reader's discourse is biased also against the protestors. 
Text Absence Bias —> Mystifying Discourse as Bias 
But there is another form of text bias that leads to a different form of discourse bias - one 
which is a by-product of mystification, which itself stems this time from text absence. While 
the perceived cause-consequent of a non-sympathizer (Edmund King) is present in the text, 
absent in the text is the RTS protestors' perceived cause-consequent that it was LU 
management's reneging on a pay deal that caused the extra traffic pollution. This text 
absence, as I indicated earlier, is a form of bias. 
But what happens when we relate this text absence to a particular reader? As we saw in 
6.2.4, causal consequents are not constructed when the reader has little vested interest in a 
text or is unfamiliar with subject matter. But they can be constructed when the reader is 
familiar with subject matter. So a reader familiar with the eco-protest (e.g., heard a radio 
report earlier in the day; has eco-protest sympathies etc) could produce in their discourse the 
necessary identification with RTS to generate the RTS perceived cause-consequent. And if 
the subject matter is familiar enough, then the causal consequent might be treated as being 
automatic (see 6.2.4). A second type of reader, one not as familiar with the subject matter 
but with a vested interest in the text nonetheless, could also eventually generate the RTS 
perceived cause-consequent if the trouble is taken to piece together certain aspects of the 
text, e.g., 'Tube strike brought central London to a standstill' (1); protestors breaking into 
LU headquarters (1); declaring 'don't squeeze the tube' (3); 'combatting car use and 
supporting public transport' (13); 'campaigning against pollution' (17) etc). In such a 
circumstance, the perceived causal consequent would be strategically generated rather than 
automatically. But despite the text absence bias, in both cases above the reader's discourse 
would not be biased against the protestors. Finally in this paragraph, related to the above, 
if a reader puts in the required cognitive work, it is possible to generate inferentially that 
RTS slowing the traffic (sentence 18) would lead to greater pollution, if it had not been 
mentioned in sentence 17 already (i.e. Edmund King's non-sympathetic perceived cause-
consequent). But again this would be a strategic generation. 
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I have mentioned two different types of reader who are able to generate the RTS perceived 
cause-consequent. But what about IR? As I indicated in 8.3.2, given that IR has little vested 
interest in the text, and has no prior knowledge of the protest, they will not generate this 
perceived cause-consequent. It is an absence in IR's discourse. Moreover, not only would 
IR not generate this perceived cause-consequent in their discourse, but being a non-
analytical reader, IR would not notice its absence either. Consequently, IR's discourse is not 
only mystifying  as to the full rationale of RTS but also inadvertently biased against the 
prote stors .3  
Why the Text-Based Principle of 'Reporting both Sides' needs to be Discourse-Based 
In disputes or protests where there are opposing sides such as in the above, it seems 
reasonable that a news text should report 'both sides of the story' so as to avoid bias. But 
this is only a text-based principle. Much of this thesis has tried to show that highlighting a 
text as being mystifying needs to take account of the reader's contribution to the text. We 
saw in 6.6, for example, that because CDA does not properly take account of a reader's 
contribution, they wrongly assume that an absence of agent-process-patient structures means 
causal antecedent inferences were only weak representations, and thus mystifying of causal 
relations. Furthermore, we saw above that despite its textual absence some readers (either 
with vested interest or familiar with subject matter) could generate the RTS perceived cause-
consequent. In other words, while there is text absence bias, the discourse of such readers 
is not biased against the protestors. In the context of these readers, then, the principle of 
`reporting both sides' so as to avoid bias does not seem so relevant. 
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But how does the text-based principle of 'reporting both sides' relate to IR? In contrast to 
the above, we saw that IR, a reader with little vested interest in the text and one largely 
unfamiliar with its subject matter, would not generate the RTS perceived cause-consequent. 
For IR, it is both a text absence and a discourse absence. And now to the crux of this 
section. On the basis of the above, I want to argue that: 
since: 
a) Edmund King's perceived cause-consequent is present in the text, but would not be 
generated as an inference by IR if it were absent, as this would involve strategic generation 
then: 
b) the RTS perceived cause-consequent should also be present since again this also would 
not be generated by IR, as again it would involve strategic generation. 
In other words, when the particular reader is IR, the text really should report both sides. 
To sum up: in the case of (perceived) cause-consequents absent from a text, the principle 
of 'reporting both sides' has only real significance in the context of a particular reader. 
This reader should not be one who has a vested interest in the text and is then willing to 
invest a high degree of cognitive labour. Neither should this reader be one who is familiar 
with the subject matter of the text. Rather this reader should be one who makes minimum 
cognitive effort and one largely unfamiliar with a text's subject matter (i.e. IR). What I have 
done, then, is to adjust the text-based principle of 'reporting both sides' into a discourse-
based principle. The value-judgement that texts should 'report both sides' to avoid bias has 
thus been grounded in a processing criterion, i.e. one which relates to minimum processing 
effort. 
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Using IR as a Yardstick for the Success of a Text 
From what I have argued above, the IR framework can be used as a yardstick to gauge the 
success of news texts in discourse with regard to the issue of cause-consequents, and can 
also be used to improve the text. Below I offer an improved alternative fragment which 
removes the prospect of IR mystifying discourse bias related to text absences: 
ECO-PROTEST MOB STORM TUBE HQ 
Cycle Demonstrators fight past security men to occupy chiefs office 
1. Eco-protestors today smashed their way into London Underground headquarters as the tube strike and a mass 
cycling demonstration brought central London traffic to a standstill. 
2. An angry mob of cyclists dismounted and overpowered security guards at the LU head offices above St 
James's station and rushed up seven floors to march into the chairman's office. 
3. There they threw papers around and unfurled banners from the windows declaring 'Don't squeeze the tube'. 
Removing the potential for text absences to lead to IR mystifying discourse bias does not 
mean that text presence biases (`mob', 'anarchists' below etc) are also removed. The IR 
framework is based on a minimum processing effort criterion that aims to remove the 
prospect of generating information strategically, i.e. information that takes a good deal of 
cognitive effort. So since 'mob', 'anarchists' etc are biases present in the text, they take 
much less cognitive effort to detect than to locate text absence bias; this is why I do not 
remove text presence biases in my alternative text fragment. Furthermore, I have not 
removed what CDA would regard as `nominalisations' - 'protestors' and 'demonstration' 
either. But the addition of `eco-' and 'cycle' etc, which do not take up that much space, 
mean there is enough information this time for IR to instantiate 'protestors' and 
`demonstration' in discourse. In other words (pace a CDA type analysis), in the original 
Evening Standard text, it was not the syntactic form of 'protestors' and 'demonstration' 
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which was the obscuring factor. Rather mystification transpired because of their abstract / 
general nature, reducing the accessing of appropriate encyclopaedic knowledge, as well as 
the absence of appropriate information to instantiate these categories. With the alternative 
text, then, mystification as to causal antecedence is reduced in the discourse of IR. But what 
about causal consequence? The causal consequent of the strike that the protestors are trying 
to highlight (see Guardian text below for corroboration) might go something like the 
following: 
4. A spokesperson said the protest was in support of the tube drivers' strike. It aimed to make LU bosses aware 
that reneging on a pay deal was causing greater traffic pollution with thousands of tube-commuters taking their 
cars into central London today. 
I include 4 since i) explicit mention of supporting the tube strike means this avoids the 
cognitive labour involved in generating this rationale from 'don't squeeze the tube'; ii) IR 
would not produce the RTS perceived cause-consequent as it would involve identification 
and thus more than minimum cognitive labour. I keep the causal consequent in 5 since it 
is part of the event. 
5. The mass-cycling protest throughout central London, however, caused massive knock-on effects on routes 
already overloaded with the Tube strike traffic. 
6. Edmund King, head of campaigns for the RAC, said: 'I'm appalled by the action of a bunch of anarchists 
stopping the traffic. 
7. It's ironic that they are campaigning against pollution when they've caused 10 times more in Trafalgar 
Square by blocking the traffic.' 
`Anarchists' in 6 is an example of text presence bias and I keep this for the same reasons as 
above. I keep 7 since it is also a perceived cause-consequent which, again, IR would not 
generate, given the effort involved with identifying with the perception. [We can imagine 
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that in an eco-protest-friendly newspaper that such a casual consequence might be omitted. 
In these circumstances, again it would not be generated by IR.] Finally, consider the 
following from Sanford and Garrod (1994: 704): 
The primary processing account assumes that a text is easy to read if it can be mapped onto familiar 
background knowledge structures and that the writer should try to make such mappings possible. 
Since the nature of the protest is not familiar enough for IR to generate the RTS perceived 
cause-consequent, The Evening Standard text should have made available the rationale of 
the protest in the first place so IR would have this as 'familiar background knowledge'. 
8.4.2 Contrast with Other 'Reclaim the Streets' Texts 
Firstly, consider the following from the same edition of the 'Evening Standard' (Wednesday 
7 August 1996) but this time from page 2 and by one of the same authors of the first piece. 
Compared to the first text, text 2 is in smaller type, is only one of five stories on the page 
and so does not take up the whole page: 
Evening Standard Text 2 
CRAWL TO WORK IS THE WORST YET 
by Luke Blair 
Industrial Correspondent 
1. LONDON today suffered its worst traffic congestion of the summer as the Tube strike and the mass protest 
by cyclists caused widespread chaos. 
2. At the height of the morning rush hour, parts of central London came to a complete standstill as the protest, 
ironically aimed at supporting public transport, caused massive knock-on effects on routes already 
overloaded with Tube strike traffic. 
3. Roads around Westminster, including some of the busiest in London, were blocked solid, according to 
motoring organisations. 
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4. Emergency services said the public were doing their best to let them through, but a spokesman for the 
ambulance service added: 'Obviously it gets difficult in a gridlock situation.' 
(In 1 to 4 PRESENCE OF NEGATIVE CAUSAL CONSEQUENTS OF THE PROTEST] 
5. A spokesman for the protest group, known only as Chris, said: 'The idea was not to block traffic but to get 
motorists to leave their cars at home.' 
6. He said the group supported both the striking Tube drivers and the idea of public transport. 
7. A London Underground spokesman, however rubbished the protest as 'totally self-defeating'. 
8. He said: 'they are not helping the cause of public transport at all. We need to keep the roads clear on today 
of all days, if only so that our buses can get through...' 	 [my bold] 
Sentence 1 indicates that the protest is by cyclists and so allows some instantiation of 
`protest' as to the nature of the causal antecedent fairly early on in the text's reading, unlike 
Evening Standard Text 1. Sentence 2 indicates that the protest 'aimed at supporting public 
transport', again allowing more instantiation. However, the impact of this is reduced since 
this text is much less salient than Evening Standard text 1. Moreover, there is still no 
explicitly mentioned perceived cause-consequent by the protestors that because LU 
management reneged on a pay deal, there is more traffic and thus more pollution on the 
roads. Admittedly there is a hint of all this in 5 and 6 but IR would not invest the necessary 
cognitive effort to 'expand' these hints. Besides, this hint does not compare favourably to 
1 - 4 and 8 where there is explicit specifying of negative causal consequents of the cycle 
protest. In this respect, the text still leads to mystifying discourse for IR about the rationale 
of the protest. 
The Guardian August 8 1996 
Motorists fume over show of support for strikers 
CYCLE PROTEST ADDS TO TUBE DISRUPTION 
Alex Bellos 
1. Bicycle campaigners ended a rally that brought chaos to London's rush hour traffic yesterday by invading 
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the office of London Transport's chairman and using their bicycle locks to chain themselves to his window. 
2. Forty protestors entered LT's headquarters in Westminster after 500 cyclists had brought traffic around 
Trafalgar and Parliament squares to a standstill. 
3. The action was in support of yesterday's strike by tube drivers. 
(ABSENCE OF PROTESTORS' PERCEPTION THAT LU MANAGEMENTS RENEGING ON A PAY 
DEAL (CAUSAL ANTECEDENT) leading to an inevitable strike PRODUCES EXTRA TRAFFIC 
POLLUTION (CAUSAL CONSEQUENT), i.e. CARS LEAD TO POLLUTION, TUBES DO NOT] 
4. An LT spokeswoman said that the chairman, Peter Ford, was in his seventh floor office when about 10 
cyclists came in, started throwing papers around, and hung a banner out the window. 
5. They spent 10 minutes having a 'fairly good-humoured chat', in which they all agreed public transport was 
under-funded, until the police arrived with bolt cutters. 
6. Nine protestors were arrested and charged with offences including assault, breach of the peace, criminal 
damage and theft. 
7. Scotland Yard said that protestors punched and kicked a police sergeant. 
8. They also grabbed his video camera, police radio and helmet. 
9. The event was organised by the anti-car pressure group Reclaim the Streets, which has close links to 
London's monthly Critical Mass bicycle demonstrations. 
10. While participants said the aim was not to infuriate car drivers, an inevitable consequence was that traffic 
- already slower than normal because of the tube strike - was brought to a standstill in several places. 
[SEPARATION OF CAUSAL CONSEQUENTS OF TUBE STRIKE AND PROTEST] 
11. Many drivers honked their horns in anger and threatened violence at the cheering protestors. 
12. Groups of cyclists converged on Trafalgar Square at 9am, where a man in his 40s was arrested for breach 
of the peace. 
13. Reg Wagland, aged 62, a retired electrician, said the protest was to highlight transport problems and show 
solidarity. 'We are here to support the tube drivers. Their employers reneged on a deal.' 
(ABSENCE OF PROTESTORS' PERCEPTION THAT LU MANAGEMENTS RENEGING ON A PAY 
DEAL (CAUSAL ANTECEDENT) leading to an inevitable strike PRODUCES EXTRA TRAFFIC 
POLLUTION (CAUSAL CONSEQUENT), i.e. CARS LEAD TO POLLUTION, TUBES DO NOT] 
14. Another cyclist said: 'By cycling instead of driving Londoners can show their concern about the chronic 
underfunding of public transport, which results from placing profits before the environment, the health and 
safety of workers and quality of life.' 
15. Bearing banners saying Squeeze Cars Not Tubes, the demonstration moved on to Parliament Square. 
(ABSENCE OF PROTESTORS' PERCEPTION THAT LU MANAGEMENTS RENEGING ON A PAY 
DEAL (CAUSAL ANTECEDENT) leading to an inevitable strike PRODUCES EXTRA TRAFFIC 
POLLUTION (CAUSAL CONSEQUENT), i.e. CARS LEAD TO POLLUTION, TUBES DO NOT] 
16. In front of the House of Commons the protestors got out of their saddles and held their bikes in the air. 
17. The demonstration was criticised by motorists' organisations. 
18. The RAC's head of campaigns, Edmund King, said: 'To stage this protests on a strike day when many 
people have no alternative but to use their cars is selfish and counter-productive.' 
19. An AA spokesman, Paul Wafters, said: 'Direct action protests really do cause chaos, and some of the more 
illegal activities can cause disruption to the emergency services and people having to make urgent journeys.' 
[PRESENCE OF A PERCEIVED CAUSAL CONSEQUENT OF PROTEST BY NON- 
SYMPATHIZER] 	 [111n, lx)1c1] 
Like the previous texts, The Guardian text does not attempt to conceal the fact that the 
protest caused huge disruption. However, the crucial point is that IR's discourse is less 
mystifying, with regard to causal antecedence in the early part of the text, than the one 
derived from Evening Standard Text 1. This highlights how the nature of the 'protestors' 
is significantly downplayed in 'Evening Standard' text 1. IR knows it is a 'cycle protest' 
from the start as well as knowing explicitly that the cyclists are supporting the tube strike. 
Since posing why-questions as to causal antecedence is a natural part of discourse derivation 
even for a reader with little vested interest in a text, a rationale can begin to be formulated 
that this is some kind of ecological protest. However, again, the Guardian text does not 
specify the RTS perceived causal consequent at sentence 3, i.e., that LU management from 
the perspective of the bicycle campaigners have caused the extra traffic pollution and nor 
does it seek to flesh this out at sentence 13. The mention of the banner 'squeeze cars not 
tubes' (sentence 15) again hints at this consequence. But a fuller generation of the 
consequence would not be forthcoming from IR since again it is a consequent based on the 
perception of the campaigners, requiring more processing effort in order to produce the 
necessary identification. Compare also sentence 10 in The Guardian with sentence 1 from 
the Evening Standard text 1: 
The Guardian 
10. While participants said the aim was not to infuriate car drivers, an inevitable consequence was that traffic 
- already slower than normal because of the tube strike - was brought to a standstill in several places. 
(SEPARATION OF CAUSAL CONSEQUENTS OF TUBE STRIKE AND PROTEST] 
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Evening Standard Text 1 
1. Protestors today smashed their way into London Underground headquarters as a mass demonstration on 
the streets and the Tube strike brought central London to a standstill. 
(CONFLATED CAUSAL CONSEQUENTS + FRONTING OF'  ASS DEMONSTRATION] 
In the Guardian, there is a separation of the causal consequents of the tube strike and the 
protest. That is, the tube strike meant that the traffic was slower than normal and the protest 
meant that the traffic was brought to standstill in places. In Evening Standard text 1, these 
consequents are not separated. Indeed, with the fronting of 'mass demonstration on the 
streets', the impression created for me is that the demonstration is an equal contributor to 
the central London standstill if not the major contributor. 
8.4.3 Mystification through Automatic Selective Process around Main Characters 
Recall the information as to selective processing of narratives we looked at in 6.5. We saw 
how a number of studies indicated that main and subsidiary characters are processed in 
different ways. We saw how Morrow (1985) showed that when a character (B) is perceived 
from the point of view of character (A) that the reader's perception of states is bound up 
with the perspective of character (A). In effect, (A) is the main character and (B) is the 
subsidiary character. We also saw how Garrod and Sanford (1988) examined the differences 
in reference resolution with both proper names and role descriptions and that sentences with 
references to proper names were read more rapidly than those with references to role-defined 
characters. Both these experiments demonstrated that causal explanation of main characters 
is automatically sought. IR only generates automatic and not strategic inferences and so will 
only automatically seek causal explanation of main characters and not seek strategic 
explanation of secondary characters which requires more effort. With these points in mind, 
consider the 'character' of Peter Ford in the following seven sentences from Evening 
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Standard text 1 and the discourse IR derives4: 
4. LU chairman Peter Ford said: 'I was astonished when they burst into my office. 
5. I asked them what they wanted and they didn't seem too sure. 
6. 'They started chanting slogans, throwing paperwork around and opening the windows and unfurling banners 
outside'. 
7. 'I was worried that they would damage my family photographs so I asked them to respect them and they did. 
8. I explained that I was a keen cyclist and asked them if there were any points I could clarify about the dispute. 
9. 'I even told them how much Underground drivers earn. 
10. Then they said they wanted to lock the doors but I told them if this was a non-violent protest they would 
have to play by the rules, which they did.' 
The fact that sentence 6 is in fact a repetition of sentence 3 is an example of text bias 
furthering the case that the real nature of the protest is being delayed. And now to the 
discourse bias. In seven sentences, the protestors are viewed from Peter Ford's perspective 
thus imparting to them subsidiary status as 'characters'. Furthermore, 'protestors' are 'role-
defined characters' whereas Peter Ford is a proper name. Given that IR would seek 
automatic causal explanation of the main character, IR's discourse would inadvertently 
downplay the perspective of the 'protestors', leading to even more mystification as to the 
purpose of the protestors. In other words, again, IR's discourse is inadvertently biased 
against the protestors. But what about a reader more familiar with the nature of the protest 
and so one who more easily relates the picture of 'demonstrators' to 'protestors' in the text? 
For such a reader, the 'secondary' billing of the protestors will not lead to such a mystifying 
discourse of the purpose of the protest and so this reader's discourse would not be biased in 
the same way as IR's discourse. By the same token, a reader with a more vested interest in 
the text can seek causal explanation for the actions of the secondary characters. However, 
this would be a strategic procedure rather than being an automatic one. 
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A word or two about apparent anomalies. Consider sentence 9 'I even told them how much 
LU drivers earn'. On page one where sentence 9 is found, IR would still not know that the 
protestors are eco-protestors and is highly likely to assume that the protestors are LU 
employees, perhaps tube drivers. On this assumption, Peter Ford's utterance would seem 
odd. Peter Ford also explains that he was a keen cyclist (8), which also seems anomalous. 
However, both these anomalies are from Peter Ford's perspective, the main character 
perspective, and so the oddity of 'cyclist' is somewhat diminished in IR's discourse. In the 
same way, in sentences 16 and 17, Edmund King is given more primary character status in 
being allowed to voice his opinion of the protestors who in consequence receive the 'billing' 
of secondary characters. Again, as secondary characters, the nature of the protest is 
diminished in IR's discourse. 
And a few final points concerning the Guardian text: 
4. An LT spokeswoman said that the chairman, Peter Ford, was in his seventh floor office when about 10 
cyclists came in, started throwing papers around, and hung a banner out the window. 
5. They spent 10 minutes having a 'fairly good-humoured chat', in which they all agreed public transport was 
under-funded, until the police arrived with bolt cutters. 
With regard to Peter Ford, the perspective has become 3rd person and not 1st person. Thus 
the protestors are not perceived from the viewpoint of a main character. The configuration 
of the Guardian text means that the nature of the protest is not as downplayed in IR's 
discourse as compared to IR's discourse from the 'Evening Standard' (text 1). 
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8.5 News in Brief Text - 'Sex Assault Sailors Jailed': The Mirror October 8 1997 
8.5.1 Instantiation of the Text Body by the Headline 
Compare the following two 'News In Brief' texts: 
i) INDECENT ASSAULT SAILORS JAILED 
SIX Navy ratings were kicked out of the service and jailed for up to 10 months yesterday after two recruits 
were indecently assaulted in an initiation ceremony. (CAUSAL CONSEQUENT PRESENT] 
Their young victims were attacked on board HMS Southampton. Two other ratings were given three-month 
suspended sentences by a Portsmouth court martial. 
ii) THE MIRROR October 8, 1997: 
SEX ASSAULT SAILORS JAILED 
SIX Navy ratings were kicked out of the service and jailed for up to 10 months yesterday after two recruits 
were indecently assaulted in an initiation ceremony. (CAUSAL CONSEQUENT PRESENT] 
Their young victims were attacked on board HMS Southampton. Two other ratings were given three-month 
suspended sentences by a Portsmouth court martial. 	 [my italics] 
Only the headlines in the texts differ, with the second headline being authentic. I will 
comment initially on text i). While 'indecent assault's may suffice in the headline, we would 
expect to be supplied with details in the body of the text. But this is not the case. Notice 
how the superordinate verb 'assault' is used in both the headline and the text body. It is 
difficult to form prototypes around superordinates and thus difficult to access the familiar. 
Superordinates, unlike basic-level categories, are not characterised by cognitive economy 
— a high amount of information yielded from a minimum cognitive effort. IR, of course, 
does not invest much cognitive effort and so processing of the text is shallow with regard 
to the possibilities for what type of assault took place. Text i) is mystifying in reading for 
IR. 
Now consider text ii), which is the actual text. The headline is SEX ASSAULT SAILORS 
JAILED. Before I continue with the analysis here are McKoon and Ratcliff (1989b: 1143): 
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...when a [general] category is contextually defined, then information about a most typical exemplar of the 
category is encoded to a high degree of inference processes...these processes can be claimed to apply only for 
contextually defined categories that have a most typical exemplar...Other categories may have so little 
definition that there is no most typical exemplar (e.g. Dorothy thought about the animal, from Roth and 
Shoben, 1983). 
`Indecent assault' on McKoon and Ratcliff's line would not lead to a 'typical exemplar' for 
IR, in the same way that 'Dorothy thought about the animal' would not. But what of 'sexual 
assault'? I would not like to claim that 'sexual assault' would lead to a sharply delineated 
typical exemplar such as penile penetration. But all the same, it is more constraining than 
`indecent assault'. That is, the modifier 'sex' (which could be construed as a basic-level 
event, given that 'rape' is a basic-level event (see, Rifkin, 1985)) leads to some degree of 
instantiation of 'assault' (or to use Rosch's (1978) phrase, leads to some 'translation' of the 
more general category) such that the assault much more obviously included penile sexual 
contact, which characterises `rape'.6 Because 'sex assault' is more constraining than 
`indecent assault', and a prototype is partially emergent at least, 'sex assault' has some 
association with 'direct manipulation'. Crucially though, this 'translation' of 'assault' in the 
headline does not require much cognitive effort since basic-level categories are characterised 
by cognitive economy. Thus, the above 'translation' is one readily produced by readers and 
not just by IR. 
Now, as the interpersonal function presides in a headline, we would not expect the ideational 
function of this headline to be the ultimate guide for how the text is processed. However, 
`indecently assaulted' describes the nature of the events in the body of text ii), whereas 'sex 
assault' is in the headline. Furthermore, there is no mention of the actual details of the 
assault in the text body. This is to be expected since it is a 'news-in-brief text. 
Consequently, it is likely for IR that the general category in the body of the text — 'indecently 
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assaulted' [i.e. without a typical exemplar] - has some instantiation by the more constraining 
`sex assault' of the headline towards the typical exemplar of 'rape'. Given also IR's 
propensity (or any reader's) to try to 'ask why?', to generate a causal antecedent from a 
specified causal consequent (being 'kicked out of the service and jailed...'), we would 
expect such instantiation in IR' s discourse. 
If the events being described were of a 'typical sexual assault', then this instantiation of the 
main body of the text by the headline, even though the function of a headline is usually more 
interpersonal than ideational, would not matter. However, what actually took place was not 
a typical exemplar of 'sexual assault'. Consider the following from the Guardian as an 
indication of the real nature of events: 
The Guardian: 8th October 1997 
COURT MARTIAL CONDEMNS GANG'S 'DISGUSTING CRUELTIES' 
NAVY WARNS BULLIES AS 8 RATINGS JAILED (by David Pallister) 
Royal Navy sailors were given a stern warning yesterday that bullying will not be tolerated, as a court martial 
jailed eight naval ratings who carried out a cruel initiation ceremony on two recruits. 
They were sentenced to between three and 10 months, and six of them were also dismissed from the service. 
Captain John Wright, the president of the court martial panel of five officers sitting at HMS Nelson 
in Portsmouth, told them: 'This is a case in which you all as a gang used violence against two young men in 
their first sea draft. 
`You humiliated and caused great distress to your victims, such that in one case the young, promising 
sailor is likely to be unable to pursue his career in the Navy because of the mental anguish he still suffers as 
a result of your actions. 
`The Navy will not tolerate such behaviour. Your actions were not horseplay, they went well beyond that and 
were despicable and in some cases disgusting acts of cruel ill-treatment.' 
The two-day hearing had been told that the recruits, aged 20 and 21, had been subjected to sexual abuse and 
beatings on board the destroyer HMS Southampton, while it was anchored off the coast of Oman in April this 
year. 
One had been taped to a table and the other had been trussed up with rope and sodomised with the metal handle 
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of [a] mop, known as a 'doodlebug'. One of the ratings' defence lawyers told the hearing that humiliating 
initiation rites were a routine part of Navy life. 
Kieran Fuller, aged 18, and 25-year-old Antony Wilkinson, who both admitted one charge of assault, were 
sentenced to three months suspended detention. They were left with their Navy careers intact for playing lesser 
parts in the assaults. 
James Rowland, aged 20, who admitted two charges of indecent assault, was dismissed from the Navy and 
jailed for five months. Gary Weston, aged 21, who admitted a charge of indecent assault and another of 
assault, faced the same jail term and dismissal. 
Alasdair Whall, aged 22, who admitted two charges of assault and one charge of conduct prejudicial to good 
order and Naval discipline, and Lee Phillips, aged 23, who pleaded guilty to two assault charges and one charge 
of indecent assault, were also dismissed and jailed for five months. 
Former able seaman Michael Thomson, aged 27, who had already left the Navy, had admitted four charges of 
assault and one indecent assault. He was dismissed and jailed for eight months. 
The final defendant, Gareth Jones, aged 25, had pleaded guilty to two charges of indecent assault and three 
charges of assault. Jones, who was married three months ago, was jailed for 10 months and dismissed from 
the service. 	 [my bold] 
In the circumstances as described, the inclusion of 'sex assault' in the Mirror text is 
misleading since it leads to some instantiation at least of prototypical sexual contact when 
in fact what happened was not prototypical sexual contact. There is mention that the court 
heard of 'sexual abuse' and this is presumably the argument being put forward by the 
prosecuting lawyers. Now, the length of 'The Guardian' article means more information can 
be provided than in a 'News In Brief' text. This enables the NP 'sexual abuse' to be given 
sufficient contextualisation such that the reader will know by that point that non-typical 
`sexual abuse' has occurred. Recall from chapter 5 the following from Lakoff (1987a: 452) 
on the symbiosis between prototypicality and basic-level categorisation: 
Rosch has observed that simple basic-level expressions are used to refer to a prototypical instance of a basic-
level category, but that it is misleading to use such an expression to refer to a nonprototyical instance. For 
example, if a sparrow lands on the front porch, it is not misleading to report this by There's a bird on the porch. 
But it would be quite misleading to use such a sentence to report that an eagle had landed on the porch or that 
a penguin had waddled up the front steps. Similarly, if John hit a baseball with a bat in the usual way by 
swinging the bat at the ball, we could straightforwardly report that John hit a ball. But if he hit a beachball 
with a pizza platter, or if he hit a ball by throwing a rock at it, it would be misleading to describe such an event 
to someone who didn't see it as John hit a ball, even though such a description, strictly speaking, would be 
true. Hit a ball has an associated conventional image that characterizes the normal case, and with no further 
modification we assume that the normal case holds. Thus, conventional images are used to understand even 
the simplest, most straightforward sentences with no idioms in them. 
By the same token, use of 'sex assault' is misleading since what took place was a non-typical 
instance.7  
The crucial point about 'News in Brief' texts are their size. Since sufficient details cannot 
be supplied, on reflection text i) shows what might be called responsible mystification. Text 
ii) on the other hand suffers from headline instantiation of the text body. In other words, the 
pragmatic use of 'SEX ASSAULT' to capture a reader's attention exceeds its interpersonal 
function and becomes embroiled in the ideational function of the text as a whole. 
8.5.2 Contrast with Other News Texts 
News in Brief Text - 'Sailors Jailed': The Times, 8th October 1997 
Now, as an actual example of 'responsible mystification', consider the 'News In Brief' 
report of the same events by 'The Times': 
The Times: 8th October 1997 
SAILORS JAILED 
Eight sailors from the destroyer HMS Southampton were jailed for subjecting two recruits to a degrading 
initiation ceremony. The eight mechanics had forced the two 20-year-olds to undergo a series of disgusting 
acts when they joined for their first sea posting. 	 [my bold] 
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`Acts' here can be treated as an ad-hoc superordinate category. Superordinates are not 
characterised by cognitive economy. Since IR does not make much cognitive effort and the 
fact that context is not so constraining, a typical exemplar is not readily generated in IR's 
discourse when what in fact happened was non-typical. In other words, the text is being 
responsibly mystifying since 'acts' is not readily instantiated in the discourse of IR. 
News In Brief - Sex Attack Arrest: The Times October 22nd 1997 
SEX ATTACK ARREST 
1. A 23-year-old man has been arrested on suspicion of a sexual attack on a woman who was dumped in the 
boot of her car after being abducted in Loughborough town centre and raped in fields last Saturday. 
2. The assault lasted seven hours. 
3. The car was later found by a farmer near Bolton. 	 [my bold] 
In the headline, again 'sex attack' is more constraining, for IR, towards the typicality of 
penile penetration associated with 'rape' than 'indecent assault'. This is confirmed when 
IR reaches the body of the text and encounters 'raped' i.e., 'direct manipulation', a high 
degree of interaction between agent and patient, which in turn instantiates 'assault' in 
sentence 2. As a result, the headline, which in general usually has an interpersonal rather 
than ideational emphasis, does not have to provide the ideational component and thus 
instantiate the superordinate category 'assault' in the text body. 
Chaplain Wins Sex Case Fight: Evening Standard 2 June 1998 
CHAPLAIN WINS SEX CASE FIGHT 
CAPTAIN WEEPS AT COURT MARTIAL VERDICT 
By Ed Harris 
AN ARMY chaplain who was accused of indecently assaulting a soldier's wife broke down in tears this 
afternoon as he was cleared by a military court. 
Captain Richard Landall, 41, was found not guilty of four charges of indecent assault. All the offences were 
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alleged to have taken place in Germany in November, after the woman had sought pastoral help from him. 
While chaplain to the Second Battalion Royal Regiment of Fusiliers and stationed in Celle, near Hanover, he 
was alleged to have grabbed the woman's breast, rubbed his groin against her, put his hand down her knickers 
and kissed her mouth. 
The father-of-four was cleared at a court martial at Aldershot barracks...' 
The headline includes the modifier 'SEX CASE'. But because of the length of the article, 
the actual charges brought against the chaplain are detailed and so, in this text, we actually 
find out the nature of the indecent assault. Consequently the function of the headline which 
is usually in the favour of the interpersonal function is not tipped in favour of the ideational 
function. 
8.6. 'Interpreter 'Was Prepared to Prostitute Herself" News Text: Evening Standard 
21 November 1997 
We saw in 8.4.1 how incorrect causal antecedents can be generated because of the propensity 
of readers (in 8.4.1, IR) to want to instantiate general categories by relating them to familiar 
knowledge. In the following, I show how a misleading causal antecedent can be constructed 
because of irresponsible text configuration, rather than instantiation. Consider the 
following: 
Evening Standard News Text 1: 21 November 1997 
INTERPRETER 'WAS PREPARED TO PROSTITUTE HERSELF' 
`Squadron leader, his mistress and the other man' 
1. THE YOUNG lover of a squadron leader accused of murdering his wife was 'tricky and manipulative' and 
prepared to prostitute herself with an older man, a court heard today. 
2. Nicholas Tucker, 46, is said to have murdered his wife over his love for Dijana Dudokovic, whom 
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The 'schoolboy' love letters: Page 5 
he met in Bosnia. 
3. However, when he telephoned her about his wife's death, she 'realised her future had broken down and she 
was ready to do anything. 
4. She said that she was even ready to prostitute herself and even go with an old man if she could find one.' 
5. She went off to live with a Swiss restaurateur in Verbier. 
[Photo of attractive blonde woman - caption - Serbian interpreter Dijana Dudukovic, 23, was described 
in court today as 'tricky and manipulative'.] 
We have seen (6.2) amongst the minimalists and later constructionists that there is a 
consensus that the reader searches for the causal antecedent. And so even IR, a reader with 
little vested interest in a text, seeks to generate causal antecedence in discourse derivation. 
Consider now the complement 'tricky and manipulative' and its position. Dudokovic is the 
global theme of the article being the subject of the headline which is reinforced by her 
picture. She is also the sentence theme of sentence 1 which establishes a relational function 
with 'tricky and manipulative'. The effect of both the global and the local topicalisation is 
that IR would make a connecting causal antecedent inference between Dudokovic's 'tricky 
and manipulative' personality and the death of Tucker's wife. This is reinforced by 'tricky 
and manipulative' in the photo caption. The most straightforward elaborative causal 
antecedent inference here is that Dudokovic manipulated Tucker to commit murder. Indeed, 
the seeming immorality of Dudokovic is initially abetted by the information that she 'was 
prepared to prostitute herself". The 'prostituting' is with an older man and so IR may 
assume that this is Nicholas Tucker, aged 46, as he is mentioned in the next sentence (2). 
But Nicholas Tucker is not the 'older man' and indeed 'older man' becomes 'old man' in 
sentence 4. It is difficult also to know what Dudokovic means by 'her future' without a 
great deal of speculative forward elaborative inferencing as to why. But this would be a 
strategic inference which would not be forthcoming from IR. Furthermore, the fact that her 
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future had broken down does create some kind of narrative conflict. If she had egged Tucker 
on to murder his wife, then, she would presumably be more prepared for the outcome. All 
the same, sentence 4 conflicts with but does not cancel the previous IR causal antecedent 
inference that she manipulated Tucker into the murder. Now consider the follow-up text to 
this story on page 5: 
Evening Standard News Text 2: 21 November 1997 
`The Squadron leader's letters of love, love, love' 
by PAUL CHESTON 
Courts Correspondent 
1. The RAF officer accused of murdering his wife sent schoolboy-style love letters to his girlfriend, constantly 
repeating the words 'I love you' for five pages, the court heard today. 
2. Squadron Leader Nicholas Tucker, 46, is said to have murdered his wife Carol over his love for Serbian 
interpreter Dijana Dudukovic, now 23, whom he met while acting as a United Nations military observer with 
the peacekeeping force in Bosnia. 
3. However, the jury was told that Miss Dudukovic, was 'tricky and manipulative' and wanted to make 
a secure future for herself in western Europe. 
4. She is now married and living with another man in Switzerland, the court was told. 
5. Father-of-two Tucker is accused of staging a fake road accident on a lonely Suffolk country road to cover 
his attempt to strangle and then drown his wife in July, 1995. 
6. The court has been told that he had an affair in Bosnia with Miss Dudukovic and also brought her to London 
to stay in a double room in the RAF Club in Piccadilly. 
7. Bertrand Du Pasquier, who met Miss Dudokovic while acting as a UN refugee official in the former 
Yugoslavia, told Norwich Crown Court how she came to stay with him at his home in Geneva at the request 
of her parents, who feared for her safety in former Yugoslavia. 
8. 'Tucker rang her at least once a day, sometimes twice, sometimes lasting five minutes, sometimes 50 
minutes. 
9. He started ringing her from the first day she arrived here,' he said. 
10. 'I don't believe during that time she wrote to him but she received letters. 
11. One had five or six pages with the same words repeated all the time like a schoolboy tradition - but the 
sentence was not what a schoolboy would say. 
12. He was repeating 'I love you' for line after line on every page. It was signed 'Nick'. She burned the 
letters.' 
13. Two days after Mrs Tucker's death the Squadron Leader rang to tell Miss Dudukovic what had happened, 
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the court heard. 
14. 'After that call she realised it was not possible to go to him in England as was planned,' said Mr Du 
Pasquier. 
15. 'She realised her future had broken down and she said she was ready to do anything, even prostitute 
herself and go with an old man if she could find one.' 
16. A few days later she went with Mr Du Pasquier and one of his children to stay in his chalet in Verbier. 
17. She met a restaurant owner there and stayed on with him. 
18. 'I never heard anything from her again,' said Mr Du Pasquier. 
19. Tucker of Honington, Suffolk denies murder. 
20. The case continues. 	 [my bold] 
IR now knows that 'future' from page 1 refers to a desire to secure a future in Western 
Europe. Sentence 3 does not now have the topicalisation effects that the complement, 
`tricky and manipulative', had on page 1. However, despite the length of the article, the 
elaborative causal antecedent inference from page 1 that Dudokovic manipulated Tucker to 
commit murder is not cancelled. Consider 13-17: 
CAUSE 
13. Two days after Mrs Tucker's death the Squadron Leader rang to tell Miss Dudukovic what had happened, 
the court heard. 
CONSEQUENCES 
14. 'After that call she realised it was not possible to go to him in England as was planned,' said Mr Du 
Pasquier. 
15. 'She realised her future had broken down and she said she was ready to do anything, even prostitute 
herself and go with an old man if she could find one.' 
16. A few days later she went with Mr Du Pasquier and one of his children to stay in his chalet in Verbier. 
17. She met a restaurant owner there and stayed on with him. 	 [my bold] 
Recall from chapter 5 the following from Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 102) on superordinate 
verbs: 
...their main function is to highlight one very general attribute which is part of a whole range of basic-level 
action categories...Other candidates for superordinate action categories with a salient general attribute are 
HAPPEN, BECOME, BEGIN and STOP. 
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The verb 'happen' (see sentence 13) highlights a general attribute and so can be taken as a 
superordinate verb. Now let us return to the text. The consequences are well specified and 
certainly we would expect IR to generate a connecting causal antecedent inference between 
sentence 13, Tucker 'rang to tell Dudokovic what had happened' and sentence 15 `...she 
realised her future had broken down'. In other words, IR knows generally what [i.e. 
something in the phone call] caused Dudokovic to realise her future had broken down but 
does not know why, something any reader is generally interested in; see quote from Graesser 
et al. (1994: 379) in 8.2.1 above. For IR, encyclopaedic knowledge of the causal relations 
between sentence 13 and 15 could not be that strong in memory since they do not know the 
characters of the story. Thus, IR' s discourse at this part of the text is mystifying as to these 
causal relations. In other words, while IR makes a connecting causal antecedent inference, 
the elaborative causal antecedent inference, an inference based on background knowledge, 
is necessarily shallow. This can all be tied to the results of Vonk and Noordman (1990). In 
other words, in the absence of sufficient background knowledge, even coherence inferences 
can be shallow. 
As before, any speculation as to Dudokovic's 'role' in the murder, so as to provide a 
stronger elaborative causal antecedent inference, is strategic inferencing and not the 
automatic variety of IR. Besides, that is all it would be - speculation. The fact is there is no 
evidence in text 2 that she was or was not an accessory to murder. The upshot of all this is 
that the automatic causal antecedent inference derived in IR' s discourse from text 1 that 
Dudokovic manipulated Tucker to murder his wife is still not cancelled when IR finishes 
text 2. Because this is a report of what happened in court and there has been no verdict 
passed as yet, there are no facts yet pertaining to whether Dudokovic was party to the 
murder. Consequently, in such a circumstance, newspapers should show prudence in 
topicalisation and condensation of information. Inferences generated because of the natural 
propensity of readers to try to ascertain causal antecedence, prompted by such topicalisation 
and condensation, may not be cancelled because evidence may not yet be available to assist 
abrogation. To illustrate the point, it might be fruitful to compare the above with the 
following text: 
The Sun News Text: September 5th 1995 
HYPNO-FIST 
Bruno: Telly Paul gave me better trance 
PHOTO OF 
	
PHOTO OF 
PAUL MCKENNA 	 FRANK BRUNO 
caption: Paul...hotel sessions 	 caption: Frank...no-nonsense mood 
WORLD EXCLUSIVE 
WORLD boxing champ Frank Bruno last night revealed how he won his title with help from telly hypnotist 
Paul McKenna. 
The mesmerising star put Big Frank in a tough, no-nonsense mood for his fight with American Oliver McCall. 
The pair, who are long-time pals, chatted like test-mates' to make the boxer think positively during two 
sessions days before Saturday's bout. 
New WBC heavyweight champion Frank 33, told The Sun exclusively: 'Paul came round to my hotel and 
talked me through a load of things. 
`He didn't hypnotise me - but he helped me relax and it was really constructive. He built up my confidence 
through calm, friendly chat. 
`He was a very nice, cool bloke who talked common sense and helped me get in the right frame of mind.' 
In 6.2.4, from McKoon and Ratcliff (1989a), we saw that for an inference to be generated 
automatically, a fair degree of semantic associative richness must be present. In the above 
339 
text, the semantic field 'mesmerising', 'sessions', 'hypno', 'trance' etc create a strong 
semantic associative richness and thus IR is likely to construct the elaborative inference that 
Bruno was hypnotised. However, later in the text we have a quote from Bruno (which I 
assume to be true) that McKenna did not in fact hypnotise him. The semantic associative 
inference that Bruno was hypnotised is thus cancelled. 
8.7 'The Thin End of the Veg' Text: Today October 20 1995 
The text I analyse below depends on an understanding of the complex category 
`vegetarianism'. I shall indicate why I think it is complex below and how the discourse of 
IR would be mystifying. Consider the following extract: 
The Thin End of the Veg8 
As Linda McCartney withdraws her 'too fatty' burgers, is life without meat really so 
healthy? 
by DOMINIC MIDGELEY 	 TODAY Friday October 20 1995 
1. ITS growing number of disciples would have us believe that it is the wonder diet for the next millennium. 
2. Turn vegetarian, they say, and your chances of dying from cancer could plummet by 40 per cent, and from 
heart disease, by 28 per cent. 
3. What's more you would suffer 80 per cent less food poisoning and reduce your chances of contracting 
diabetes or arthritis. 
4. But on Wednesday, the vegetarian passport to long life and happiness was left looking a bit tattered around 
the edges. 
5. Celebrity veggie Linda McCartney withdrew from sale thousands of packs of her Beefless Burgers after a 
TV programme revealed they contained twice as much vegetable fat as advertised. 
6. While the list of ingredients on the packets gave a fat content of 11.2 per cent, laboratory tests by ITV's The 
Big Story showed levels of up to 22.7 per cent. 
7. And the revelation coincided with a report from the Food Commission which found that 17 out of 21 popular 
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brands of veggie sausages and burgers were high in fat. 
8. The worst offender was a Granovita sausage which contained more fat than a pork sausage. 
9. [ital] So are Britain's three million vegetarians being taken for a an unhealthy ride by veggie food 
producers? [ital] 
10. Sue Dibb of the Food Commission thinks so. 'The high price of these products and the relatively cheap 
ingredients suggest manufacturers are trying to cash in on the growing interest in vegetarian food', she says. 
11. As if this wasn't enough, the Meat and Livestock Commission is weighing in with a campaign that claims 
the fat content of pork can be as low as four per cent, roughly the same as cheese. 
12. 'Vegetarians claim they are healthier,' says Commission spokesman Phil Saunders. 'They claim they live 
longer, suffer less from every disease known to man and probably at least a third will live forever. 
13. 'But you can get too much fat from a vegetarian diet just as can from a meat diet'... 
[picture of vegetables - caption 'Burgers are off: Linda and the veggies are under fire'] 
As an indication of the complexity of the issue of vegetarianism, I reproduce an extract from 
the British Nutrition Foundation web site www.nutrition.org.uk:  
Variations in strictness of vegetarianism are great and are largely dependent on the person's beliefs and reasons 
for adopting vegetarianism. This may be for a variety of personal, philosophical, ecological and economical 
reasons. 
The issue is a complex one and so vegetarianism may not be appreciated by everyone to the 
same degree. The web-site defines different types of vegetarianism in terms of what is 
excluded.9 For instance: 
Lacto-ovo-vegetarian 	 Exclusion of all meat, fish and poultry; milk, 
milk products and eggs are still consumed 
In other words, the vegetarian types are defined negatively, hence use of the term exclusion. 
The positive definition, what is eaten by the vegetarian type, is secondary. However, while 
we have allusion to the negative definition in the headline: 
As Linda McCartney withdraws her 'too fatty' burgers, is life without meat really so healthy? 
negative definition 
the actual thrust of the article rests predominantly and thus anomalously on a positive 
definition, i.e., that vegetarians eat manufactured 'veggie-food': 
4. But on Wednesday, the vegetarian passport to long life and happiness was left looking a bit tattered around 
the edges. 
9. So are Britain's three million vegetarians being taken for an unhealthy ride by veggie food producers? 
positive definition 
Consider all this broken down logically. Use of the term 'vegetarian' below does not 
include fruitarians and macrobiotics: 
i) If X is a vegetarian, then X eats vegetables 	 valid 
ii) If X eats vegetables, then X is a vegetarian 	 invalid [Affirming the Consequent] 
i) does not imply 
On the basis of this, one could argue that the picture and the caption are misleading since it 
is wrong to 'define' a vegetarian by what they eat at the expense of what they do not eat. In 
the same way: 
iii) If X eats manufactured 'veggie-food', then X is a vegetarian 	 valid 
[This of course is not true absolutely - carnivores can, should they choose, eat manufactured 'veggie-food' but 
eaters of such food are at least likely to be vegetarians.] 
iv) If X is a vegetarian, then X eats manfactured 'veggie-food' 	 invalid [Affirming the Consequent] 
does not imply iv). 
The text, then, commits the logical offence of affirming the consequent. Recall the difficulty 
subjects had with the Wason test (6.4.2) and how in most cases subjects affirmed the 
consequent. However, when a logical problem was couched in a familiar context then 
processing became easier. IR, by definition, has little vested interest in the text: IR has, then, 
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little vested interest in vegetarianism. Firstly, this would then diminish the likelihood that 
IR would notice the affirming of the consequent. Secondly, the processing labour necessary 
to notice that the consequent is affirmed is increased with the problems of defining 
vegetarianism. So, since IR only makes minimum cognitive effort, the processing labour 
needed to notice that while the positive definition is present, the negative definition is 
absent, would not be invested in IR's discourse. The overall effect is that IR is not likely to 
notice how the concept of vegetarianism is being mystified in discourse. Or to put it another 
way, similar to the 'Reclaim the Streets Evening Standard Text 1', IR's discourse is 
inadvertently biased against 'vegetarianism'. As a coda to the above, I am not suggesting 
that people have difficulty in processing logically. Rather, this kind of processing will incur 
a higher degree of cognitive labour if the reader cannot draw upon familiar encyclopaedic 
knowledge in discourse. And for a reader with little vested interest in the text, this cognitive 
labour is unlikely. Conversely, a reader with a vested interest in vegetarianism will no doubt 
notice the logical offence in deriving a different discourse from that of IR. That is, the 
discourse of such a reader is not biased against vegetarianism. 
8.8 Fairclough's (1989) 'Quarry Load-Shedding Problem' News Text 
8.8.1 Highlighting how the Text Can Lead to a Different Mystification in Reading Compared 
to that Found by Fairclough 
Recall from chapter 1, the use of the following text from Fairclough (1989: 51): 
Quarry load-shedding problem 
UNSHEETED lorries from Middlebarrow Quarry were still causing problems by shedding stones on their 
journey through Warton village, members of the parish council heard at their September meeting. 
The council's observations have been sent to the quarry management and members are hoping to see an 
improvement. 
In his commentary, Fairclough (1989: 51) argues that causality in the above is not clear 
because of the surface syntax - 'it is difficult to take seriously the notion that the lorries are 
the cause of the problem'. He contends that `unsheeted lorries' contains 'unspecified 
causality' for unsheeted implies the failure of a process to happen - someone did not put 
sheets over the loads' and that the cause of the problem in a different representation could 
be this 'someone'. However, from the psycholinguistic evidence I highlighted in chapter 6, 
causal antecedence can be inferred across sentences, this evidence conflicting with 
Fairclough's syntax-first symbolicism. Since IR readily tries to generate causal antecedence, 
there would be little difficulty in inferring that the quarry management is at the head of the 
causal chain since they own the lorries etc. To gloss this slightly, IR should have little 
problem establishing a connecting causal antecedent inference between 'quarry 
management' and 'shedding stones'. The richness of the elaborative backwards causal 
antecedent inference is of course very much dependent upon the richness of the background 
knowledge of a reader as to how a quarry management might manage its lorry drivers etc. 
To sum up: the text is actually not mystifying of causality in the way in which Fairclough 
contends. 
Now let me show how from the perspective of the IR framework the text can lead to a 
different mystification from that identified by Fairclough. The noun 'problems' is here an 
ad-hoc superordinate. Superordinates are less 'directly understood' than basic-level 
categories, and are not characterised by cognitive economy. So, since IR is a parsimonious 
reader, little effort will be invested to ascertain the possible nature of these 'problems'. As 
I have indicated previously, causal consequent inferences are not generated in the discourse 
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of IR or only shallowly at best. They are more likely when the situation is highly 
constrained by being familiar, having a high degree of semantic associative richness and 
where there is only one obvious outcome. However, a causal consequent inference here 
would be weak at best since the causal consequent of stones being shed does not fit these 
criteria. Recall also (5.4.2) that the word 'cause' characterises non-central causation 
(Lakoff, 1987a: 55). Moreover, recall (5.6.2) how Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 102) suggest 
that verbs like 'cause' and 'become' can be seen as superordinate verbs because: 
...their main function is to highlight one very general attribute which is part of a whole range of basic-level 
action categories. 
Now, taking into account that: 
i) since both 'problems' and 'cause' are superordinates, they are not characterised by 
cognitive economy 
ii) 'cause' characterises non-central causation 
iii) IR has little vested interest in the text 
any causal consequent inference for IR, a reader who invests minimum cognitive effort, as 
to how the stones caused problems would be very weak indeed. What Sanford (1990) (6.2.4) 
says about topicalisation is also pertinent to this text. `UNSHEETED lorries from 
Middlebarrow Quarry' is theme and 'were still causing problems by shedding stones on their 
journey through Warton village' the rheme. Since 'shedding-stones' is included in the 
rheme, again, it makes it less likely that an elaborative inference in IR' s discourse, as to what 
the 'problems' are, will be produced. 
Unlike Fairclough's analysis, the IR framework does not just focus on the text itself at the 
expense of a particular kind of reader. [However, in the absence of an explicit notion of a 
reader here, but with Fairclough's comments on the syntax and absence of agency, the 
implication seems to be that, for Fairclough, readers consume the text (see 9.2).] An 
analysis of the text only would reveal that a causal consequent has not been specified. The 
IR framework, however, attends to the discourse perspective of a particular reader and so 
is both text and discourse based. On this basis then it is not just that the text does not 
stipulate the causal consequent, but IR, being non-analytical, would not notice this anyway. 
That is, IR' s discourse is inadvertently mystifying as to what the 'problems' were. 
Now consider the following variations: 
UNSHEETED lorries from Middlebarrow Quarry were still causing problems by shedding stones on their 
journey through Warton village, members of the parish council heard at their September meeting. 
a) Particularly concerned were village mothers. 
OR 
b) Particularly concerned were village mothers afraid of injury to their babies. 
The council's observations have been sent to the quarry management and members are hoping to see an 
improvement. 
With a), the context is beginning to become constrained and so we might expect the causal 
consequent to have some degree of generation, i.e., more than in the original. With b) a 
(possible) causal consequent has been specified and processing of the event for IR is less 
shallow. I should stress here that I am not suggesting that the 'Quarry' text is deliberately 
mystifying the nature of the event in a sinister way because it does not specify the causal 
consequent. I just use this text to show how the IR framework isolates text which can lead 
to mystification in reading from a perspective which conflicts with the mystification 
Fairclough perceives. 
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8.8.2 The Interpersonal Function of the Headline 
Consider again the headline that Fairclough (1989: 50-51) refers to and his commentary: 
Quarry load-shedding problem 
`the grammatical form in which the headline is cast is that of a nominalization: a process is expressed as a 
noun, as if it were an entity' 
Fairclough (1989), in the above, is highlighting how the nominalisation has, in the removal 
of agent and patient, mystified the causality of the event. Similar to Fairclough's analysis 
of the 'cancer' text in 7.5.3, this is an example of treating a headline from an ideational 
perspective when its function is interpersonal. Like Fairclough, I too want to criticise the 
headline - but from an interpersonal perspective rather than an ideational one. The sentence 
`the lorry shed its load', because of the use of the basic-level 'lorry', and thus more directly 
understood category, can lead to the generation of a gestalt. However, 'Quarry load-
shedding problem' is difficult to generate a gestalt from because of the lack of directly 
understood basic-level categories. There are two, loosely speaking, superordinate categories 
['load' and 'problem] which are necessarily only indirectly meaningful for IR. It is usual 
for a headline's interpersonal function to be more prominent than its ideational function. 
One effective way of achieving this is to use directly meaningful concepts, i.e., basic-level 
categories, rather than the superordinate categories used. To sum up: construing the 
ideational function of the headline as being mystifying is inappropriate. Rather, it is its 
interpersonal function which is ineffective. 
As an example of a headline which is successful from an interpersonal perspective, consider 
the following newspaper headline and extract from The Express (Saturday January 23 1999): 
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Klinsmann lifts English 2006 Cup bid 
JURGEN KLINSMANN gave England's 2006 World cup campaign a huge boost last night - by walking out 
on his role promoting Germany. 
Former Tottenham star Klinsmann had been acting as an ambassador in the Germans' battle with England and 
South Africa to stage the fmals. 
However, his plea for a testimonial match was turned down by the German Football Federation — 'We will not 
make any exceptions,' said vice-president Franz Beckenbauer - and he quit his post. 
`They made me sick with this refusal and I'm not going to continue with the bid,' said Klinsmann. Fedor 
Radmann, head of the German bid committee, said he deplored the withdrawal but added: 'We have to accept 
it unfortunately.' 
The `Klinsmann lifts English 2006 Cup bid' headline is characterised by punning expected 
in newspaper headlines. But from the perspective of cognitive linguistics, this punning is 
salient. When football teams win competitions, they lift trophies. Until IR encounters the 
text body, naturally this is all they have to go on. Klinsmann, a German and former Spurs 
footballing hero, is subject, the 'cup bid' is object. It is likely that the motor-interactive 
sense of 'lift' will feature in the initial processing, particularly given that prototypical 
causation involves direct manipulation of a patient as a real object with use of hands, body 
etc (Lakoff, 1987a: 54-55) (5.4.2). The headline is actually an abstract 'lifting'. However, 
before the text body is processed, IR interprets Klinsmann as being involved in direct 
causation as AGENT in the reviving of the World Cup in 2006, instead of the rather indirect 
causation that is actually the case from the text body. Again, it is inappropriate to say that 
the headline 'mystifies' from an ideational point of view. Rather, it is successful from an 
interpersonal point of view because of what is associated with prototypical transitivity. 
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8.9 Providing a More Comprehensive Explanation of Trew (1979: 100-1) / Montgomery 
(1995) 
While I have in previous chapters criticised CL as well as CDA, I endorse the following 
analysis of Trew (1979) (and Montgomery's (1995) follow-up) but show how my framework 
provides a fuller explanation of the mystification which Trew and Montgomery highlight. 
Consider first the text and then the examination by Trew (1979: 100-1), an analysis 
subsequently endorsed by Toolan (1988: 231); Lee (1992: 101-2); Montgomery (1995; 240): 
DAY 2 The Times 
Split threatens ANC after Salisbury's riots 
After Sunday's riots in which 13 Africans were killed and 28 injured, a serious rift in the ranks of the African 
National Council became apparent today. 
In The Times report itself there is a reference to the killing, but in a way that is significant. It is in the clause: 
After Sunday's riots in which 13 Africans were killed. 
...it is in the passive form, and the agent is deleted. But more than this, the description is changed from 'shot 
dead' to 'killed' so that any reference to the manner of death is deleted. The new description gives no hint of 
the agent or the manner of death - there is only a suggestion of a cause resulting from the way the 'riots' are 
made focal and made the context of the deaths. 
Trew (1979: 100-1) does not regard as particularly strong the causal antecedence inference 
that the riots killed the 13 Africans. In other words, for Trew, this is mystifying of the actual 
causal relations. Before I return to this analysis by Trew, let me cite again another of Trew's 
analyses. Previously (1.4.1) we saw another instance of Trew (1979: 98-9) regarding a 
causal antecedence inference as a weak representation: 
The Times 
Eleven Africans were shot dead and 15 wounded when Rhodesian Police opened fire on a rioting crowd of 
about 2,000. 
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...the syntactic agent is deleted (` 11 Africans were shot dead by...') and is identified only weakly by 
implication through the temporal conjunction with the police opening fire ('when police opened fire on a 
rioting crowd of about 2,000'). 	 [my bold] 
In 6.6.2, I outlined how Keenan et al. (1984) showed that the strength of a causal 
antecedence inference was proportional to the degree of strength of causal relation in 
memory so that causal strength decreased from 1 to 4: 
level 
1 	 Joey's big brother punched him again and again. 
The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
2 	 Racing down the hill, Joey fell off his bike. 
The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
3 	 Joey's crazy mother became furiously angry with him. 
The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
4 	 Joey went to a neighbor's house to play. 
The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
The inference then that police were responsible for the deaths, then, would be fairly strong 
for most people since it is safe to say that people being shot dead after police open fire is a 
fairly strong causal relation in the memories of most people, similar to 1 above. But while 
Trew was wrong about the strength of the inference based on '11 Africans were shot and 15 
wounded...etc', he is actually correct about the strength of the inference in 'After Sunday's 
riots in which 13 Africans were killed'. Why then is Trew correct when he says 'there is 
only a suggestion of a cause resulting from the way the 'riots' are made focal and made the 
context of the deaths'? When Trew says this, it is because he is only able to make a 
connecting causal antecedent inference. However, the elaborative causal antecedent 
inference he makes is not so strong since the sentence resembles 4 above. In other words, 
the causal relation in memory for Trew (and most people) that riots lead to deaths is not as 
strong as people being shot dead when police open fire on them. 
350 
Finally, consider the following from Montgomery's (1995: 240) commentary on Trew's text: 
...the agent remains completely unspecified. This vagueness is reinforced if anything by the selection of 'were 
killed' rather than 'were shot' which would have at least implied someone to do the shooting. [my bold] 
Again I provide a fuller explanation from the perspective of my framework on why 
Montgomery's point is essentially correct. If 'were shot' had been used, 'with guns' would 
be a likely accompanying instrument inference. It is a likely inference given the cognitive 
interdependence between 'gun' and 'shoot', the high degree of motor-interaction etc. It thus 
facilitates IR's natural ability to seek causal antecedence and thus seek a different causal 
agent other than the `riot'.1° 
8.10 Endpoints 
I hope I have shown that the framework: 
i) reveals aspects of text which could lead to mystification in non-analytical reading, given 
the conditions of idealised reading I have set out. 
ii) reveals that IR would not notice this mystification and that their discourse is inadvertently 
biased. 
iii) has demonstrated enough systematic breadth to be able to highlight evidence of sound 
CDA with regard to the relationship between inference generation and mystification. 
In the final chapter (chapter 9), I provide an overarching contrast between CDA's and my 
framework's assumptions of text processing as well as a summary of what I have achieved 
in this thesis. 
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Notes 
1. To make clear what constitutes 'hard news', here is Bell (1991: 14): 
`1nIewsworkers' basic distinction is between hard news and features. Hard news is their staple product: reports 
of accidents, conflicts, crimes, announcements, discoveries and other events which have occurred or come to 
light since the previous issue of their paper or programme The one-off, unscheduled events such as fires and 
disasters are sometimes called 'spot news'. The opposite to hard news is 'soft' news, which is not time-bound 
to immediacy. Features are the most obvious case of soft news. These are longer 'articles' rather than 'stories' 
covering immediate events. They provide background, sometimes 'editorialize' (carry the writer's personal 
opinions), and are usually bylined with the writer's name...For both newsworkers and researchers, the 
boundaries between hard and soft news are unclear...journalists spend much of their energy trying to find an 
angle which will present what is essentially soft news in hard news terms. Journalists and media researchers 
both recognize hard news as the core news product, the typical against which other copy will be measured. 
Hard news is also the place where a distinctive news style will be found if anywhere.' 
2. The framework would also disallow a post-structuralist approach to (non-literary) language. Post-
structuralism's focus on 'full' signifiers makes it a bottom-up based approach to meaning production, 
neglecting the expense of top-down expectation processing and how the semantic value of signifiers in context 
is partial in automatic natural language processing. With literary texts, it is a different matter. Literary texts, 
particularly poems, often do not present obvious beginnings for top-down processing. They often initially draw 
the reader into bottom-up tactics, make the reader incur more cognitive effort and thus strategic processing, 
and in so doing, they can lead to the refreshment of conventional top-down strategies (cf Cook, 1994). That 
is, with literary text, readers may begin with 'full' signifiers in the absence of obvious top-down beginnings. 
3. Another absence in the first page of the text is the nature of the protestors. I.R's mystifying discourse as to 
the nature of the protestors, imagining them to be striking L.0 employees, is another example of discourse 
which is (initially at least) biased against the protestors. Recall from chapter 3 that when I looked at CDA's 
approach to highlighting mystifying text, we saw that the absence of agent-process-patient structures to 
describe events, and the need to generate agency inferentially, was seen as leading to mystification. But we 
saw in chapter six that even though causal antecedence may be 'absent' in a text because it is indirectly 
present, it can, all the same, be readily generated even if a reader has little vested interest in a text. Thus, not 
all text absences can be necessarily related to mystifying discourse. 
4. To show the Evening Standard's (text 1) narrow selection of information, and downplaying of the aims of 
the protest, compare with The Daily Telegraph's report 'Cyclists' Demo Adds to Tube Strike Chaos' (Thursday 
August 8th 1996 p.6): 
`One of them started throwing my papers around,' Mr Ford said. 'I asked them to leave my family photographs 
alone which they did. 
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`I asked them what the problem was and one said they were in favour of bicycles, so I told them I was a keen 
cyclist. Another said they were supporting the Tube Drivers. A third said they were campaigning for more 
investment in public transport. I told them that on that issue we were on the same side.' 
One more point. Compare the headline of the Telegraph text (`Cyclists' Demo Adds to Tube Strike Chaos') 
and the headline from the Guardian text (`Cycle Protest Adds to Tube Disruption'). Both mention the protest 
in the context of 'cycles' and so the pictures are easy to relate to the text. In effect, this highlights the absence 
of a link between 'cycles' and 'protestors' in 'Evening Standard' text 1, how the picture is difficult for IR to 
relate to the text, and how, as a result, the nature of the protest is downplayed. 
5. The category of 'indecent assault' corresponds to a legal definition. The legal defmition of 'indecent 
assault', from Ashworth (1991) is as follows: 
`In English law, the offence of indecent assault is charged for all forms of sexual assault other than rape, 
buggery, and attempts to commit those crimes' 
There is no typical indecent assault, then, since its range is so wide and disparate, from bottom-pinching to 
forced oral sex. While the phrase 'indecent assault' is commonly encountered in newspapers, I assume most 
people are unaware of the legal definition. 
6. Data from the British National Corpus would seem to support a reading of 'sex assault' as being close to, 
if not, equivalent to 'rape'. Here are a few contexts for 'sexual assault': 
In our recent study of papers in the mid-1980s we broadened the focus and examined not only rape but also 
other forms of sexual assault and not only reporting of trials but also other stages, including the search and 
post-conviction. ' 
The narrow definition of rape and its failure to increase the categories of sexual assault may be attributed 
to the early origins of the offence. ' 
'In common parlance, however, rape is used to describe the sexual assault of men as well as women, as, for 
example, in the prison context. ' 
`On the other hand, i f a mature woman is sexually assaulted by a stranger in daylight or at home, then she 
has not been raped by a man but by a monster. ' 
As further support that 'sex assault' is closer to rape than 'indecent assault', consider another 'News in Brief 
text and what is bolded: 
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THE TIMES Wednesday October 22nd 1997 - NEWS IN BRIEF COLUMN p.2 
SEX ATTACK ARREST 
1. A 23-year-old man has been arrested on suspicion of a sexual attack on a woman who was dumped in the 
boot of her car after being abducted in Loughborough town centre and raped in fields last Saturday. 
2. The assault lasted seven hours. 
3. The car was later found by a farmer near Bolton. 	 [my bold] 
The text sets up equivalences, I would argue, between 'sex attack' and 'rape'. 'Assault' in sentence 2 receives 
instantiation by 'sex attack' and 'rape' from sentence 1. There would be little, if any, change in meaning if 
`attack' in 'sexual attack' in sentence 1 were interchanged with 'assault' in sentence 2. In other words, there 
is a large amount of similarity between 'sex assault' and 'rape' as much as between 'sex attack' and 'rape'. 
7. The relationship between prototypicality and instantiation is often exploited in 'trick questions'. Consider 
the 'Trivial Pursuit' question - What mammals can jump the highest? Instantiations are automatic when they 
rely on familiar knowledge. So automatically, 'mammal' would be instantiated as one with legs since 'jump' 
is prototypically associated with 'legs'. But it is the automatic relating to familiar knowledge in instantiations 
that can lead the player astray. 'Whales', the answer, are neither prototypical 'jumpers', having no legs, and 
are prototypical mammals neither. 
8. This is an example of 'soft news'. See note 1 above. 
9. As an indication of the complexity of 'vegetarianism', below is a list of types of vegetarian diets found on 
the British Nutrition Foundation web site www.nutrition.org.uk web-site: 
Term 	 Description 
`Semi' or 'demi' vegetarian (pescatarian) 	 Exclusion of red meat or all meat, but fish and other 
animal products are still consumed; some people also 
exclude poultry 
Lacto-ovo-vegetarian 	 Exclusion of all meat, fish and poultry; milk, milk 
products and eggs are still consumed 
Lacto-vegetarian 	 Exclusion of all meat, fish and poultry and eggs; milk 
and milk products are still consumed 
Vegan 	 Exclusion of all foods of animal origin; diets comprise 
vegetables, vegetable oils, cereals, pulses such as beans 
and lentils, nuts, fruit and seeds. 
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Fruitarian 
Macrobiotic 
Exclusion of all foods of animal origin as well as pulses 
and cereals. Diets mainly comprise raw and dried fruits, 
nuts, honey and olive oil. 
Sometimes referred to as Zen Macrobiotic diet. The diet 
progresses through a series of levels, gradually 
eliminating all animal produce, fruit and vegetables 
and leading to a restricted diet of cereal (brown rice) 
only. Fluids are also severely restricted. 
10. In chapter 5 (5.4.3), we saw that Martin (1989: 43) regarded 'killing techniques' as helping to 'immobilise 
the most unsavoury part of the seal hunt'. Since the `action' killing' is 'the modifier of an abstract noun', 
Martin argues this 'refers to the 'killing indirectly'. In 5.4.2, I flagged how Lakoff (1987a: 55) regarded 'kill' 
as expressing 'direct causation, with cause and result expressed in a single morpheme - the closest possible 
connection'. On this basis, I criticised Martin since if 'kill' is the closest possible connection, the syntactic 
position of 'killing' in 'killing techniques' diminishes in significance. But Lakoff s (1987a) cognitive linguistic 
analysis of 'kill' and my use of it in chapter 5 are in tension with my analysis of 'kill' here. This is because 
`killed' in 'After Sunday's riots in which 13 Africans were killed...' is not the 'closest possible connection' 
between the 'cause and effect' in this context. 'Shot dead' is a much better candidate. One corollary that flows 
from this is that cognitive linguistics needs to deal more with examples from discourse and not with isolated 
lexical examples. Indeed, it is not just discourse context which would have to be taken into account but genre 
as well. For example, killing in a Bond movie is different to killings as reported in news text. 
But what about the tension I have drawn attention to? The tension centres around the issue of agency absence. 
However, the nature of agency is only relevant in the 'After Sunday's riots...' sentence and not in the 'hunting 
seals' text. So, if the 'cause' of death in a particular context is straightforwardly understood, then, 'kill' 
adequately expresses the connection between cause and effect. 
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
9.1 Introduction 
To begin with, I provide an overarching comparison of my framework and CDA by 
comparing 'master-metaphors' so that the reader can see what I have broadly tried to achieve 
in the thesis. Then from such a broad perspective, I move on to what are more specific 
demonstrations of the thesis. 
9.2 Shallow Reading vs Consumption Reading 
9.2.1 The Consumption Metaphor as Constitutive Metaphor 
The metaphor I have used for a type of processing based on the scenario of the idealised 
reader has been that of shallow reading. This is very much in contradistinction to the 
metaphor of text consumption, which is often used in CDA. Their notion that texts are 
consumed by readers is particularly prevalent in the work of Fairclough, for example, 
(1992a: 71-73; 78-79; 85), (1995a: 49-50; 58-9), (1995b: 9) but also in the work of others 
associated with CL / CDA, for example in Chilton (1988: 79): 
...most people don't or won't think round and beyond the language they consume.... 	 Chilton (1988: 79) 
and also in the following from Simpson (1993 : 182): 
All this brings us on to the question of the position of the analyst relative to the interaction between producers 
and consumers of a text. 
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In 7.5.2, I indicated how 'philosophy of mind' metaphors are likely to defeat the primary 
processing principle and constitute processing, particularly for a reader who has little 
expertise or vested interest in this field. Consequently for such a reader, the primary 
processing principle is likely to be defeated when coming across the notion of 'consuming 
texts'. In other words, the 'consumption' metaphor is likely to be a constitutive metaphor 
for such a reader. 
9.2.2 The Consumption Metaphor as Misleading Discourse 
Certain things follow from the consumption metaphor being constitutive. The consumption 
metaphor can lead to mystification in the reading process about the actual nature of the 
reading process. In the light of the evidence for shallow / selective processing I outlined in 
chapter 6, it can hardly be said that everything in a text is consumed in the reading process. 
So much of text processing does not involve 'consumption' of the text but generation of 
inferences. We saw also that for IR, a reader with no specific goal, reading is more likely 
to involve the inadvertent downplaying of phenomena such as secondary characters. But the 
consumption metaphor would imply that main and secondary characters are processed to the 
same 'degree'. The consumption metaphor would also imply that the mental representation 
of words in a sentence mirrors their compositionality in the sentence. But IR' s processing 
is also in line with the concept of accommodation which is made use of in cognitive 
linguistics and connectionism. This refers to the phenomenon of automatic meaning 
reduction or shading along a sentence. That is, while a sentence in a text may be 
compositional, the mental representation of it is not compositional since readers make 
closure along the length of a sentence. The 'consumption' metaphor also reinforces the 
notion that sentences can be taken as a representational medium rather than serving as 
`evokers' of encyclopaedic knowledge. Moreover, the 'consumption' metaphor detracts 
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from viewing text as an external device to be be interacted with. To sum up, the notion that 
non-analytical readers 'consume' text misleads as to the nature of the micro-context of 
interpretation of a non-analytical reader, as well as going some way to explaining why the 
notion of a non-resistant reader in CDA is so undeveloped. 
9.2.3 The Consumption Metaphor as Legitimisation of CDA 
So, the consumption metaphor, then, bears little relationship to actual processing. But its 
use is more insidious than that. The consumption metaphor can actually be regarded as a 
legitimising metaphor for the practice of CDA. It legitimises a detailed dissection of the text 
by the CD analyst by proxy for the non-resistant reader on the assumption that the non-
resistant reader 'consumes' the whole text, making a mental copy of it, and so ingesting 
`encoded ideologies' etc. The 'job description' of the CD analyst that naturally flows from 
this is to show readers what encoded phenomena have been ingested or would be ingested 
if these had not been pointed out. Since all of the text is consumed, it allows the analyst to 
dissect the text without any conceptual limitations, picking out anything they choose since 
anything could be relevant for the consumptive reader. And the analyst, free to dissect any 
part of the text they choose, usually picks out aspects of the text which suit their own 
predilections. The consumption metaphor thus erases not only inter-personal variation 
amongst readers but the intra-personal variation based on degree of vested interest and 
familiarity with the text's subject matter that I have tried to highlight in this thesis. 
9.2.4 Saying One Thing: Doing Another 
A CD analyst may feel that my points traduce CDA. Fairclough (1996), for example, is 
explicit about the fact that 'diversity of interpretation of texts is a central assumption' in 
Fairclough (1992a). Here, for instance, is Fairclough (1996: 50): 
...social meanings (including discourse) cannot simply be read off from the text without considering patterns 
and variations in the social distribution, consumption and interpretation of the text. 
But with regards to variation in 'consumption' this is merely lip-service. As Widdowson 
(1995a) points out there is rarely any attempt to illustrate 'diversity of interpretation'. 
Furthermore, there are criticisms in CDA of how critical linguistics: 
...construe texts as merely producing ideological effects upon a passive recipient...' 
Fairclough (1992a: 29) 
But there is irony here since what Fairclough criticises CL for is actually in line with his 
consumption metaphor perspective. Indeed, regardless of their criticisms of CL, CDA, 
particularly Fairclough, often proceed in something akin to CL manner, supported by the 
legitimising consumption metaphor (e.g. Fairclough's (1989) analysis of the 'Quarry load-
shedding problem text' in 1.4.1 and 8.8.1). 
9.2.5 Consumption Constitutive Metaphor vs the Shallow Explanatory Metaphor 
Of course, 'shallow' processing is another metaphor. In contrast to CDA, I have supplied 
a good deal of psycholinguistic detail as to why 'shallow' processing is a more plausible 
metaphor than 'consumption' for the text comprehension of a reader with no specific goal 
and unfamiliarity of subject matter (see chapter 6). Since I have provided psycholinguistic 
evidence for 'shallow' processing, 'shallow' is, then, much more of an explanatory rather 
than constitutive metaphor. 
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To sum up section 9.2: the approach I have taken to text processing highlights how the 
degree of a reader's cognitive investment in a text affects the type of inferences generated 
and thus the discourse derived from the text. My approach has been, then, explicitly 
interactionist. While CDA accords in theory with an interactionist principle, in practice the 
tendency is assume that the text is merely mentally facsimiled by a non-resistant reader. In 
other words, there is little or no attempt to show how the static symbols on a page are 
actualised dynamised by a particular reader. 
I move on now to what are more specific demonstrations of the thesis. 
9.3 Specific Demonstrations of the Thesis 
9.3.1 The Problematic Processing Assumptions in CDA 
Recall from chapter 1 where I listed the main processing assumptions of CDA and the ones 
which guided how CDA highlighted (predominantly) mystifying text. In this thesis I have 
shown these assumptions to be problematic. I now contrast my framework with these 
assumptions. 
Inferences as Weaker Representations 
In CDA, inferences across clauses or adjacent sentences are often regarded as weaker 
representations either explicitly or implicitly because more weight is given to the surface 
structure of a sentence and its ability or inability to reflect reality. On the basis of my 
framework, informed by recent psycholinguistic evidence, inferences across clauses or 
adjacent sentences are not weak representations per se. A causal antecedent inference across 
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adjacent clauses or sentences, where the causal relation is strong in memory, is not a weak 
inference. The same applies to instantiations, where the background knowledge is readily 
available, and instrument inferences, which are highly constrained by context. Causal 
consequent inferences are likely to be weakly generated, though, for a reader with no specific 
reading goal, especially if there are many alternative possible consequents. 
Inference as Work vs Automatic Gap-Filling 
Fairclough (1989) outlines two types of inferencing: 'automatic gap-filling' which requires 
minimum cognitive labour while 'inferences' are those which require higher than minimum 
cognitive labour. His assumption, emanating from Brown and Yule (1983) and adopted by 
Gough and Talbot (1996), was that readers are willing to work to produce inferences 
necessary for what he regards as the coherence of a particular text, even if the subject matter 
is unfamiliar. However, we have seen that if the subject matter is unfamiliar for a reader 
who makes minimum cognitive effort: i) causal consequents are not produced; ii) even 
coherence inferences, those which are normally instituted, can be shallowly generated, 
readers satisfying themselves that a text is coherent because it is cohesive. In other words, 
on the basis of the psycholinguistic evidence I discussed in chapter 6, if readers are 
unfamiliar with the subject matter of the text and have no specific goal, it is likely that they 
will not work to create inferences as Fairclough supposes. While Fairclough makes a 
distinction between automatic gap-filling and inferences, using McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) 
my distinction has been between automatic and strategic inferences. The latter require work 
and so depend on the inclination and vested interest of the reader. In terms of this 
vocabulary, Fairclough supposes that a reader will naturally seek to make the strategic 
inferences he makes in line with his vested interest in a text. 
361 
A High Degree of Nominalisation in a Text Requires Extra Processing Effort 
We saw in 3.2.3 that Hodge and Kress (1993) regard transformations as being 
psychologically real and in 1.4.2 that a non-energetic reader would not process deeply 
enough to recover the 'original form' of a nominalisation. Hodge and Kress (1993) in effect 
were detailing a form of shallow processing but it is a variety of shallow processing that is 
disallowed by my framework. The derivational theory of complexity has been discredited 
and so looking at nominalisation in terms of psychologically real transformations is 
incorrect. 
Excessive Nominalisation Make a Text Abstract and Distant From Concrete Events 
CDA makes the point that since nominalisations remove participants, events are made more 
distant. CDA tend, however, to conflate ideational distance with interpersonal distance. 
I have no problem with nominalisations producing interpersonal distance since formal and 
so 'distant' letters are characterised by a higher degree of nominalisation, and thus deletion 
of 1st person participants, than informal letters. In other words, I have no problem with the 
fact that interpersonal distance is created though the absence of participants. But this does 
not mean, as I showed in chapter 4 and 5, that ideational distance is necessarily created by 
nominalisations through the absence of participants and the presence of 'object-like' 
nominals. Basic-level noun categories are cognitively interdependent with basic-level action 
categories. So just because a basic-level noun is used to describe an action, it does not 
follow that its nominal form leads the reader to see the action in an abstract, distant 
`objectified' way. Ideational distance can be created, though, when superordinate / abstract 
categories, nominal or verbal, lack sufficient information in the text to lead to their 
instantiation (e.g. sufficient basic-level categories). 
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In further contrast to CDA, what I have tried to show is that ideational distance can be 
related to a particular discourse derivation even if participants and processes are being used 
to describe events. Just because participants are present in a text does not necessarily mean 
that there are no differences in the 'depth' to which different participants are processed in 
discourse. Compared to primary characters, secondary characters are automatically read in 
a more shallow way for a reader who has little vested interest in a text. Or put another way, 
in the discourse of such a non-analytical reader, secondary characters are ideationally 
distant. 
Confusing Semantic Transitivity with Syntactic Transitivity 
Following the experimental evidence of Taraban and McClelland (1988), psycholinguistic 
evidence of top-down expectation overriding bottom-up processing etc, as well as the 
principles of connectionism and cognitive linguistics where syntax and semantics are 
interactive, my framework prohibits the imparting of semantic transitivity - the structure 
agent-process-patient - to just any subject-verb-object structure, pace CDA. 
Metaphors are Conceptually Active 
Metaphors per se do not constitute processing. If they do, it is because they cannot be 
related to a high degree of experiential encyclopaedic knowledge (predominantly based on 
sight), leading to the defeat of Sanford and Garrod's primary processing principle. When 
they do not constitute processing, when they are explanatory, it is because they can be 
related to a high degree of experiential encyclopaedic knowledge, i.e., in accordance with 
the primary processing principle. The degree of absence of experiential knowledge is 
proportional to the constitutive power of the metaphor. A corollary of the connectionist and 
cognitive linguistic principle that linguistic input is not equivalent to process output is that 
metaphor cannot be associated with any one particular lexical item. Rather metaphor is then 
best seen as the processing output which has involved a high degree of microfeatural closure 
via the constraints of lexical environment. 
9.3.2 Situating CDA Processing Assumptions in an Historical Context 
In chapter 3, I showed how symbolic assumptions of processing inadvertently underpin 
much of CDA, assumptions in line with much Anglo-American-Austrian philosophy in the 
twentieth-century and symbolic cognitive science. This was brought into relief by setting 
them alongside assumptions of mental representation in connectionism and cognitive 
linguistics. The inconsistencies in CDA with regard to psycholinguistic assumptions (see: 
1.4) no doubt arise, in part, because CDA is largely nescient of its cognitive foundations. 
In contrast to CDA, my framework has been overt about its philosophical and cognitive 
foundations and has tried to be systematic and consistent. 
9.3.3 The Partiality of Interpretation Principle 
I have, to some extent, reflected intra-personal variation based on degree of vested interest 
in the micro-context of interpretation. For example, the medical textbook a person read 
reluctantly as part of a compulsory course leads to a different discourse for the same person 
when they are reading it again for information about their own illness. In drawing attention 
to variation of vested interest in a text, (little in the case of IR but high for a CD analyst), I 
have demonstrated the principle of partiality of interpretation for the same text. Of course 
ethnographic studies are ultimately better in trying to ascertain the diversity of interpretation 
of texts. But as I said in 8.2.1, always seeking ethnographic support for a discourse analysis 
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is arduous. Furthermore, ethnographic research faces the problem, similar to the memory-
recall experiments of early constructionists, that inferences might be generated in response 
to questioning, which might not have been generated in ordinary discourse. This problem 
is not faced by my framework since it is informed by psycholinguistic experimentation 
where this has been dealt with. 
9.3.4 Exploring the Micro-context of Interpretation to Show CDA 'Over-Interpretation' 
By using the distinction between automatic inferences and strategic inferences, I have shown 
that what a CD analyst explains (`interpretation-2') as being the news text interpretation of 
a non-resistant reader does not coincide with the discourse of non-resistant IR. It most likely 
accords with their own vested interest in the text. In other words, CDA over-interprets by 
proxy for a reader with little vested interest in a news text. [Of course, I recognise that I 
have also had a vested interest in a text in showing how CDA is misguided. Unlike CDA, 
my use of IR framework, where only automatic inferences are generated, has prevented the 
production of strategic inferences in my analyses.] 
9.3.5 Where CDA is an Inappropriate Mode of Discourse Analysis 
Since the discourses (derived predominantly from news text) of the non-resistant IR and the 
non-resistant reader in CDA do not coincide, I have in effect shown that the assumption in 
CDA that the macro-context always weighs heavily on the micro-context (Fairclough, 
1992a: 85-86) of interpretation, by a non-resistant reader of news text, is not the case. This 
is hardly surprising when one considers that usually readers of news text are at liberty to vary 
the level of interest in the text. It is reasonable to conclude that in a reading situation, where 
readers are not coerced into a particular interpretation, that CDA is an inappropriate mode 
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of discourse analysis. A corollary of all this is that discourse analysis needs to be 
differentiated into (at least) two spheres: 
a) Analysis where the macro-context is more likely to impinge upon and restrict 
interpretation in the micro-context, e.g. in regimented 'institutions' such as religious cults, 
the armed forces etc. These seem to me more natural constituencies for the kind of analysis 
performed in CDA. 
b) Analysis where the micro-context of interpretation is much less restricted by the macro-
context, e.g, as in the reading of news text, as I have tried to show in this thesis. 
9.3.6 Highlighting Recent Work on Inference Generation in Psycholinguistics 
I have flagged recent important work in cognitive psychology and have attempted to plug 
some of the gaps in discourse analysis that deals with inference generation (e.g, Brown and 
Yule, 1983). The psycholinguistic research I have drawn on also lends support for the 
`discourse as dialogue' principle of written discourse (Hoey, 1983: 168-188; Widdowson, 
1984b: 39-53; and Cook, 1994: 48-51). For example, with regard to causal antecedence, 
readers are geared to process texts in something resembling a 'dialogical' manner in their 
posing of 'why' questions (Graesser et al., 1994). However, I have shown that the value of 
the `(inferential) response' depends upon familiarity with subject matter. 
9.3.7 An Alternative Framework for the Highlighting of Mystifying  Discourse 
Orientation 
I have indicated a host of problems with how CDA highlights mystification in news text and 
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how the notion of a non-analytical reader in CDA is undeveloped. My framework predicts 
how certain text can lead to mystification for a non-analytical reader who has little vested 
interest in a text and is largely unfamiliar with its subject matter. I have shown how 
mystification for this non-analytical reader is connected with inference generation but, in 
contrast to CDA, I have provided a detailed processing profile for such a reader. Symbolic 
attitudes in CDA towards inference generation are often in conflict with recent 
psycholinguistic research. My framework, rooted in empirical psycholinguistic study, 
enables a more plausible, comprehensive and thus consistent perspective on inference 
generation in reading and how this relates to mystification. Owing to their different 
assumptions about mental representation and cognition, where my non-symbolic 
`framework' detects text that can lead to mystification in reading is not necessarily 
coincident with where symbolic CDA detects mystification. 
Use of IR as a Yardstick for the Success of a News Text 
Discourse analysis of text from the perspective of IR is useful as a yardstick as to the success 
of a text for a reader who invests minimum cognitive effort and is largely unfamiliar with 
the text's subject matter. With regard to cause-consequents, the IR framework can reveal 
discourse bias as a by-product of mystification related to text absence in a news text as 
opposed to just simply text bias which is present in the text. Moreover, the IR framework 
can indicate how news text can be improved so as to remove the necessity for strategic 
processing', and thus reduce the potential for mystification for a reader who invests only 
minimum cognitive labour. Via the IR framework, the text-based principle of 'reporting 
both sides' was adjusted into a discourse-based principle, i.e., news texts should report both 
sides for IR. Thus, the value judgement that texts should 'report both sides' was, in effect, 
grounded in a processing criterion. 
9.3.8 The Distinction between Text Linguistics and Discourse Analysis 
While certain linguists make little distinction between text linguistics and written discourse 
analysis (e.g. Stubbs, 1983), by focusing on inference generation my thesis has 
(inadvertently) affirmed the validity of such a distinction. Inferences such as anaphora etc, 
which are more text-based, are more reliant on text knowledge which is common amongst 
readers. They are in line with the definition of text in chapter 1 - 'linguistic forms in a 
stretch of language, and those interpretations of them which do not vary with context' 
(Cook, 1994: 24). However, I have concentrated on inferences whose efficacy is related to 
the degree of vested interest in a text and a reader's familiarity of subject matter. These 
inferences have been, then, dependent for their generation on a particular reader and thus 
more discourse-based. 
My focus on discourse-based inferences means, then, I have not made much use of a text-
linguistic metalanguage, unlike CDA. One advantage of this has been that, also unlike 
CDA, I have not been tempted to read off meaning from the application of such a 
metalanguage to text. Since this approach does not take into account the perspective of a 
particular reader, it gives a misleading impression of the 'ideological potential' of the text. 
We have seen, though, how text-linguistic phenomena such as topicalisation and 
information condensation can lead to the misleading generation of causal antecedent 
inferences. I also highlighted how Sanford (1990) indicates the prospect of causal 
consequent inference generation can be dependent on topicalisation. The task ahead 
remains, then, to link text linguistic analysis in a systematically descriptive way to the 
discourse analytical perspective of IR, and in doing so, to establish a more detailed and 
systematic metalanguage which bridges text and reader. In turn, such a bridging 
metalanguage would allow a greater precision in the prediction of how the discourse derived 
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by IR can be said to be mystifying. 
9.4 Endpoint 
And to my final point, here is Widdowson (1995b: 515) in a critique of Fairclough (1992a): 
On a number of occasions in the book, Fairclough makes the point that significance, ideological implication, 
and so on cannot be just read out of the text. That is to say, interpretation is not a semantic but a pragmatic 
matter: you do not read meanings out of a text, but into a text. But then we need a theory of some kind which 
seeks to account for these pragmatic conditions, for the textual constraints on how interpreters reduce and opt 
for meanings...But we get no such thing. 
This thesis has been concerned with 'how (non-analytical) interpreters reduce and opt for 
meanings'. I hope that it has gone some way to indicating how this happens. 
Notes 
1. While I have concentrated on how text can lead to mystifying discourse for a reader with little vested interest 
in it, one task ahead would be to make systematic predictions for the kinds of inference likely for readers with 
a greater interest in the text, e.g, language-learners taking part in a reading comprehension activity where task-
based strategic inferences are more likely to be generated. 
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